GIFT   OF 
ALB1K   r*UTZKER 


^     ;' 


/h  *^c^£\jc. 


/T 


THE     MEDITATIONS 

OF 

THE    EMPEROR 

MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS. 


THE  .MEDITATIONS  . 


THE     EMPEROR 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS 


TRANSLATED    BY   GEORGE   LONG 


NEW  YORK 
LOVELL,   CORYELL    &   COMPANY 

43,  45  AND  47  EAST  lOrn  STREET 


:      L 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE. 

BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH        .        .        ,        .  l 

PHILOSOPHY  OF  ANTONINUS        ...  37 

THE  MEDITATIONS       .....  89 

INDEX  OF  TERMS 299 

GENERAL  INDEX  305 


PREFACE. 


I  HAVE  carefully  revised  the  Life  and  Philos- 
ophy of  ANTONINUS,  in  which  I  have  made  a  few 
corrections,  and  added  a  few  notes. 

I  have  also  made  a  few  alterations  in  the  trans- 
lation where  I  thought  that  I  could  approach 
nearer  to  the  author's  meaning  ;  and  I  have  added 
a  few  notes  and  references. 

There  still  remain  difficulties  which  I  cannot 
remove,  because  the  text  is  sometimes  too  cor- 
rupt to  be  understood,  and  no  attempt  to  restore 
the  true  readings  could  be  successful. 

GEORGE  LONG. 


BIOGRAPHICAL    SKETCH 


OF 


MARCUS  AURELIUS   ANTONINUS. 


M.  ANTONINUS  was  born  at  Rome,  A.  D.  121,  on 
the  26th  of  April.  His  father,  Annius  Verus,  died 
while  he  was  praetor.  His  mother  was  Domitia 
Calvilla,  also  named  Lucilla.  The  Emperor  T. 
Antoninus  Pius  married  Annia  Galeria  Faustina, 
the  sister  of  Annius  Verus,  and  was  consequently 
the  uncle  of  M.  Antoninus.  When  Hadrian 
adopted  Antoninus  Pius  and  declared  him  his  suc- 
cessor in  the  empire,  Antoninus  Pius  adopted  both 
L.  Ceionius  Commodus,  the  son  of  Aelius  Caesar, 
&nd  M.  Antoninus,  whose  original  name  was  M- 
Annius  Verus.  Antoninus  then  took  the  name  of 
M.  Aelius  Aurelius  Verus,  to  which  was  added  the 
title  of  Caesar  in  A.  D.  139:  the  name  Aelius 
belonged  to  Hadrian's  family,  and  Aurelius  was 
the  name  of  Antoninus  Pius.  When  M.  Antoninus 
became  Augustus,  he  dropped  the  name  of  Verus 


2  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

and  took  the  name  of  Antoninus.  Accordingly 
he  is  generally  named  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus  or 
simply  M.  Antoninus. 

The  youth  was  most  carefully  brought  up.  He 
thanks  the  gods  (i.  17)  that  he  had  good  grand- 
fathers, good  parents,  a  good  sister,  good  teachers, 
good  associates,  good  kinsmen  and  friends,  nearly 
everything  good.  He  had  the  happy  fortune  to 
witness  the  example  of  his  uncle  and  adoptive 
father  Antoninus  Pius,  and  he  has  recorded  in  his 
work  (i.  16  ;  vi.  30)  the  virtues  of  this  excellent 
man  and  prudent  ruler.  Like  many  young  Romans 
he  tried  his  hand  at  poetry  and  studied  rhetoric. 
Herodes  Atticus  and  M.  Cornelius  Fronto  were  his 
teachers  in  eloquence.  There  are  extant  letters 
between  Fronto  and  Marcus,1  which  show  the  great 
affection  of  the  pupil  for  the  master,  and  the  mas- 
ter's great  hopes  of  his  industrious  pupil.  M.  An- 
toninus mentions  Fronto  (i.  11)  among  those  to 
whom  he  was  indebted  for  his  education. 

When  he  was  eleven  years  old,  he  assumed  the 
dress  of  philosophers,  something  plain  and  coarse, 
became  a  hard  student,  and  lived  a  most  laborious, 
abstemious  life,  even  so  far  as  to  injure  his  health. 
Finally,  he  abandoned  poetry  and  rhetoric  for  phil- 
osophy, and  he  attached  himself  to  the  sect  of  the 
Stoics.  But  he  did  not  neglect  the  study  of  law, 


1  M.  Cornelii  Frontonis  Reliquiae,  Berlin,  181G.     There  are 
a  few  letters  between  Froiito  and  Antoninus  Pius. 


I 


MAE C US  ATJBELIUS  ANTONINUS.  3 

which  was  a  useful  preparation  for  the  high  place 
which  he  was  designed  to  fill.  His  teacher  was 
L.  Volusianus  Maecianus,  a  distinguished  jurist. 
We  must  suppose  that  he  learned  the  Roman 
discipline  of  arms,  which  was  a  necessary  part  of 
the  education  of  a  man  who  afterwards  led  his 
troops  to  battle  against  a  warlike  race. 

Antoninus  has  recorded  in  his  first  book  the 
.names  of  his  teachers,  and  the  obligations  which 
he  owed  to  each  of  them.  The  way  in  which  he 
speaks  of  what  he  learned  from  them  might  seem 
to  savor  of  vanity  or  self-praise,  if  we  look  care- 
lessly at  the  way  in  which  he  has  expressed  him- 
self ;  but  if  any  one  draws  this  conclusion,  he  will 
be  mistaken.  Antoninus  means  to  commemorate 
the  merits  of  his  several  teachers,  what  they 
taught,  and  what  a  pupil  might  learn  from  them. 
Besides,  this  book,  like  the  eleven  other  books, 
was  for  his  own  use ;  and  if  we  may  trust  the 
note  at  the  end  of  the  first  book,  it  was  written 
during  one  of  M.  Antoninus'  campaigns  against 
the  Quadi,  at  a  time  when  the  commemoration  of 
the  virtues  of  his  illustrious  teachers  might  re- 
mind him  of  their  lessons  and  the  practical  uses 
which  he  might  derive  from  them. 

Among  his  teachers  of  philosophy  was  Sextus  of 
Chaeroneia,  a  grandson  of  Plutarch.  What  he 
learned  from  this  excellent  man  is  told  by  himself 
(i.  9).  His  favorite  teacher  was  Q.  Junius  Rus- 


4  BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH. 

ticus  (i.  7),  a  philosopher,  and  also  a  man  of 
practical  good  sense  in  public  affairs.  Rusticus 
was  the  adviser  of  Antoninus  after  he  became 
emperor.  Young  men  who  are  destined  for  high 
places  are  not  often  fortunate  in  those  who  are 
about  them,  their  companions  and  teachers;  and 
I  do  not  know  any  example  of  a  young  prince 
having  had  an  education  which  can  be  compared 
with  that  of  M.  Antoninus.  Such  a  body  of 
teachers  distinguished  by  their  acquirements  and 
their  character  will  hardly  be  collected  again ;  and 
as  to  the  pupil,  we  have  not  had  one  like  him 
since. 

Hadrian  died  in  July  A.  D.  138,  and  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Antoninus  Pius.  M.  Antoninus  mar- 
ried Faustina,  his  cousin,  the  daughter  of  Pius, 
probably  about  A.  D.  146,  for  he  had  a  daughter 
born  in  147.  He  received  from  his  adoptive 
father  the  title  of  Caesar,  and  was  associated  with 
him  in  the  administration  of  the  state.  The  father 
and  the  adopted  son  lived  together  in  perfect 
friendship  and  confidence.  Antoninus  was  a  duti- 
ful son,  and  the  emperor  Pius  loved  and  esteemed 
him. 

Antoninus  Pius  died  in  March,  A.  D.  161.  The 
Senate,  it  is  said,  urged  M.  Antoninus  to  take  the 
sole  administration  of  the  empire,  but  he  associated 
with  himself  the  other  adopted  son  of  Pius, 
L.  Ceionius  Commodus,  who  is  generally  called 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  O 

L.  Verus.  Thus  Rome  for  the  first  time  had  two 
emperors.  Verus  was  an  indolent  man  of  pleasure, 
and  unworthy  of  his  station.  Antoninus  however 
bore  with  him,  and  it  is  said  that  Verus  had  sense 
enough  to  pay  to  his  colleague  the  respect  due  to 
his  character.  A  virtuous  emperor  and  a  loose 
partner  lived  together  in  peace,  and  their  alliance 
was  strengthened  by  Antoninus  giving  to  Verus 
for  wife  his  daughter  Lucilla. 

The  reign  of  Antoninus  was  first  troubled  by  a 
Parthian  war,  in  which  Verus  was  sent  to  com- 
mand ;  but  he  did  nothing,  and  the  success  that 
was  obtained  by  the  Romans  in  Armenia  and  on 
the  Euphrates  and  Tigris  was  due  to  his  generals. 
This  Parthian  war  ended  in  A.  D.  165.  Aurelius 
and  Verus  had  a  triumph  (A.  D.  166)  for  the  vic- 
tories in  the  East.  A  pestilence  followed,  which 
carried  off  great  numbers  in  Rome  and  Italy,  and 
spread  to  the  west  of  Europe. 

The  north  of  Italy  was  also  threatened  by  the 
rude  people  beyond  the  Alps  from  the  borders  of 
Gallia  to  the  eastern  side  of  the  Hadriatic.  These 
barbarians  attempted  to  break  into  Italy,  as  the 
Germanic  nations  had  attempted  near  three  hun- 
dred years  before ;  and  the  rest  of  the  life  of  An- 
toninus, with  some  intervals,  was  employed  in 
driving  back  the  invaders.  In  169  Verus  sud- 
denly died,  and  Antoninus  administered  the  state 
alone. 


6  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

During  the  German  wars  Antoninus  resided  for 
three  years  on  the  Danube  at  Camuntum.  The 
Marcomanni  were  driven  out  of  Pannonia  and 
almost  destroyed  in  their  retreat  across  the 
Danube  ;  and  in  A.  D.  174  the  emperor  gained  a 
great  victory  over  the  Quadi. 

In  A.  D.  175,  Avidius  Cassius,  a  brave  and  skil- 
ful Roman  commander  who  was  at  the  head  of  the 
troops  in  Asia,  revolted  and  declared  himself 
Augustus.  But  Cassius  was  assassinated  by  some 
of  his  officers,  and  so  the  rebellion  came  to  an  end. 
Antoninus  showed  his  humanity  by  his  treatment 
of  the  family  and  the  partisans  of  Cassius ;  and 
his  letter  to  the  Senate,  in  which  he  recommends 
mercy,  is  extant.  (Vulcatius,  Avidius  Cassius, 
c.  12.) 

Antoninus  set  out  for  the  East  on  hearing  of 
Cassius'  revolt.  Though  he  appears  to  have  re- 
turned to  Rome  in  A.  D.  174,  he  went  back  to 
prosecute  the  war  against  the  Germans,  and  it  is 
probable  that  he  marched  direct  to  the  East  from 
the  German  war.  His  wife  Faustina,  who  accom- 
panied him  into  Asia,  died  suddenly  at  the  foot  of 
the  Taurus,  to  the  great  grief  of  her  husband. 
Capitolinus,  who  has  written  the  life  of  Antoni- 
nus, and  also  Dion  Cassius  accuse  the  empress  of 
scandalous  infidelity  to  her  husband  and  of  abom- 
inable lewdness.  But  Capitolinus  says  that  Anto- 
ninus either  knew  it  not  or  pretended  not  to  know 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  1 

it.  Nothing  is  so  common  as  such  malicious 
reports  in  all  ages,  and  the  history  of  imperial 
Rome  is  full  of  them.  Antoninus  loved  his  wife, 
and  he  says  that  she  was  "  obedient,  affectionate, 
and  simple."  The  same  scandal  had  been  spread 
about  Faustina's  mother,  the  wife  of  Antoninus 
Pius,  and  yet  he  too  was  perfectly  satisfied  with 
his  wife.  Antoninus  Pius  says  after  her  death  in 
a  letter  to  Fronto  that  he  would  rather  have  lived 
in  exile  with  his  wife  than  in  his  palace  at  Rome 
without  her.  There  are  not  many  men  who  would 
give  their  wives  a  better  character  than  these  two 
emperors.  Capitolinus  wrote  in  the  time  of  Dio- 
cletian. He  may  have  intended  to  tell  the  truth, 
but  he  is  a  poor,  feeble  biographer.  Dion  Cassius, 
the  most  malignant  of  historians,  always  reports 
and  perhaps  he  believed  any  scandal  against  any- 
body. 

Antoninus  continued  his  journey  to  Syria  and 
Egypt,  and  on  his  return  to  Italy  through  Athens 
he  was  initiated  into  the  Eleusinian  mysteries.  It 
was  the  practice  of  the  emperor  to  conform  to  the 
established  rites  of  the  age,  and  to  perform 
religious  ceremonies  with  due  solemnity.  We 
cannot  conclude  from  this  that  he  was  a  supersti- 
tious man,  though  we  might  perhaps  do  so  if  his 
book  did  not  show  that  he  was  not.  But  this  is 
only  one  among  many  instances  that  a  ruler's 
public  acts  do  not  always  prove  his  real  opinions. 


8  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

A  prudent  governor  will  not  roughly  oppose  even 
the  superstitions  of  his  people  ;  and  though  he 
may  wish  that  they  were  wiser,  he  will  know  that 
he  cannot  make  them  so  by  offending  their 
prejudices. 

Antoninus  and  his  son  Commodus  entered  Rome 
in  triumph,  perhaps  for  some  German  victories,  on 
the  23d  of  December,  A.  D.  176.  In  the  following 
year  Commodus  was  associated  with  his  father  in 
the  empire,  and  took  the  name  of  Augustus.  This 
year  A.  D.  177  is  memorable  in  ecclesiastical 
history.  Attains  and  others  were  put  to  death  at 
Lyon  for  their  adherence  to  the  Christian  religion. 
The  evidence  of  this  persecution  is  a  letter  pre- 
served by  Eusebius  (E.  H.  v.  1 ;  printed  in 
Routh's  Reliquiae  Sacrae,  vol.  I.  with  notes).  The 
letter  is  from  the  Christians  of  Vienna  and  Lug- 
dunum  in  Gallia  (Vienne  and  Lyon)  to  their 
Christian  brethren  in  Asia  and  Phrygia ;  and  it  is 
preserved  perhaps  nearly  entire.  It  contains  a 
very  particular  description  of  the  tortures  inflicted 
on  the  Christians  in  Gallia,  and  it  states  that 
while  the  persecution  was  going  on,  Attains,  a 
Christian  and  a  Roman  citizen,  was  loudly  de- 
manded by  the  populace  and  brought  into  the 
amphitheatre  ;  but  the  governor  ordered  him  to  be 
reserved,  with  the  rest  who  were  in  prison,  until 
he  had  received  instructions  from  the  emperor. 
Many  had  been  tortured  before  the  governor 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS. 

thought  of  applying  to  Antoninus.  The  imperial 
rescript,  says  the  letter,  was  that  the  Christians 
should  be  punished,  but  if  they  would  deny  their 
faith,  they  must  be  released.  On  this  the  work 
began  again.  The  Christians  who  were  Roman 
citizens  were  beheaded ;  the  rest  were  exposed  to 
the  wild  beasts  in  the  amphitheatre.  Some  modern 
writers  on  ecclesiastical  history,  when  they  use 
this  letter,  say  nothing  of  the  wonderful  stories  of 
the  martyrs'  sufferings.  Sanctus,  as  the  letter 
says,  was  burnt  with  plates  of  hot  iron  till  his  body 
was  one  sore  and  had  lost  all  human  form  ;  but  on 
being  put  to  the  rack  he  recovered  his  former 
appearance  under  the  torture,  which  was  thus  a 
cure  instead  of  a  punishment.  He  was  afterwards 
torn  by  beasts,  and  placed  on  an  iron  chair  and 
roasted.  He  died  at  last. 

The  letter  is  one  piece  of  evidence.  The  writer, 
whoever  he  was  that  wrote  in  the  name  of  the 
Gallic  Christians,  is  our  evidence  both  for  the  or- 
dinary and  the  extraordinary  circumstances  of  the 
story,  and  we  cannot  accept  his  evidence  for  one 
part  and  reject  the  other.  We  often  receive  small 
evidence  as  a  proof  of  a  thing  which  we  believe  to 
be  within  the  limits  of  probability  or  possibility, 
and  we  reject  exactly  the  same  evidence,  when  the 
thing  to  which  it  refers,  appears  very  improbable 
or  impossible.  But  this  is  a  false  method  of  in- 
quiry, though  it  is  _  folio  wed  by  some  modern 


10  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

writers,  who  select  what  they  like  from  a  story 
and  reject  the  rest  of  the  evidence ;  or  if  they  do 
not  reject  it,  they  dishonestly  suppress  it.  A  man 
can  only  act  consistently  by  accepting  all  this 
letter  or  rejecting  it  all,  and  we  cannot  blame  him 
for  either.  But  he  who  rejects  it  may  still  admit 
that  such  a  letter  may  be  founded  on  real  facts ; 
and  he  would  make  this  admission  as  the  most 
probable  way  of  accounting  for  the  existence  of  the 
letter :  but  if,  as  he  would  suppose,  the  writer  has 
stated  some  things  falsely,  he  cannot  tell  what 
part  of  his  story  is  worthy  of  credit. 

The  war  on  the  northern  frontier  appears  to 
have  been  uninterrupted  during  the  visit  of  Anto- 
ninus to  the  East,  and  on  his  return  the  emperor 
again  left  Rome  to  oppose  the  barbarians.  The 
Germanic  people  were  defeated  in  a  great  battle 
A.  D.  179.  During  this  campaign  the  emperor 
was  seized  with  some  contagious  malady,  of  which 
he  died  in  the  camp  at  Sirmium  (Mitrovitz)  on 
the  Save,  in  Lower  Pannonia,  but  at  Vindebona 
(Vienna)  according  to  other  authorities,  on  the 
17th  of  March,  A.  D.  180,  in  the  fifty-ninth  year  of 
his  age.  His  son  Com  modus  was  with  him.  The 
body  or  the  ashes  probably  of  the  emperor  were 
carried  to  Rome,  and  he  received  the  honor  of 
deification.  Those  who  could  afford  it  had  his 
statue  or  bust ;  and  when  Capitolinus  wrote,  many 
people  still  had  statues  of  Antoninus  among  the 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  11 

Dei  Penates  or  household  deities.  He  was  in  a 
manner  made  a  saint.  Commodus  erected  to  the 
memory  of  his  father  the  Antonine  column  which 
is  now  in  the  Piazza  Colonna  at  Rome.  The  bassi 
rilievi  which  are  placed  in  a  spiral  line  round  the 
shaft  commemorate  the  victories  of  Antoninus 
over  the  Marcomanni  and  the  Quadi,  and  the 
miraculous  shower  of  rain  which  refreshed  the 
Roman  soldiers  and  discomfited  their  enemies. 
The  statue  of  Antoninus  was  placed  on  the  capital 
of  the  column,  but  it  was  removed  at  some  time 
unknown,  and  a  bronze  statue  of  St.  Paul  was  put 
in  the  place  by  Pope  Sixtus  the  fifth. 

The  historical  evidence  for  the  times  of  Anto- 
ninus is  very  defective,  and  some  of  that  which 
remains  is  not  credible.  The  most  curious  is  the 
story  about  the  miracle  which  happened  in  A.  D. 
174,  during  the  war  with  the  Quadi.  The  Roman 
army  was  in  danger  of  perishing  by  thirst ;  but  a 
sudden  storm  drenched  them  with  rain,  while  it 
discharged  fire  and  hail  on  their  enemies,  and  the 
Romans  gained  a  great  victory.  All  the  author- 
ities which  speak  of  the  battle  speak  also  of  the 
miracle.  The  Gentile  writers  assign  it  to  their 
gods,  and  the  Christians  to  the  intercession  of  the 
Christian  legion  in  the  emperor's  army.  To  con- 
firm the  Christian  statement  it  is  added  that  the 
emperor  gave  the  title  of  Thundering  to  this 
legion ;  but  Dacier  and  others  who  maintain  the 


12  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

Christian  report  of  the  miracle,  admit  that  this 
title  of  Thundering  or  Lightning  was  not  given 
to  this  legion  because  there  was  a  figure  of  light- 
ning on  their  shields,  and  that  this  title  of  the 
legion  existed  in  the  time  of  Augustus. 

Scaliger  also  had  observed  that  the  legion  was 
called  Thundering  (/cepawo^oXos,  or  Kepawo^opo?) 
before  the  reign  of  Antoninus.  We  learn  this 
from  Dion  Cassius  (Lib.  55,  c.  23,  and  the  note  of 
Reimarus),  who  enumerates  all  the  legions  of 
Augustus'  time.  The  name  Thundering  or  Light- 
ning also  occurs  on  an  inscription  of  the  reign  of 
Trajan,  which  was  found  at  Trieste.  Eusebius 
(v.  5),  when  he  relates  the  miracle,  quotes  Apoli- 
narius,  bishop  of  Hierapolis,  as  authority  for  this 
name  being  given  to  the  legion  Melitene  by  the 
emperor  in  consequence  of  the  success  which  he 
obtained  through  their  prayers ;  from  which  we 
may  estimate  the  value  of  Apolinarius'  testimony. 
Eusebius  does  not  say  in  what  book  of  Apolina- 
rius the  statement  occurs.  Dion  says  that  the 
Thundering  legion  was  stationed  in  Cappadocia  in 
the  time  of  Augustus.  Valesius  also  observes 
that  in  the  Notitia  of  the  Imperium  Romanum 
there  is  mentioned  under  the  commander  of 
Armenia  the  Praefectura  of  the  twelfth  legion 
named  "  Thundering  Melitene  ;  "  and  this  position 
in  Armenia  will  agree  with  what  Dion  says  of  its 
position  in  Cappadocia.  Accordingly  Valesii 


MARCUS  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.  IB 

concludes  that  Melitene  was  not  the  name  of  the 
legion,  but  of  the  town  in  which  it  was  stationed. 
Melitene  was  also  the  name  of  the  district  in 
which  this  town  was  situated.  The  legions  did 
not,  he  says,  take  their  name  from  the  place  where 
they  were  on  duty,  but  from  the  country  in  which 
they  were  raised,  and  therefore  what  Eusebius 
says  about  the  Melitene  does  not  seem  probable  to 
him.  Yet  Valesius,  on  the  authority  of  Apolina- 
rius  and  Tertullian,  believed  that  the  miracle  was 
worked  through  the  prayers  of  the  Christian 
soldiers  in  the  emperor's  army.  Rufinus  does  not 
give  the  name  of  Melitene  to  this  legion,  says 
Valesius,  and  probably  he  purposely  omitted  it, 
because  he  knew  that  Melitene  was  the  name  of  a 
town  in  Armenia  Minor,  where  the  legion  was 
stationed  in  his  time. 

The  emperor,  it  is  said,  made  a  report  of  his 
victory  to  the  Senate,  which  we  may  believe,  for 
such  was  the  practice  ;  but  we  do  not  know  what 
he  said  in  his  letter,  for  it  is  not  extant.  Dacier 
assumes  that  the  emperor's  letter  was  purposely 
destroyed  by  the  Senate  or  the  enemies  of  Christi- 
anity, that  so  honorable  a  testimony  to  the  Chris- 
tians and  their  religion  might  not  be  perpetuated. 
The  critic  has  however  not  seen  that  he  contra- 
dicts himself  when  he  tells  us  the  purport  of  the 
letter,  for  he  says  that  it  was  destroyed,  and  even 
Eusebius  could  not  find  it.  But  there  does  exist 


14  BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH. 

a  letter  in  Greek  addressed  by  Antoninus  to  the 
Roman  people  and  the  sacred  Senate  after  this 
memorable  victory.  It  is  sometimes  printed  after 
Justin's  first  Apology,  but  it  is  totally  uncon- 
nected with  the  apologies.  This  letter  is  one  of 
the  most  stupid  forgeries  of  the  many  which  exist, 
and  it  cannot  be  possibly  founded  even  on  the 
genuine  report  of  Antoninus  to  the  Senate.  If  it 
were  genuine,  it  would  free  the  emperor  from  the 
charge  of  persecuting  men  because  they  were 
Christians,  for  he  says  in  this  false  letter  that  if  a 
man  accuse  another  only  of  being  a  Christian,  and 
the  accused  confess,  and  there  is  nothing  else 
against  him,  he  must  be  set  free ;  with  this 
monstrous  addition,  made  by  a  man  inconceivably 
ignorant,  that  the  informer  must  be  burnt  alive.1 

During  the  time  of  Antoninus  Pius  and  Marcus 
Antoninus  there  appeared  the  first  Apology  of 
Justinus,  and  under  M.  Antoninus  the  Oration  of 

1  Eusebius  (v.  5)  quotes  Tertullian's  Apology  to  the  Roman 
Senate  in  confirmation  of  the  story.  Tertullian,  he  says, 
writes  that  letters  of  the  emperor  were  extant,  in  which  he 
declares  that  his  army  was  saved  by  the  prayers  of  the 
Christians ;  and  that  he  ' '  threatened  to  punish  with  death 
those  who  ventured  to  accuse  us."  It  is  possible  that  the 
forged  letter  which  is  now  extant  may  be  one  of  those  which 
Tertullian  had  seen,  for  he  uses  the  plural  number,  "letters." 
A  great  deal  has  been  written  about  this  miracle  of  the 
Thundering  Legion,  and  more  than  is  worth  reading.  There 
is  a  dissertation  on  this  supposed  miracle  in  Moyle's  Works, 
London,  1726. 


MAR  C  US  A  UEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  15 

Tatian  against  the  Greeks,  which  was  a  fierce 
attack  on  the  established  religions  ;  the  address 
of  Athenagoras  to  M.  Antoninus  on  behalf  of  the 
Christians,  and  the  Apology  of  Melito,  bishop  of 
Sardes,  also  addressed  to  the  emperor,  and  that  of 
Apolinarius.  The  first  Apology  of  Justinus  is 
addressed  to  T.  Antoninus  Pius  and  his  two 
adopted  sons  M.  Antoninus  and  L.  Verus ;  but  we 
do  not  know  whether  they  read  it.1  The  second 
Apology  of  Justinus  is  entitled  "to  the  Roman 
Senate ;  "  but  this  superscription  is  from  some 
copyist.  In  the  first  chapter  Justinus  addresses 
the  Romans.  In  the  second  chapter  he  speaks  of 
an  affair  that  had  recently  happened  in  the  time 
of  M.  Antoninus  and  L.  Verus,  as  it  seems ;  and 
he  also  directly  addresses  the  emperor,  saying  of  a 
certain  woman,  "  she  addressed  a  petition  to  thee 
the  emperor,  and  thou  didst  grant  the  peti- 
tion." In  other  passages  the  writer  addresses  the 
two  emperors,  from  which  we  must  conclude  that 
the  Apology  was  directed  to  them.  Eusebius 
(E.  H.  iv.  18)  states  that  the  second  Apology  was 
addressed  to  the  successor  of  Antoninus  Pius,  and 
he  names  him  Antoninus  Verus,  meaning  M.  An- 
toninus. In  one  passage  of  this  second  Apol- 
ogy (c.  8),  Justinus,  or  the  writer,  whoever  he 

1  Orosius,  vii.  14,  says  that  "Justinus  the  philosopher  pre- 
sented to  Antoninus  Pius  his  work  in  defence  of  the  Chris- 
tian religion,  and  made  him  merciful  to  the  Christians. 


16  BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH. 

may  be,  says  that  even  men  who  followed  the 
Stoic  doctrines,  when  they  ordered  their  lives 
according  to  ethical  reason,  were  hated  and  mur- 
dered, such  as  Heraclitus,  Musonius  in  his  own 
times,  and  others;  for  all  those  who  in  any  way 
labored  to  live  according  to  reason  and  avoided 
wickedness  were  always  hated ;  and  this  was  the 
effect  of  the  work  of  daemons. 

Justinus  himself  is  said  to  have  been  put  to 
death  at  Rome,  because  he  refused  to  sacrifice 
to  the  gods.  It  cannot  have  been  in  the  reign  of 
Hadrian,  as  one  authority  states ;  nor  in  the  time 
of  Antoninus  Pius,  if  the  second  Apology  was 
written  in  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus  ;  and  there 
is  evidence  that  this  event  took  place  under 
M.  Antoninus  and  L.  Verus,  when  Rusticus  was 
praefect  of  the  city.1 

1  See  the  Martyrium  Sanctorum  Justini,  &c. ,  in  the  works 
of  Justinus,  ed.  Otto,  vol.  II.  559.  "  Junius  Rusticus  Prae- 
fectus  Urbi  erat  sub  imperatoribus  M.  Aurelio  et  L.  Vero,  id 
quod  liquet  ex  Themistii  Orat.  xxxiv.  Dindorf.  p.  451,  et  ex 
quodam  illorum  rescripto,  Dig.  49.  i.  1,  §  2  "  (Otto).  The 
rescript  contains  the  words  "  Junium  Rusticum  amicum 
nostrum  Praefectum  Urbi."  The  Martyrium  of  Justinus  and 
others  is  written  in  Greek.  It  begins,  "In  the  time  of  the 
wicked  defenders  of  idolatry  impious  edicts  were  published 
against  the  pious  Christians  both  in  cities  and  country  places, 
for  the  purpose  of  compelling  them  to  make  offerings  to  vain 
idols.  Accordingly  the  holy  men  (Justinus,  Chariton,  a 
woman  Charito,  Paeon,  Liberianus,  and  others)  were  brought 
before  Rusticus,  the  praefect  of  Rome." 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  17 

The  persecution  in  which  Polycarp  suffered  at 
Smyrna  belongs  to  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus. 
The  evidence  for  it  is  the  letter  of  the  church  of 
Smyrna  to  the  churches  of  Philomelium  and  the 
other  Christian  churches,  and  it  is  preserved  by 
Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  15).  But  the  critics  do  not 
agree  about  the  time  of  Poly  carp's  death,  differ- 
ing in  the  two  extremes  to  the  amount  of  twelve 
years.  The  circumstances  of  Polycarp's  martyr- 
dom were  accompanied  by  miracles,  one  of  which 
Eusebius  (iv.  15)  has  omitted,  but  it  appears  in 
the  oldest  Latin  version  of  the  letter,  which 
Usher  published,  and  it  is  supposed  that  this 
version  was  made  not  long  after  the  time  of 
Eusebius.  The  notice  at  the  end  of  the  letter 
states  that  it  was  transcribed  by  Caius  from  the 
copy  of  Irenaeus,  the  disciple  of  Polycarp,  then 
transcribed  by  Socrates  at  Corinth ;  "  after  which 

The  Martyrium  gives  the  examination  of  the  accused  by 
Rusticus.  All  of  them  professed  to  be  Christians.  Justinus 
was  asked  if  he  expected  to  ascend  into  heaven  and  to 
receive  a  reward  for  his  sufferings,  if  he  was  condemned  to 
death.  He  answered  that  he  did  not  expect :  he  was  certain 
of  it.  Finally,  the  test  of  obedience  was  proposed  to  the 
prisoners ;  they  were  required  to  sacrifice  to  the  gods.  All 
refused,  and  Rusticus  pronounced  the  sentence,  which  was 
that  those  who  refused  to  sacrifice  to  the  gods  and  obey  the 
emperor's  order  should  be  whipped  and  beheaded  according 
to  the  law.  The  martyrs  were  then  led  to  the  usual  place  of 
execution  and  beheaded.  Some  of  the  faithful  secretly 
carried  off  the  bodies  and  deposited  them  in  a  fit  place. 


18  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

I  Pionius  again  wrote  it  out  from  the  copy  above 
mentioned,  having  searched  it  out  by  the  revelation 
of  Polycarp,  who  directed  me  to  it,"  &c.  The  story 
of  Polycarp's  martyrdom  is  embellished  with  mirac- 
ulous circumstances  which  some  modern  writers  on 
ecclesiastical  history  take  the  liberty  of  omitting.1 
In  order  to  form  a  proper  notion  of  the  condi- 
tion of  the  Christians  under  M.  Antoninus  we 
must  go  back  to  Trajan's  time.  When  the 
younger  Pliny  was  governor  of  Bithynia,  the 
Christians  were  numerous  in  those  parts,  and  the 
worshippers  of  the  old  religion  were  falling  off. 
The  temples  were  deserted,  the  festivals  neglected, 
and  there  were  no  purchasers  of  victims  for  sacri- 
fice. Those  who  were  interested  in  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  old  religion  thus  found  that  their 
profits  were  in  danger.  Christians  of  both  sexes 
and  of  all  ages  were  brought  before  the  governor, 
who  did  not  know  what  to  do  with  them.  He 
could  come  to  no  other  conclusion  than  this,  that 

1  Conyers  Middleton,  An  Inquiry  into  the  Miraculous  Pow- 
ers, &c.  p.  126.  Middleton  says  that  Eusebius  omitted  to 
mention  the  dove,  which  flew  out  of  Polycarp's  body,  and 
Dodwell  and  Archbishop  Wake  have  done  the  same.  Wake 
says,  "  I  am  so  little  a  friend  to  such  miracles  that  I  thought 
it  better  with  Eusebius  to  omit  that  circumstance  than  to 
mention  it  from  Bp.  Usher's  Manuscript,"  which  manuscript 
however,  says  Middleton,  he  afterwards  declares  to  be  so 
well  attested  that  we  need  not  any  further  assurance  of  the 
truth  of  it. 


MAECUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  19 

those  who  confessed  to  be  Christians  and  perse- 
vered in  their  religion  ought  to  be  punished;  if 
for  nothing  else,  for  their  invincible  obstinacy. 
He  found  no  crimes  proved  against  the  Christians, 
and  he  could  only  characterize  their  religion  as  a 
depraved  and  extravagant  superstition,  which 
might  be  stopped  if  the  people  were  allowed  the 
opportunity  of  recanting.  Pliny  wrote  this  in  a 
letter  to  Trajan  (Plinius,  Ep.  x.  97).  He  asked  for 
the  emperor's  directions,  because  he  did  not  know 
what  to  do.  He  remarks  that  he  had  never  been 
engaged  in  judicial  inquiries  about  the  Christians, 
and  that  accordingly  he  did  not  know  what  to 
inquire  about  or  how  far  to  inquire  and  punish. 
This  proves  that  it  was  not  a  new  thing  to  ex- 
amine into  a  man's  profession  of  Christianity  and 
to  punish  him  for  it.J  Trajan's  rescript  is  extant. 
He  approved  of  the  governor's  judgment  in  the 
matter,  but  he  said  that  no  search  must  be  made 
after  the  Christians  ;  if  a  man  was  charged  with 
the  new  religion  and  convicted,  he  must  not  be 
punished  if  he  affirmed  that  he  was  not  a  Christian 

1  Orosius  (vii.  12)  speaks  of  Trajan's  persecution  of  the 
Christians,  and  of  Pliny's  application  to  him  having  led  the 
emperor  to  mitigate  his  severity.  The  punishment  by  the 
Mosaic  law  for  those  who  attempted  to  seduce  the  Jews  to 
follow  new  gods  was  death.  If  a  man  was  secretly  enticed 
to  such  new  worship,  he  must  kill  the  seducer,  even  if  the 
seducer  were  brother,  son,  daughter,  wife  or  friend.  (Deut. 
xiii.) 


20  BIOGEAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

and  confirmed  his  denial  by  showing  his  reverence 
to  the  heathen  gods.  He  added  that  no  notice 
must  be  taken  of  anonymous  informations,  for 
such  things  were  of  bad  example.  Trajan  was  a 
mild  and  sensible  man;  and  both  motives  of 
mercy  and  policy  probably  also  induced  him  to 
take  as  little  notice  of  the  Christians  as  he  could, 
to  let  them  live  in  quiet  if  it  were  possible. 
Trajan's  rescript  is  the  first  legislative  act  of  the 
head  of  the  Roman  state  with  reference  to  Chris- 
tianity, which  is  known  to  us.  It  does  not  appear 
that  the  Christians  were  further  disturbed  under 
his  reign.  The  martyrdom  of  Ignatius  by  the 
order  of  Trajan  himself  is  not  universally  admitted 
to  be  an  historical  fact.1 

In  the  time  of  Hadrian  it  was  no  longer  possi- 
ble for  the  Roman  government  to  overlook  the 
great  increase  of  the  Christians  and  the  hostility 
of  the  common  sort  to  them.  If  the  governors  in 
the  provinces  were  willing  to  let  them  alone,  they 
could  not  resist  the  fanaticism  of  the  heathen 
community,  who  looked  on  the  Christians  as 
atheists.  The  Jews  too,  who  were-  settled  all 
over  the  Roman  Empire,  were  as  hostile  to  the 
Christians  as  the  Gentiles  were.2  With  the  time 

1  The  Martyrium  Ignatii,  first  published  in  Latin  by  Arch- 
bishop Usher,  is  the  chief  evidence  for  the  circumstances  of 
Ignatius'  death. 

2  We  have  the  evidence  of  Justinus  (ad  Dioguetum,  c.  5) 


MARCUS  AURELIVS  ANTONINUS.  21 

of  Hadrian  begin  the  Christian  Apologies,  which 
show  plainly  what  the  popular  feeling  towards  the 
Christians  then  was.  A  rescript  of  Hadrian  to 
Minucius  Fundanus,  the  Proconsul  of  Asia,  which 
stands  at  the  end  of  Justin's  first  Apology,1  in- 
structs the  governor  that  innocent  people  must  not 
be  troubled,  and  false  accusers  must  not  be  allowed 
to  extort  money  from  them  ;  the  charges  against 
the  Christians  must  be  made  in  due  form,  and  no 
attention  must  be  paid  to  popular  clamors ;  when 
Christians  were  regularly  prosecuted  and  con- 
victed of  illegal  acts,  they  must  be  punished 
according  to  their  deserts ;  and  false  accusers  also 
must  be  punished.  Antoninus  Pius  is  said  to 
have  published  rescripts  to  the  same  effect.  The 
terms  of  Hadrian's  rescript  seem  very  favorable  to 

to  this  effect :  ' '  The  Christians  are  attacked  by  the  Jews  as 
if  they  were  men  of  a  different  race,  and  are  persecuted  by 
the  Greeks ;  and  those  who  hate  them  cannot  give  the  reason 
of  their  enmity." 

1  And  in  Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  8,  9).  Orosius  (vii.  13)  says 
that  Hadrian  sent  this  rescript  to  Minucius  Fundanus,  pro- 
consul of  Asia,  after  being  instructed  in  books  written  on  the 
Christian  religion  by  Quadratus  a  disciple  of  the  Apostles, 
and  Aristides  an  Athenian,  an  honest  and  wise  man,  and 
Serenus  Granius.  In  the  Greek  text  of  Hadrian's  rescript 
there  is  mentioned  Serenius  Granianus,  the  predecessor  of 
Minucius  Fundanus  in  the  government  of  Asia. 

This  rescript  of  Hadrian  has  clearly  been  added  to  the 
Apology  by  some  editor.  The  Apology  ends  with  the  words  : 


22  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

the  Christians ;  but  if  we  understand  it  in  this 
^  sense,  that  they  were  only  to  be  punished  like 
other  people  for  illegal  acts,  it  would  have  had 
no  meaning,  for  that  could  have  been  done  with- 
out asking  the  emperor's  advice.  The  real  pur- 
pose of  the  rescript  is  that  Christians  must  be 
punished  if  they  persisted  in  their  belief,  and 
would  not  prove  their  renunciation  of  it  by  ac- 
knowledging the  heathen  religion.  This  was 
Trajan's  rule,  and  we  have  no  reason  for  suppos- 
ing that  Hadrian  granted  more  to  the  Christians 
than  Trajan  did.  There  is  also  printed  at  the 
end  of  Justin's  first  Apology  a  rescript  of  Anto- 
ninus Pius  to  the  Commune  of  Asia  (TO  KOLVOV  r^s 
'Ao-ias),  and  it  is  also  in  Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  13). 
The  date  of  the  rescript  is  the  third  consulship 
of  Antoninus  Pius.1  The  rescript  declares  that 

1  Eusebius   (E.  H.  iv.  12),  after  giving  the  beginning  of 
Justinus'  first  Apology,  which  contains  the  address  to  T.  Ai 
toninus  and  his  two  adopted  sons,  adds  :  "  The  same  empei 
being  addressed  by  other  brethren  in  Asia  honored  the  Coi 
mune  of  Asia  with  the  following  rescript."    This  rescri] 
which  is  in  the  next  chapter  of  Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  13),  is 
the  sole  name  of  Caesar  Marcus  Aurelius  Antoninus  August 
Armenius,  though  Eusebius  had  just  before  said  that  he  wz 
going  to  give  us  a  rescript  of  Antoninus  Pius.     There 
some  material  variations  between  the  two  copies  of  the 
script  besides  the   difference  in  the  title,  which  differem 
makes  it  impossible  to  say  whether  the  forger  intended 
assign  this  rescript  to  Pius  or  to  M.  Antoninus. 

The  author  of  the  Alexandrine  Chronicum  savs  that 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  23 

the  Christians  —  for  they  are  meant,  though  the 
name  Christians  does  not  occur  in  the  rescript  — 
were  not  to  be  disturbed  unless  they  were  attempt- 
ing something  against  the  Roman  rule  ;  and  no 
man  was  to  be  punished  simply  for  being  a 
Christian.  But  this  rescript  is  spurious.  Any 
man  moderately  acquainted  with  Roman  history 
will  see  by  the  style  and  tenor  that  it  is  a  clumsy 
forgery. 

In  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus  the  opposition  be- 
tween the  old  and  the  new  belief  was  still  stronger, 
and  the  adherents  of  the  heathen  religion  urged 
those  in  authority  to  a  more  regular  resistance  to 
the  invasions  of  the  Christian  faith.  Melito  in  his 
Apology  to  M.  Antoninus  represents  the  Christians 
of  Asia  as  persecuted  under  new  imperial  orders. 
Shameless  informers,  he  says,  men  who  were  greedy 
after  the  property  of  others,  used  these  orders  as 
a  means  of  robbing  those  who  were  doing  no  harm. 
He  doubts  if  a  just  emperor  could  have  ordered 
anything  so  unjust;  and  if  the  last  order  was 

cus,  being  moved  by  the  entreaties  of  Melito  and  other  heads 
of  the  church,  wrote  an  Epistle  to  the  Commune  of  Asia  in 
which  he  forbade  the  Christians  to  be  troubled  on  account  of 
their  religion.  Valesius  supposes  this  to  be  the  letter  or 
rescript  which  is  contained  in  Eusebius  (iv.  13) ,  and  to  be 
the  answer  to  the  Apology  of  Melito,  of  which  I  shall  soon 
give  the  substance.  But  Marcus  certainly  did  not  write  this 
letter  which  is  in  Eusebius,  and  we  know  not  what  answer 
he  made  to  Melito. 


24  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

really  not  from  the  emperor,  the  Christians  entreat 
him  not  to  give  them  up  to  their  enemies.1  We 
conclude  from  this  that  there  were  at  least  im- 
perial rescripts  or  constitutions  of  M.  Antoninus 
which  were  made  the  foundations  of  these  perse- 

1  Eusebius,  iv.  26;  and  Routh's  Reliquiae  Sacrae,  vol.  I. 
and  the  notes.  The  interpretation  of  this  Fragment  is  not 
easy.  Mosheim  misunderstood  one  passage  so  far  as  to 
affirm  that  Marcus  promised  rewards  to  those  who  denounced 
the  Christians;  an  interpretation  which  is  entirely  false. 
Melito  calls  the  Christian  religion  "  our  philosophy,"  which 
began  among  barbarians  (the  Jews),  and  flourished  among 
the  Roman  subjects  in  the  time  of  Augustus,  to  the  great 
advantage  of  the  empire,  for  from  that  time  the  power  of 
the  Romans  grew  great  and  glorious.  He  says  that  the 
emperor  has  and  will  have  as  the  successor  to  Augustus' 
power  the  good  wishes  of  men,  if  he  will  protect  that 
philosophy  which  grew  up  with  the  empire  and  began  with 
Augustus,  which  philosophy  the  predecessors  of  Antoninus 
honored  in  addition  to  the  other  religions.  He  further  says 
that  the  Christian  religion  had  suffered  no  harm  since  the 
time  of  Augustus,  but  on  the  contrary  had  enjoyed  all  honor 
and  respect  that  any  man  could  desire.  Nero  and  Domitian, 
he  says,  were  alone  persuaded  by  some  malicious  men  to 
calumniate  the  Christian  religion,  and  this  was  the  origin  of 
the  false  charges  against  the  Christians.  But  this  was 
corrected  by  the  emperors  who  immediately  preceded  Antoni- 
nus, who  often  by  their  rescripts  reproved  those  who  at- 
tempted to  trouble  the  Christians.  Hadrian,  Antoninus' 
grandfather,  wrote  to  many,  and  among  them  to  Fundanus 
the  governor  of  Asia.  Antoninus  Pius,  when  Marcus  was 
associated  with  him  in  the  empire,  wrote  to  the  cities  that 
they  must  not  trouble  the  Christians ;  among  others,  to  the 
people  of  Larissa,  Thessalonica,  the  Athenians,  and  all  the 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  25 

cutions.  The  fact  of  being  a  Christian  was  now  a 
crime  and  punished,  unless  the  accused  denied 
their  religion.  Then  come  the  persecutions  at 
Smyrna,  which  some  modern  critics  place  in  A.  D. 
167,  ten  years  before  the  persecution  of  Lyon. 
The  governors  of  the  provinces  under  M.  Anto- 
ninus might  have  found  enough  even  in  Trajan's 
rescript  to  warrant  them  in  punishing  Christians, 
and  the  fanaticism  of  the  people  would  drive 
them  to  persecution,  even  if  they  were  unwilling. 
But  besides  the  fact  of  the  Christians  rejecting  all 
the  heathen  ceremonies,  we  must  not  forget  that 
they  plainly  maintained  that  all  the  heathen 
religions  were  false.  The  Christians  thus  declared 
war  against  the  heathen  rites,  and  it  is  hardly 
necessary  to  observe  that  this  was  a  declaration  of 

Greeks.  Melito  concluded  thus:  "We  are  persuaded  that 
thou  who  hast  about  these  things  the  same  mind  that  they 
had,  nay  rather  one  much  more  humane  and  philosophical, 
wilt  do  all  that  we  ask  thee."  —  This  Apology  was  written 
after  A.D.  169,  the  year  in  which  Verus  died,  for  it  speaks  of 
Marcus  only  and  his  son  Commodus.  According  to  Melito's 
testimony,  Christians  had  only  been  punished  for  their 
religion  in  the  time  of  Nero  and  Domitian,  and  the  persecu- 
tions began  again  in  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus,  and  were 
founded  on  his  orders,  which  were  abused,  as  he  seems  to 
mean.  He  distinctly  affirms  "  that  the  race  of  the  godly  is 
now  persecuted  and  harassed  by  fresh  imperial  orders  in 
Asia,  a  thing  which  had  never  happened  before."  But  we 
know  that  all  this  is  not  true,  and  that  Christians  had 
punished  in  Trajan's  time. 


26  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

hostility  against  the  Roman  government,  which 
tolerated  all  the  various  forms  of  superstition  that 
existed  in  the  empire,  and  could  not  consistently 
tolerate  another  religion,  which  declared  that  all 
the  rest  were  false  and  all  the  splendid  ceremonies 
of  the  empire  only  a  worship  of  devils. 

If  we  had  a  true  ecclesiastical  history,  we 
should  know  how  the  Roman  emperors  attempted 
to  check  the  new  religion ;  how  they  enforced 
their  principle  of  finally  punishing  Christians, 
simply  as  Christians,  which  Justin  in  his  Apology 
affirms  that  they  did,  and  I  have  no  doubt  that  he 
tells  the  truth ;  how  far  popular  clamor  and  riots 
went  in  this  matter,  and  how  far  many  fanatical 
and  ignorant  Christians — for  there  were  many 
such  —  contributed  to  excite  the  fanaticism  on 
the  other  side  and  to  imbitter  the  quarrel  between 
the  Roman  government  and  the  new  religion. 
Our  extant  ecclesiastical  histories  are  manifestly 
falsified,  and  what  truth  they  contain  is  grossly 
exaggerated ;  but  the  fact  is  certain  that  in  the 
time  of  M.  Antoninus  the  heathen  populations 
were  in  open  hostility  to  the  Christians,  and  that 
under  Antoninus'  rule  men  were  put'  to  death 
because  they  were  Christians.  Eusebius,  in  the 
preface  to  his  fifth  book,  remarks  that  in  the 
seventeenth  year  of  Antoninus'  reign,  in  some 
parts  of  the  world,  the  persecution  of  the  Chris- 
tians became  more  violent,  and  that  it  proceeded 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  27 

from  the  populace  in  the  cities ;  and  he  adds,  in 
his  usual  style  of  exaggeration,  that  we  may  infer 
from  what  took  place  in  a  single  nation  that 
myriads  of  martyrs  were  made  in  the  habitable 
earth.  The  nation  which  he  alludes  to  is  Gallia ; 
and  he  then  proceeds  to  give  the  letter  of  the 
churches  of  Vienna  and  Lugdunum.  It  is  proba- 
ble that  he  has  assigned  the  true  cause  of  the 
persecutions,  the  fanaticism  of  the  populace,  and 
that  both  governors  and  emperor  had  a  great  deal 
of  trouble  with  these  disturbances.  How  far 
Marcus  was  cognizant  of  these  cruel  proceedings 
we  do  not  know,  for  the  historical  records  of  his 
reign  are  very  defective.  He  did  not  make  the 
rule  against  the  Christians,  for  Trajan  did  that; 
and  if  we  admit  that  he  would  have  been  willing 
to  let  the  Christians  alone,  we  cannot  affirm  that 
it  was  in  his  power,  for  it  would  be  a  great  mis- 
take to  suppose  that  Antoninus  had  the  unlimited 
authority  which  some  modern  soverigns  have  had. 
His  power  was  limited  by  certain  constitutional 
forms,  by  the  Senate,  arid  by  the  precedents  of  his 
predecessors.  We  cannot  admit  that  such  a  man 
was  an  active  persecutor,  for  there  is  no  evidence 
that  he  was,1  though  it  is  certain  that  he  had  no 
1  Except  that  of  Orosius  (vii.  15),  who  says  that  during 
the  Parthian  war  there  were  grievous  persecutions  of  the 
Christiana  in  Asia  and  Gallia  under  the  orders  of  Marcus 
(praecepto  ejus),  and  "  many  were  crowned  with  the  martyr- 
dom of  sainta." 


28  BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH. 

good  opinion  of  the  Christians,  as  appears  from 
his  own  words.1  But  he  knew  nothing  of  them 
except  their  hostility  to  the  Roman  religion,  and 
he  probably  thought  that  they  were  dangerous  to 

1  See  xi.  3.  The  emperor  probably  speaks  of  such  fanatics 
as  Clemens  (quoted  by  Gataker  on  this  passage)  mentions. 
The  rational  Christians  admitted  no  fellowship  with  them, 
"Some  of  these  heretics,"  says  Clemens,  "show  their  im- 
piety and  cowardice  by  loving  their  lives,  saying  that  the 
knowledge  of  the  really  existing  God  is  true  testimony 
(martyrdom) ,  but  that  a  man  is  a  self-murderer  who  bears 
witness  by  his  death.  We  also  blame  those  who  rush  to 
death;  for  there  are  some,  not  of  us,  but  only  bearing  the 
same  name,  who  give  themselves  up.  We  say  of  them  that 
they  die  without  being  martyrs,  even  if  they  are  publicly 
punished;  and  they  give  themselves  up  to  a  death  which 
•avails  nothing,  as  the  Indian  Gymnosophists  give  themselves 
up  foolishly  to  fire."  Cave,  in  his  primitive  Christianity 
(ii.  c.  7),  Bays  of  the  Christians:  "They  did  flock  to  the 
place  of  torment  faster  than  droves  of  beasts  that  are  driven 
to  the  shambles.  They  even  longed  to  be  in  the  arms  of 
suffering.  Ignatius,  though  then  in  his  journey  to  Rome  in 
order  to  his  execution,  yet  by  the  way  as  he  went  could  not 
but  vent  his  passionate  desire  of  it :  '  Oh  that  I  might  come 
to  those  wild  beasts  that  are  prepared  for  me;  I  heartily 
wish  that  I  may  presently  meet  with  them ;  I  would  invite 
and  encourage  them  speedily  to  devour  me,  and  not  be  afraid 
to  set  upon  me  as  they  have  been  to  others ;  nay,  should  they 
refuse  it,  I  would  even  force  them  to  it ; ' "  and  more  to  the 
same  purpose  from  Eusebius.  Cave,  an  honest  and  good 
man,  says  all  this  in  praise  of  the  Christians;  but  I  think 
that  he  mistook  the  matter.  We  admire  a  man  who  holds  to 
his  principles  even  to  death ;  but  these  fanatical  Christians 
are  the  Gyranosophists  whom  Clemens  treats  with  disdain. 


MAECUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  29 

the  state,  notwithstanding  the  professions  false  or 
true  of  some  of  the  Apologists.  So  much  I  have 
said,  because  it  would  be  unfair  not  to  state  all 
that  can  be  urged  against  a  man  whom  his  con- 
temporaries and  subsequent  ages  venerated  as  a 
model  of  virtue  and  benevolence.  If  I  admitted 
the  genuineness  of  some  documents,  he  would  be 
altogether  clear  from  the  charge  of  even  allowing 
any  persecutions ;  but  as  I  seek  the  truth  and  am 
sure  that  they  are  false,  I  leave  him  to  bear  what- 
ever blame  is  his  due.1  I  add  that  it  is  quite  cer- 
tain that  Antoninus  did  not  derive  any  of  his 
ethical  principles  from  a  religion  of  which  he  knew 
nothing.2 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Emperor's  Reflec- 
tions —  or  his  Meditations,  as  they  are  generally 
named  —  is  a  genuine  work.  In  the  first  book  he 
speaks  of  himself,  his  family,  and  his  teachers ; 
and  in  other  books  he  mentions  himself.  Suidas 
(v.  Mct/oKos)  notices  a  work  of  Antoninus  in  twelve 
books,  which  he  names  the  "  conduct  of  his  own 

1  Dr.  F.  C.  Baur,  in  his  work  entitled  "  Das  Christenthum 
und  die  Christliche  Kirche  der  drei  ersten  Jahrhunderte," 
&c.,  has  examined  this  question  with  great  good  sense  and 
fairness,  and  I  believe  he  has  stated  the  truth  as  near  as  our 
authorities  enable  us  to  reach  it. 

2  In  the  Digest,  48,  19,  3Q,  there  is  the  following  excerpt 
from  Modestinus :  "  Si  quis  aliquid  fecerit,  quo  leves  homi- 
num  animi  superstitione  numinis  terrerentur,  divus  Marcus 
hujusmodi  homines  in  insulam  relegari  rescripsit." 


30  BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH. 

life ; "  and  he  cites  the  book  under  several  words 
in  his  Dictionary,  giving  the  emperor's  name,  but 
not  the  title  of  the  work.  There  are  also  passages 
cited  by  Suidas  from  Antoninus  without  mention 
of  the  emperor's  name.  The  true  title  of  the 
work  is  unknown.  Xy lander,  who  published  the 
first  edition  of  this  book  (Zurich,  1558,  8vo,  with 
a  Latin  version),  used  a  manuscript  which  con- 
tained the  twelve  books,  but  it  is  not  known 
where  the  manuscript  is  now.  The  only  other 
complete  manuscript  which  is  known  to  exist  is  in 
the  Vatican  library,  but  it  has  no  title  and  no 
inscriptions  of  the  several  books :  the  eleventh 
only  has  the  inscription  Ma/a/<ov  avroKparopo?  marked 
with  an  asterisk.  The  other  Vatican  manuscripts 
and  the  three  Florentine  contain  only  excerpts 
from  the  emperor's  book.  All  the  titles  of  the  ex- 
cerpts nearly  agree  with  that  which  Xylander  pre- 
fixed to  his  edition,  Map/cov  'AvTaWvov  Avro/cparopos 

TCOI/  eis  eavrov  /fySAia  ifi.  This  title  has  been  used 
by  all  subsequent  editors.  We  cannot  tell  whether 
Antoninus  divided  his  work  into  books  or  some- 
body else  did  it.  If  the  inscriptions  at  the  end  of 
the  first  and  second  books  are  genuine,  he  may 
have  made  the  division  himself. 

It  is  plain  that  the  emperor  wrote  down  his 
thoughts  or  reflections  as  the  occasions  arose ;  and 
since  they  were  intended  for  his  own  use,  it  is  no 
improbable  conjecture  that  he  left  a  complete 


MAE C US  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.  31 

copy  behind  him  written  with  his  own  hand ;  for 
it  is  not  likely  that  so  diligent  a  man  would  use 
the  labor  of  a  transcriber  for  such  a  purpose,  and 
expose  his  most  secret  thoughts  to  any  other  eye. 
He  may  have  also  intended  the  book  for  his  son 
Commodus,  who  however  had  no  taste  for  his 
father's  philosophy.  Some  careful  hand  preserved 
the  precious  volume  ;  and  a  work  by  Antoninus 
is  mentioned  by  other  late  writers  besides  Suidas. 
Many  critics  have  labored  on  the  text  of  An- 
toninus. The  most  complete  edition  is  that  by 
Thomas  Gataker,  1652,  4to.  The  second  edition 
of  Gataker  was  superintended  by  George  Stan- 
hope, 1697,  4to.  There  is  also  an  edition  of  1704. 
Gataker  made  and  suggested  many  good  cor- 
rections, and  he  also  made  a  new  Latin  version, 
which  is  not  a  very  good  specimen  of  Latin,  but 
it  generally  expresses  the  sense  of  the  original, 
and  often  better  than  some  of  the  more  recent 
translations.  He  added  in  the  margin  opposite 
to  each  paragraph  references  to  the  other  paral- 
lel passages ;  and  he  wrote  a  commentary,  one 
of  the  most  complete  that  has  been  written 
on  any  ancient  author.  This  commentary  con- 
tains the  editor's  exposition  of  the  more  diffi- 
cult passages,  and  quotations  from  all  the  Greek 
and  Roman  writers  for  the  illustration  of  the  text. 
It  is  a  wonderful  monument  of  learning  and  labor, 
and  certainly  no  Englishman  has  yet  done  any- 


32  BIOGRAPHICAL   SKETCH. 

thing  like  it.  At  the  end  of  his  preface  the 
editor  says  that  he  wrote  it  at  Rotherhithe  near 
London  in  a  severe  winter,  when  he  was  in  the 
seventy-eighth  year  of  his  age,  1651,  —  a  time 
when  Milton,  Selden,  and  other  great  men  of  the 
Commonwealth  time  were  living;  and  the  great 
French  scholar  Saumaise  (Salmasius),  with  whom 
Gataker  corresponded  and  received  help  from  him 
for  his  edition  of  Antoninus.  The  Greek  text 
has  also  been  edited  by  J.  M.  Schultz,  Leipzig, 
1802,  8vo ;  and  by  the  learned  Greek  Adaman- 
tinus  Cora'is,  Paris,  1816,  8vo.  The  text  of 
Schultz  was  republished  by  Tauchnitz,  1821. 

There  are  English,  German,  French,  Italian, 
and  Spanish  translations  of  M.  Antoninus,  and 
there  may  be  others.  I  have  not  seen  all  the 
English  translations.  There  is  one  by  Jeremy 
Collier,  1702,  8vo,  a  most  coarse  and  vulgar  copy 
of  the  original.  The  latest  French  translation  by 
Alexis  Pierron  in  the  collection  of  Charpentier  is 
better  that  Dacier's,  which  has  been  honored  with 
an  Italian  version  (Udine,  1772).  There  is  an 
Italian  version  (1675)  which  I  have  not  seen.  It 
is  by  a  cardinal.  "A  man  illustrious  in  the 
church,  the  Cardinal  Francis  Barberini  the  el- 
der, nephew  of  Pope  Urban  VIII.,  occupied  the 
last  years  of  his  life  in  translating  into  his  native 
language  the  thoughts  of  the  Roman  emperor,  in 
order  to  diffuse  among  the  faithful  the  fertilizing 


MARCUS  AUEELIU8  ANTONINUS.  33 

and  vivifying  seeds.  He  dedicated  this  trans- 
lation to  his  soul,  to  make  it,  as  he  says  in  his 
energetic  style,  redder  than  his  purple  at  the  sight 
of  the  virtues  of  this  Gentile  "  (Pierron,  Preface). 
I  have  made  this  translation  at  intervals  after 
having  used  the  book  for  many  years.  It  is  made 
from  the  Greek,  but  I  have  not  always  followed 
one  text ;  and  I  have  occasionally  compared  other 
versions  with  my  own.  I  made  this  translation 
for  my  own  use,  because  I  found  that  it  was 
worth  the  labor ;  but  it  may  be  useful  to  others 
also,  and  therefore  I  determined  to  print  it.  As 
the  original  is  sometimes  very  difficult  to  under- 
stand and  still  more  difficult  to  translate,  it  is  not 
possible  that  I  have  always  avoided  error.  But  I 
believe  that  I  have  not  often  missed  the  meaning, 
and  those  who  will  take  the  trouble  to  compare 
the  translation  with  the  original  should  not  hastily 
conclude  that  I  am  wrong,  if  they  do  not  agree 
with  me.  Some  passages  do  give  the  meaning, 
though  at  first  sight  they  may  not  appear  to  do  so  ; 
and  when  I  differ  from  the  translators,  I  think 
that  in  some  places  they  are  wrong,  and  in  other 
places  I  am  sure  that  they  are.  I  have  placed  in 
some  passages  a  f,  which  indicates  corruption  in 
the  text  or  great  uncertainty  in  the  meaning.  I 
could  have  made  the  language  more  easy  and  flow- 
ing, but  I  have  preferred  a  ruder  style  as  being  bet- 
ter suited  to  express  the  character  of  the  original ; 


34  BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH. 

and  sometimes  the  obscurity  which  may  appear  in 
the  version  is  a  fair  copy  of  the  obscurity  of  the 
Greek.  If  I  should  ever  revise  this  version,  I  would 
gladly  make  use  of  any  corrections  which  may  be 
suggested.  I  have  added  an  index  of  some  of  the 
Greek  terms  with  the  corresponding  English.  If  I 
have  not  given  the  best  words  for  the  Greek,  I  have 
done  the  best  that  I  could ;  and  in  the  text  I  have 
always  given  the  same  translation  of  the  same  word. 
The  last  reflection  of  the  Stoic  philosophy  that  I 
have  observed  is  in  Simplicius'  Commentary  on  the 
Enchiridion  of  Epictetus.  Simplicius  was  not  a 
Christian,  and  such  a  man  was  not  likely  to  be 
converted  at  a  time  when  Christianity  was  grossly 
corrupted.  But  he  was  a  really  religious  man,  and 
he  concludes  his  commentary  with  a  prayer  to  the 
Deity  which  no  Christian  could  improve.  From 
the  time  of  Zeno  to  Simplicius,  a  period  of  about 
nine  hundred  years,  the  Stoic  philosophy  formed 
the  characters  of  some  of  the  best  and  greatest  men. 
Finally  it  became  extinct,  and  we  hear  no  more  of 
it  till  the  revival  of  letters  in  Italy.  Angelo  Poli- 
ziano  met  with  two  very  inaccurate  and  incomplete 
manuscripts  of  Epictetus'  Enchiridion,  which  he 
translated  into  Latin  and  dedicated  to  his  great 
patron  Lorenzo  de'  Medici,  in  whose  collection  he 
had  found  the  book.  Poliziano's  version  was 
printed  in  the  first  Bale  edition  of  the  Enchiridion, 
A.  D.  1531  (apud  And.  Cratandrum).  Poliziano 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  35 

recommends  the  Enchiridion  to  Lorenzo  as  a  work 
well  suited  to  his  temper,  and  useful  in  the  diffi- 
culties by  which  he  was  surrounded. 

Epictetus  and  Antoninus  have  had  readers  ever 
since  they  were  first  printed.  The  little  book  of 
Antoninus  has  been  the  companion  of  some  great 
men.  Machiavelli's  Art  of  War  and  Marcus  Anto- 
ninus were  the  two  books  which  were  used  when 
he  was  a  young  man  by  Captain  John  Smith,  and 
he  could  not  have  found  two  writers  better  fitted 
to  form  the  character  of  a  soldier  and  a  man. 
Smith  is  almost  unknown  and  forgotten  in  England, 
his  native  country,  but  not  in  America,  where  he 
saved  the  young  colony  of  Virginia.  He  was  great 
in  his  heroic  mind  and  his  deeds  in  arms,  but 
greater  still  in  the  nobleness  of  his  character.  For 
a  man's  greatness  lies  not  in  wealth  and  station,  as 
the  vulgar  believe,  nor  yet  in  his  intellectual  capac- 
ity, which  is  often  associated  with  the  meanest  moral 
character,  the  most  abject  servility  to  those  in  high 
places,  and  arrogance  to  the  poor  and  lowly ;  but  a 
man's  true  greatness  lies  in  the  consciousness  of  an 
honest  purpose  in  life,  founded  on  a  just  estimate 
of  himself  and  everything  else,  on  frequent  self- 
examination,  and  a  steady  obedience  to  the  rule 
which  he  knows  to  be  right,  without  troubling  him- 
self, as  the  emperor  says  he  should  not,  about  what 
others  may  think  or  say,  or  whether  they  do  or  do 
not  do  that  which  he  thinks  and  says  and  does. 


THE    PHILOSOPHY 


OF 


MARCUS  ATJRELIUS   ANTONINUS. 


IT  has  been  said  that  the  Stoic  philosophy  first 
showed  its  real  value  when  it  passed  from  Greece 
to  Rome.  The  doctrines  of  Zeno  and  his  successors 
were  well  suited  to  the  gravity  and  practical  good 
sense  of  the  Romans ;  and  even  in  the  Republican 
period  we  have  an  example  of  a  man,  M.  Cato 
Uticensis,  who  lived  the  life  of  a  Stoic  and  died 
consistently  with  the  opinions  which  he  professed. 
He  was  a  man,  says  Cicero,  who  embraced  the  Stoic 
philosophy  from  conviction  ;  not  for  the  purpose  of 
vain  discussion,  as  most  did,  but  in  order  to  make 
his  life  conformable  to  the  Stoic  precepts.  In  the 
wretched  times  from  the  death  of  Augustus  to  the 
murder  of  Domitian,  there  was  nothing  but  the 
Stoic  philosophy  which  could  console  and  support 
the  followers  of  the  old  religion  under  imperial 
tyranny  and  amidst  universal  corruption.  There 


38  PHILOSOPHY. 

were  even  then  noble  minds  that  could  dare  and 
endure,  sustained  by  a  good  conscience  and  an 
elevated  idea  of  the  purposes  of  man's  existence. 
Such  were  Paetus  Thrasea,  Helvidius  Priscus,  Cor- 
nutus,  C.  Musonius  Rufus,1  and  the  poets  Persius 
and  Juvenal,  whose  energetic  language  and  manly 
thoughts  may  be  as  instructive  to  us  now  as  they 
might  have  been  to  their  contemporaries.  Persius 
died  under  Nero's  bloody  reign  ;  but  Juvenal  had 
the  good  fortune  to  survive  the  tyrant  Domitian 
and  to  see  the  better  times  of  Nerva,  Trajan,  and 
Hadrian.2  His  best  precepts  are  derived  from  the 
Stoic  school,  and  they  are  enforced  in  his  finest 
verses  by  the  unrivalled  vigor  of  the  Latin  language. 
The  best  two  expounders  of  the  later  Stoical  phi- 
losophy were  a  Greek  slave  and  a  Roman  emperor. 
Epictetus,  a  Phrygian  Greek,  was  brought  to  Rome, 

1  I  have  omitted  Seneca,  Nero's  preceptor.     He  was  in  a 
sense  a  Stoic,  and  he  has  said  many  good  things  in  a  very 
fine  way.     There  is  a  judgment  of  Gellius  (xii.  2)  on  Seneca, 
or  rather  a  statement  of  what  some  people  thought  of  his 
philosophy,  and  it  is  not  favorable.     His  writings  and  his 
life  must  be  taken  together,  and  I  have  nothing  more  to  say 
of  him  here.     The  reader  will  find  a  notice  "of  Seneca  and 
his  philosophy  in  "  Seekers  after  God,"  by  the  Rev.  F.  W. 
Farrar.    Macmillan  and  Co. 

2  Ribbeck  has  labored  to  prove  that  those  Satires,  which 
contain  philosophical  precepts,  are  not  the  work  of  the  real, 
but  of  a  false  Juvenal,  a  Declamator.     Still  the  verses  exist, 
and  were  written  by  somebody  who  was  acquainted  with  the 
Stoic  doctrines. 


MAECUS  A  UEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  39 

we  know  not  how,  but  he  was  there  the  slave  and 
afterwards  the  freedman  of  an  unworthy  master, 
Epaphroditus  by  name,  himself  a  freedman  and  a 
favorite  of  Nero.  Epictetus  may  have  been  a 
hearer  of  C.  Musonius  Rufus,  while  he  was  still  a 
slave,  but  he  could  hardly  have  been  a  teacher 
before  he  was  made  free.  He  was  one  of  the  phi- 
losophers whom  Domitian's  order  banished  from 
Rome.  He  retired  to  Nicopolis  in  Epirus,  and  he 
may  have  died  there.  Like  other  great  teachers 
he  wrote  nothing,  and  we  are  indebted  to  his  grate- 
ful pupil  Arrian  for  what  we  have  of  Epictetus' 
discourses.  Arrian  wrote  eight  books  of  the  dis- 
courses of  Epictetus,  of  which  only  four  remain 
and  some  fragments.  We  have  also  from  Arrian's 
hand  the  small  Enchiridion  or  Manual  of  the  chief 
precepts  of  Epictetus.  There  is  a  valuable  com- 
mentary on  the  Enchiridion  by  Simplicius,  who 
lived  in  the  time  of  the  emperor  Justinian.1 

Antoninus  in  his  first  book  (i.  7),  in  which  he 
gratefully  commemorates  his  obligations  to  his 
teachers,  says  that  he  was  made  acquainted  by 
Junius  Rusticus  with  the  discourses  of  Epictetus, 
whom  he  mentions  also  in  other  passages  (iv.  41 ; 
xi.  34,  36).  Indeed,  the  doctrines  of  Epictetus 

1  There  is  a  complete  edition  of  Arrian's  Epictetus  with 
the  commentary  of  Simplicius  by  J.  Schweighaeuser,  6  vols. 
8vo.  1799,  1800.  There  is  also  an  English  translation  of 
Epictetus  by  Mrs.  Carter. 


40  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  Antoninus  are  the  same,  and  Epictetus  is  the 
best  authority  for  the  explanation  of  the  philosoph- 
ical language  of  Antoninus  and  the  exposition  of 
his  opinions.  But  the  method  of  the  two  philoso- 
phers is  entirely  different.  Epictetus  addressed 
himself  to  his  hearers  in  a  continuous  discourse 
and  in  a  familiar  and  simple  manner.  Antoninus 
wrote  down  his  reflections  for  his  own  use  only, 
in  short,  unconnected  paragraphs,  which  are  often 
obscure. 

The  Stoics  made  three  divisions  of  philosophy, — 
Physic  (<£voWi/),  Ethic  (^IKOI/),  and  Logic  (AoyiKov) 
(viii.  13).  This  division,  we  are  told  by  Diogenes, 
was  made  by  Zeno  of  Citium,  the  founder  of  the 
Stoic  sect,  and  by  Chrysippus  ;  but  these  philoso- 
phers placed  the  three  divisions  in  the  following 
order, —  Logic,  Physic,  Ethic.  It  appears,  how- 
ever, that  this  division  was  made  before  Zeno's 
time,  and  acknowledged  by  Plato,  as  Cicero  re- 
marks (Acad.  Post.  i.  5.).  Logic  is  not  synony- 
mous with  our  term  Logic  in  the  narrower  sense 
of  that  word. 

Cleanthes,  a  Stoic,  subdivided  the  three  divisions, 
and  made  six, —  Dialectic  and  Rhetoric,  comprised 
in  Logic ;  Ethic  and  Politic  ;  Physic  and  Theology. 
This  division  was  merely  for  practical  use,  for  all 
Philosophy  is  one.  Even  among  the  earliest  Stoics 
Logic,  or  Dialectic,  does  not  occupy  the  same  place 
as  in  Plato :  it  is  considered  only  as  an  instrument 


MARCUS  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.  41 

which  is  to  be  used  for  the  other  divisions  of  Phi- 
losophy. An  exposition  of  the  earlier  Stoic  doc- 
trines and  of  their  modifications  would  require  a 
volume.  My  object  is  to  explain  only  the  opinions 
of  Antoninus,  so  far  as  they  can  be  collected  from 
his  book. 

According  to  the  subdivision  of  Cleanthes, 
Physic  and  Theology  go  together,  or  the  study 
of  the  nature  of  Things,  and  the  study  of  the 
nature  of  the  Deity,  so  far  as  man  can  understand 
the  Deity,  and  of  his  government  of  the  universe. 
This  division  or  subdivision  is  not  formally  adopted 
by  Antoninus,  for,  as  already  observed,  there  is 
no  method  in  his  book ;  but  it  is  virtually  con- 
tained in  it. 

Cleauthes  also  connects  Ethic  and  Politic,  or  the 
study  of  the  principles  of  morals  and  the  study  of  the 
constitution  of  civil  society ;  and  undoubtedly  he 
did  well  in  subdividing  Ethic  into  two  parts,  Ethic 
in  the  narrower  sense  and  Politic ;  for  though  the 
two  are  intimately  connected,  they  are  also  very 
distinct,  and  many  questions  can  only  be  properly 
discussed  by  carefully  observing  the  distinction. 
Antoninus  does  not  treat  of  Politic.  His  subject 
is  Ethic,  and  Ethic  in  its  practical  application  to 
his  own  conduct  in  life  as  a  man  and  as  a  governor. 
His  Ethic  is  founded  on  his  doctrines  about  man's 
nature,  the  Universal  Nature,  and  the  relation  of 
every  man  to  everything  else.  It  is  therefore 


42  PHILOSOPHY. 

intimately  and  inseparably  connected  with  Physic, 
or  the  nature  of  Things,  and  with  Theology,  or  the 
Nature  of  the  Deity.  He  advises  us  to  examine 
well  all  the  impressions  on  our  minds  (<£ai>Ta0-t'cu) 
and  to  form  a  right  judgment  of  them,  to  make  just 
conclusions,  and  to  inquire  into  the  meanings  of 
words,  and  so  far  to  apply  Dialetic  ;  but  he  has  no 
'attempt  at  any  exposition  of  Dialectic,  and  his 
philosophy  is  in  substance  purely  moral  and  prac- 
tical. He  says  (viii.  13),  "Constantly  and,  if  it 
be  possible,  on  the  occasion  of  every  impression  on 
the  soul,1  apply  to  it  the  principles  of  Physic,  of 
Ethic,  and  of  Dialectic  :  "  which  is  only  another 
way  of  telling  us  to  examine  the  impression  in 
every  possible  way.  In  another  passage  (iii.  11) 
he  says,  "To  the  aids  which  have  been  mentioned, 
let  this  one  still  be  added:  make  for  thyself  a 
definition  or  description  of  the  object  (TO  </>avrao-ToV) 
which  is  presented  to  thee,  so  as  to  see  distinctly 
what  kind  of  a  thing  it  is  in  its  substance,  in  its 


1  The  original  is  tiri  irdvys  <t>a.vTa.<ria.s.  We  have  no  word 
which  expresses  <t>aiv  curia,  for  it  is  not  only  the  sensuous  ap- 
pearance which  comes  from  an  external  object,  which  object 
is  called  rb  <t>a.vTa<TTt>v,  but  it  is  also  the  thought  or  feeling 
or  opinion  which  is  produced  even  when  there  is  no  corre- 
ponding  external  object  before  us.  Accordingly  everything 
which  moves  the  soul  is  <f>avraffr6vf  and  produces  a  ^avraaia. 

In  this  extract  Antoninus  says  <t>v(r<.o\oye'ii>,  iradoXoyeiv,  5ia- 
\fKTiKefa<r6ai.  I  have  translated  7ra0o\o7e?i'  by  using  the  word 
Moral  (Ethic)  ,  and  that  is  the  meaning  here. 


MARCUS  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.  43 

nudity,  in  its  complete  entirety,  and  tell  thyself 
its  proper  name,  and  the  names  of  the  things  of 
which  it  has  been  compounded,  and  into  which  it 
will  be  resolved."  Such  an  examination  implies  a 
use  of  Dialectic,  which  Antoninus  accordingly 
employed  as  a  means  towards  establishing  his 
Physical,  Theological,  and  Ethical  principles. 

There  are  several  expositions  of  the  Physical, 
Theological,  and  Ethical  principles,  which  are  con- 
tained in  the  work  of  Antoninus ;  and  more  exposi- 
tions than  I  have  read.  Ritter  (Geschichte  der 
Philosophic,  iv.  241),  after  explaining  the  doctrines 
of  Epictetus,  treats  very  briefly  and  insufficiently 
those  of  Antoninus.  But  he  refers  to  a  short  essay, 
in  which  the  work  is  done  better.1  There  is  also 
an  essay  on  the  Philosophical  Principles  of  M.  Au- 
relius  Antoninus  by  J.  M.  Schultz,  placed  at  the 
end  of  his  German  translation  of  Antoninus 
(Schleswig,  1799).  With  the  assistance  of  these 
two  useful  essays  and  his  own  diligent  study  a 
man  may  form  a  sufficient  notion  of  the  principles 
of  Antoninus  ;  but  he  will  find  it  more  difficult  to 
expound  them  to  others.  Besides  the  want  of 
arrangement  in  the  original  and  of  connection 
among  the  numerous  paragraphs,  the  corruption  of 
the  text,  the  obscurity  of  the  language  and  the 

1  De  Marco  Aurelio  Antonino  ...  ex  ipsius  Comraen- 
tariis.  Scriptio  Philologica.  Instituit  Nicolaus  Bachius, 
Lipsiae,  1826. 


44  PHILOSOPHY. 

style,  and  sometimes  perhaps  the  confusion  in  the 
writer's  own  ideas, —  besides  all  this,  there  is 
occasionally  an  apparent  contradiction  in  the  em- 
peror's thoughts,  as  if  his  principles  were  sometimes 
unsettled,  as  if  doubt  sometimes  clouded  his  mind. 
A  man  who  leads  a  life  of  tranquillity  and  reflec- 
Jion,  who  is  not  disturbed  at  home  and  meddles 
not  with  the  affairs  of  the  world,  may  keep  his 
mind  at  ease  and  his  thoughts  in  one  even  course. 
But  such  a  man  has  not  been  tried.  All  his  Ethical 
philosophy  and  his  passive  virtue  might  turn  out 
to  be  idle  words,  if  he  were  once  exposed  to  the 
rude  realities  of  human  existence.  Fine  thoughts 
and  moral  dissertations  from  men  who  have  not 
worked  and  suffered  may  be  read,  but  they  will  be 
forgotten.  No  religion,  no  Ethical  philosophy  is 
worth  anything,  if  the  teacher  has  not  lived  the 
"  life  of  an  apostle,"  and  been  ready  to  die  "  the 
death  of  a  martyr."  "  Not  in  passivity  (the  passive 
affects)  but  in  activity  lie  the  evil  and  the  good 
of  the  rational  social  animal,  just  as  his  virtue  and 
his  vice  lie  not  in  passivity,  but  in  activity  "  (ix. 
16).  The  emperor  Antoninus  was  a  practical  mor- 
alist. From  his  youth  he  followed  a  laborious  dis- 
cipline, and  though  his  high  station  placed  him 
above  all  want  or  the  fear  of  it,  he  lived  as  frugally 
and  temperately  as  the  poorest  philosopher.  Epic- 
tetus  wanted  little,  and  it  seems  that  he  always 
had  the  little  that  he  wanted  and  he  was  content 


Mill 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  45 

with  it,  as  he  had  been  with  his  servile  station. 
But  Antoninus  after  his  accession  to  the  empire  sat 
on  an  uneasy  seat.  He  had  the  administration  of 
an  empire  which  extended  from  the  Euphrates  to 
the  Atlantic,  from  the  cold  mountains  of  Scotland 
to  the  hot  sands  of  Africa ;  and  we  may  imagine, 
though  we  cannot  know  it  by  experience,  what 
must  be  the  trials,  the  troubles,  the  anxiety,  and 
the  sorrows  of  him  who  has  the  world's  business 
on  his  hands,  with  the  wish  to  do  the  best  that  he 
can,  and  the  certain  knowledge  that  he  can  do  very 
little  of  the  good  which  he  wishes. 

In  the  midst  of  war,  pestilence,  conspiracy,  gen- 
eral corruption,  and  with  the  weight  of  so  unwieldy 
an  empire  upon  him,  we  may  easily  comprehend 
that  Antoninus  often  had  need  of  all  his  fortitude 
to  support  him.  The  best  and  bravest  men  have 
moments  of  doubt  and  of  weakness ;  but  if  they 
are  the  best  and  the  bravest,  they  rise  again  from 
their  depression  by  recurring  to  first  principles,  as 
Antoninus  does.  The  emperor  says  that  life  is 
smoke,  a  vapor,  and  St.  James  in  his  Epistle  is  of 
the  same  mind ;  that  the  world  is  full  of  envious, 
jealous,  malignant  people,  and  a  man  might  be  well 
content  to  get  out  of  it.  He  has  doubts  perhaps 
sometimes  even  about  that  to  which  he  holds  most 
firmly.  There  are  only  a  few  passages  of  this  kind, 
but  they  are  evidence  of  the  struggles  which  even 
the  noblest  of  the  sons  of  men  had  to  maintain 


46  PHILOSOPHY, 

against  the  hard  realities  of  his  daily  life.  A  poor 
remark  it  is  which  I  have  seen  somewhere,  and 
made  in  a  disparaging  way,  that  the  emperor's  re- 
flections show  that  he  had  need  of  consolation  and 
comfort  in  life,  and  even  to  prepare  him  to  meet 
his  death.  True  that  he  did  need  comfort  and  sup- 
port, and  we  see  how  he  found  it.  He  constantly 
recurs  to  his  fundamental  principle  that  the  uni- 
verse is  wisely  ordered,  that  every  man  is  a  part  of 
it  and  must  conform  to  that  order  which  he  cannot 
change,  that  whatever  the  Deity  has  done  is  good, 
that  all  mankind  are  a  man's  brethren,  that  he  must 
:  love  arid  cherish  them  and  try  to  make  them  bet- 
ter, even  those  who  would  do  him  harm.  This  is 
his  conclusion  (ii.  17)  :  "  What  then  is  that  which 
is  able  to  conduct  a  man  ?  One  thing  and  only 
one,  Philosophy.  But  this  consists  in  keeping  the 
divinity  within  a  man  free  from  violence  and  un- 
harmed, superior  to  pains  and  pleasures,  doing  noth- 
ing without  a  purpose  nor  yet  falsely  and  with 
hypocrisy,  not  feeling  the  need  of  another  man's 
doing  or  not  doing  anything ;  and  besides,  accept- 
ing all  that  happens  and  all  that  is  allotted,  as 
corning  from  thence,  wherever  it  is,  from  whence 
he  himself  came  ;  and  finally  waiting  for  death 
with  a  cheerful  mind  as  being  nothing  else  than  a 
dissolution  of  the  elements  of  which  every  living 
being  is  compounded.  But  if  there  is  no  harm  to 
the  elements  themselves  in  each  continually  chang- 


MAECUS  AURELIU8  ANTONINUS.  47 

ing  into  another,  why  should  a  man  have  any  appre- 
hension about  the  change  and  dissolution  of  all  the 
elements  [himself]  ?  for  it  is  according  to  nature  ; 
and  nothing  is  evil  that  is  according  to  nature." 

The  Physic  of  Antoninus  is  the  knowledge  of 
the  Nature  of  the  Universe,  of  its  government, 
and  of  the  relation  of  man's  nature  to  both.  He 
names  the  universe  (17  TWV  oA.au/  <wna,  vi.  I),1  "  the 
universal  substance,"  and  he  adds  that  "  reason  " 
(Ko'yos)  governs  the  universe.  He  also  (vi.  9)  uses 
the  terms  "  universal  nature  "  or  "  nature  of  the 
universe."  He  (vi.  25)  calls  the  universe  "the 
one  and  all,  which  we  name  Cosmos  or  Order  " 

1  As  to  the  word  ofoia,  the  reader  may  sea  the  Index.  I 
add  here  a  few  examples  of  the  use  of  the  word ;  Antoninus 
has  (v.  24),  TI  ffvfj.Tra.a-a  otoia,  "the  universal  substance."  He 
says  (xii.  30  and  iv.  40),  "there  is  one  common  substance"- 
(ovffta),  distributed  among  countless  bodies.  In  Stobaeus 
(torn.  i.  lib.  1,  tit.  14)  there  is  this  definition,  otolav  5t  <j>a<ru> 
T(av  6v7b}i>  dwdyruv  TTJV  TrpuTTjv  'iXyv.  In  viii.  11,  Antoninus 
speaks  of  rb  ownwSes  Kal  v\ti<6v,  "  the  substantial  and  the  ma- 
terial;" and  (vii.  10)  he  says  that  "everything  material" 
(cj/uXov)  disappears  in  the  substance  of  the  whole  (ry  rS>v  S\uv 
owl?) .  The  ofiffia  is  the  generic  name  of  that  existence  which 
we  assume  as  the  highest  or  ultimate,  because  we  conceive 
no  existence  which  can  be  co-ordinated  with  it  and  none 
above  it.  It  is  the  philosopher's  "  substance : "  it  is  the 
ultimate  expression  for  that  which  we  conceive  or  suppose 
to  be  the  basis,  the  being  of  a  thing.  "From  the  Divine, 
which  is  substance  in  itself,  or  the  only  and  sole  substance, 
all  and  everything  that  is  created  exists"  (Swedenborg, 
Angelic  Wisdom,  198). 


48  PHILOSOPHY. 

(KOO-/XOS).  If  he  ever  seems  to  use  these  general 
terms  as  significant  of  the  All,  of  all  that  man  can 
in  any  way  conceive  to  exist,  he  still  on  other 
occasions  plainly  distinguishes  between  Matter, 
Material  things  (v\rj,  vXiKoV),  and  Cause,  Origin, 
Reason  (ama  amwSes,  Aoyos).1  This  is  conformable 
to  Zeno's  doctrine  that  there  are  two  original 
principles  («pxaO  of  all  things,  that  which  acts 

1  I  remark,  in  order  to  anticipate  any  misapprehension, 
that  all  these  general  terms  involve  a  contradiction.  The 
"  one  and  all,"  and  the  like,  and  "the  whole,"  imply  limita- 
tion. "One "is  limited;  "all"  is  limited;  the  "whole "is 
limited.  We  cannot  help  it.  We  cannot  find  words  to  ex- 
press that  which  we  cannot  fully  conceive.  The  addition  of 
"absolute"  or  any  other  such  word  does  not  mend  the 
matter.  Even  the  word  God  is  used  by  most  people,  often 
unconsciously,  in  such  a  way  that  limitation  is  implied,  and 
yet  at  the  same  time  words  are  added  which  are  intended  to 
deny  limitation.  A  Christian  martyr,  when  he  was  asked 
what  God  was,  is  said  to  have  answered  that  God  has  no 
name  like  a  man;  and  Justin  says  the  same  (Apol.  ii.  6), 
"  the  names  Father,  God,  Creator,  Lord,  and  Master  are  not 
names,  but  appellations  derived  from  benefactions  and  acts." 
(Compare  Seneca,  De  Benef.  iv.  8.)  We  can  conceive  the 
existence  of  a  thing,  or  rather  we  may  have  the  idea  of  an 
existence,  without  an  adequate  notion  of  it,  "adequate" 
meaning  coextensive  and  coequal  with  the  thing.  We  have 
a  notion  of  limited  space  derived  from  the  dimensions  of 
what  we  call  a  material  thing,  though  of  space  absolute,  if  I 
may  use  the  term,  we  have  no  notion  at  all ;  and  of  infinite 
space  the  notion  is  the  same,  — no  notion  at  all;  and  yet  we 
conceive  it  in  a  sense,  though  I  know  not  how,  and  we 
believe  that  space  is  infinite,  and  we  cannot  conceive  it  to  be 
finite, 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  49 

(TO  TTOIOW)  and  that  which  is  acted  upon  (TO 
TTCUTXOV).  That  which  is  acted  on  is  the  formless 
batter  (^):  that  which  acts  is  the  reason 
l(Ao'yos),  God,  who  is  eternal  and  operates  through 
all  matter,  and  produces  all  things.  So  Antoninus 
(v.  32)  speaks  of  the  reason  (Aoyos)  which  per- 
vades all  substance  (ova-fa)  9  and  through  all  time 
by  fixed  periods  (revolutions)  administers  the  uni- 
verse (TO  TTO.V).  God  is  eternal,  and  Matter  is 
eternal.  It  is  God  who  gives  form  to  matter,  but 
he  is  not  said  to  have  created  matter.  According 
to  this  view,  whicITTs  as  olcTas'Tlhaxagoras,  God 
and  matter  exist  independently,  but  God  governs 
matter.  This  doctrine  is  simply  the  expression  of 
the  fact  of  the  existence  both  of  matter  and  of 
God.  The  Stoics  did  not  perplex  themselves  with 
the  insoluble  question  of  the  origin  and  nature  of 
matter.1  Antoninus  also  assumes  a  beginning  of 

1  The  notions  of  matter  and  of  space  are  inseparable.  We 
derive  the  notion  of  space  from  matter  and  form.  But  we 
have  no  adequate  conception  either  of  matter  or  of  space. 
Matter  in  its  ultimate  resolution  is  as  unintelligible  as  what 
men  call  mind,  spirit,  or  by  whatever  other  name  they  may 
express  the  power  which  makes  itself  known  by  acts.  Anax- 
agoras  laid  down  the  distinction  between  intelligence  (voOs) 
and  matter,  and  he  said  that  intelligence  impressed  motion 
on  matter,  and  so  separated  the  elements  of  matter  and  gave 
them  order;  but  he  probably  "only  assumed  a  beginning,  as 
Simplicius  says,  as  a  foundation  of  his  philosophical  teach- 
ing. Empedocles  said,  "  The  universe  always  existed."  He 
had  no  idea  of  what  is  called  creation.  Ocellus  Lucanus 


50  PHILOSOPHY. 

things,  as  we  now  know  them ;  but  his  language 
is  sometimes  very  obscure.  I  have  endeavored  to 
explain  the  meaning  of  one  difficult  passage  (vii. 
75,  and  the  note). 

Matter  consists  of  elemental  parts  (cn-oc^etd)  of 
which  all  material  objects  are  made.  But  nothing 
is  permanent  in  form.  The  nature  of  the  uni- 
verse, according  to  Antoninus'  expression  (iv.  36), 
"loves  nothing  so  much  as  to  change  the  things 
which  are,  and  to  make  new  things  like  them. 
For  everything  that  exists  is  in  a  manner  the  seed 
of  that  which  will  be.  But  thou  art  thinking 
only  of  seeds  which  are  cast  into  the  earth  or  into 
a  womb  ;  but  this  is  a  very  vulgar  notion."  All 
things  then  are  in  a  constant  flux  and  change: 
some  things  are  dissolved  into  the  elements,  others 
come  in  their  places  ;  and  so  the  "  whole  universe 
continues  ever  young  and  perfect  "  (xii.  23). 

Antoninus  has  some  obscure  expressions  about 

(1,  §  2)  maintained  that  the  Universe  (TO  TTCIJ/)  was  imperish- 
able and  uncreated.  Consequently  it  is  eternal.  He  admitted 
the  existence  of  God ;  but  his  theology  would  require  some 
discussion.  On  the  contrary,  the  Brachmans,  according  to 
Strabo  (p,  713,  ed.  Gas.),  taught  that  the.  universe  was 
created  and  perishable;  and  the  creator  and  administrator 
of  it  pervades  the  whole.  The  author  of  the  book  of 
Solomon's  Wisdom  says  (xi.  17)  :  "  Thy  Almighty  hand 
made  the  world  of  matter  without  form,"  which  may  mean 
that  matter  existed  already. 

The  common  Greek  word  which  we  translate  "matter  "is 
v\-rj.     It  is  the  stuff  that  things  are  made  of. 


M  MIC  US  AURELIUS  ANTOXINUS.  51 


what  he  calls  "  seminal  principles  " 
Xoyoi).  He  opposes  them  to  the  Epicurean  atoms 
(vi.  24),  and  consequently  his  "  seminal  princi- 
ples "  are  not  material  atoms  which  wander  about 
at  hazard,  and  combine  nobody  knows  how.  In 
one  passage  (iv.  21)  he  speaks  of  living  principles, 
souls  (^at)  after  the  dissolution  of  their  bodies 
being  received  into  the  "  seminal  principle  of  the 
universe."  Schultz  thinks  that  by  "  seminal  prin- 
ciples Antoninus  means  the  relations  of  the 
various  elemental  principles,  which  relations  are 
determined  by  the  Deity  and  by  which  alone 
the  production  of  organized  beings  is  possible." 
This  may  be  the  meaning  ;  but  if  it  is,  nothing  of 
any  value  can  be  derived  from  it.1  Antoninus 
often  uses  the  word  "  Nature  "  (Averts),  and  we 
must  attempt  to  fix  its  meaning.  The  simple 
etymological  sense  of  <£vVi?  is  "  production,"  the 
birth  of  what  we  call  Things.  The  Romans  used 
Natura,  which  also  means  "birth"  originally.  But 
neither  the  Greeks  nor  the  Romans  stuck  to  this 
simple  meaning,  nor  do  we.  Antoninus  says 

1  Justin  (Apol.  ii.  8)  has  the  words  Kara  <nrep[j.a.TiKov  \6yov 
t^pos,  where  he  is  speaking  of  the  Stoics  ;  but  he  uses  this 
expression  in  a  peculiar  sense  (note  11).  The  early  Chris- 
tian writers  were  familiar  with  the  Stoic  terms,  and  their 
Avritings  show  that  the  contest  was  begun  between  the 
Christian  expositors  and  the  Greek  philosophy.  Even  in 
the  second  Epistle  of  St.  Peter  (ii.  1,  v.  4)  we  flnd  a  Stoic 
expression,  tva  5ta  TOI/TWJ/  ytmivOc  Of  Las 


o2  PHILOSOPHY. 

(x.  6)  :  "  Whether  the  universe  is  [a  concourse  of] 
atoms  or  Nature  [is  a  system],  let  this  first  be 
established,  that  I  am  a  part  of  the  whole  which  is 
governed  by  nature."  Here  it  might  seem  as  if 
nature  were  personified  and  viewed  as  an  active, 
efficient  power ;  as  something  which,  if  not  inde- 
pendent of  the  Deity,  acts  by  a  power  which  is 
given  to  it  by  the  Deity.  Such,  if  I  understand 
the  expression  right,  is  the  way  in  which  the  word 
Nature  is  often  used  now,  though  it  is  plain  that 
many  writers  use  the  word  without  fixing  any 
exact  meaning  to  it.  It  is  the  same  with  the 
expression  Laws  of  Nature,  which  some  writers 
may  use  in  an  intelligible  sense,  but  others  as 
clearly  use  in  no  definite  sense  at  all.  There  is  no 
meaning  in  this  word  Nature,  except  that  which 
Bishop  Butler  assigns  to  it,  when  he  says,  "  The 
only  distinct  meaning  of  that  word  Natural  is 
Stated,  Fixed,  or  Settled ;  since  what  is  natural 
as  much  requires  and  presupposes  an  intelligent 
agent  to  render  it  so,  i.  e.  to  effect  it  continually 
or  at  stated  times,  as  what  is  supernatural  or 
miraculous  does  to  effect  it  at  once."  This  is 
Plato's  meaning  (De  Leg.  iv.  715)  when  he  says 
that  God  holds  the  beginning  and  end  and  middle 
of  all  that  exists,  and  proceeds  straight  on  his 
course,  making  his  circuit  according  to  nature 
(that  is,  by  a  fixed  order) ;  and  he  is  continually 
accompanied  by  justice,  who  punishes  those  who 


MAliCUS  AURELW8  ANTONINUS.  53 

deviate  from    the    divine    law,   that  is,  from   the 
order  or  course  which  God  observes. 

When  we  look  at  the  motions  of  the  planets, 
the  action  of  what  we  call  gravitation,  the  ele- 
mental combination  of  unorganized  bodies  and 
their  resolution,  the  production  of  plants  and  of 
living  bodies,  their  generation,  growth,  and  their 
dissolution,  which  we  call  their  death,  we  observe 
a  regular  sequence  of  phenomena,  which  within 
the  limits  of  experience  present  and  past,  so  far  as 
we  know  the  past,  is  fixed  and  invariable.  But  if 
this  is  not  so,  if  the  order  and  sequence  of  phe- 
nomena, as  known  to  us,  are  subject  to  change  in 
the  course  of  an  infinite  progression,  —  and  such 
change  is  conceivable,  —  we  have  not  discovered, 
nor  shall  we  ever  discover,  the  whole  of  the  order 
and  sequence  of  phenomena,  in  which  sequence 
there  may  be  involved  according  to  its  very 
nature,  that  is,  according  to  its  fixed  order,  some 
variation  of  what  we  now  call  the  Order  or  Nature 
of  Things.  It  is  also  conceivable  that  such 
changes  have  taken  place,  —  changes  in  the  order 
of  things,  as  we  are  compelled  by  the  imperfection 
of  language  to  call  them,  but  which  are  no 
changes ;  and  further  it  is  certain  that  our  knowl- 
edge of  the  true  sequence  of  all  actual  phenomena, 
as  for  instance  the  phenomena  of  generation, 
growth,  and  dissolution,  is  and  ever  must  be  im- 
perfect. 


54  PHILOSOPHY. 

We  do  not  fare  much  better  when  we  speak  of 
Causes  and  Effects  than  when  we  speak  of  Nature. 
For  the  practical  purposes  of  life  we  may  use  the 
terms  cause  and  effect  conveniently,  and  we  may 
fix  a  distinct  meaning  to  them,  distinct  enough  at 
least  to  prevent  all  misunderstanding.  But  the 
case  is  different  when  we  speak  of  causes  and 
effects  as  of  Things.  All  that  we  know  is  phe- 
nomena, as  the  Greeks  called  them,  or  appearances 
which  follow  one  another  in  a  regular  order,  as  we 
conceive  it,  so  that  if  some  one  phenomenon 
should  fail  in  the  series,  we  conceive  that  there 
must  either  be  an  interruption  of  the  series,  or 
that  something  else  will  appear  after  the  phenom- 
enon which  has  failed  to  appear,  and  will  occupy 
the  vacant  place;  and  so  the  series  in  its  pro- 
gression may  be  modified  or  totally  changed. 
Cause  and  effect  then  mean  nothing  in  the  se- 
quence of  natural  phenomena  beyond  what  I  have 
said ;  and  the  real  cause,  or  the  transcendent 
cause,  as  some  would  call  it,  of  each  successive 
phenomenon  is  in  that  which  is  the  cause  of  all 
things  which  are,  which  have  been,  and  which  will 
be  forever.  Thus  the  word  Creation  may  have  a 
real  sense  if  we  consider  it  as  the  first,  if  we  can 
conceive  a  first,  in  the  present  order  of  natural 
phenomena ;  but  in  the  vulgar  sense  a  creation  of 
all  things  at  a  certain  time,  followed  by  a  quies- 
cence of  the  first  cause  and  an  abandonment  of 


MAECUS  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.  5t> 

all  sequences  of  Phenomena  to  the  laws  of  Nature, 
or  to  the  other  words  that  people  may  use,  is 
absolutely  absurd.1 

Now,  though  there  is  great  difficulty  in  under- 
standing all  the  passages  of  Antoninus,  in  which 
he  speaks  of  Nature,  of  the  changes  of  things  and 
of  the  economy  of  the  universe,  I  am  convinced 
that  his  sense  of  Nature  and  Natural  is  the  same 
as  that  which  I  have  stated  ;  and  as  he  was  a  man 
who  knew  how  to  use  words  in  a  clear  way  and 
with  strict  consistency,  we  ought  to  assume,  even 
if  his  meaning  in  some  passages  is  doubtful,  that 
his  view  of  Nature  was  in  harmony  with  his  fixed 
belief  in  the  all-pervading,  ever  present,  and  ever 
active  energy  of  God.  (ii.  4  ;  iv.  40  ;  x.  1 ;  vi.  40 ; 
and  other  passages.  Compare  Seneca,  De  Benef. 
iv.  7.  Swedenborg,  Angelic  Wisdom,  349  -  357.) 

1  Time  and  space  are  the  conditions  of  our  thought ;  but 
time  infinite  and  space  infinite  cannot  be  objects  of  thought, 
except  in  a  very  imperfect  way.  Time  and  space  must  not 
in  any  way  be  thought  of  when  we  think  of  the  Deity. 
Swedenborg  says,  "  The  natural  man  may  believe  that  he 
would  have  no  thought,  if  the  ideas  of  time,  of  space,  and 
of  things  material  were  taken  away;  for  upon  those  is 
founded  all  the  thought  that  man  has.  But  let  him  know 
that  the  thoughts  are  limited  and  confined  in  proportion  as 
they  partake  of  time,  of  space,  and  of  what  is  material ;  and 
that  they  are  not  limited  and  are  extended,  in  proportion  as 
they  do  not  partake  of  those  things ;  since  the  mind  is  so  far 
elevated  above  the  things  corporeal  and  worldly''  (Concern- 
ing Heaven  and  Hell,  169). 


56  PHILOSOPHY. 

There  is  much  in  Antoninus  that  is  hard  to 
understand,  and  it  might  be  said  that  he  did  not 
fully  comprehend  all  that  he  wrote ;  which  would 
however  be  in  no  way  remarkable,  for  it  happens 
now  that  a  man  may  write  what  neither  he  nor 
anybody  can  understand.  Antoninus  tells  us 
(xii.  10)  to  look  at  things  and  see  what  they  are, 
resolving  them  into  the  material  (^77),  the  casual 
(OUTIOV),  and  the  relation  (ava<j>opd),  or  the  purpose, 
by  which  he  seems  to  mean  something  in  the 
nature  of  what  we  call  effect,  or  end.  The  word 
Cause  (ama)  is  the  difficulty.  There  is  the  same 
word  in  the  Sanscrit  (h£tu) ;  and  the  subtle  phil- 
osophers of  India  and  of  Greece,  and  the  less 
subtle  philosophers  of  modern  times,  have  all 
used  this  word,  or  an  equivalent  word,  in  a  vague 
way.  Yet  the  confusion  sometimes  may  be  in  the 
inevitable  ambiguity  of  language  rather  than  in 
the  mind  of  the  writer,  for  I  cannot  think  that 
some  of  the  wisest  of  men  did  not  know  what  they 
intended  to  say.  When  Antoninus  says  (iv.  36), 
"that  everything  that  exists  is  in  a  manner  the 
seed  of  that  which  will  be,"  he  might  be  supposed 
to  say  what  some  of  the  Indian  philosophers  have 
said,  and  thus  a  profound  truth  might  be  con- 
verted into  a  gross  absurdity.  But  he  says,  "  in 
a  manner,"  and  in  a  manner  he  said  true  ;  and  in 
another  manner,  if  you  mistake  his  meaning,  he 
said  false.  When  Plato  said,  "Nothing  ever  is, 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  57 

but  is  always  becoming  "  (ad  ytyvcrat),  he  delivered 
a  text,  out  of  which  we  may  derive  something ; 
for  he  destroys  by  it  not  all  practical,  but  all 
speculative  notions  of  cause  and  effect.  The 
whole  series  of  things,  as  they  appear  to  us,  must 
be  contemplated  in  time,  that  is  in  succession, 
and  we  conceive  or  suppose  intervals  between 
one  state  of  things  and  another  state  of  things, 
so  that  there  is  priority  and  sequence,  and  inter- 
val, and  Being,  and  a  ceasing  to  Be,  and  begin- 
ing  and  ending.  But  there  is  nothing  of  the 
kind  in  the  Nature  of  Things.  It  is  an  everlast- 
ing continuity  (iv.  45 ;  vii.  75).  When  Antoninus 
speaks  of  generation  (x.  26),  he  speaks  of  one 
cause  (  ama)  acting,  and  then  another  cause  taking 
up  the  work,  which  the  former  left  in  a  certain 
state,  and  so  on ;  and  we  might  perhaps  conceive 
that  he  had  some  notion  like  what  has  been 
called  "the  self -evolving  power  of  nature  ;  "  a  fine 
phrase  indeed,  the  full  import  of  which  I  believe 
that  the  writer  of  it  did  not  see,  and  thus  he  laid 
himself  open  to  the  imputation  of  being  a  follower 
of  one  of  the  Hindu  sects,  which  makes  all 
things  come  by  evolution  out  of  nature  or  matter, 
or  out  of  something  which  takes  the  place  of 
Deity,  but  is  not  Deity.  I  would  have  all  men 
think  as  they  please,  or  as  they  can,  and  I  only 
claim  the  same  freedom  which  I  give.  When  a 
man  writes  anything,  we  may  fairly  try  to  find  out 


58  PHILOSOPHY. 

all  that  his  words  must  mean,  even  if  the  result  is 
that  they  mean  what  he  did  not  mean ;  and  if 
we  find  this  contradiction,  it  is  not  our  fault,  but 
his  misfortune.  Now  Antoninus  is  perhaps  some- 
what in  this  condition  in  what  he  says  (x.  26), 
though  he  speaks  at  the  end  of  the  paragraph  of 
the  power  which  acts,  unseen  by  the  eyes,  but  still 
no  less  clearly.  But  whether  in  this  passage  (x. 
26)  he  means  that  the  power  is  conceived  to  be  in 
the  different  successive  causes  (CUTMU),  or  in  some- 
thing else,  nobody  can  tell.  From  other  passages, 
however,  I  do  collect  that  his  notion  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  universe  is  what  I  have  stated. 
The  Deity  works  unseen,  if  we  may  use  such 
language,  and  perhaps  I  may,  as  Job  did,  or  he 
who  wrote  the  book  of  Job.  "In  him  we  live 
and  move  and  are,"  said  St.  Paul  to  the  Athenians; 
and  to  show  his  hearers  that  this  was  no  new  doc- 
trine, he  quoted  the  Greek  poets.  One  of  these 
poets  was  the  Stoic  Cleanthes,  whose  noble  hymn 
to  Zeus,  or  God,  is  an  elevated  expression  of  de- 
votion and  philosophy.  It  deprives  Nature  of  her 
power,  and  puts  her  under  the  immediate  govern- 
ment of  the  Deity. 

"  Thee  all  this  heaven,  which  whirls  around  the  earth, 
Obeys  and  willing  follows  where  thou  leadest. 
Without  thee,  God,  nothing  is  done  on  earth, 
Nor  hi  the  ethereal  realms,  nor  in  the  sea, 
Save  what  the  wicked  through  their  folly  do." 
Antoninus'  conviction   of  the  existence  of  a  di- 


MARCUS  A  UEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  59 

vine  power  and  government  was  founded  on  his 
perception  of  the  order  of  the  universe.  Like 
Socrates  (Xen.  Mem.  iv.  3,  13,  &c.),  he  says  that 
though  we  cannot  see  the  forms  of  divine  powers, 
we  know  that  they  exist  because  we  see  their 
works. 

"  To  those  who  ask,  Where  hast  thou  seen  the 
gods,  or  how  dost  thou  comprehend  that  they  ex- 
ist and  so  worshippest  them  ?  I  answer,  in  the  first 
place,  that  they  may  be  seen  even  with  the  eyes ; 
in  the  second  place,  neither  have  I  seen  my  own 
soul,  and  yet  I  honor  it.  Thus  then  with  respect 
to  the  gods,  from  what  I  constantly  experience  of 
their  power,  from  this  I  comprehend  that  they  ex- 
ist, arid  I  venerate  them."  (xii.  28,  and  the  note. 
Comp.  Aristotle  de  Mundo,  c.  6 ;  Xen.  Mem.  i.  4, 
9 ;  Cicero,  Tuscul.  i.  28,  29 ;  St.  Paul's  Epistle  to 
the  Romans,  i.  19,  20 ;  and  Montaigne's  Apology 
for  Raimond  de  Sebonde,  ii.  c.  12.)  This  is  a  very 
old  argument,  which  has  always  had  great  weight 
with  most  people,  and  has  appeared  sufficient. 
It  does  not  acquire  the  least  additional  strength 
by  being  developed  in  a  learned  treatise.  It  is  as 
intelligible  in  its  simple  enunciation  as  it  can  be 
made.  If  it  is  rejected,  there  is  no  arguing  with 
him  who  rejects  it:  and  if  it  is  worked  out 
into  innumerable  particulars,  the  value  of  the 
evidence  runs  the  risk  of  being  buried  under  a 
mass  of  words. 


60  PHILOSOPHY. 

Man  being  conscious  that  he  is  a  spiritual  power 
or  an  intellectual  power,  or  that  he  has  such  a 
power,  in  whatever  way  he  conceives  that  he  has 
it,  —  for  I  wish  simply  to  state  a  fact,  —  from  this 
power  which  he  has  in  himself,  he  is  led,  as  Anto- 
ninus says,  to  believe  that  there  is  a  greater  power, 
which,  as  the  old  Stoics  tell  us,  pervades  the  whole 
universe  as  the  intellect1  (vo£s)  pervades  man. 

1  I  have  always  translated  the  word  vovs,  "  intelligence"  or 
"intellect."  It  appears  to  be  the  word  used  by  the  oldest 
Greek  philosophers  to  express  the  notion  of  "intelligence" 
as  opposed  to  the  notion  of  "  matter."  I  have  always  trans- 
lated the  word  X67os  by  "reason,"  and  Xoyixh  by  the  word 
"rational,"  or  perhaps  sometimes  "reasonable,"  as  I  have 
translated  voep6s  by  the  word  "  intellectual."  Every  man  who 
has  thought  and  has  read  any  philosophical  writings  knows 
the  difficulty  of  finding  words  to  express  certain  notions, 
how  imperfectly  words  express  these  notions,  and  how  care, 
lessly  the  words  are  often  used.  The  various  senses  of  the 
word  X67os  are  enough  to  perplex  any  man.  Our  translators 
of  the  New  Testament  (St.  John,  c.  i.)  have  simply  trans- 
lated 6  \67os  by  "  the  word,"  as  the  Germans  translated  it  by 
"das  Wort;"  but  in  their  theological  writings  they  some- 
times retain  the  original  term  Logos.  The  Germans  have  a 
term  Vernunft,  which  seems  to  come  nearest  to  our  word 
Reason,  or  the  necessary  and  absolute  truths  which  we  can- 
not conceive  as  being  other  than  what  they  are.  Such  are 
what  some  people  have  called  the  laws  of  thought,  the  con- 
ceptions of  space  and  of  time,  and  axioms  or  first  principles, 
which  need  no  proof  and  cannot  be  proved  or  denied.  Ac- 
cordingly the  Germans  can  say,  "  Gott  ist  die  hochste  Ver- 
nunft," the  Supreme  Reason.  The  Germans  have  also  a 
word  Verstand,  which  seems  to  represent  our  word  "under- 
standing," "intelligence,"  ''intellect,"  not  as  a  thing  abso- 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  61 

(Compare  Epictetus'  Discourses,  i.  14  ;  and  Vol- 
taire a  Made.  Necker,  vol.  Ixvii.  p.  278,  ed.  Lequien.) 
God  exists  then,  but  what  do  we  know  of  his 
nature?  Antoninus  says  that  the  soul  of  man  is 
an  efflux  from  the  divinity.  We  have  bodies  like 
animals,  but  we  have  reason,  intelligence,  as  the 
gods.  Animals  have  life  (^x7?)?  an(i  what  we  call 


lute  which  exists  by  itself,  but  as  a  thing  connected  with  an 
individual  being,  as  a  man.  Accordingly  it  is  the  capacity 
of  receiving  impressions  (Vorsteliungen,  <f>avra.(rlai),  and 
forming  from  them  distinct  ideas  (Begriffe)  ,  and  perceiving 
differences.  I  do  not  think  that  these  remarks  will  help  the 
reader  to  the  understanding  of  Antoninus,  or  his  use  of  the 
words  wOj  and  \&yos.  The  emperor's  meaning  must  be  got 
from  his  own  words,  and  if  it  does  not  agree  altogether 
with  modern  notions,  it  is  not  our  business  to  force  it  into 
agreement,  but  simply  to  find  out  what  his  meaning  is,  if  we 
can. 

Justinus  (ad  Diognetum,  c.  vii.)  says  that  the  omnipotent, 
all-creating,  and  invisible  God  has  fixed  truth  and  the  holy, 
incomprehensible  Logos  in  men's  hearts;  and  this  Logos 
is  the  architect  and  creator  of  the  Universe.  Iii  the  first 
Apology  (c.  xxxli.)  he  says  that  the  seed  (cnr^/za)  from  God 
is  the  Logos,  which  dwells  in  those  who  believe  in  God.  So 
it  appears  that  according  to  Justinus  the  Logos  is  only  in 
such  believers.  In  the  second  Apology  (c.  viii.)  he  speaks 
of  the  seed  of  the  Logos  being  implanted  in  all  mankind  ;  but 
those  who  order  their  lives  according  to  Logos,  such  as  the 
Stoics,  have  only  a  portion  of  the  Logos  (/card  ffirepfMTiKov 
\6yov  /^pos),  and  have  not  the  knowledge  and  contemplation 
of  the  entire  Logos,  which  is.  Christ.  Swedenborg's  remarks 
(Angelic  Wisdom,  240)  are  worth  comparing  with  Justinus. 
The  modern  philosopher  in  substance  agrees  with  the  an- 
cient •,  but,  he  is  more  precise. 


62  PHILOSOPHY. 

instincts  or  natural  principles  of  action :  but  the 
rational  animal  man  alone  has  a  rational,  intelli- 
gent soul  («/^x^  ^oytAoj,  vocpa).  Antoninus  insists 
on  this  continually:  God  is  in  man,1  and  so  we 
must  constantly  attend  to  the  divinity  within  us, 
for  it  is  only  in  this  way  that  we  can  have  any 
knowledge  of  the  nature  of  God.  The  human 
soul  is  in  a  sense  a  portion  of  the  divinity,  and  the 
soul  alone  has  any  communication  with  the  Deity  ; 
for  as  he  says  (xii.  2)  :  "  With  his  intellectual  part 
alone  God  touches  the  intelligence  only  which  has 
flowed  and  been  derived  from  himself  into  these 
bodies."  In  fact  he  says  that  which  is  hidden  with- 
in a  man  is  life,  that  is,  the  man  himself.  All  the 
rest  is  vesture,  covering,  organs,  instrument,  which 
the  living  man,  the  real2  man,  uses  for  the  purpose 
of  his  present  existence.  The  air  is  universally 
diffused  for  him  who  is  able  to  respire ;  and  so  for 
him  who  is  willing  to  partake  of  it  the  intelligent 
power,  which  holds  within  it  all  things,  is  diffused 
as  wide  and  free  as  the  air  (viii.  54).  It  is  by  liv- 
ing a  divine  life  that  man  approaches  to  a  knowl- 

1  Comp.  Ep.  to  the  Corinthians,  i.  3.  17,  and  James  iv.  8, 
"  Draw  nigh  to  God  and  he  will  draw  nigh  to  you." 

2  This  is  also  Swedenborg's  doctrine  of  the  soul.     "  As  to 
what  concerns  the  soul,  of  which  it  is  said  that  it  shall  live 
after  death,  it  is  nothing  else  but  the  man  himself,  who  lives 
in  the  body,  that  is,  the  interior  man,  who  by  the  body  acts 
in  the  world  and  from  whom  the  body  itself  lives  "  (quoted 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  63 

edge  of  the  divinity.1  It  is  by  following  the 
divinity  within,  £ufu»y  or  0eos,  as  Antoninus  calls  it, 
that  man  comes  nearest  to  the  Deity,  the  supreme 
good  ;  for  man  can  never  attain  to  perfect  agree- 
ment with  his  internal  guide  (TO  ^ye/Aw/coV).  "  Live 


by  Clissold,  p.  456  of  "  The  Practical  Nature  of  the  Theo- 
logical Writings  of  Emanuel  Swedenborg,  in  a  Letter  to  the 
Archbishop  of  Dublin  (Whately),"  second  edition,  1859;  a 
book  which  theologians  might  read  with  profit).  This  is  an 
old  doctrine  of  the  soul,  which  has  been  often  proclaimed, 
but  never  better  expressed  than  by  the  "  Auctor  de  Mundo." 
c.  6,  quoted  by  Gataker  in  his  "Antoninus,"  p.  436.  The 
soul  by  which  we  live  and  have  cities  and  houses  is  invisible, 
but  it  is  seen  by  its  works;  for  the  whole  method  of  life 
has  been  devised  by  it  and  ordered,  and  by  it  is  held  to- 
gether. In  like  manner  we  must  think  also  about  the  Deity, 
who  in  power  is  most  mighty,  in  beauty  most  comely,  in  life 
immortal,  and  in  virtue  supreme  :  wherefore  though  he  is 
invisible  to  human  nature,  he  is  seen  by  his  very  works.'' 
Other  passages  to  the  same  purpose  are  quoted  by  Gataker 
(p.  382).  Bishop  Butler  has  the  same  as  to  the  soul  :  "  Up- 
on the  whole,  then,  our  organs  of  sense  and  our  limbs  are 
certainly  instruments,  which  the  living  persons,  ourselves, 
make  use  of  to  perceive  and  move  with."  If  this  is  not 
plain  enough,  he  also  says:  "It  follows  that  our  organized 
bodies  are  no  more  ourselves,  or  part  of  ourselves,  than  any 
other  matter  around  us."  (Compare  Anton,  x.  38). 

1  The  reader  may  consult  Discourse  V.  "Of  the  existence 
and  nature  of  God,"  in  John  Smith's  "  Select  Discourses." 
He  has  prefixed  as  a  text  to  this  Discourse,  the  striking  pas- 
sage of  Agapetus,  Paraenes.  §  3  :  "He  who  knows  himself 
will  know  God  ;  and  he  who  knows  God  will  be  made  like  to 
God;  and  he  will  be  made  like  to  God,  who  has  become 
worthy  God;  and  he  becomes  worthy  of  God,  who  does 


64  PHILOSOPHY. 

with  the  gods.  And  he  does  live  with  the  gods 
who  constantly  shows  to  them  that  his  own  soul  is 
satisfied  with  that  which  is  assigned  to  him,  and 
that  it  does  all  the  daemon  (Sai/xcov)  wishes,  which 
Zeus  hath  given  to  every  man  for  his  guardian  and 
guide,  a  portion  of  himself.  And  this  daemon  is 
every  man's  understanding  and  reason"  (v.  27). 

There  is  in  man,  that  is  in  the  reason,  the  intel- 
ligence, a  superior  faculty  which  if  it  is  exercised 
rules  all  the  rest.  This  is  the  ruling  faculty  (TO 
lyye/xoviKoV) ,  which  Cicero  (De  Natura  Deorum,  ii.  11) 
renders  by  the  Latin  word  Principatus,  "  to  which 
nothing  can  or  ought  to  be  superior."  Antoninus 
often  uses  this  term  and  others  which  are  equiv- 
alent. He  names  it  (vii.  64)  "the  governing  intel- 
ligence." The  governing  faculty  is  the  master  of 
the  soul  (v.  26).  A  man  must  reverence  only  his 
ruling  faculty  and  the  divinity  within  him.  As  we 
must  reverence  that  which  is  supreme  in  the  uni- 
verse, so  we  must  reverence  that  which  is  supreme 
in  ourselves  ;  and  this  is  that  which  is  of  like  kind 
with  that  which  is  supreme  in  the  universe  (v.  21). 
So,  as  Plotinus  says,  the  soul  of  man  can  only  know 

nothing  unworthy  of  God,  but  thinks  the  tilings  that  are  his, 
and  speaks  what  he  thinks,  and  does  what  he  speaks."  I 
suppose  that  the  old  saying,  "  Knew  thyself,"  which  is  attrib- 
uted to  Socrates  and  others,  had  a  larger  meaning  than  the 
narrow  sense  which  is  generally  given  to  it.  (Agapetus,  ed. 
Stephan.  Schoning,  Franeker,  1608.  This  volume  contains 
also  the  Paraeneses  of  Nilus.) 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  65 

the  divine  so  far  as  it  knows  itself.  In  one  passage 
(xi.  19)  Antoninus  speaks  of  a  man's  condemnation 
of  himself  when  the  diviner  part  within  him  has 
been  overpowered  and  yields  to  the  less  honorable 
and  to  the  perishable  part,  the  body,  and  its  gross 
pleasures.  In  a  word,  the  views  of  Antoninus  on 
this  matter,  however  his  expressions  may  vary,  are 
exactly  what  Bishop  Butler  expresses  when  he 
speaks  of  "  the  natural  supremacy  of  reflection  or 
conscience,"  of  the  faculty  "  which  surveys,  ap- 
proves, or  disapproves  the  several  affections  of 
ou*:  mind  and  actions  of  our  lives." 

Much  matter  might  be  collected  from  Antoni- 
nus on  the  notion  of  the  Universe  being  one 
animated  Being.  But  all  that  he  says  amounts  to 
no  more,  as  Schultz  remarks,  than  this :  the  soul 
of  man  is  most  intimately  united  to  his  body,  and 
together  they  make  one  animal,  which  we  call 
man ;  so  the  Deity  is  most  intimately  united  to 
the  world,  or  the  material  universe,  and  together 
they  form  one  whole.  But  Antoninus  did  not 
view  God  and  the  material  universe  as  the  same, 
any  more  than  he  viewed  the  body  and  soul  of 
man  as  one.  Antoninus  has  no  speculations  on 
the  absolute  nature  of  the  Deity.  It  was  not  his 
fashion  to  waste  his  time  on  -what  man  cannot 
understand.1  He  was  satisfied  that  God  exists, 

1  "  God,  who  is  infinitely  beyond  the  reach  of  our  narrow 
capacities "  (Locke,  Essay  concerning  the  Human  •  Under- 
standing, ii.  chap.  17), 


66  PHILOSOPHY. 

that  he  governs  all  things,  that  man  can  only  have 
an  imperfect  knowledge  of  his  nature,  and  he 
must  attain  this  imperfect  knowledge  by  rever- 
encing the  divinity  which  is  within  him,  and  keep- 
ing it  pure. 

From  all  that  has  been  said,  it  follows  that  the 
universe  is  administered  by  the  Providence  of 
God  (77y>oVota),  and  that  all  things  are  wisely 
ordered.  There  are  passages  in  which  Antoni- 
nus expresses  doubts,  or  states  different  possible 
theories  of  the  constitution  and  government  of 
the  universe ;  but  he  always  recurs  to  his  funda- 
mental principle,  that  if  we  admit  the  existence 
of  a  deity,  we  must  also  admit  that  he  orders  all 
tilings  wisely  and  well  (iv.  27 ;  vi.  1 ;  ix.  28 ;  xii. 
5;  and  many  other  passages).  Epic.tetus  says 
(i.  6)  that  we  can  discern  the  providence  which 
rules  the  world,  if  we  possess  two  things,  —  the 
power  of  seeing  all  that  happens  with  respect  to 
each  thing,  and  a  grateful  disposition. 

But  if  all  things  are  wisely  ordered,  how  is  the 
world  so  full  of  what  we  call  evil,  physical  and 
moral  ?  If  instead  of  saying  that  there  is  evil  in 
the  world,  we  use  the  expression  which  I  have 
used,  "  what  we  call  evil,"  we  have  partly  antici- 
pated the  emperor's  answer.  We  see  and  feel  and 
know  imperfectly  very  few  things  in  the  few 
years  that  we  live,  and  all  the  knowledge  and  all 
the  experience  of  all  the  human  race  is  positive 


MAE C US  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  67 

ignorance  of  the  whole,  which  is  infinite.  Now. 
as  our  reason  teaches  us  that  everything  is  in 
some  way  related  to  and  connected  with  every 
other  thing,  all  notion  of  evil  as  being  in  the 
universe  of  things  is  a  contradiction;  for  if  the 
whole  comes  from  and  is  governed  by  an  intelli- 
gent being,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  anything 
in  it  which  tends  to  the  evil  or  destruction  of  the 
whole  (viii.  55;  x.  6).  Everything  is  in  constant 
mutation,  and  yet  the  whole  subsists.  We  might 
imagine  the  solar  system  resolved  into  its  elemen- 
tal parts,  and  yet  the  whole  would  still  subsist 
"  ever  young  and  perfect." 

All  things,  all  forms,  are  dissolved  and  new 
forms  appear.  All  living  things  undergo  the 
change  which  we  call  death.  If  we  call  death  an 
evil,  then  all  change  is  an  evil.  Living  beings 
also  suffer  pain,  and  man  suffers  most  of  all,  for 
he  suffers  both  in  and  by  his  body  and  by  his 
intelligent  part.  Men  suffer  also  from  one  an- 
other, and  perhaps  the  largest  part  of  human 
suffering  comes  to  man  from  those  whom  he  calls 
his  brothers.  Antoninus  says  (viii.  55),  "  Gen- 
erally, wickedness  does  no  harm  at  all  to  the  uni- 
verse; and  particularly,  the  wickedness  [of  one 
man]  does  no  harm  to  another.  It  is  only  harmful 
to  him  who  has  it  in  his"  power  to  be  released  from 
it  as  soon  as  he  shall  choose."  The  first  part  of 
this  is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  doctrine  that 


68  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  whole  can  sustain  no  evil  or  harm.  The  second 
part  must  be  explained  by  the  Stoic  principle  that 
there  is  no  evil  in  anything  which  is  not  in  our 
power.  What  wrong  we  suffer  from  another  is  his 
evil,  not  ours.  But  this  is  an  admission  that  there 
is  evil  in  a  sort,  for  he  who  does  wrong  does  evil, 
arid  if  others  can  endure  the  wrong,  still  there  is 
evil  in  the  wrong-doer.  Antoninus  (xi.  18)  gives 
many  excellent  precepts  with  respect  to  wrongs 
and  injuries,  and  his  precepts  are  practical.  He 
teaches  us  to  bear  what  we  cannot  avoid,  and  his 
lessons  may  be  just  as  useful  to  him  who  denies 
the  being  and  the  government  of  God  as  to  him 
who  believes  in  both.  There  is  no  direct  answer 
in  Antoninus  to  the  objections  which  may  be 
made  to  the  existence  and  providence  of  God 
because  of  the  moral  disorder  and  suffering  which 
are  in  the  world,  except  this  answer  which  he 
makes  in  reply  to  the  supposition  that  even  the 
best  men  may  be  extinguished  by  death.  He 
says  if  it  is  so,  we  may  be  sure  that  if  it  ought 
to  have  been  otherwise,  the  gods  would  have 
ordered  it  otherwise  (xii.  5).  His  conviction  of 
the  wisdom  which  we  may  observe  in  the  govern- 
ment of  the  world  is  too  strong  to  be  disturbed 
by  any  apparent  irregularities  in  the  order  of 
things.  That  these  disorders  exist  is  a  fact,  and 
those  who  would  conclude  from  them  against  the 
being  and  government  of  God  conclude  too  has- 


MAR  CUP!  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  69 

tily.  We  all  admit  that  there  is  an  order  in  the 
material  world,  a  Nature,  in  the  sense  in  which 
that  word  has  been  explained,  a  constitution 
(Karao-Kevi;),  what  we  call  a  system,  a  relation  of 
parts  to  one  another  and  a  fitness  of  the  whole  for 
something.  So  in  the  constitution  of  plants  and  of 
animals  there  is  an  order,  a  fitness  for  some  end. 
Sometimes  the  order,  as  we  conceive  it,  is  inter- 
rupted and  the  end,  as  we  conceive  it,  is  not 
attained.  The  seed,  the  plant,  or  the  animal 
sometimes  perishes  before  it  has  passed  through 
all  its  changes  and  done  all  its  uses.  It  is  accord- 
ing to  Nature,  that  is  a  fixed  order,  for  some  to 
perish  early  and  for  others  to  do  all  their  uses  and 
leave  successors  to  take  their  place.  So  man  has 
a  corporeal  and  intellectual  and  moral  constitution 
fit  for  certain  uses,  and  on  the  whole  man  per- 
forms these  uses,  dies,  and  leaves  other  men  in  his 
place.  So  society  exists,  and  a  social  state  is 
manifestly  the  natural  state  of  man, — the  state  for 
which  his  nature  fits  him,  and  society  amidst  in- 
numerable irregularities  and  disorders  still  sub- 
sists ;  and  perhaps  we  may  say  that  the  history  of 
the  past  and  our  present  knowledge  give  us  a 
reasonable  hope  that  its  disorders  will  diminish, 
and  that  order,  its  governing  principle,  may  be 
more  firmly  established.  As  order  then,  a  fixed  or- 
der, we  may  say,  subject  to  deviations  real  or  appar- 
ent, must  be  admitted  to  exist  in  the  whole  nature 


70  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  things,  that  which  we  call  disorder  or  evil,  as  it 
seems  to  us,  does  not  in  any  way  alter  the  fact  of 
the  general  constitution  of  things  having  a  nature 
or  fixed  order.  Nobody  will  conclude  from  the 
existence  of  disorder  that  order  is  not  the  rule,  for 
the  existence  of  order  both  physical  and  moral  is 
proved  by  daily  experience  and  all  past  experience. 
We  cannot  conceive  how  the  order  of  the  universe 
is  maintained :  we  cannot  even  conceive  how  our 
own  life  from  day  to  day  is  continued,  nor  how 
we  perform  the  simplest  movements  of  the  body, 
nor  how  we  grow  and  think  and  act,  though  we 
know  many  of  the  conditions  which  are  necessary 
for  all  these  functions.  Knowing  nothing  then  of 
the  unseen  power  which  acts  in  ourselves  except  by 
what  is  done,  we  know  nothing  of  the  power  which 
acts  through  what  we  call  all  time  and  all  space ; 
but  seeing  that  there  is  a  nature  or  fixed  order  in 
all  things  known  to  us,  it  is  conformable  to  the  na- 
ture of  our  minds  to  believe  that  this  universal 
Nature  has  a  cause  which  operates  continually,  and 
that  we  are  totally  unable  to  speculate  on  the  rea- 
son of  any  of  those  disorders  or  evils  which  we  per- 
ceive. This  I  believe  is  the  answer  which  may  be 
collected  from  all  that  Antoninus  has  said.1 
1  Cleauthes  says  in  his  Hymn :  — 

"  For  all  things  good  and  bad  to  One  thou  formest, 
So  that  One  everlasting  reason  governs  all." 

See  Bishop  Butler's  Sermons.     Sermon  XV.,   "Upon  the 
Ignorance  of  Man." 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  71 

The  origin  of  evil  is  an  old  question.  Achilles 
tells  Priam  (Iliad,  24,  527)  that  Zeus  has  two 
casks,  one  filled  with  good  things,  and  the  other 
with  bad,  and  that  he  gives  to  men  out  of  each 
according  to  his  pleasure ;  and  so  we  must  be 
content,  for  we  cannot  alter  the  will  of  Zeus. 
One  of  the  Greek  commentators  asks  how  must 
we  reconcile  this  doctrine  with  what  we  find  in 
the  first  book  of  the  Odyssey,  where  the  king  of 
the  gods  says,  Men  say  that  evil  comes  to  them 
from  us,  but  they  bring  it  on  themselves  through 
their  own  folly.  The  answer  is  plain  enough  even 
to  the  Greek  commentator.  The  poets  make  both 
Achilles  and  Zeus  speak  appropriately  to  their 
several  characters.  Indeed,  Zeus  says  plainly  that 
men  do  attribute  their  sufferings  to  the  gods,  but 
they  do  it  falsely,  for  they  are  the  cause  of  their 
own  sorrows. 

Epictetus  in  his  Enchiridion  (c.  27)  makes  short 
work  of  the  question  of  evil.  He  says,  "  As  a 
mark  is  not  set  up  for  the  purpose  of  missing  it,  so 
neither  does  the  nature  of  evil  exist  in  the  uni- 
verse." This  will  appear  obscure  enough  to  those 
who  are  not  acquainted  with  Epictetus,  but  he 
always  knows  what  he  is  talking  about.  We  do 
not  set  up  a  mark  in  order  to  miss  it,  though  we 
may  miss  it.  God,  whose  existence  Epictetus 
assumes,  has  not  ordered  all  things  so  that  his 
purpose  shall  fail.  Whatever  there  may  be  of 


|2  PHILOSOPHY. 

what  we  call  evil,  the  nature  of  evil,  as  he 
expresses  it,  does  not  exist ;  that  is,  evil  is  not  a 
part  of  the  constitution  or  nature  of  things.  If 
there  were  a  principle  of  evil  (a-pxyi)  in  the  consti- 
tution of  things,  evil  would  no  longer  be  evil,  as 
Simplicius  argues,  but  evil  would  be  good.  Sim- 
plicius  (c.  34,  [27])  has  a  long  and  curious  dis- 
course on  this  text  of  Epictetus,  and  it  is  amusing 
and  instructive. 

One  passage  more  will  conclude  this  matter.  It 
contains  all  that  the  emperor  could  say  (ii.  11)  : 
"  To  go  from  among  men,  if  there  are  gods,  is  not 
a  thing  to  be  afraid  of,  for  the  gods  will  not 
involve  thee  in  evil ;  but  if  indeed  they  do  not 
exist,  or  if  they  have  no  concern  about  human 
affairs,  what  is  it  to  me  to  live  in  a  universe 
devoid  of  gods  or  devoid  of  providence  ?  But  in 
truth  they  do  exist,  and  they  do  care  for  human 
things,  and  they  have  put  all  the  means  in  man's 
power  to  enable  him  not  to  fall  into  real  evils. 
And  as  to  the  rest,  if  there  was  anything  evil, 
they  would  have  provided  for  this  also,  that  it 
should  be  altogether  in  a  man's  power  not  to  fall 
into  it.  But  that  which  does  not  make  a  man 
worse,  how  can  it  make  a  man's  life  worse  ?  But 
neither  through  ignorance,  nor  having  the  knowl- 
edge but  not  the  power  to  guard  against  or  correct 
these  things,  is  it  possible  that  the  nature  of  the 
universe  has  overlooked  them ;  nor  is  it  possible 


MAE C US  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  73 

that  it  has  made  so  great  a  mistake,  either  through 
want  of  power  or  want  of  skill,  that  good  and  evil 
should  happen  indiscriminately  to  the  good  and 
the  bad.  But  death  certainly  and  life,  honor  and 
dishonor,  pain  and  pleasure,  all  these  things 
equally  happen  to  good  and  bad  men,  being  things 
which  make  us  neither  better  nor  worse.  There- 
fore they  are  neither  good  nor  evil." 
"fc  The  Ethical  part  of  Antoninus'  Philosophy 
follows  from  his  general  principles.  The  end  of 
all  his  philosophy  is  to  live  conformably  to  Nature, 
both  a  man's  own  nature  and  the  nature  of  the 
universe.  Bishop  Butler  has  explained  what  the 
Greek  philosophers  meant  when  they  spoke  of 
living  according  to  Nature,  and  he  says  that  when 
it  is  explained,  as  he  has  explained  it  and  as  they 
understood  it,  it  is  "a  manner  of  speaking  not 
loose  and  undeterrninate,  but  clear  and  distinct, 
strictly  just  and  true."  To  live  according  to 
Nature  is  to  live  according  to  a  man's  whole 
nature,  not  according  to  a  part  of  it,  and  to 
reverence  the  divinity  within  him  as  the  governor 
of  all  his  actions.  "To  the  rational  animal  the 
same  act  is  according  to  nature  and  according  to 
reason  " l  (vii.  11).  That  which  is  done  contrary 
to  reason  is  also  an  act  contrary  to  nature,  to  the 
whole  nature,  though  it  is  certainly  conformable 

1  This  is  what  Juvenal  means  when  he  says  (xiv.  321),  — 
"  Nunquam  aliud  Natnra  aliud  Sapieutia  elicit." 


74  PHILOSOPHY. 

to  some  part  of  man's  nature,  or  it  could  not  be 
done.  Man  is  made  for  action,  not  for  idleness  or 
pleasure.  As  plants  and  animals  do  the  uses  of 
their  nature,  so  man  must  do  his  (v.  1). 

Man  must  also  live  conformably  to  the  uni- 
versal nature,  conformably  to  the  nature  of  all 
things  of  which  he  is  one ;  and  as  a  citizen  of  a 
political  community  he  must  direct  his  life  and 
actions  .with  reference  to  those  among  whom,  and 
for  whom,  among  other  purposes,  he  lives.1  A 
man  must  not  retire  into  solitude  and  cut  himself 
off  from  his  fellow-men.  He  must  be  ever  active 
to  do  his  part  in  the  great  whole.  All  men  are 
his  kin,  not  only  in  blood,  but  still  more  by  par- 
ticipating in  the  same  intelligence  and  by  being  a 
portion  of  the  same  divinity.  A  man  cannot 
really  be  injured  by  his  brethren,  for  no  act  of 
theirs  can  make  him  bad,  and  he  must  not  be 
angry  with  them  nor  hate  them :  "  For  we  are 
made  for  co-operation,  like  feet,  like  hands,  like 
eyelids,  like  the  rows  of  the  upper  and  lower 
teeth.  To  act  against  one  another  then  is  con- 
trary to  nature ;  and  it  is  acting-  against  one 
another  to  be  vexed  and  to  turn  away'"  (ii.  1). 

Further  he  says :  "  Take  pleasure  in  one  thing 
and  rest  in  it  in  passing  from  one  social  act  to 
another  social  act,  thinking  of  God  "  (vi.  7). 
Again  :  "  Love  mankind.  Follow  God  "  (vii.  31). 

1  See  viii.  52 ;  and  Persius  iii.  66. 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  T5 

It  is  the  characteristic  of  the  rational  soul  for  a 
man  to  love  his  neighbor  (xi.  1).  Antoninus 
teaches  in  various  passages  the  forgiveness  of 
injuries,  and  we  know  that  he  also  practised  what 
he  taught.  Bishop  Butler  remarks  that  "this 
divine  precept  to  forgive  injuries  and  to  love  our 
enemies,  though  to  be  met  with  in  Gentile  moral- 
ists, yet  is  in  a  peculiar  sense  a  precept  of  Chris- 
tianity, as  our  Saviour  has  insisted  more  upon  it 
than  on  any  other  single  virtue."  The  practice 
of  this  precept  is  the  most  difficult  of  all  virtues. 
Antoninus  often  enforces  it  and  gives  us  aid 
towards  following  it.  When  we  are  injured,  we 
feel  anger  and  resentment,  and  the  feeling  is 
natural,  just,  and  useful  for  the  conservation  of 
society.  It  is  useful  that  wrong-doers  should 
feel  the  natural  consequences  of  their  actions, 
among  which  is  the  disapprobation  of  society  and 
the  resentment  of  him  who  is  wronged.  But 
revenge,  in  the  proper  sense  of  that  word,  must 
not  be  practised.  "  The  best  way  of  avenging 
thyself,"  says  the  emperor,  "  is  not  to  become  like 
the  wrong-doer."  It  is  plain  by  this  that  he  does 
not  mean  that  we  should  in  any  case  practise 
revenge  ;  but  he  says  to  those  who  talk  of  reveng- 
ing wrongs,  Be  not  like  him  who  has  done  the 
wrong.  Socrates  in  the  Crito  (c.  10)  says  the 
same  in  other  words,  arid  St.  Paul  (Ep.  to  the 
Romans,  xii,  17).  "  When  a  man  has  done  thee 


76  PHILOSOPHY. 

any  wrong,  immediately  consider  with  what  opin- 
ion about  good  or  evil  he  has  done  wrong.  For 
when  thou  hast  seen  this,  thou  wilt  pity  him  and 
wilt  neither  wonder  nor  be  angry "  (vii.  26). 
Antoninus  would  not  deny  that  wrong  naturally 
produces  the  feeling  of  anger  and  resentment,  for 
this  is  implied  in  the  recommendation  to  reflect 
on  the  nature  of  the  man's  mind  who  has  done 
the  wrong,  and  then  you  will  have  pity  instead  of 
resentment ;  and  so  it  comes  to  the  same  as  St. 
Paul's  advice  to  be  angry  and  sin  not ;  which,  as 
Butler  well  explains  it,  is  not  a  recommendation 
to  be  angry,  which  nobody  needs,  for  anger  is  a 
natural  passion,  but  it  is  a  warning  against  allow- 
ing anger  to  lead  us  into  sin.  In  short  the  em- 
peror's doctrine  about  wrongful  acts  is  this : 
wrong-doers  do  not  know  what  good  and  bad 
are  :  they  offend  out  of  ignorance,  and  in  the 
sense  of  the  Stoics  this  is  true.  Though  this 
kind  of  ignorance  will  never  be  admitted  as  a 
legal  excuse,  and  ought  not  to  be  admitted  as  a 
full  excuse  in  any  way  by  society,  there  may  be 
grievous  injuries,  such  as  it  is  in  a  man's  power  to 
forgive  without  harm  to  society ;  and  if  he  for- 
gives because  he  sees  that  his  enemies  know  not 
what  they  do,  he  is  acting  in  the  spirit  of  th 
sublime  prayer,  "Father,  forgive  them,  for  they 
know  not  what  they  do." 

The   emperor's    moral    philosophy   was   not    a 


>t 

: 

a 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  1 7 

feeble,  narrow  system,  which  teaches  a  man  to 
look  directly  to  his  own  happiness,  though  a  man's 
happiness  or  tranquillity  is  indirectly  promoted  by 
living  as  he  ought  to  do.  A  man  must  live  con- 
formably to  the  universal  nature,  which  means,  as 
the  emperor  explains  it  in  many  passages,  that  a 
man's  actions  must  be  conformable  to  his  true 
relations  to  all  other  human  beings,  both  as  a 
citizen  of  a  political  community  and  as  a  member 
of  the  whole  human  family.  This  implies,  and  he 
often  expresses  it  in  the  most  forcible  language, 
that  a  man's  words  and  action,  so  far  as  they 
affect  others,  must  be  measured  by  a  fixed  rule, 
which  is  their  consistency  with  the  conservation 
and  the  interests  of  the  particular  society  of 
which  he  is  a  member,  and  of  the  whole  human 
race.  To  live  conformably  to  such  a  rule,  a  man 
must  use  his  rational  faculties  in  order  to  discern 
clearly  the  consequences  and  full  effect  of  all  his 
actions  and  of  the  actions  of  others :  he  must  not 
live  a  life  of  contemplation  and  reflection  only, 
though  he  must  often  retire  within  himself  to 
calm  and  purify  his  soul  by  thought,1  but  he  must 
mingle  in  the  work  of  man  and  be  a  fellow  laborer 
for  the  general  good. 

A  man  should  have  an  object  or  purpose  in  life, 
that  he  may  direct  all  his  energies  to  it ;  of  course 

1  Ut  nemo  in  sese  tentat  descendere,  nemo.  —  Persius, 
iv.  21. 


78  PHILOSOPHY. 

a  good  object  (ii.  7).  He  who  has  not  one  object 
or  purpose  of  life,  cannot  be  one  and  the  same  all 
through  his  life  (xi.  21).  Bacon  has  a  remark  to 
the  same  effect,  on  the  best  means  of  "  reducing 
of  the  mind  unto  virtue  and  good  estate ;  which 
is,  the  electing  and  propounding  unto  a  man's  self 
good  and  virtuous  ends  of  his  life,  such  as  may  be 
in  a  reasonable  sort  within  his  compass  to  attain." 
He  is  a  happy  man  who  has  been  wise  enough  to 
do  this  when  he  was  young  and  has  had  the  oppor- 
tunities ;  but  the  emperor  seeing  well  that  a  man 
cannot  always  be  so  wise  in  his  youth,  encourages 
himself  to  do  it  when  he  can,  and  not  to  let  life 
slip  away  before  he  has  begun.  He  who  can  pro- 
pose to  himself  good  and  virtuous  ends  of  life^ 
and  be  true  to  them,  cannot  fail  to  live  conform- 
ably to  his  own  interest  and  the  universal  interest, 
for  in  the  nature  of  things  they  are  one.  If  a 
thing  is  not  good  for  the  hive,  it  is  not  good  for 
the  bee  (vi.  54). 

One  passage  may  end  this  matter.  "If  the 
gods  have  determined  about  me  and  about  the 
things  which  must  happen  to  me,-  they  have 
determined  well,  for  it  is  not  easy  even  'to  imagine 
a  deity  without  forethought;  and  as  to  doing 
me  harm,  why  should  they  have  any  desire 
towards  that  ?  For  what  advantage  would  re- 
sult to  them  from  this  or  to  the  whole,  which  is 
the  special  object  of  their  providence  ?  But  if 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  79 

they  have  not  determined  about  me  individually, 
they  have  certainly  determined  about  the  whole  at 
least ;  and  the  things  which  happen  by  way  of 
sequence  in  this  general  arrangement  I  ought  to 
accept  with  pleasure  and  to  be  content  with  them. 
But  if  they  determine  about  nothing  —  which  it 
is  wicked  to  believe,  or  if  we  do  believe  it,  let  us 
neithsr  sacrifice  nor  pray  nor  swear  by  them,  nor 
do  anything  else  which  we  do  as  if  the  gods  were 
present  and  lived  with  us  ;  but  if  however  the 
gods  determine  about  none  of  the  things  which 
concern  us,  I  am  able  to  determine  about  myself, 
and  I  can  inquire  about  that  which  is  useful ;  and 
that  is  useful  to  every  man  which  is  conformable 
to  his  own  constitution  (Karao-Kcv^)  and  nature. 
But  my  nature  is  rational  and  social ;  and  my  city 
and  country,  so  far  as  I  am  Antoninus,  is  Rome ; 
but  so  far  as  I  am  a  man,  it  is  the  world.  The 
things  then  which  are  useful  to  these  cities  are 
alone  useful  to  me  "  (viL  44). 

It  would  be  tedious,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to 
state  the  emperor's  opinions  on  all  the  ways  in 
which  a  man  may  profitably  use  his  understanding 
towards  perfecting  himself  in  practical  virtue. 
The  passages  to  this  purpose  are  in  all  parts  of  his 
book,  but  as  they  are  in  no  order  or  connection,  a 
man  must  use  the  book  a"  long  time  before  he  will 
find  out  all  that  is  in  it.  A  few  words  may  be 
added  here.  If  we  analyze  all  other  things,  we 


80  PHILOSOPHY. 

find  how  insufficient  they  are  for  human  life,  and 
how  truly  worthless  many  of  them  are.  Virtue 
alone  is  indivisible,  one,  and  perfectly  satisfying. 
The  notion  of  Virtue  cannot  be  considered  vague 
or  unsettled,  because  a  man  may  find  it  difficult 
to  explain  the  notion  fully  to  himself,  or  to  ex- 
pound it  to  others  in  such  a  way  as  to  prevent 
cavilling.  Virtue  is  a  whole,  and  no  more  con- 
sists of  parts  than  man's  intelligence  does ;  and 
yet  we  speak  of  various  intellectual  faculties  as  a 
convenient  way  of  expressing  the  various  powers 
which  man's  intellect  shows  by  his  works.  In  the 
same  way  we  may  speak  of  various  virtues  or  parts 
of  virtue,  in  a  practical  sense,  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  what  particular  virtues  we  ought  to 
practice  in  order  to  the  exercise  of  the  whole  of 
virtue,  that  is,  as  much  as  man's  nature  is  capable 
of. 

The  prime  principle  in  man's  constitution  is 
social.  The  next  in  order  is  not  to  yield  to  the 
persuasions  of  the  body,  when  they  are  not  con- 
formable to  the  rational  principle,  which  must 
govern.  The  third  is  freedom  from  error  and 
from  deception.  "  Let  then  the  ruling  principle 
holding  fast  to  these  things  go  straight  on  and  it 
has  what  is  its  own  "  (vii.  55).  The  emperor  selects 
justice  as  the  virtue  which  is  the  basis  of  all  the 
rest  (x.  11),  and  this  had  been  said  long  before 
his  time. 


MAKCUS  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.  81 

It  is  true  that  all  people  have  some  notion  of 
what  is  meant  by  justice  as  a  disposition  of  the 
mind,  and  some  notion  about  acting  in  conformity 
to  this  disposition ;  but  experience  shows  that 
men's  notions  about  justice  are  as  confused  as 
their  actions  are  inconsistent  with  the  true  notion 
of  justice.  The  emperor's  notion  of  justice  is 
clear  enough,  but  not  practical  enough  for  all 
mankind.  "  Let  there  be  freedom  from  perturb- 
ations with  respect  to  the  things  which  come 
from  the  external  cause ;  and  let  there  be  justice 
in  the  things  done  by  virtue  of  the  internal  cause, 
that  is,  let  there  be  movement  and  action  termina- 
ting in  this,  in  social  acts,  for  this  is  according  to 
thy  nature "  (ix.  31).  In  another  place  (ix.  1) 
he  says  that  "  he  who  acts  unjustly  acts  impiously," 
which  follows  of  course  from  all  that  he  says  in 
various  places.  He  insists  on  the  practice  of 
truth  as  a  virtue  and  as  a  means  to  virtue,  which 
no  doubt  it  is :  for  lying  even  in  indifferent  things 
weakens  the  understanding;  and  lying  maliciously 
is  as  great  a  moral  offence  as  a  man  can  be  guilty 
of,  viewed  both  as  showing  an  habitual  disposition, 
and  viewed  with  respect  to  consequences.  He 
couples  the  notion  of  justice  with  action.  A  man 
must  not  pride  himself  on  having  some  fine  notion 
of  justice  in  his  head,-  but  he  must  exhibit  his 
justice  in  act,  like  St.  James's  notion  of  faith. 
But  this  is  enough. 


: 


82  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  Stoics,  and  Antoninus  among  them,  call 
some  things  beautiful  (/<a/\a)  and  some  ugly  (aurxpa), 
and  as  they  are  beautiful  so  they  are  good,  and  as 
they  are  ugly  so  they  are  evil,  or  bad  (ii.  1).  All 
these  things,  good  and  evil,  are  in  our  power,  ab- 
solutely some  of  the  stricter  Stoics  would  say;  in 
a  manner  only,  as  those  who  would  not  depart 
altogether  from  common  sense  would  say ;  practi- 
cally they  are  to  a  great  degree  in  the  power  of 
some  persons  and  in  some  circumstances,  but  in  a 
small  degree  only  in  other  persons  and  in  other 
circumstances.  The  Stoics  maintain  man's  free 
will  as  to  the  things  which  are  in  his  power;  for 
as  to  the  things  which  are  out  of  his  power,  free 
will  terminating  in  action  is  of  course  excluded  by 
the  very  terms  of  the  expression.  I  hardly  know 
if  we  can  discover  exactly  Antoninus'  notion  of  the 
free  will  of  man,  nor  is  the  question  worth  the 
inquiry.  What  he  does  mean  and  does  say  is 
X  intelligible.  All  the  things  which  are  not  in  our 
power  (dTrpoaipeTa)  are  indifferent :  they  are  neither 
good  nor  bad,  morally.  Such  are  life,  health, 
wealth,  power,  disease,  poverty,  and  death.  Life 
and  death  are  all  men's  portion.  Health,  wealth, 
power,  disease,  and  poverty  happen  to  men,  indif- 
ferently to  the  good  and  to  the  bad ;  to  those  who 
live  according  to  nature  and  to  those  who  do  not.1 

1  "All  events  come  alike  to  all:  there  is  one  event  to  the 
righteous  and  to  the  wicked :  to  the  good  and  to  the  clean 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  83 

"  Life,"  says  the  emperor,  "  is  a  warfare  and  a 
stranger's  sojourn,  and  after  fame  is  oblivion " 
(ii.  17).  After  speaking  of  those  men  who  have 
disturbed  the  world  and  then  died,  and  of  the 
death  of  philosophers  such  as  Heraclitus  and 
Democritus,  who  was  destroyed  by  lice,  and  of 
Socrates  whom  other  lice  (his  enemies)  destroyed, 
he  says,  "  What  means  all  this  ?  Thou  hast  em- 
barked, thou  hast  made  the  voyage,  thou  art  come 
to  shore  ;  get  out.  If  indeed  to  another  life,  there 
is  no  want  of  gods,  not  even  there.  But  if  to  a 
state  without  sensation,  thou  wilt  cease  to  be  held 
by  pains  and  pleasures,  and  to  be  a  slave  to  the 
vessel  which  is  as  much  inferior  as  that  which 
serves  it  is  superior :  for  the  one  is  intelligence 
and  Deity  ;  the  other  is  earth  and  corruption  "  (iii. 
3).  It  is  not  death  that  a  man  should  fear,  but  he 
should  fear  never  beginning  to  live  according  to 
nature  (xii.  1).  Every  man  should  live  in  such  a 
way  as  to  discharge  his  duty,  and  to  trouble  him- 
self about  nothing  else.  He  should  live  such  a 
life  that  he  shall  always  be  ready  for  death,  and 

and  to  the  unclean,"  &c.  (Ecclesiastes,  ix.  v.  2) ;  and  (v.  3), 
"  This  is  an  evil  among  all  things  that  are  done  under  the 
sun,  that  there  is  one  event  unto  all."  In  what  sense  "  evil" 
is  meant  here  seems  rather  doubtful.  There  is  no  doubt 
about  the  emperor's  meaning.  Compare  Epictetus,  Enchiri- 
dion, c.  i.,  &c. ;  and  the  doctrine  of  the  Brachmans  (Strabo. 
p.  713,  ed.  Cas.)  :  dyaObv  dt  q  Ka.nbv  w$tv  elvat  rwv  <rvfj.pait>6vrwv 


84  PHILOSOPHY. 

shall  depart  content  when  the  summons  comes. 
For  what  is  death?  "A  cessation  of  the  impres- 
sions through  the  senses,  and  of  the  pulling  of  the 
strings  which  move  the  appetites,  and  of  the  dis- 
cursive movements  of  the  thoughts,  and  of  the  ser- 
vice to  the  flesh"  (vi.  28).  Death  is  such  as  gen- 
ei  atiori  is,  a  mystery  of  nature  (iv.  5).  In  another 
passage,  the  exact  meaning  of  which  is  perhaps 
doubtful  (ix.  3),  he  speaks  of  the  child  which 
leaves  the  womb,  and  so  he  says  the  soul  at  death 
leaves  its  envelope.  As  the  child  is  born  or  comes 
into  life  by  leaving  the  womb,  so  the  soul  may  on 
leaving  the  body  pass  into  another  existence  which 
is  perfect.  I  am  not  sure  if  this  is  the  emperor's 
meaning.  Butler  compares  it  with  a  passage  in 
Strabo  (p.  713)  about  the  Brachmans'  notion  of 
death  being  the  birth  into  real  life  and  a  happy 
life,  to  those  who  have  philosophized  ;  and  he  thinks 
Antoninus  may  allude  to  this  opinion.1 

Antoninus'  opinion  of  a  future  life  is  nowhere 
clearly  expressed^ ~~"His  doctrine  of  the  nature  of 

1  Seneca  (Ep.  102)  has  the  same,  whether  an  expression  of 
his  own  opinion,  or  merely  a  fine  saying  of  others  employed 
to  embellish  his  writings,  I  know  not.  After  speaking  of 
the  child  being  prepared  in  the  womb  to  live  this  life,  he 
adds,  "  Sic  per  hoc  spatium,  quod  ab  infantia  patet  in  senec- 
tutem,  in  alium  naturae  sumimur  partum.  Alia  origo  nos 
expectat,  alius  rerum  status."  See  Ecclesiastes,  xii.  7;  and 
Lucan,  i.  457  :  — 

"  Longae,  canitis  si  cognita,  vitae 
Mors  media  est." 


S  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  85 

the  soul  of  necessity  implies  that  it  does  not  perish 
absolutely,  for  aTpbftion  of  the  divinity  cannot 
perish.  The  opinion  is  at  least  as  old  as  the  time 
of  Epicharmus  and  Euripides;  what  comes  from 
earth  goes  back  to  earth,  and  what  comes  from 
heaven,  the  divinity,  returns  to  him  wlio  gave  it.  ( 
But  I  find  nothing  clear  in  Antoninus  as  to  the 
notion  of  the  man  existing  after  death  so  as  to  be 
conscious  of  his  sameness  with  that  soul  which 
occupied  his  vessel  of  clay.  He  seems  to  be  per- 
plexed on  this  matter,  and  finally  to  have  rested 
in  this,  that  God  or  the  gods  will  do  whatever  is 
best,  and  consistent  with  the  university  of  things. 
Nor,  I  think,  does  he  speak  conclusively  on  an- 
other Stoic  doctrine,  which  some  Stoics  practised, 
—  the  anticipating  the  regular  course  of  nature 
by  a  man's  own  act.  The  reader  will  find  some 
passages  in  which  this  is  touched  on,  and  he  may 
make  of  them  what  he  can.  But  there  are  pas- 
sages in  which  the  emperor  encourages  himself  to 
wait  for  the  end  patiently  and  with  tranquillity  ; 
and  certainly  it  is  consistent  with  all  his  best 
teaching  that  a  man  should  bear  all  that  falls  to 
his  lot  and  do  useful  acts  as  long  as  he  lives.  He 
should  not  therefore  abridge  the  time  of  his  use- 
fulness by  his  own  act.  .Whether  he  contemplates 
any  possible  cases  in  which  a  man  should  die  by 
his  own  hand,  I  cannot  tell ;  and  the  matter  is  not 
worth  a  curious  inquiry,  for  I  believe  it  would  not 


86  PHILOSOPHY. 

lead  to  any  certain  result  as  to  his  opinion  on  this 
point.  I  do  not  think  that  Antoninus,  who  never 
mentions  Seneca,  though  he  must  have  known  all 
about  him,  would  have  agreed  with  Seneca  when 
he  gives  as  a  reason  for  suicide,  that  the  eternal 
law,  whatever  he  means,  has  made  nothing  better 
for  us  than  this,  that  it  has  given  us  only  one  way 
of  entering  into  life  and  many  ways  of  going  out 
of  it.  The  ways  of  going  out  indeed  are  many, 
and  that  is  a  good  reason  for  a  man  taking  care  of 
himself.1 

Happiness  was  not  the  direct  object  of  a  Stoic's 
life.  There  is  no  rule  of  life  contained  in  the  pre- 
cept that  a  man  should  pursue  his  own  happiness. 
Many  men  think  that  they  are  seeking  happiness 
when  they  are  only  seeking  the  gratification  of 
some  particular  passion,  the  strongest  that  they 
have.  The  end  of  a  man  is,  as  already  explained, 
to  live  conformably  to  nature,  and  he  will  thus 
obtain  happiness,  tranquillity  of  mind,  and  con- 
tentment (iii.  12 ;  viii.  1,  and  other  places).  As  a 
means  of  living  conformably  to  nature  he  must 
study  the  four  chief  virtues,  each  of  which  has  its 
proper  sphere  :  wisdom,  or  the  knowledge  of  good 
and  evil ;  justice,  or  the  giving  to  every  man  his 
due  ;  fortitude,  or  the  enduring  of  labor  and  pain  ; 
and  temperance,  which  is  moderation  in  all  things. 

1  See  Plinius  H.  N.  11.,  c.  7;  Seneca,  De  Provid.  c.  6;  and 
Ep.  70 :  "  Nihil  melius  aeterna  lex,"  &c. 


MABCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  87 

By  thus  living  conformably  to  nature  the  Stoic 
obtained  all  that  he  wished  or  expected.  His  re- 
ward was  in  his  virtuous  life,  and  he  was  satisfied 
with  that.  Some  Greek  poet  long  ago  wrote  :  — 

"  For  virtue  only  of  all  human  things 
Takes  her  reward  not  from  the  hands  of  others. 
Virtue  herself  rewards  the  toils  of  virtue." 

Some  of  the  Stoics  indeed  expressed  themselves 
in  very  arrogant,  absurd  terms,  about  the  wise 
man's  self-sufficiency ;  they  elevated  him  to  the 
rank  of  a  deity.1  But  these  were  only  talkers  and 
lecturers,  such  as  those  in  all  ages  who  utter  fine 
words,  know  little  of  human  affairs,  and  care  only 
for  notoriety.  Epictetus  and  Antoninus  both  by 
precept  and  example  labored  to  improve  them- 
selves and  others  ;  and  if  we  discover  imperfections 
in  their  teaching,  we  must  still  honor  these  great 
men  who  attempted  to  show  that  there  is  in  man's 
nature  and  in  the  constitution  of  things  sufficient 
reason  for  living  a  virtuous  life.  It  is  difficult 
enough  to  live  as  we  ought  to  live,  difficult  even 
for  any  man  to  live  in  such  a  way  as  to  satisfy  him- 
self, if  he  exercises  only  in  a  moderate  degree  the 

1  J.  Smith  in  his  Select  Discourses  on  "  the  Excellency  and 
Nobleness  of  True  Religion  "  "(c.  vi.)  has  remarked  on  this 
Stoical  arrogance.  He  finds  it  in  Seneca  and  others.  In 
Seneca  certainly,  and  perhaps  something  of  it  in  Epictetus ; 
but  it  is  not  in  Antoninus. 


88  PHILOSOPHY. 

power  of  reflecting  upon  and  reviewing  his  own 
conduct ;  and  if  all  men  cannot  be  brought  to  the 
same  opinions  in  morals  and  religion,  it  is  at  least 
worth  while  to  give  them  good  reasons  for  as 
much  as  they  can  be  persuaded  to  accept. 


THE    MEDITATIONS 


OF 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS. 


I. 

1.  FROM  my  grandfather  Verus  1  [I  learned] 
good  morals  and  the  government  of  my  temper. 

2.  From  the  reputation  and  remembrance  of  my 
father,2  modesty  and  a  manly  character. 

i  Annius  Vcrus  was  his  grandfather's  name.  There  is  no 
verb  in  this  section  connected  with  the  word  "  from,"  nor  in 
the  following  sections  of  this  book ;  and  it  is  not  quite  cer- 
tain what  verb  should  be  supplied.  What  I  have  added  may 
express  the  meaning  here,  though  there  are  sections  which 
it  will  not  fit.  If  he  does  not  mean  to  say  that  he  learned 
all  these  good  things  from  the  several  persons  whom  he 
mentions,  he  means  that  he  observed  certain  good  qualities 
in  them,  or  received  certain  benefits  from  them,  and  it  is 
implied  that  he  was  the  better  for  it,  or  at  least  might  have 
been;  for  It  would  be  a  mistake  to  understand  Marcus  as 
saying  that  he  possessed  all  the  virtues  which  he  observed  in 
his  kinsmen  and  teachers. 

*  His  father's  name  was  Annius  Wrus. 


90  MEDITATIONS. 

3.  From  my  mother,1  piety  and  beneficence,  and 
abstinence,  not  only  from  evil  deeds,  but  even  from 
evil  thoughts ;  and  further,  simplicity  in  my  way 
of  living,  far  removed  from  the  habits  of  the  rich. 

4.  From  my  great-grandfather,2  not  to  have  fre- 
quented public   schools,   and   to   have  had  good 
teachers  at  home,  and  to  know  that  on  such  things 
a  man  should  spend  liberally. 

5.  From  my  governor,  to  be  neither  of  the  green 
nor  of  the  blue  party  at  the  games  in  the  Circus, 
nor  a  partisan  either  of  the  Parmularius  or  the 
Scutarius  at  the  gladiators'  fights ;  from  him  too  I 
learned  endurance  of  labor,  and  to  want  little,  and 
to  work  with  my  own  hands,  and  not  to  meddle 
with  other  people's  affairs,  and  not  to  be  ready  to 
listen  to  slander. 

6.  From  Diognetus,3  not  to  busy  myself  about 

1  His  mother  was  Domitia  Calvilla,  named  also  Lucilla. 

1  Perhaps  his  mother's  grandfather,  Catilius  Severus. 

3  In  the  works  of  Justinus  there  is  printed  a  letter  to  one 
Diognetus,  whom  the  writer  names  "most  excellent."  He 
was  a  Gentile,  but  he  wished  very  much  to  know  what  the 
religion  of  the  Christians  was,  what  God  they  worshipped, 
and  how  this  worship  made  them  despise  the  world  and 
death,  and  neither  believe  in  the  gods  of  the  Greeks  nor 
observe  the  superstition  of  the  Jews;  and  what  was  this 
love  to  one  another  which  they  had,  and  why  this  new  kind 
of  religion  was  introduced  now  and  not  before.  My  friend 
Mr.  Jenkins,  rector  of  Lyminge  in  Kent,  has  suggested  to 
me  that  this  Diognetus  may  have  been  the  tutor  of  M. 
Antoninus. 


MAE C US  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  91 

trifling  things,  and  not  to  give  credit  to  what  was 
said  by  miracle-workers  and  jugglers  about  incan- 
tations and  the  driving  away  of  demons  and  such 
things  ;  and  not  to  breed  quails  [for  fighting],  nor 
to  give  myself  up  passionately  to  such  things; 
and  to  endure  freedom  of  speech;  and  to  have 
become  intimate  with  philosophy;  and  to  have 
been  a  hearer,  first  of  Bacchius,  then  of  Tandasis 
and  Marcianus ;  and  to  have  written  dialogues  in 
my  youth ;  and  to  have  desired  a  plank  bed  and 
skin,  and  whatever  else  of  the  kind  belongs  to  the 
Grecian  discipline. 

7.  From  Rusticus1  I  received  the  impression 
that  my  character  required  improvement  and  disci- 
pline ;  and  from  him  I  learned  not  to  be  led  astray 
to  sophistic  emulation,  nor  to  writing  on  specula- 
tive matters,  nor  to  delivering  little  hortatory 
orations,  nor  to  showing  myself  off  as  a  man  who 
practises  much  discipline,  or  does  benevolent  acts 
in  order  to  make  a  display ;  and  to  abstain  from 
rhetoric,  and  poetry,  and  fine  writing;  and  not  to 
walk  about  in  the  house  in  my  outdoor  dress,  nor 

1  Q.  Junius  Rusticus  was  a  Stoic  philosopher,  whom  Anto- 
ninus valued  highly,  and  often  took  his  advice  (Capitol.  M. 
Antonin.  iii.)- 

Antoninus  says,  TOIJ  'EiriKTTjretois  {nro}j.rfifjia<riv,  which  must 
not  be  translated,  "the  writings  of  Epictetus,"  for  Epictetus 
wrote  nothing.  His  pupil  Arrian,  who  has  preserved  for  us 
all  that  we  know  of  Epictetus,  says,  ravra  tireipdO-rjv  vro/i^aTo 
i/Xd£cu  TT/J  ixclvov  Btavoias  (Ep.  ad  Gell.}. 


92  MEDITATIONS. 

to  do  other  things  of  the  kind ;  and  to  write 
my  letters  with  simplicity,  like  the  letter  which 
Rusticus  wrote  from  Sinuessa  to  my  mother ;  and 
with  respect  to  those  who  have  offended  me 
by  words,  or  done  me  wrong,  to  be  easily  dis- 
posed to  be  pacified  and  reconciled,  as,,  soon  as 
they  have  shown  a  readiness  to  be  reconciled ; 
and  to  read  carefully,  and  not  to  be  satisfied 
with  a  superficial  understanding  of  a  book ;  nor 
hastily  to  give  my  assent  to  those  who  talk  over- 
much ;  and  I  am  indebted  to  him  for  being  ac- 
quainted with  the  discourses  of  Epictetus,  which 
he  communicated  to  me  out  of  his  own  collec- 
tion. 

8.  From  Apollonius  l  I  learned  freedom  of  will 
and  undeviating  steadiness  of  purpose ;  and  to 
look  to  nothing  else,  not  even  for  a  moment, 
except  to  reason ;  and  to  be  always  the  same,  in 
sharp  pains,  on  the  occasion  of  the  loss  of  a  child, 
and  in  long  illness ;  and  to  see  clearly  in  a  living 
example  that  the  same  man  can  be  both  most 
resolute  and  yielding,  and  not  peevish  in  giving 
his  instruction ;  and  to  have  had  before  my  eyes 
a  man  who  clearly  considered  his  expedience  and 
his  skill  in  expounding  philosophical  principles  as 
the  smallest  of  his  merits ;  and  from  him  I  learned 
how  to  receive  from  friends  what  are  esteemed 

1  Apollonius  of  Chalcis  came  to  Rome  in  the  time  of  Pius 
to  be  Marcus'  preceptor.     He  was  a  rigid  Stoic. 


MARCU& AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  93 

favors,  without  being  either  humbled  by  them  or 
letting  them  pass  unnoticed. 

9.  From  Sextus,1  a  benevolent  disposition,  and 
the  example  of  a  family  governed  in  a  fatherly 
manner,   and  the   idea  of  living   conformably  to 
nature;   and  gravity  without   affectation,  and  to 
look  carefully  after  the  interests  of  friends,  and  to 
tolerate   ignorant   persons,  and   those  who   form 
opinions    without    consideration :  f    he    had    the 
power  of  readily  accommodating  himself  to  all, 
so  that  intercourse  with  him  was  more  agreeable 
than  any  flattery;  and  at  the  same  time  he  was 
most  highly  venerated   by  those  who  associated 
with  him :  and  he  had  the  faculty  both  of  dis- 
covering   and    ordering,   in    an    intelligent    and 
methodical  way,  the  principles  necessary  for  life ; 
and  he  never  showed  anger  or  any  other  passion, 
but  was  entirely  free  from  passion,  and  also  most 
affectionate ;  and   he   could   express   approbation 
without   noisy   display,   and   he   possessed   much 
knowledge  without  ostentation. 

10.  From  Alexander2  the  grammarian,  to   re- 
frain from  fault-finding,  and  not  in  a  reproachful 
way  to  chide  those  who  uttered  any  barbarous  or 

1  Sextus  of  Chaeronea,  a  grandson  of  Plutarch,  or  nephew, 
as  some  say ;  but  more  probably  a  grandson. 

*  Alexander  was  a  Grammaticus,  a  native  of  Phrygia.  He 
wrote  a  commentary  on  Homer ;  and  the  rhetorician  Aristide^ 
wrote  a  panegyric  on  Alexander  in  a  fummil  oration. 


94  MEDITATIONS. 

solecistic  or  strange-sounding  expression;  but  dex- 
terously to  introduce  the  very  expression  which 
ought  to  have  been  used,  and  in  the  way  of  answer 
or  giving  confirmation,  or  joining  in  an  inquiry 
about  the  thing  itself,  not  about  the  word,  or  by 
some  other  fit  suggestion. 

11.  From  Fronto  1  I  learned  to  observe  what 
envy  and  duplicity  and  hypocrisy  are  in  a  tyrant, 
and  that  generally  those  among  us  who  are  called 
Patricians  are  rather  deficient  in  paternal  affection. 

12.  From    Alexander    the    Platonic,   not    fre- 
quently nor  without  necessity  to  say  to  any  one, 
or  to  write  in  a  letter,  that  I  have  no  leisure  ;  nor 
continually  to   excuse   the  neglect  of   duties  re- 
quired by  our  relation  to  those  with  whom  we 
live,  by  alleging  urgent  occupations. 

13.  From  Catulus,2  not  to  be  indifferent  when 
a  friend  finds  fault,  even  if  he  should  find  fault 
without  reason,  but  to  try  to  restore  him  to  his 
usual  disposition ;  and  to  be  ready  to  speak  well 
of  teachers,   as  it   is   reported  of  Domitius   and 
Athenodotus ;  and  to  love  my  children  truly. 

14.  From  my  brother  3  Severus,  to  love  my  kin, 

1  M.  Cornelius  Fronto  was  a  rhetorician,  and  in  great  favor 
with  Marcus.      There  are  extant  various  letters   between 
Marcus  and  Pronto. 

2  Cinna  Catulus,  a  Stoic  philosopher. 

3  The  word  brother  may  not  be  genuine.     Antoninus  had 
no  brother.     It  has  been  supposed  that  he  may  mean  some 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  95 

and  to  love  truth,  and  to  love  justice;  and  through 
him  I  learned  to  know  Thrasea,  Helvidius,  Cato, 
Dion,  Brutus ; l  ana  from  him  I  received  the  idea 
of  a  polity  in  which  there  is  the  same  law  for  all, 
a  polity  administered  -vith  regard  to  equal  rights 
and  equal  freedom  of  speech,  and  the  idea  of  a 
kingly  government  whict  respects  most  of  all  the 
freedom  of  the  governed ;  I  learned  from  him 
also  f  consistency  and  undeviating  steadiness  in 
my  regard  for  philosophy;  and  a  disposition  to  do 
good,  and  to  give  to  others  readilv,  and  to  cherish 
good  hopes,  and  to  believe  that  I  am  loved  by  my 
friends;  and  in  him  I  observed  no  concealment  of 
his  opinions  with  respect  to  those  whom  he  con- 
demned, and  that  his  friends  had  no  need  to  con- 
jecture what  he  wished  or  did  not  wish,  but  it  was 
quite  plain. 

15.  From  Maximus  2  I  learned  self-government, 
and  not  to  be  led  aside  by  anything ;  and  cheer- 
cousin.  Sclmltz  in  his  translation  omits  "  brother,"  and 
says  that  this  Severus  is  probably  Claudius  Severus,  a  peri- 
patetic. 

1  We  know,  from  Tacitus  (Annal.  xiii.,  xvi.  21 ;  and  other 
passages),  who  Thrasea  and  Helvidius  were.  Plutarch  has 
written  the  lives  of  the  two  Catos,  and  of  Dion  and  Brutus. 
Antoninus  probably  alludes  to  Cato  of  Utica,  who  was  a 
Stoic. 

8  Claudius  Maximus  was  a  Stoic  philosopher,  who  was 
highly  esteemed  also  by  Antoninus  Pius,  Marcus'  predeces- 
sor. The  character  of  Maximus  is  that  of  a  perfect  man. 
(See  viii.  25.) 


96  MEDITATIONS. 

fulness  in  all  circumstances,  as  well  as  in  illness ; 
and  a  just  admixture  in  the  moral  character  of 
sweetness  and  dignity,  and  tj  do  what  was  set 
before  me  without  complaining.  I  observed  that 
everybody  believed  that  he  thought  as  he  spoke, 
and  that  in  all  that  he  did  he  never  had  any  bad 
intention;  and  he  never  showed  amazement  and 
surprise,  and  was  nev-jr  in  a  hurry,  and  never 
put  off  doing  a  thidg,  nor  was  perplexed  nor 
dejected,  nor  did  he  ever  laugh  to  disguise  his 
vexation,  nor,  ou  the  other  hand,  was  he  ever 
passionate  or  suspicious.  He  was  accustomed  to 
do  acts  /:f  beneficence,  and  was  ready  to  forgive, 
and  was  free  from  all  falsehood ;  and  he  presented 
the  appearance  of  a  man  who  could  not  be  diverted 
from  right,  rather  than  of  a  man  who  had  been 
improved.  I  observed,  too,  that  no  man  could 
ever  think  that  he  was  despised  by  Maximus,  or 
ever  venture  to  think  himself  a  better  man.  He 
had  also  the  art  of  being  humorous  in  an  agree- 
able way.f 

16.  In  my  father l  I  observed  mildness  of  tem- 
per, and  unchangeable  resolution  in  the  things 
which  he  had  determined  after  due  deliberation ; 
and  no  vainglory  in  those  things  which  men  call 
honors;  and  a  love  of  labor  and  perseverance  ;  and 
a  readiness  to  listen  to  those  who  had  anything  to 

1  He  means  his  adoptive  father,  his  predecessor,  the  Em- 
peror Antoninus  Pius.  Compare  vi.  30. 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  97 

propose  for  the  common  weal;  and  undeviating 
firmness  in  giving  to  every  man  according  to  his 
deserts  ;  and  a  knowledge  derived  from  experience 
of  the  occasions  for  vigorous  action  and  for  remis- 
sion. And  I  observed  that  he  had  overcome  all 
passion  for  boys ;  and  he  considered  himself  no  more 
than  any  other  citizen ; l  and  he  released  his  friends 
from  all  obligation  to  sup  with  him  or  to  attend 
him  of  necessity  when  he  went  abroad,  and  those 
who  had  failed  to  accompany  him,  by  reason  of  any 
urgent  circumstances,  always  found  him  the  same. 
I  observed  too  his  habit  of  careful  inquiry  in  all 
matters  of  deliberation,  and  his  persistency,  and 
that  he  never  stopped  his  investigation  through 
being  satisfied  with  appearances  which  first  pre- 
sent themselves;  and  that  his  disposition  was  to 
keep  his  friends,  and  not  to  be  soon  tired  of  them, 
nor  yet  to  be  extravagant  in  his  affection ;  and  to 
be  satisfied  on  all  occasions,  and  cheerful ;  and  to 
foresee  things  a  long  way  off,  and  to  provide  for 
the  smallest  without  display ;  and  to  check  imme- 
diately popular  applause  and  all  flattery ;  and  to 
be  ever  watchful  over  the  things  which  were  nec- 
essary for  the  administration  of  the  empire,  and  to 
be  a  good  manager  of  the  expenditure,  and  patiently 
to  endure  the  blame  which  he  got  for  such  conduct; 
and  he  was  neither  superstitious  with  respect  to  the 
gods,  nor  did  he  court  men  by  gifts  or  by  trying 
1  He  uses  the  word  Koivovo-ntuxrtvr).  See  Gatakcr's  note. 


98  MEDITATIONS. 

to  please  them,  or  by  flattering  the  populace  ;  but 
he  showed  sobriety  in  all  things  and  firmness,  and 
never  any  mean  thoughts  or  action,  nor  love  of 
novelty.     And  the  things  which  conduce  in  any 
way  to  the  commodity  of  life,  and  of  which  fortune 
gives  an  abundant  supply,  he  used  without  arro- 
gance and  without  excusing  himself;  so  that  when 
he  had  them,  he  enjoyed  them  without  affectation, 
and  when  he  had  them  not,  he  did  not  want  them. 
No  one  could  ever  say  of  him  that  he  was  either  a 
sophist  or  a  [home-bred]  flippant  slave  or  a  pedant ; 
but  every  one  acknowledged  him  to  be  a  man  ripe, 
perfect,  above  flattery,  able  to  manage  his  own  and 
other  men's  affairs.     Besides  this,  he  honored  those 
who  were  true  philosophers,  and  he  did  not  reproach 
those  who  pretended  to  be  philosophers,  nor  yet 
was  he  easily  led  by  them.     He  was  also  easy  in 
conversation,  and  he  made  himself  agreeable  with- 
out any  offensive  affectation.     He  took  a  reason- 
able care  of  his  body's  health,  not  as  one  who  was 
greatly  attached  to  life,  nor  out  of  regard  to  per- 
sonal appearance,  nor  yet  in  a  careless  way,  but  so 
that  through   his  own  attention   he  very  seldom 
stood  in  need  of  the  physician's  art  or  of  medicine 
or  external  applications.     He  was  most  ready  to 
give  without  envy  to  those  who  possessed  any  par- 
ticular faculty,  such  as  that  of  eloquence  or  knowl- 
edge of  the  law  or  of  morals,  or  of  anything  else ; 
and  he  gave  them  his  help,  that  each  might  enjoy 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  99 

reputation  according  to  his  deserts ;  and  he  always 
acted  conformably  to  the  institutions  of  his  coun- 
try, without  showing  any  affectation  of  doing  so. 
Further,  he  was  not  fond  of  change  nor  unsteady, 
but  he  loved  to  stay  in  the  same  places,  and  to 
employ  himself  about  the  same  things ;  and  after 
his  paroxysms  of  headache  he  came  immediately 
fresh  and  vigorous  to  his  usual  occupations.  His 
secrets  were  not  many,  but  very  few  and  very  rare, 
and  these  only  about  public  matters;  and  he 
showed  prudence  and  economy  in  the  exhibition  of 
the  public  spectacles  and  the  construction  of  public 
buildings,  his  donations  to  the  people,  and  in  such 
things,  for  he  was  a  man  who  looked  to  what 
ought  to  be  done,  not  to  the  reputation  which  is 
got  by  a  man's  acts.  He  did  not  take  the  bath  at 
unseasonable  hours ;  he  was  not  fond  of  building 
houses,  nor  curious  about  what  he  ate,  nor  about 
the  texture  and  color  of  his  clothes,  nor  about  the 
beauty  of  his  slaves.1  His  dress  came  from  Lorium, 
his  villa  on  the  coast,  arid  from  Lanuvium  gener- 
ally.2 We  know  how  he  behaved  to  the  toll- 
collector  at  Tusculum  who  asked  his  pardon ;  and 
such  was  all  his  behavior.  There  was  in  him  noth- 

1  This  passage  is  corrupt,  and  the  exact  meaning  is  un- 
certain. 

1  Lorium  was  a  villa  on  the  coast  north  of  Borne,  and 
there  Antoninus  was  brought  up,  and  he  died  there.  This 
also  is  corrupt. 


100  MEDITATIONS. 

ing  harsh,  nor  implacable,  nor  violent,  nor,  as  one 
may  say,  anything  carried  to  the  sweating  point ; 
but  he  examined  all  things  severally,  as  if  he  had 
abundance  of  time,  and  without  confusion,  in  an 
orderly  way,  vigorously  and  consistently.  And 
that  might  be  applied  to  him  which  is  recorded  of 
Socrates,1  that  he  was  able  both  to  abstain  from, 
and  to  enjoy,  those  things  which  many  are  too 
weak  to  abstain  from,  and  cannot  enjoy  without 
excess.  But  to  be  strong  enough  both  to  bear  the 
one  and  to  be  sober  in  the  other  is  the  mark  of  a 
man  who  has  a  perfect  and  invincible  soul,  such  as 
he  showed  in  the  illness  of  Maxim  us. 

17.  To  the  gods  I  am  indebted  for  having  good 
grandfathers,  good  parents,  a  good  sister,  good 
teachers,  good  associates,  good  kinsmen  and  friends, 
nearly  everything  good.  Further,  I  owe  it  to  the 
gods  that  I  was  not  hurried  into  any  offence  against 
any  of  them,  though  I  had  a  disposition  which,  if 
opportunity  had  offered,  might  have  led  me  to  do 
something  of  this  kind ;  but,  through  their  favor, 
there  never  was  such  a  concurrence  of  circumstances 
as  put  me  to  the  trial.  Further,  I  am  thankful  to 
the  gods  that  I  was  not  longer  brought  up  with 
my  grandfather's  concubine,  and  that  I  preserved 
the  flower  of  my  youth,  and  that  I  did  not  make 
proof  of  my  virility  before  the  proper  season,  but 
even  deferred  the  time ;  that  I  was  subjected  to  a 
1  Xenophon,  Memorab.  i.  3.  15. 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  101 

ruler  and  a  father  who  was  able  to  take  away  all 
pride  from  me,  and  to  bring  me  to  the  knowledge 
that  it  is  possible  for  a  man  to  live  in  a  palace 
without  wanting  either  guards  or  embroidered 
dresses,  or  torches  and  statues,  and  such-like  show ; 
but  that  it  is  in  such  a  man's  power  to  bring  him- 
self very  near  to  the  fashion  of  a  private  person, 
without  being  for  this  reason  either  meaner  in 
thought,  or  more  remiss  in  action,  with  respect  to 
the  things  which  must  be  done  for  the  public 
interest  in  a  manner  that  befits  a  ruler.  I  thank 
the  gods  for  giving  me  such  a  brother,1  who  was 
able  by  his  moral  character  to  rouse  me  to  vigi- 
lance over  myself,  and  who  at  the  same  time 
pleased  me  by  his  respect  and  affection ;  that  my 
children  have  not  been  stupid  nor  deformed  in 
body;  that  I  did  not  make  more  proficiency  in 
rhetoric,  poetry,  and  the  other  studies,  in  which  I 
should  perhaps  have  been  completely  engaged,  if  I 
had  seen  that  I  was  making  progress  in  them  ;  that 
I  made  haste  to  place  those  who  brought  me  up  in 
the  station  of  honor,  which  they  seemed  to  desire, 
without  putting  them  off  with  hope  of  my  doing  it 
some  other  time  after,  because  they  were  then  still 
young ;  that  I  knew  Apollonius,  Rusticus,  Max- 
imus ;  that  I  received  clear  and  frequent  impres- 
sions about  living  according  to  nature,  and  what 

1  The  emperor  had  no  brother  except  L.  Verus,  his  brother 
by  adoption. 


102  MEDITATIONS. 

kind  of  a  life  that  is,  so  that,  so  far  as  depended 
on  the  gods,  and  their  gifts,  and  help,  and  inspira- 
tions, nothing  hindered  me  from  forthwith  living 
according  to  nature,  though  I  still  fall  short  of  it 
through  my  own  fault,  and  through  not  observing 
the  admonitions  of  the  gods,  and,  I  may  almost 
say,  their  direct  instructions ;  that  my  body  has 
held  out  so  long  in  such  a  kind  of  life;  that  1 
never  touched  either  Benedicta  or  Theodotus,  and 
that,  after  having  fallen  into  amatory  passions,  1 
was  cured,  and,  though  I  was  often  out  of  humor 
with  Rusticus,  I  never  did  anything  of  which  I 
had  occasion  to  repent ;  that,  though  it  was  my 
mother's  fate  to  die  young,  she  spent  the  last 
years  of  her  life  with  me ;  that,  whenever  I  wished 
to  help  any  man  in  his  need,  or  on  any  other 
occasion,  I  was  never  told  that  I  had  not  the 
means  of  doing  it ;  and  that  to  myself  the  same 
necessity  never  happened,  to  receive  anything 
from  another ;  that  I  have  such  a  wife,1  so  obedi- 
ent, and  so  affectionate,  and  so  simple ;  that  I  had 
abundance  of  good  masters  for  my  children ;  and 
that  remedies  have  been  shown  to  me  by  dreams, 
both  others,  and  against  bloodspitting  and  giddi- 
ness2 .  .  .  ;  and  that,  when  I  had  an  inclination 
to  philosophy,  I  did  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  any 
sophist,  and  that  I  did  not  waste  my  time  on 

1  See  the  Life  of  Antoninus. 
9  This  is  corrupt. 


MAE C US  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.  103 

writers    [of   histories],   or   in    the    resolution    of 
syllogisms,  or  occupy  myself  about   the   investi- 
gation of  appearances  in  the  heavens ;  for  all  these 
things  require  the  help  of  the  gods  and  fortune. 
Among  the  Quadi  at  the  Granua.1 

1  The  Quadi  lived  in  the  southern  part  of  Bohemia  and 
Moravia;  and  Antoninus  made  a  campaign  against  them. 
(See  the  Life.}  Granua  is  probably  the  river  Graan,  which 
flows  into  the  Danube. 

If  these  words  are  genuine,  Antoninus  may  have  written 
this  first  book  during  the  war  with  the  Quadi.  In  the  first 
edition  of  Antoninus,  and  in  the  older  editions,  the  first 
three  sections  of  the  second  book  make  the  conclusion  of 
the  first  book.  Gataker  placed  them  at  the  beginning  of  the 
second  book. 


n. 

/    1.  BEGIN  the  morning  by  saying  to  thyself,  I 
/  shall   meet   with   the   busybody,   the   ungrateful, 
I    arrogant,  deceitful,  envious,  unsocial.     All  these 
\    things  happen  to  them  by  reason  of  their  igno- 
\rance  of  what  is  good  and  evil.     But  I  who  have 
seen  the  nature  of  the  good  that  it  is  beautiful, 
and  of  the  bad  that  it  is  ugly,  and  the  nature  of  him 
who  does  wrong,  that  it  is  akin  to  me,  not  [only] 
of  the  same  blood  or  seed,  but  that  it  participates 
in  [the  same]  intelligence  and  [the  same]  portion 
of  the  divinity,  I  can  neither  be  injured  by  any  of 
them,  for  no  one  can  fix  on  me  what  isugly,;nor 
can  I  be  angry  with  my  kinsman,  nor  hate  him. 
we  are  made  for  co-operation,  like  feet,  like 
hands,  like  eyelids,  like  the  rows  of  the  upper  and 
lower  teeth.1     To  act  against  one  another,  then,  is 
contrary  to  nature  ;  and  it  is  acting  against  one 
another  to  be  vexed  and  to  turn  away. 

2.  Whatever  this  is  that  I  am,  it  is  a  little  flesh 
and  breath,  and  the  ruling  part.     Throw  away  thy 
1  Xenophon,  Mem.  ii.  3.  18. 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  105 

books  ;  no  longer  distract  thyself :  it  is  not  allowed ; 
but  as  if  thou  wast  now  dying,  despise  the  flesh ;  it 
is  blood  and  bones  and  a  network,  a  contexture  of 
nerves,  veins,  and  arteries.  See  the  breath  also, 
what  kind  of  a  thing  it  is ;  air,  and  not  always  the 
same,  but  every  moment  sent  out  and  again 
sucked  in.  The  third,  then,  is  the  ruling  part; 
consider  thus:  Thou  art  an  old  man;  no  longer  let 
this  be  a  slave,  no  longer  be  pulled  by  the  strings 
like  a  puppet  to  unsocial  movements,  no  longer  be 
either  dissatisfied  with  thy  present  lot,  or  shrink 
from  the  future. 

3.  All  that  is  from  the  gods  is  full  of  provi- 
dence. That  which  is  from  fortune  is  not  separa- 
ted from  nature  or  without  an  interweaving  and 
involution  with  the  things  which  are  ordered  by 
providence.  From  thence  all  things  flow;  and 
there  is  besides  necessity,  and  that  which  is  for 
the  advantage  of  the  whole  universe,  of  which 
thoir»  art  a  part.  But  that  is  good  for  every  part 
of  nature  which  the  nature  of  the  whole  brings, 
and  what  serves  to  maintain  this  nature.  Now 
the  universe  is  preserved,  as  by  the  changes  of 
the  elements  so  by  the  changes  of  things  com- 
pounded of  the  elements.  Let  these  principles  be 
enough  for  thee ;  let  them  always  be  fixed  opin- 
ions. But  cast  away  the  thirst  after  books,  that 
thou  mayest  not  die  murmuring,  but  cheerfully, 
truly,  and  from  thy  heart  thankful  to  the  gods. 


106  MEDITATIONS. 

4.  Remember  how  long  thou  hast  been  putting 
off  these  things,  and  how  often  thou  hast  received 
an  opportunity  from  the  gods,  and  yet  dost  not 
use  it.     Thou  must  now  at  last  perceive  of  what 
universe  thou  art  a   part,  arid   of   what  adminis- 
trator of  the  universe  thy  existence  is  an  efflux, 
and  that  a  limit  of  time  is  fixed  for  thee,  which  if 
thou  dost   not  use  for  clearing   away  the  clouds 
from  thy  mind,  it  will  go  and  thou  wilt  go,  and  it 
will  never  return. 

5.  Every   moment   think   steadily  as  a  Roman 
and  a  man  to  do  what   thou  hast  in   hand  with 
perfect  and  simple  dignity,  and  feeling  of  affec- 
tion, and  freedom,  and  justice,  and  to  give  thyself 
relief  from  all   other   thoughts.     And   thou   wilt 
give  thyself  relief  if  thou  doest  every  act  of  thy 
life  as  if  it  were  the  last,  laying  aside  all  careless- 
ness and  passionate  aversion  from  the  commands 
of  reason,  and  all   hypocrisy,  and   self-love,  and 
discontent  with  the  portion  which  has  been  given 
to  thee.     Thou  seest  how  few  the  things  are,  the 
which  if  a  man  lays  hold  of,  he  is  able  to  live  a 
life  which  flows  in  quiet,  and  is  like  the  existence 
of  the  gods ;  for  the  gods  on  their  part  will  re- 
quire nothing  more  from  him  who  observes  these 
things. 

6.  Do  wrong  l  to  thyself,  do  wrong  to  thyself, 

1  Perhaps  it  should  be,  "  thou  art  doing  violence  to  thy- 
self," bpftlfra  not 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  107 

my  soul ;  but  thou  wilt  no  longer  have  the  oppor- 
tunity of  honoring  thyself.  Every  man's  life  is 
sufficient.!  But  thine  is  nearly  finished,  though 
thy  soul  reverences  not  itself,  but  places  thy 
felicity  in  the  souls  of  others. 

7.  Do  the  things  external  which  fall  upon  thee 
distract  thee?     Give  thyself  time  to  learn  some- 
thing  new   and   good,  and  cease   to   be  whirled 
around.     But  then  thou  must  also   avoid   being 
carried  about  the  other  way;   for  those  too    are 
triflers  who  have  wearied  themselves  in  life  by 
their  activity,  and  yet  have  no  object  to  which  to 
direct  every  movement,  and,  in  a  word,  all  their 
thoughts. 

8.  Through  not  observing  what  is  in  the  mind  of 
another   a   man   has  seldom  been  seen  to  be  un- 
happy ;  but  those  who  do  not  observe  the  move- 
ments of  their  own  minds  must  of  necessity  be 

^nhappy. 

9.  This  thou  must  always  bear  in  mind,  what  is 
the  nature  of  the  whole,  and  what  is  my  nature, 
and  how  this  is  related  to  that,  and  what  kind  of 
a  part  it  is  of   what  kind  of  a  whole,  and  that 
there  is  no  one  who  hinders  thee  from  always  do- 
ing and  saying  the  things  which  are  according  to 
the  nature  of  which  thou  art  a  part. 

10.  Theophrastus,  in  his  comparison  of  bad  acts 
—  such  a  comparison  as  one  would  make  in  accord- 
ance with   the   common   notions   of    mankind  — 


108  MEDITATIONS. 

says,  like  a  true  philosopher,  that  the  offences 
which  are  committed  through  desire  are  more 
blamable  than  those  which  are  committed  through 
anger.  For  he  who  is  excited  by  anger  seems  to 
turn  away  from  reason  with  a  certain  pain  and 
unconscious  contraction ;  but  he  who  offen'ds 
through  desire,  being  overpowered  by  pleasure, 
seems  to  be  in  a  manner  more  intemperate  and 
more  womanish  in  his  offences.  Rightly,  then, 
and  in  a  way  worthy  of  philosophy,  he  said  that 
the  offence  which  is  committed  with  pleasure  is 
more  blamable  than  that  which  is  committed  with 
pain  ;  and  on  the  whole  the  one  is  more  like  a 
person  who  has  been  first  wronged  and  through 
pain  is  compelled  to  be  angry ;  but  the  other  is 
moved  by  his  own  impulse  to  do  wrong,  being  car- 
ried towards  doing  something  by  desire. 

11.  Since  it  is  possible1  that  thou  mayest  depart 
from  life  this  very  moment,  regulate  every  act  and 
thought  accordingly.2  But  to  go  away  from" 
among  men,  if  there  are  gods,  is  not  a  thing  to 
be  afraid  of,  for  the  gods  will  not  involve  thee  in 
evil ;  but  if  indeed  they  do  not  exist,  or  if  they 
have  no  concern  about  human  affairs1,  what  is  it 
to  me  to  live  in  a  universe  devoid  of  gods  or 
devoid  of  providence  ?  But  in  truth  they  *"do~ 

Or  it  may  mean,  "  since  it  is  in  thy  power  to  depart;" 
which  gives  a  meaning  somewhat  different. 
2  See  Cicero,  Tuscul.  i.  49. 


MARCUS  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.          109 

exist,  and  they  do  care  for  human  things,  and  they 
have  put  all  the  means  in  man's  power  to  enable 
him  not  to  fall  into  real  evils.  And  as  to  the  rest,  if 
there  was  anything  evil,  they  would  have  provided 
for  this  also,  that  it  should  be  altogether  in  a 
man's  power  not  to  fall  into  it.  Now  that  which 
does  not  make  a  man  worse,  how  can  it  make  a 
man's  life  worse  ?  But  neither  through  ignorance, 
nor  having  the  knowledge  but  not  the  power  to 
guard  against  or  correct  these  things,  is  it  possible 
that  the  nature  of  the  universe  has  overlooked 
them ;  nor  is  it  possible  that  it  has  made  so  great 
a  mistake,  either  through  want  of  power  or  want 
of  skill,  that  good  and  evil  should  happen  indis- 
criminately to  the  good  and  the  bad.  But  death 
certainly,  and  life,  honor  and  dishonor,  pain  and 
pleasure,  —  all  these  things  equally  happen  to 
good  men  and  bad,  being  things  which  make  us 
neither  better  nor  worse.  Therefore  they  are 
neither  good  nor  evil. 

12.  How  quickly  all  things  disappear,  —  in  the 
universe  the  bodies  themselves,  but  in  time  the 
remembrance  of  them.  What  is  the  nature  of  all 
sensible  things,  and  particularly  those  which  attract 
with  the  bait  of  pleasure  or  terrify  by  pain,  or  are 
noised  abroad  by  vapory  fame ;  how  worthless,  and 
contemptible,  and  sordid,  and  perishable,  and  dead 
they  are,  —  all  this  it  is  the  part  of  the  intellectual 
faculty  to  observe.  To  observe  too  who  these  are 


110  MEDITATIONS. 

whose  opinions  and  voices  give  reputation ;  what 
death  is,  and  the  fact  that,  if  a  man  looks  at  it  in 
itself,  and  by  the  abstractive  power  of  reflection 
resolves  into  their  parts  all  the  things  which  pre- 
sent themselves  to  the  imagination  in  it,  he  will 
then  consider  it  to  be  nothing  else  than  an  opera- 
tion of  nature;  and  if  any  one  is  afraid  of  an 
operation  of  nature,  he  is  a  child.  This,  however, 
is  not  only  an  operation  of  nature,  but  it  is  also  a 
thing  which  conduces  to  the  purposes  of  nature. 
To  observe  too  how  man  comes  near  to  the  Deity, 
and  by  what  part  of  him,  and  when  this  part  of  man 
is  so  disposed  f  (vi.  28). 

13.  Nothing  is  more  wretched  than  a  man  who 
traverses  everything  in  a  round,  and  pries  into  the 
things  beneath  the  earth,  as  the  poet l  says,  and 
seeks  by  conjecture  what  is  in  the  minds  of  his 
neighbors,  without  perceiving  that  it  is  sufficient 
to  attend  to  the  daemon  within  him,  and  to  rev- 
erence it  sincerely.  And  reverence  of  the  daemon 
consists  in  keeping  it  pure  from  passion  and  thought- 
lessness, and  dissatisfaction  with  what  comes  from 
gods  and  men.  For  the  things  from  the  gods 
merit  veneration  for  their  excellence;-  and  the 
things  from  men  should  be  dear  to  us  by  reason  of 
kinship ;  and  sometimes  even,  in  a  manner,  they 
move  our  pity  by  reason  of  men's  ignorance  of 
good  and  bad  ;  this  defect  being  not  less  than  that 
1  Pindar,  in  the  Theaetetus  of  Plato.  See  xi.  1. 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  Ill 

which  deprives  us  of  the  power  of  distinguishing 
things  that  are  white  and  black. 

14.  Though  thou  shouldest  be  going  to  live  three  j  /^) 
thousand  years,  and  as  many  times  ten  thousand 
years,  still  remember  that  no  man  loses  any  other 

life  than  this  which  he  now  lives,  nor  lives  any 
other  than  this  which  he  now  loses.     The  longest 
and  shortest  are  thus  brought  to  the  same.     For 
the  present  is  the  same  to  all,  though  that  whic 
perishes  is  not  the  same;  f  l  and  so  that  which 
lost  appears  to  be  a  mere  moment.     For  a  man  c 
not  lose  either  the  past  or  the  future :  for  what 
man  has  not,  how  can  any  one  take  this  from  hi 
These  two  things  then  thou  must  bear  in  mind 
the  one,  that  all  things  from  eternity  are  of  like 
forms   and   come   round  in  a   circle,  and  that   it 
makes  no  difference  whether  a  man  shall  see  the 
same  things  during  a  hundred  years,  or  two  hun- 
dred, or  an  infinite  time ;  and  the  second,  that  the 
longest  liver  and  he  who  will  die  soonest  lose  just 
the  same.     For  the  present  is  the  only  thing   of 
which  a  man  can  be  deprived,  if  it  is  true  that  this 
is  the  only  thing  which  he  has,  and  that  a  man  can- 
not lose  a  thing  if  he  has  it  not. 

15.  Remember   that   all  is   opinion.     For  what 
was  said  by  the  Cynic  Monimus  is  manifest :  and 
manifest  too  is  the  use  of  what  was  said,  if  a  man 
receives  what  may  be  got  out  of  it  as  far  as  it  is  true. 

1  See  Gataker's  note. 


112  MED  IT  A  TIONS. 

16.  The  soul  of  man  does  violence  to  itself,  first 
of  all,  when  it  becomes  an  abscess,  and,  as  it  were, 
a  tumor  on  the  universe,  so  far  as  it  can.     For  to 
be  vexed  at  anything  which  happens  is  a  separation 
of  ourselves  from  nature,  in  some  part  of  which  the 
natures  of  all  other  things  are  contained.     In  the 
next  place,  the  soul  does  violence  to  itself  when  it 
turns  away  from  any  man,  or  even  moves  towards 
him  with  the  intention  of  injuring,  such  as  are  the 
souls  of  those  who  are  angry.     In  the  third  place, 
the  soul  does  violence  to  itself  when  it  is  over- 
powered by  pleasure  or  by  pain.     Fourthly,  when 
it  plays  a  part,  and  does  or  says  anything  insin- 
cerely and  untruly.     Fifthly,  when  it  allows  any 
act  of  its  own  and  any  movement  to  be  without  an 
aim,  and  does  anything  thoughtlessly  and  without 
considering  what  it  is,  it  being  right  that  even  the 
smallest  things  be  done  with  reference  to  an  end ; 
and  the  end  of  rational  animals  is  to  follow  the 
reason  and  the  law  of  the  most  ancient  city  and 
polity. 

17.  Of  human  life  the  time  is  a  point,  and  the 
substance  is  in  a  flux,  and  the  perception  dull,  and 
the  composition  of  the  whole  body  subject  to  putre- 
faction, and  the  soul  a  whirl,  and  fortune  hard  to 
divine,    and  fame   a   thing   devoid   of  judgment. 
And,  to  say  all  in  a  word,  everything  which  belongs 
to  the  body  is  a  stream,  and  what  belongs  to  the 
soul  is  a  dream  and  vapor,  and  life  is  a  warfare  and 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.          113 

stranger's  sojourn,  and  after-fame  is  oblivion. 
rWhat  then  is  that  which  is  able  to  conduct  a  man  ? 
One  thing,  and  only  one,  philosophy.  But  this 
consists  in  keeping  the  daemon  within  a  man  free 
from  violence  and  unharmed,  superior  to  pains  arid 
pleasures,  doing  nothing  without  a  purpose,  nor 
yet  falsely  and  with  hypocrisy,  not  feeling  the  need 
of  another  man's  doing  or  not  doing  anything ;  and 
besides,  accepting  all  that  happens,  and  all  that  is 
allotted,  as  coming  from  thence,  wherever  it  is, 
from  whence  he  himself  came  ;  and,  finally,  waiting 
for  death  with  a  cheerful  mind,  as  being  nothing 
else  than  a  dissolution  of  the  elements  of  which 
every  living  being  is  compounded.  But  if  there 
is  no  harm  to  the  elements  themselves  in  each  con- 
tinually changing  into  another,  why  should  a  man 
have  any  apprehension  about  the  change  and  dis- 
solution of  all  the  elements  ?  For  it  is  according  to 
nature,  and  nothing  is  evil  which  is  according  to 
nature. 

This  in  Carnuntum.1 

1  Carnuntum  was  a  town  of  Pannonia,  on  the  south  side  of 
the  Danube,  about  thirty  miles  east  of  Vindobona  (Vienna). 
Orosius  (vii.  15)  and  Eutropius  (viii.  13)  say  that  Antoninus 
remained  three  years  at  Carnuntum  during  his  war  with  the 
Marcomanni. 


III. 

1.  WE  ought  to  consider  not  only  that  our  life  is 
daily  wasting  away  and  a  smaller  part  of  it  is  left, 
but  another  thing  also  must  be  taken  into  the  ac- 
count, that  if  a  man  should  live  longer,  it  is  quite 
uncertain  whether  the  understanding  will  still  con- 
tinue sufficient  for  the  comprehension  of  things, 
and  retain  the  power  of  contemplation  which 
strives  to  acquire  the  knowledge  of  the  divine  and 
the  human.  For  if  he  shall  begin  to  fall  into 
dotage,  perspiration  and  nutrition  and  imagination 
and  appetite,  and  whatever  else  there  is  of  the 
kind,  will  not  fail ;  but  the  power  of  making  use 
of  ourselves,  and  filling  up  the  measure  of  our 
duty,  and  clearly  separating  all  appearances,  and 
considering  whether  a  man  should  now  depart 
from  life,  and  whatever  else  of  the  kind' absolutely 
requires  a  disciplined  reason,  —  all  this  is  already 
extinguished.  We  must  make  haste,  then,  not 
only  because  we  are  daily  nearer  to  death,  but 
also  because  the  conception  of  things  and  the 
understanding  of  them  cease  first. 


MAR C  US  A  UEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  H  5 

2.  We  ought  to  observe  also  that  even  the 
things  which  follow  after  the  things  which  are 
produced  according  to  nature  contain  something 
pleasing  and  attractive.  For  instance,  when  bread 
is  baked  some  parts  are  split  at  the  surface,  and 
these  parts  which  thus  open,  and  have  a  certain 
fashion  contrary  to  the  purpose  of  the  baker's  art, 
are  beautiful  in  a  manner,  and  in  a  peculiar  way 
excite  a  desire  for  eating.  And  again,  figs,  when 
they  are  quite  ripe,  gape  open ;  and  in  the  ripe 
olives  the  very  circumstance  of  their  being  near  to 
rottenness  adds  a  peculiar  beauty  to  the  fruit.  And 
the  ears  of  corn  bending  down,  and  the  lion's  eye- 
brows, and  the  foam  which  flows  from  the  mouth  of 
wild  boars,  and  many  other  things,  —  though  they 
are  far  from  being  beautiful  if  a  man  should  examine 
them  severally,  —  still,  because  they  are  conse- 
quent upon  the  things  which  are  formed  by  nature, 
help  to  adorn  them,  and  they  please  the  mind ;  so 
that  if  a  man  should  have  a  feeling  and  deeper 
insight  with  respect  to  the  things  which  are  pro- 
duced in  the  universe,  there  is  hardly  one  of  those 
which  follow  by  way  of  consequence  which  will 
not  seem  to  him  to  be  in  a  manner  disposed  so  as 
to  give  pleasure.  And  so  he  will  see  even  the  real 
gaping  jaws  of  wild  beasts  with  no  less  pleasure 
than  those  which  painters  and  sculptors  show  by 
imitation  ;  and  in  an  old  woman  and  an  old  man 
he  will  be  able  to  see  a  certain  maturity  and 


116  MED  IT  A  TIOX8. 

comeliness ;  and  the  attractive  loveliness  of  young 
persons  he  will  be  able  to  look  on  with  chaste 
eyes ;  and  many  such  things  will  present  them- 
selves, not  pleasing  to  every  man,  but  to  him  only 
who  has  become  truly  familiar  with  Nature  and 
her  works. 

3.  Hippocrates,  after  curing  many  diseases,  him- 
self fell  sick  and  died.     The  Chaldaei  foretold  the 
deaths  of  many,  and  then  fate  caught  them  too. 
Alexander  and  Pompeius  and  Caius  Caesar,  after 
so  often  completely  destroying  whole  cities,  and  in 
battle  cutting  to   pieces   many   ten  thousands  of 
cavalry  and  infantry,  themselves  too   at  last  de- 
parted from  life.     Heraclitus,  after  so  many  spec- 
ulations on  the  conflagration  of  the  universe,  was 
rilled  with  water  internally  and  died  smeared  all 
over  with  mud.     And  lice  destroyed  Deir.ocritus; 
and  other  lice  killed  Socrates.     What  means  all 
this?     Thou  hast  embarked,  thou  hast  made  the 
voyage,    thou    art    come    to    shore ;   get    out.      If 
indeed  to  another  life,  there  is  no  want  of  gods, 
not  even  there  ;  but  if  to  a  state  without  sensation, 
thou  wilt  cease  to  be  held  by  pains  and  pleasures, 
and  to  be  a  slave  to  the  vessel,  which  is  as  much 
inferior  as  that  which  serves  it  is  superior :  f  for 
the  one  is  intelligence   and    deity ;  the    other   is 
earth  and  corruption. 

4.  Do  not  waste  the  remainder  of   thy  life  in 
thoughts  about  others,  when  thou  dost  not  refer 


MARCUS  AVBELWS  AtfTONINlS.  117 

thy  thoughts  to  some  object  of  common  utility. 
For  thou  losest  the  opportunity  of  doing  something 
else  when  thou  hast  such  thoughts  as  these,  — 
What  is  such  a  person  doing,  and  why,  and  what 
is  he  saying,  and  what  is  he  thinking  of,  and  what 
is  he  contriving,  and  whatever  else  of  the  kind  makes 
us  wander  away  from  the  observation  of  our  own 
ruling  power.  We  ought  then  to  check  in  the 
series  of  our  thoughts  everything  that  is  without 
a  purpose  and  useless,  but  most  of  all  the  over- 
curious  feeling  and  the  malignant ;  and  a  man 
should  use  himself  to  think  of  those  things  only 
about  which  if  one  should  suddenly  ask,  What 
hast  thou  now  in  thy  thoughts  ?  with  perfect  open- 
ness thou  mightest  immediately  answer,  This  or 
That ;  so  that  from  thy  words  it  should  be  plain 
that  everything  in  thee  is  simple  and  benevolent, 
and  such  as  befits  a  social  animal,  and  one  that 
cares  not  for  thoughts  about  pleasure  or  sensual 
enjoyments  at  all,  nor  has  any  rivalry  or  envy  and 
suspicion,  or  anything  else  for  which  thou  wouldst 
blush  if  thou  shouldst  say  that  thou  hadst  it  in 
thy  mind.  For  the  man  who  is  such,  and  no 
longer  delays  being  among  the  number  of  the 
best,  is  like  a  priest  and  minister  of  the  gods, 
using  too  the  [deity]  which  is  planted  within  him, 
which  makes  the  man  uncontaminated  by  pleasure, 
unharmed  by  any  pain,  untouched  by  any  insult, 
feeling  no  wrong,  a  fighter  in  the  noblest  fight, 


118  MEDITA  TIONS 

one  who  cannot  be  overpowered  by  any  passion, 
dyed  deep  with  justice,  accepting  with  all  his  soul 
everything  which  happens  and  is  assigned  to  him 
as  his  portion ;  and  not  often,  nor  yet  without 
great  necessity  and  for  the  general  interest,  im- 
agining what  another  says,  or  does,  or  thinks. 
For  it  is  only  what  belongs  to  himself  that  he 
makes  the  matter  for  his  activity  ;  and  he  con- 
stantly thinks  of  that  which  is  allotted  to  himself 
out  of  the  sum  total  of  things,  and  he  makes  his 
own  acts  fair,  and  he  is  persuaded  that  his  own 
portion  is  good.  For  the  lot  which  is  assigned  to 
each  man  is  carried  along  with  him  and  carries 
him  along  with  it.f  And  he  remembers  also  that! 
every  rational  animal  is  his  kinsman,  and  that  to  j 
care  for  all  men  is  according  to  man's  nature ;  and  i 
a  man  should  hold  on  to  the  opinion  not  of  all,  1 
but  of  those  only  who  confessedly  live  according 
to  nature.  But  as  to  those  who  live  not  so,  he 
always  bears  in  mind  what  kind  of  men  they  are 
both  at  home  and  from  home,  both  by  night  and 
by  day,  and  what  they  are,  and  with  what  men 
they  live  an  impure  life.  Accordingly,  he  does  not 
value  at  all  the  praise  which  comes  from  such  men, 
since  they  are  not  even  satisfied  with  themselves. 
5.  Labor  not  unwillingly,  nor  without  regard  to 
the  common  interest,  nor  without  due  considera- 
tion, nor  with  distraction  ;  nor  let  studied  orna- 
ment set  off  thy  thoughts,  and  be  not  either  a  man 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  119 

of  many  words,  or  busy  about  too  many  things 
And  further,  let  the  deity  which  is  in  thee  be  the 
guardian  of  a  living  being,  manly  and  of  ripe  age, 
and  engaged  in  matter  political,  and  a  Roman,  and 
a  ruler,  who  has  taken  his  post  like  a  man  waiting 
for  the  signal  which  summons  him  from  life,  and 
ready  to  go,  having  need  neither  of  oath  nor  of  any 
man's  testimony.  Be  cheerful  also,  and  seek  not 
external  help  nor  the  tranquillity  which  others 
give.  A  man  then  must  stand  erect,  not  be  kept 
erect  by  others. 

6.  If  thou  findest  in  human  life  anything  better 
than  justice,  truth,  temperance,  fortitude,  and,  in  a 
word,  anything  better  than  thy  own  mind's  self- 
satisfaction  in  the  things  which  it  enables  thee  to 
do  according  to  right  reason,  and  in  the  condition 
that  is  assigned  to  thee  without  thy  own  choice ; 
if,  I  say,  thou  seest  anything  better  than  this,  turn 
to  it  with  all  thy  soul,  and  enjoy  that  which  thou 
hast  found  to  be  the  best.  But  if  nothing  appears 
to  be  better  than  the  Deity  which  is  planted  in 
thee,  which  has  subjected  to  itself  all  thy  appetites, 
and  carefully  examines  all  the  impressions,  and,  as 
Socrates  said,  has  detached  itself  from  the  persua- 
sions of  sense,  and  has  submitted  itself  to  the  gods, 
and  cares  for  mankind  ;  if  thou  findest  everything 
else  smaller  and  of  less  value  than  this,  give  place 
to  nothing  else,  for  if  thou  dost  once  diverge  and 
incline  to  it,  thou  wilt  no  longer  without  distraction 


120  MEDITATIONS. 

be  able  to  give  the  preference  to  that  good  thing 
which  is  thy  proper  possession  and  thy  own ;  for  it 
is  not  right  that  anything  of  any  other  kind,  such 
as  praise  from  the  many,  or  power,  or  enjoyment 
of  pleasure,  should  come  into  competition  with  that 
which  is  rationally  and  politically  [or,  practically] 
good.  All  these  things,  even  though  they  may 
seem  to  adapt  themselves  [to  the  better  things]  in 
a  small  degree,  obtain  the  superiority  all  at  once, 
and  carry  us  away.  But  do  thou,  I  say,  simply  and 
freely  choose  the  better,  and  hold  to  it.  —  But  that 
which  is  useful  is  the  better.  —  Well,  then,  if  it  is 
useful  to  thee  as  a  rational  being,  keep  to  it ;  but 
if  it  is  only  useful  to  thee  as  an  animal,  say  so,  and 
maintain  thy  judgment  without  arrogance :  only 
take  care  that  thou  makest  the  inquiry  by  a  sure 
method. 

/      7.  Never  value  anything  as  profitable  to  thyself 
which  shall  compel  thee  to  break  thy  promise,  to 
lose  thy  self-respect,  to  hate  any  man,  to  suspect, 
to  curse,  to  act  the  hypocrite,  to  desire  anything 
which  needs  walls  and  curtains:  for  he  who  has 
preferred  to  everything  else  his  own  intelligence 
and  daemon  and  the  worship  of  its  excellence,  acts 
no  tragic  part,  does  not  groan,  will  not  need  either 
solitude  or  much  company ;  and,  what  is  chief  of 
,  he  will  live  without  either  pursuing  or  flying 
rom    [death]  ; 1  but  whether  for  a  longer  or  a 
1  Comp.  ix.  3. 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  121 

/  shorter  time  he  shall  have  the  soul  enclosed  in  the 

/    body,  he  cares  not  at  all:  for  even  if  he  must  de- 

/     part  immediately,  he  will  go  as  readily  as  if  he  were 

/     g°ing  t°  do  anything  else  which  can  be  done  with 

decency  and  order ;  taking  care  of  this  only  all 

through  life,  that  his  thoughts  turn  not  away  from 

I      anything  which  belongs  to  an  intelligent  animal 

\     and  a  member  of  a  civil  community. 

8.  In  the  mind  of  one  who  is    chastened   and 
purified  thou  wilt  find  no  corrupt  matter,  nor  im- 
purity, nor  any  sore  skinned  over.     Nor  is  his  life 
incomplete  when  fate  overtakes  him,  as  one  may 
say  of  an  actor  who  leaves  the  stage  before  ending 
and  finishing  the  play.     Besides,  there  is  in  him 
nothing  servile,  nor  affected,  nor  too  closely  bound 
[to  other  things],  nor  yet  detached  l  [from  other 
things],  nothing  worthy  of  blame,  nothing  which 
seeks  a  hiding-place. 

9.  Reverence  the  faculty  which  produces  opinion. 
On  this  faculty  it  entirely  depends  whether  there 
shall  exist  in  thy  ruling  part  any  opinion  incon- 
sistent with   nature   and   the    constitution  of  the 
rational  animal.     And  this  faculty  promises  free- 
dom from  hasty  judgment,  and  friendship  towards 
men,  and  obedience  to  the  gods. 

10.  Throwing  away  then  all  things,  hold  to  these 
only  which  are  few  ;  and  besides,  bear  in  mind  that 
every  man  lives  only  this  present  time,  which  is  an 

1  viii.  34. 


122  MEDITATIONS. 

indivisible  point,  and  that  all  the  rest  of  his  life  is 
either  past  or  it  is  uncertain.  Short  then  is  the 
time  which  every  man  lives,  and  small  the  nook 
of  the  earth  where  he  lives  ;  and  short  too  the  long- 
est posthumous  fame,  and  even  this  only  continued 
by  a  succession  of  poor  human  beings,  who  will 
very  soon  die,  and  who  know  not  even  themselves, 
much  less  him  who  died  long  ago. 

11.  To  the  aids  which  have  been  mentioned  let 
this  one  still  be  added :  Make  for  thyself  a  definition 
or  description  of  the  thing  which  is  presented  to 
thee,  so  as  to  see  distinctly  what  kind  of  a  thing  it 
is  in  its  substance,  in  its  nudity,  in  its  complete 
entirety,  and  tell  thyself  its  proper  name,  and  the 
names  of  the  things  of  which  it  has  been  com- 
pounded, and  into  which  it  will  be  resolved.  For 
nothing  is  so  productive  of  elevation  of  mind  as  to 
be  able  to  examine  methodically  and  truly  every 
object  which  is  presented  to  thee  in  life,  and  always 
to  look  at  things  so  as  to  see  at  the  same  time  what 
kind  of  universe  this  is,  and  what  kind  of  use 
everything  performs  in  it,  and  what  value  every- 
thing has  with  reference  to  the  whole,  and  what 
with  reference  to  man,  who  is  a  citizen  of  the  high- 
est city,  of  which  all  other  cities  are  like  families ; 
what  each  thing  is,  and  of  what  it  is  composed,  and 
how  long  it  is  the  nature  of  this  thing  to  endure 
which  now  makes  an  impression  on  me,  and  what 
virtue  I  have  need  of  with  respect  to  it,  such  as 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.          123 

gentleness,  manliness,  truth,  fidelity,  simplicity, 
contentment,  and  the  rest.  Wherefore,  on  every 
occasion  a  man  should  say  :  This  comes  from  god  ; 
and  this  is  according  to  the  apportionment  f  and 
spinning  of  the  thread  of  destiny,  and  such-like 
coincidence  and  chance ;  and  this  is  from  one  of 
the  same  stock,  and  a  kinsman  and  partner,  one 
who  knows  not,  however,  what  is  according  to  his 
nature.  But  I  know;  for  this  reason  I  behave 
towards  him  according  to  the  natural  law  of  fellow- 
ship with  benevolence  and  justice.  At  the  same 
time,  however,  in  things  indifferent 1  I  attempt  to 
ascertain  the  value  of  each. 

12.  If  thou  workest  at  that  which  is  before  thee, 
folio  wing  right  reason  seriously,  vigorously,  calmly, 
without  allowing  anything  else  to   distract  thee, 
but  keeping  thy  divine  part  pure,  as  if  thou  shouldst 
be  bound  to  give  it  back  immediately ;  if  thou  hold- 
est  to  this,  expecting  nothing,  fearing  nothing,  but 
satisfied   with  thy   present   activity  according   to 
nature,  and  with  heroic  truth  in  every  word  and 
sound  which  thou  utterest,  thou  wilt  live  happy. 
And  there  is  no  man  who  is  able  to  prevent  this.^ 

13.  As  physicians  have  always  their  instruments 
and  knives  ready  for  cases  which  suddenly  require^ 
their  skill,  sojicrthou  have  principles  ready  for  th( 
understanding  of HbnTngs  divine  and  humaiyandfor 

1  Est  et  horum  quae  media  appeilamus  grande  discrimen.  — 
Seneca,  Ep.  82. 


124  MEDITATIONS. 

doing  everything,  even  the  smallest,  with  a  recol- 
lection of  the  bond  which  unites  the  divine  and 
human  to  one  another.  For  neither  wilt  thou  do 
anything  well  which  pertains  to  man  without  at  the 
same  time  having  a  reference  to  things  divine ;  nor 
the  contrary. 

14.  No  longer  wander  at  hazard  ;  for  neither  wilt 
thou  read  thy  own  memoirs,1  nor  the  acts  of  the 
ancient  Romans  and  Hellenes,  and  the  selections 
from  books  which  thou  wast  reserving  for  thy  old 
age. 2     Hasten  then  to  the  end  which  thou  hast  be- 
fore thee,  and,  throwing  away  idle  hopes,  come  to 
thy  own  aid,  if  thou  carest  at  all  for  thyself,  while 
it  is  in  thy  power. 

15.  They  know  not  how  many  things  are  signified 
by  the  words  stealing,  sowing,  buying,   keeping 
quiet,  seeing  what  ought  to  be  done  ;  for  this  is  not 
effected  by  the  eyes,  but  by  another  kind  of  vision. 

16.  Body,  soul,  intelligence :  to  the  body  belong 
sensations,  to  the  soul  appetites,  to  the  intelligence 
principles.     To  receive  the  impressions  of  forms  by 
means  of  appearances  belongs  even  to  animals ;  to 
be  pulled  by  the  strings  3  of  desire  belongs  both  to 

1  inro^fMTa  :  or  memoranda,  notes,  and  the  like.    See  i.  17. 

8  Compare  Fronto,  ii.  9 ;  a  letter  of  Marcus  to  Fronto,  who 
was  then  consul :  "  Feci  tamen  mihi  per  hos  dies  excerpta  ex 
libris  sexaginta  in  quinque  tomis."  But  he  says  some  of 
them  were  small  books. 

3  Compare  Plato,  De  Legibus,  i.  p.  644,  6'n  ravra  rd 
etc. ;  and  Antoninus,  ii.  2 ;  vii.  8 ;  xii.  19. 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  125 

wild  beasts  and  to  men  who  have  made  themselves 
into  women,  and  to  a  Phalaris  and  a  Nero :  and  to 
have  the  intelligence  that  guides  to  the  things  which 
appear  suitable  belongs  also  to  those  who  do  not  be- 
lieve in  the  gods,  and  who  betray  their  country,  and 
do  their  impure  deeds  when  they  have  shut  the 
doors.  If  then  everything  else  is  common  to  all 
that  I  have  mentioned,  there  remains  that  which 
is  peculiar  to  the  good  man,  to  be  pleased  and  con- 
tent with  what  happens,  and  with  the  thread  which 
is  spun  for  him ;  and  not  to  defile  the  divinity 
which  is  planted  in  his  breast,  nor  disturb  it  by  a 
crowd  of  images,  but  to  preserve  it  tranquil,  follow- 
ing it  obediently  as  a  god,  neither  saying  anything 
contrary  to  the  truth,  nor  doing  anything  contrary 
to  justice.  And  if  all  men  refuse  to  believe  that  he 
lives  a  simple,  modest,  and  contented  life,  he  is 
neither  angry  with  any  of  them,  nor  does  he  deviate 
from  the  way  which  leads  to  the  end  of  life,  to 
which  a  man  ought  to  come  pure,  tranquil,  ready 
to  depart,  and  without  any  compulsion  perfectly 
reconciled  to  his  lot. 


IV. 

1.  THAT  which  rules  within,  when  it  is  accord- 
ing to  nature,  is  so  affected  with   respect  to  the 
events  which  happen,  that  it  always  easily  adapts 
itself  to  that  which  is  possible  and  is  presented 
to  it.     For  it  requires  no  definite  material,  but  it 
moves  towards  its  purpose, l  under  certain  condi- 
tions, however ;  and  it  makes  a  material  for  itself 
out  of  that  which  opposes  it,  as  fire  lays  hold  of 
what  falls  into  it,  by  which  a  small  light  would 
have  been  extinguished:  but  when  the  fire  is  strong, 
it  soon  appropriates  to  itself  the  matter  which  is 
heaped  on  it,  and  consumes  it,  and  rises  higher  by 
means  of  this  very  material. 

2.  Let  no  act  be  done  without  a  purpose,  nor 
otherwise  than  according  to  the  perfect  principles 
of  art. 

jf  3.  Men  seek  retreats  for  themselves,  houses  in  the 
j country,  sea-shores,  and  mountains ;  and  thou  too 
j  art  wont  to  desire  such  things  very  much.  But 

1  Trpoj  TOL  i)yoijfj.eva,  literally  "towards  that  which  leads." 
The  exact  translation  is  doubtful.     See  Gataker's  note. 


i 

V; 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  127 

this  is  altogether  a  mark  of  the  most  common  sort 
of  men,  for  it  is  in  thy  power  whenever  thou  shalt 
choose  to  retire  into  thyself.  For  nowhere  either 
with  more  quiet  or  more  freedom  from  trouble 
does  a  man  retire  than  into  his  own  soul,  particu- 
larly when  he  has  within  him  such  thoughts  that 
by  looking  into  them  he  is  immediately  in  perfect 
tranquillity ;  and  I  affirm  that  tranquillity  is  noth- 
ing else  than  the  good  ordering  of  the  mind.  Con- 
stantly then  give  to  thyself  this  retreat,  and  renew 
thyself ;  and  let  thy  principles  be  brief  and  funda- 
mental, which,  as  soon  as  thou  shalt  recur  to  them, 
will  be  sufficient  to  cleanse  the  soul  completely, 
and  to  send  thee  back  free  from  alljiiscontent  with 
the  things  to  which  thou  returnestTvFor  with  what 
art  thou  discontented?  With  the  tmdness  of  men? 
Recall  to  thy  mind  this  conclusion,  that  rational 
animals  exist  for  one  another,  and  that  to  endure 
is  a  part  of  justice,  and  that  men  do  wrong  invol- 
untarily ;  and  consider  how  many  already,  after 
mutual  enmity,  suspicion,  hatred,  and  fighting, 
have  been  stretched  dead,  reduced  to  ashes  ;  and 
be  quiet  at  last.  —  But  perhaps  thou  art  dissatisfied 
with  that  which  is  assigned  to  thee  out  of  the 
universe.  —  Recall  to  thy  recollection  this  alterna- 
tive ;  either  there  is  providence  or  atoms  [fortuitous 
concurrence  of  things]  ;  or  remember  the  arguments 
by  which  it  has  been  proved  that  the  world  is  a 
kind  of  political  community  [and  be  quiet  at  last]. 


128  MED  IT  A  TIONS. 

— But  perhaps  corporeal  things  will  still  fasten  upon 
thee.  —  Consider  then  further  that  the  mind  min- 
gles not  with  the  breath,  whether  moving  gently 
or  violently,  when  it  has  once  drawn  itself  apart 
and  discovered  its  own  power,  and  think  also  of  all 
that  thou  hast  heard  and  assented  to  about  pain  and 
pleasure  [and  be  quiet  at  last].  — But  perhaps  the 
desire  of  the  thing  called  fame  will  torment  thee.  — 
See  how  soon  everything  is  forgotten,  and  look  at 
the  chaos  of  infinite  time  on  each  side  of  [the  pres- 
ent], and  the  emptiness  of  applause,  and  the  chang- 
ableness  and  want  of  judgment  in  those  who  pre- 
tend to  give  praise,  and  the  narrowness  of  the  space 
within  which  it  is  circumscribed  [and  be  quiet  at 
last].  For  the  whole  earth  is  a  point,  and  how 
small  a  nook  in  it  is  this  thy  dwelling,  and  how 
few  are  there  in  it,  and  what  kind  of  people  are 
they  who  will  praise  thee. 

This  then  remains :  Remember  to  retire  into  this 
little  territory  of  thy  own,1  and  above  all  do  not 
distract  or  strain  thyself,  but  be  free,  and  look  at 
things  as  a  man,  as  a  human  being,  as  a  citizen, 
as  a  mortal.  But  among  the  things  readiest  to  thy 
hand  to  which  thou  shalt  turn,  let  there  be  these, 
which  are  two.  One  is  that  things  do  not  touch 
the  soul,  for  they  are  external  and  remain  immov- 
table  ;  but  our  perturbations  come  only  from  the 

1  Tecum  habita,  noris  quam  sit  tibi  curta  supellex.  —  Per- 
sitis,  iv.  52. 


MAECUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  129 

opinion  which  is  within.  The  other  is  that  all  these 
things,  which  thou  seest,  change  immediately  and 
will  no  longer  be  ;  and  constantly  bear  in  mind  how 
many  of  these  changes  thou  hast  already  witnessed. 
The  universe  is  transformation;  life  is  opinion. 

4.  If  our  intellectual  part  is  common,  the  reason 
also,  in  respect  of  which  we  are  rational  beings,  is 
common :  if  this  is  so,  common  also  is  the  reason 
which  commands  us  what  to  do,  and  what  not  to 
do ;  if  this  is  so,  there  is  a  common  law  also ;  if 
this  is  so,  we  are  fellow-citizens  ;  if  this  is  so,  we 
are  members  of  some  political  community,  if  this 
is  so,  the  world  is  in  a  manner  a  state.1     For  of 
what  other  common  political  community  will  any 
one  say  that  the  whole  human  race  are  members  ? 
And  from  thence,  from  this  common  political  com- 
munity comes  also  our  very  intellectual  faculty  and 
reasoning  faculty  and   our   capacity  for  law;   or 
whence  do  they  come  ?    For  as  my  earthly  part  is 
a  portion  given  to  me  from  certain  earth,  and  that 
which  is  watery  from  another  element,  and  that 
which  is  hot  and  fiery  from  some  peculiar  source 
(for  nothing  comes  out  of  that  which  is  nothing, 
as  nothing  also  returns  to  non-existence),  so  also 
the  intellectual  part  comes  from  some  source. 

5.  Death  is  such  as  generation  is,  a  mystery  of 
nature  ;  composition  out  of  the  same  elements,  and 
a   decomposition  into    the  same ;   and   altogether 

'  Compare  Cicero  De  Legibus,  i.  7. 


130  MEDITATIONS. 

not  a  thing  of  which  any  man  should  be  ashamed, 
for  it  is  not  contrary  to  [the  nature  of]  a  reason- 
able animal,  and  not  contrary  to  the  reason  of  our 
constitution. 

6.  It  is  natural  that  these  things  should  be  done 
by  such  persons,  it  is  a  matter  of  necessity ;  and  if 
a  man  will  not  have  it  so,  he  will  not  allow  the 
fig-tree  to  have  juice.     But  by  all  means  bear  this 
in  mind,  that  within  a  very  short  time  both  thou 
and  he  will  be    dead ;  and  soon  not  even   your 
names  will  be  left  behind. 

7.  Take  away  thy  opinion,  and  then  there  is 
taken  away  the  complaint,  "  I  have  been  harmed." 
Take  away  the  complaint,  "  I  have  been  harmed," 
and  the  harm  is  taken  away. 

8.  That  which  does  not  make  a  man  worse  than 
he  was,  also  does  not  make  his  life  worse,  nor 
does  it  harm  him  either  from  without   or   from 
within. 

9.  The   nature   of  that  which  is   [universally] 
useful  has  been  compelled  to  do  this. 

10.  Consider   that   everything  which   happens, 
happens  justly,  and  if  thou  observest  carefully, 

»tjiou  wilt  find  it  to  be  so.  I  do  not  say  only  with 
respect  to  the  continuity  of  the  series  of  things, 
but  with  respect  to  what  is  just,  and  as  if  it  were 
done  by  one  who  assigns  to  each  thing  its  value. 
Observe  then  as  thou  hast  begun ;  and  whatever 
thou  doest,  do  it  in  conjunction  with  this,  the 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.         131 

being  good,  and  in  the  sense  in  which  a  man  is 
properly  understood  to  be  good.  Keep  to  this  in 
every  action. 

11.  Do  not  have  such  an  opinion  of  things  as  he 
has  who  does  thee  wrong,  or  such  as  he  wishes 
thee  to  have,  but  look  at  them   as  they  are  in 
truth. 

12.  A  man  should  always  have  these  two  rules 
in  readiness;  the  one   to   do  only  whatever  the 
reason  of  the  ruling  and  legislating  faculty  may 
suggest  for  the  use  of  men ;  the  other,  to  change 
thy  opinion,  if  there  is   any  one   at  hand   who 
sets  thee  right  and  moves  thee  from   any  opin- 
ion.     But    this    change    of    opinion    must  pro- 
ceed only  from  a  certain  persuasion,  as  of  what 
is  just  or  of  common  advantage,  and  the  like,  not 
because  it  appears  pleasant  or  brings  reputation. 

13.  Hast   thou   reason  ?     I   have.  —  Why  then 
dost  not  thou  use  it?     For  if  this  does  its  own 
work,  what  else  dost  thou  wish  ? 

14.  Thou  hast  existed  as  a  part.     Thou  shalt 
disappear    in    that    which    produced    thee ;    but 
rather  thou  shalt  be  received  back  into  its  semi- 
nal  principle  by  transmutation. 

15.  Many  grains  of  frankincense  on  the  same 
'altar:  one  falls  before,  another  falls  after;  but  it 
makes  no  difference. 

16.  Within  ten  days  thou  wilt  seem  a  god  to 
those  to  whom  thou  art  now  a  beast  and  an  ape,  if 


132  MEDITA  TION8. 

thou  wilt  return  to  thy  principles  and  the  worship 
of  reason. 

17.  Do  not  act  as  if  thou  wert  going  to  live  ten 
thousand  years.      Death  hangs  over  thee.     While 
thou  livest,  while  it  is  in  thy  power,  be  good. 

18.  How  much  trouble  he  avoids  who  does  not 
look  to  see  what  his  neighbor  says   or   does   or 
thinks,  but  only  to  what  he  does  himself,  that  it 
may  be  just   and   pure ;   or,   as  Agathon  f  says, 
look  not  round  at  the  depraved  morals  of  others, 
but  run  straight  along  the  line  without  deviating 
from  it. 

19.  He  who  has  a  vehement  desire  for  posthu- 
mous fame  does  not  consider  that  every  one  of 
those  who  remember  him   will   himself  also  die 
very  soon  ;  then  again  also  they  who  have  succeeded 
them,  until  the  whole  remembrance  shall  have  been 
extinguished  as  it  is  transmitted  through  men  who 
foolishly  admire  and  perish.      But  suppose  that 
those  who  will  remember  are  even  immortal,  and 
that  the  remembrance  will  be  immortal,  what  then 
is  this  to  thee?     And  I  say  not  what  is  it  to  the 
dead,  but  what  is  it  to  the  living.     What  is  praise, 
except f  indeed  so  far  as  it  hasf  a  certain  utility? 
For  thou  now  rejectest  unseasonably  the  gift  of 
nature,  clinging  to  something  else  .  .  .  f . 

20.  Everything  which  is  in  any  way  beautiful  is 
beautiful   in  itself,  and  terminates  in  itself,  not 
having  praise   as   part   of  itself./    Neither   worse 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  133 

then  nor  better  is  a  thing  made  by  being  praised. 
I  affirm  this  also  of  the  things  which  are  called 
beautiful  by  the  vulgar,  for  example,  material 
things  and  works  of  art.  That  which  is  really 
beautiful  has  no  need  of  anything ;  not  more  than 
law,  not  more  than  truth,  not  more  than  benevo- 
lence or  modesty.  Which  of  these  things  is  beau- 
tiful because  it  is  praised,  or  spoiled  by  being 
blamed?  Is  such  a  thing  as  an  emerald  made 
worse  than  it  was,  if  it  is  not  praised?  or  gold, 
ivory,  purple,  a  lyre,  a  little  knife,  a  flower,  a 
shrub  ? 

21.  If  souls  continue  to  exist,  how  does  the  air 
contain  them  from  eternity  ?  —  But  how  does  the 
earth  contain  the  bodies  of  those  who  have  been 
buried  from  time  so  remote?  For  as  here  the 
mutation  of  these  bodies  after  a  certain  continu- 
ance, whatever  it  may  be,  and  their  dissolution 
make  room  for  other  dead  bodies,  so  the  souls 
which  are  removed  into  the  air  after  subsisting  for 
some  time  are  transmuted  ami  diffused,  and  as- 
sume a  fiery  nature  by  being  received  into  the 
seminal  intelligence  of  the  universe,  and  in  this 
way  make  room  for  the  fresh  souls  which  come  to 
dwell  there.  And  this  is  the  answer  which  a  man 
might  give  on  the  hypothesis  of  souls  continuing 
to  exist.  But  we  must  not  only  think  of  the  num- 
ber of  bodies  which  are  thus  buried,  but  also  of 
the  number  of  animals  which  are  daily  eaten  by 


1 34  MED  IT  A  TIONS. 

us  and  the  other  animals.  For  what  a  number  is 
consumed,  and  thus  in  a  manner  buried  in  the  bod- 
ies of  those  who  feed  on  them  !  And  nevertheless 
this  earth  receives  them  by  reason  of  the  changes 
[of  these  bodies]  into  blood,  and  the  transforma- 
tions into  the  aerial  or  the  fiery  element. 

What  is  the  investigation  into  the  truth  in  this 
matter  ?  The  division  into  that  which  is  material 
and  that  which  is  the  cause  of  form  [the  formal], 
(vii.  29.) 

22.  Do  not  be  whirled  about,  but  in  every  move- 
ment have  respect  to  justice,  and  on  the  occasion 
of  every  impression  maintain  the  faculty  of  com- 
prehension [or  understanding]. 

23.  Everything  harmonizes  with  me,  which  is 
harmonious  to  thee,  O  Universe.     Nothing  for  me 
is  too  early  nor  too  late,  which  is  in  due  time  for 
thee.    Everything  is  fruit  to  me  which  thy  seasons 
bring,  O  Nature :  from  thee  are  all  things,  in  thee 
are  all  things,  to  thee  all  things  return.     The  poet 
says,  Dear  city  of  Cecrops ;  and  wilt  not  thou  say, 
Dear  city  of  Zeus  ? 

24.  Occupy  thyself  with   few  things,  says   the 
philosopher,  if  thou  wouldst  be   tranquil.  —  But 
consider  if  it  would  not  be  better  to  say,  Do  what 
is   necessary,   and   whatever   the    reason   of    the 
animal  which  is  naturally  social  requires,  and  as  it 
requires.    For  this  brings  not  only  the  tranquillity 
which  comes  from  doing  well,  but  also  that  which 


MARCUS  AUREL1US  ANTONINUS. 


135 


comes  from  doing  few  things.  For  the  greatest 
part  of  what  we  say  and  do  being  unnecessary, 
if  a  man  takes  this  away,  he  will  have  more  leisure 
and  less  uneasiness.  Accordingly,  on  every  occa- 
sion a  man  should  ask  himself,  Is  this  one  of 
the  unnecessary  things?  Now  a  man  should  take 
away  not  only  unnecessary  acts,  but  also  unneces- 
sary thoughts,  for  thus  superfluous  acts  will  not 
follow  after. 

25.  Try  how  the  life  of  the  good  man  suits  thee, 
the  life  of  him  who  is  satisfied  with  his  portion  out 
of  the  whole,  and  satisfied  with  his  own  just  acts 
and  benevolent  disposition. 

26.  Hast  thou  seen  those  things  ?     Look  also  at 
these.     Do  not  disturb  thyself.     Make  thyself  all 
simplicity.    Does  anyonejdo_wrongj_ 

self  that  his  does  the  wrong.  Has  anything^ 
TTappened""'to"~thee  ?Well ;  out  of  the  universe 
Beginning  everything  which  happens  has 
out  to  thee.  In  a 
Thou  must  turn  to  profit 
the  present  by  the  aid  of  reason  and  justice.  Be 
sober  in  thy  relaxation. 

27.  Either  it  is  a  well-arranged  universe  l  or  a 
chaos  huddled  together,  but  still  a  universe.     But 
can  a  certain  order  subsist  in  thee,  and  disorder  in 

1  Antoninus  here  uses  the  word  «6<r/xos  both  in  the  sense  of 
the  Universe  and  of  Order ;  and  it  is  difficult  to  express  his 
neaning. 


been  apportioned    and   spun 
Vord,  thy  liie  is  short. 


1 86  SfEDIT.  1  770.V& 

the 'All?     And   this  too  when   all  things  are  so 
separated  and  diffused  and  sympathetic. 

28.  A  black  character,  a  womanish  characters 
stubborn     character,     bestial,     childish,     animal, 
stupid,  counterfeit,  scurrilous,  fraudulent,  tyran- 
nical. 

29.  If  he  is  a  stranger  to  the  universe  who  does 
not  know  what  is  in  it,  no  less  is  he  a  stranger  who 
does  not  know  what  is  going  on  in  it.     He  is  a 
runaway,  who  flies  from  social  reason  ;  he  is  blind, 
who  shuts  the  eyes  of   the  understanding;  he  is 
poor,  who  has  need  of  another,  and  has  not  from 
himself  all  things  which  are  useful  for  life.     He  is 
an  abscess  on  the  universe  who   withdraws  and 
separates  himself  from  the  reason  of  our  common 
nature  through  being  displeased  with  the  things 
which  happen,  for  the  same  nature  produces  this, 
and   has  produced  thee   too  :  he  is   a  piece  rent 
asunder  from  the  state,  who  tears  his  own  soul 
from  that  of  reasonable  animals,  which  is  one. 

30.  The  one  is  a  philosopher  without  a  tunic, 
and   the   other  without  a  book :  here  is  another 
half  naked  :  Bread  I  have  not,  he  says,  and  I  abide 
by  reason  —  and  I  do  not  get  the  means  of  living 
out  of  my  learning,!  and  I  abide  [by  my  reason]. 

31.  Love  the  art,  poor  as  it  may  be,  which  thou 
hast  learned,  and  be   content  with  it ;  and  pass 
through  the  rest  of  life  like  one  who  has  intrusted 
to  the  gods  with  his  whole  soul  all  that  he  has, 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.          137 

making  thyself  neither  the  tyrant  nor  the  slave  of 
any  man. 

32.  Consider,  for  example,  the  times  of  Vespa- 
sian.     Thou   wilt    see    all   these    things,   people 
marrying,  bringing  up  children,  sick,  dying,  war- 
ring, feasting,  trafficking,  cultivating  the  ground, 
flattering,  obstinately  arrogant,  suspecting,  plot- 
ting, wishing  for  some  to  die,  grumbling  about  the 
present,  loving,  heaping  up  treasure,  desiring  con- 
sulship, kingly  power.     Well,  then,  that  life  of 
these  people  no  longer  exists  at  all.     Again,  re- 
move to  the  times  of  Trajan.     Again,  all  is  the 
same.     Their   life   too  is  gone.     In   like   manner 
view  also  the  other  epochs  of  time  and  of  whole 
nations,  and  see  how  many  after  great  efforts  soon 
fell   and   were   resolved   into  the   elements.     But 
chiefly  thou  shouldst  think  of  those  whom  thou 
hast  thyself  known  distracting  themselves  about 
idle  things,  neglecting  to  do  what  was  in  accord- 
ance with  their  proper  constitution,  and  to  hold 
firmly  to  this  and  to  be   content  with  it.     And 
herein  it  is  necessary  to  remember  that  the  atten- 
tion given  to  everything  has  its  proper  value  and 
proportion.     For  thus  thou  wilt  not  be  dissatisfied, 
if  thou  appliest   thyself    to   smaller   matters   no 
further  than  is  fit. 

33.  The  words  which  were  formerly  familiar  are 
now  antiquated  :  so  also  the  names  of  those  who 
were   famed  of  old,  are  now  in   a  manner  anti- 


138  MEDITATIONS. 

quated,  Camillas,  Caeso,  Volesus,  Leonnatus,  and 
a  little  after  also  Scipio  and  Cato,  then  Augustus, 
then  also  Hadrianus  and  Antoninus.  For  all 
I  things  soon  pass  away  and  become  a  mere  tale,  arid 
I  complete  oblivion  soon  buries  them.  And  I  say 
ai  this  of  those  who  have  shone  in  a  wondrous  way. 
For  the  rest,  as  soon  as  they  have  breathed  out 
their  breath,  they  are  gone,  and  no  man  speaks  of 
them.  And,  to  conclude  the  matter,  what  is  even 
an  eternal  remembrance?  A  mere  nothing.  What 
then  is  that  about  which  we  ought  to  employ  our 
serious  pains  ?  This  one  thing,  thoughts  just,  and 
acts  social,  and  words  which  never  lie,  and  a  dis- 
position which  gladly  accepts  all  that  happens,  as 
necessary,  as  usual,  as  flowing  from  a  principle  and 
spurce  of  the  same  kind. 

34.  Willingly  give  thyself  up  to  Clotho  [one  of 
the  fates],  allowing  her  to  spin  thy  thread  f  into 
whatever  things  she  pleases. 

35.  Everything   is    only  for    a   day,   both   that 
which    remembers    and    that    which    is    remem- 
bered. 

36.  Observe  constantly  that  all  things  take  place 
by  change,  and  accustom  thyself  to  consider  that 
the  nature  of  the  universe  loves  nothing  so  much 
as  to  change  the  things  which  are  and  to  make 
new  things  like  them.     For  everything  that  exists 
is  in  a  manner  the  seed  of  that  which  will  be.  But 
thou  art  thinking  only  of  seeds  which  are   cast 


MARCUS  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.  139 

into  the  earth  or  into  a  womb  :  but  this  is  a  very 
vulgar  notion. 

37.  Thou  wilt  soon  die,  and  thou  art  not  yet 
simple,  nor  free  from  perturbations,  nor  without 
suspicion  of  being  hurt  by  external  things,  nor 
kindly  disposed  towards  all ;   nor  dost  thou  yet 
place  wisdom  only  in  acting  justly. 

38.  Examine  men's  ruling  principles,  even  those 
of  the  wise,  what  kind  of  things  they  avoid,  and 
what  kind  they  pursue. 

39.  What  is  evil  to  thee  does  not  subsist  in  the 
ruling  principle  of  another ;  nor  yet  in  any  turn- 
ing and  mutation  of  thy  corporeal  covering.  Where 
is  it  then  ?    It  is  in  that  part  of  thee  in  which  sub- 
sists the  power  of  forming  opinions  about  evils. 
Let  this  power  then  not  form  [such]  opinions,  and 
all  is  well.     And  if  that  which  is  nearest  to  it,  the 
poor  body,  is  cut,  burnt,  rilled  with  matter  and 
rottenness,  nevertheless  let  the  part  which  forms 
opinions  about  these  things  be  quiet ;  that  is,  let 
it  judge  that  nothing  is  either  bad  or  good  which 
can  happen  equally  to  the  bad  man  and  the  good,- 
For  that  which  happens  equally  to  him  who  lives 
contrary  to  nature  and  to  him  who  lives  according 
to  nature,  is  neither  according  to  nature  nor  con- 
trary to  nature. 

40.  Constantly  regard  the  universe  as  one  living 
being,  having  one  substance  and  one  soul ;  and 
observe  how  all  things  have  reference  to  one  per- 


140  MEDITATIONS. 

ception,  the  perception  of  this  one  living  being; 
\     and  how  all  things  act  with  one  movement ;  and 
Cj      how  all  things  are  the  co-operating  causes  of  all 
r       things  which  exist;  observe  too  the  continuous  spin- 
ning of  the  thread  and  the  contexture  of  the  web. 

41.  Thou  art  a  little  soul  bearing  about  a  corpse,  . 
as  Epictetus  used  to  say  (i.  c.  19).    ' 

42.  It  is  no  evil  for  things  to  undergo  change, 
and  no  good  for  things  to  subsist  in  consequence 
of  change. 

43.  (T^neA  is  like  a  river  made  up  of  the  events 
which  happen,  and  a  violent  stream  ;  for  as  soon 
as  a  thing  has  been  seen,  it  is  carried  away,  and 

Kjx  another  comes  in  its  place,  and  this  will  be  carried 
f     away  too. 

/  44.  Everything  which  happens  is  as  familiar  and 
/well  known  as  the  rose  in  spring  and  the  fruit  in 
/summer;  for  such  is  disease,  and  death,  and  cal- 
*c/   umny,  and  treachery,  and  whatever  else  delights 
s.   fools  or  vexes  them. 

^-  45.  In  the  series  of  things,  those  which  follow 
are  always-  aptly  fitted  to  those  which  have  gone 
before :  for  this  series  is  not  like  a  mere  enumera- 
tion of  disjointed  things,  which  has  only  a  neces- 
sary sequence,  but  it  is  a  rational  connection  :  and 
as  all  existing  things  are  arranged  together  harmo- 
niously, so  the  things  which  come  into  existence 
exhibit  no  mere  succession,  but  a  certain  wonderful 
relationship  (vi.  38 ;  vii,  9;  vii.  75,  note). 


MARC 'ffo  AUBELIU8  ANTONINUS.  141 

46.  Always  remember  the  saying  of  Heraclitus, 
that  the  death  of  earth  is  to  become'  water,  and  the 
death  of  water  is  to  become  air,  and  the  death  of 
air  is  to  become  fire,  and  reversely.     And  think 
too  of  him  who  forgets  whither  the  way  leads,  and 
that  men  quarrel  with  that  with  which  they  are 
most  constantly  in  communion,  the  reason  which 
governs  the  universe ;  and  the  things  which  they 
daily  meet  with  seem  to  them  strange :  and  con- 
sider that  we  ought  not  to  act  and  speak  as  if  we 
were  asleep,  for  even  in  sleep  we  seem  to  act  and 
speak ;  and  that  f  we  ought  not,  like  children  who 
learn  from  their  parents,  simply  to  act  and  speak 
as  we  have  been  taught,  f 

47.  If  any  god  told  thee  that  thou  shalt  die  to- 
morrow, or  certainly  on  the  day  after  to-morrow, 
thou  wouldst  not  care  much  whether  it  was  on  the 
third  day  or  on  the  morrow,  unless  thou  wast  in 
the  highest  degree  mean-spirited  ;  for  how  small  is 
the  difference.     So  think  it  no  great  thing  to  die 
after  as  many  years  as  thou  canst  name  rather  than 
to-morrow. 

48.  Think  continually  how  many  physicians  are 
dead  after  often  contracting  their  eyebrows  over 
the  sick ;  and  how  many  astrologers  after  predict- 
ing with  great  pretensions  the  deaths  of  others  ;  and 
how  many  philosophers  after  endless  discourses  on 
death  or  immortality  ;  how  many  heroes  after  kill- 
ing thousands ;  and  how  many  tyrants  who  have 


142  MED  IT  A  TIONS, 

used  their  power  over  men's  lives  with  terrible 
insolence,  as  if  they  were  immortal ;  and  how  many 
cities  are  entirely  dead,  so  to  speak,  Helice l  and 
Pompeii  and  Herculanum,  and  others  innumerable. 
Add  to  the  reckoning  all  whom  thou  hast  known, 
one  after  another.  One  man  after  burying  another 
has  been  laid  out  dead,  and  another  buries  him  ; 
and  all  this  in  a  short  time.  To  conclude,  always 
observe  how  ephemeral  and  worthless  human  things 
are,  and  what  was  yesterday  a  little  mucus,  to- 
morrow will  be  a  mummy  or  ashes.  Pass  then 
through  this  little  space  of  time  conformably  to 
nature,  and  end  thy  journey  in  content,  just  as  an 
olive  falls  off  when  it  is  ripe,  blessing  nature  who 
produced  it,  and  thanking  the  tree  on  which  it 
grew. 

49.  Be  like  the  promontory  against  which  the 
waves  continually  break,  but  it  stands  firm  and 
tames  the  fury  of  the  water  around  it. 

Unhappy  am  I  because  this  has  happened  to  me  ? 
Not  so,  but  happy  am  I,  though  this  has  happened 
to  me,  because  I  continue  free  from  pain,  neither 
crushed  by  the  present  nor  fearing  the  future. 
For  such  a  thing  as  this  might  have  happened  to 
every  man ;  but  every  man  would  not  have  con- 
tinued free  from  pain  on  such  an  occasion.  Why 

1  Ovid,  Met.  xv.  293  :  — 

"  Si  quaeras  Helicen  et  Burin  Achaidas  urbes, 
Invenies  «ub  aquis." 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  143 

then  is  that  rather  a  misfortune  than  this  a  good 
fortune  ?  And  dost  thou  in  all  cases  call  that  a 
man's  misfortune  which  is  not  a  deviation  from 
man's  nature  ?  And  does  a  thing  seem  to  thee  to 
be  a  deviation  from  man's  nature,  when  it  is  not 
contrary  to  the  will  of  man's  nature  ?  Well,  thou 
knowest  the  will  of  nature.  Will  then  this  which 
has  happened  prevent  thee  from  being  just,  mag- 
nanimous, temperate,  prudent,  secure  against  in- 
considerate opinions  and  falsehood  ;  will  it  prevent 
thee  from  having  modesty,  freedom,  and  everything 
else,  by  the  presence  of  which  man's  nature  obtains 
all  that  is  its  own  ?  Remember  too  on  every  occa- 
sion which  leads  thee  to  vexation  to  apply  this 
principle :  not  that  this  is  a  misfortune,  but  that 
to  bear  it  nobly  is  good  fortune. 

50.  It  is  a  vulgar,  but  still  a  useful  help  towards 
contempt  of  death,  to  pass  in  review  those  who  have 
tenaciously  stuck  to  life.  What  more  then  have 
they  gained  than  those  who  have  died  early  ? 
Certainly  they  lie  in  their  tombs  somewhere  at  last, 
Cadicianus,  Fabius,  Julianus,  Lepidus,  or  any  one 
else  like  them,  who  have  carried  out  many  to  be 
buried,  and  then  were  carried  out  themselves. 
Altogether  the  interval  is  small  [between  birth  and 
death]  ;  and  consider  with  how  much  trouble,  and 
in  company  with  what  sort  of  people,  and  in  what 
a  feeble  body  this  interval  is  laboriously  passed. 
Do  not  then  consider  life  a  thing  of  any  value.f 


144  MEDITATIONS.  ^ 

For  look  to  the  immensity  of  time  behind  thee, 
and  to  the  time  which  is  before  thee,  another 
boundless  space.  In  this  infinity  then  what  is  the 
difference  between  him  who  lives  three  days  and 
him  who  lives  three  generations?1 

51.  Always  run  to  the  short  way ;  and  the  short 
way  is  the  natural :  accordingly  say  and  do  every- 
thing in  conformity  with  the  soundest  reason. 
For  such  a  purpose  frees  a  man  from  trouble,!  and 
warfare,  and  all  artifice  and  ostentatious  display. 

1  An  allusion  to  Homer's  Nestor,  who  was  living  at  the  war 
of  Troy  among  the  third  generation,  like  old  Parr  with  his 
hundred  and  fifty-two  years,  and  some  others  in  modern 
times  who  have  beaten  Parr  by  twenty  or  thirty  years  if  it  is 
true ;  and  yet  they  died  at  last.  The  word  is  rpiyep-rjviov  in 
Antoninus.  Nestor  is  named  rptytpwv  by  some  writers ;  but 
here  perhaps  there  is  an  allusion  to  Homer's 


V. 

1.  IN  the  morning  when  thou  risest  unwillingly, 
let  this  thought  be  present,  —  I  am  rising  to  the 
work  of  a  human  being.  Why  then  am  I  dissatis- 
fied if  I  am  going  to  do  the  things  for  which  I 
exist  and  for  which  I  was  brought  into  the  world  ? 
Or  have  I  been  made  for  this,  to  lie  in  the  bed- 
clothes and  keep  myself  warm  ?  —  But  this  is  more 
^  pleasant.  —  Dost  thou  exist  then  to  take  thy  pleas- 
ure, and  not  at  all  for  action  or  exertion?  Dost 
thou  not  see  the  little  plants,  the  little  birds,  the 
ants,  the  spiders,  the  bees  working  together  to  put 
in  order  their  several  parts  of  the  universe  ?  And 
art  thou  unwilling  to  do  the  work  of  a  human 
being,  and  dost  thou  not  make  haste  to  do  that 
which  is  according  to  thy  nature? — But  it  is 
necessary  to  take  rest  also.  —  It  is  necessary. 
However,  Nature  has  fixed  bounds  to  this  too : 
she  has  fixed  bounds  to  eating  and  drinking,  and 
yet  thou  goest  beyond  these  bounds,  beyond  what 
is  sufficient;  yet  in  thy  acts  it  is  not  so,  but  thou 
stoppest  short  of  what  thou  canst  do.  So  thou 


ME  BIT  A  TIONS. 

lovest  not  thyself,  for  if  thou  didst,  thou  wouldst 
love  thy  nature  and  her  will.  But  those  who  love 
their  several  arts  exhaust  themselves  in  working 
at  them  unwashed  and  without  food;  but  thou 
valuest  thy  own  nature  less  than  the  turner  values 
the  turning  art,  or  the  dancer  the  dancing  art,  or 
the  lover  of  money  values  his  money,  or  the  vain- 
glorious man  his  little  glory.  And  such  men, 
when  they  have  a  violent  affection  to  a  thing, 
choose  neither  to  eat  nor  to  sleep  rather  than  to 
perfect  the  things  which  they  care  for.  But  are 
the  acts  which  concern  society  more  vile  in  thy 
eyes  and  less  worthy  of  thy  labor  ? 

2.  How  easy  it  is  to  repel  and  to  wipe  away 
every  impression  which  is  troublesome  or  unsuit- 
able, and  immediately  to  be  in  all  tranquillity. 

3.  Judge  every  word  and  deed  which  are   ac- 
cording  to  nature  to  be  fit  for  thee ;  and  be  not 
diverted  by   the  blame    which   follows  from  any 
people  nor  by  their  words,  but  if  a  thing  is  good 
to  be  done  or  said,  do  not  consider  it  unworthy  of 
thee.     For  those  persons  have  their  peculiar  lead- 
ing principle  and  follow  their  peculiar,  movement ; 
which  things  do  not  thou  regard,  but  go  straight 
on,  following  thy  own  nature  and   the    common 
nature  ;  and  the  way  of  both  is  one. 

4.  I  go  through  the  things  which  happen  accord- 
ing to  nature  until  I  shall  fall  and  rest,  breathing 
out  my  breath  into  that  element  out  of  which  I 


MARCUS  AUKELIUS  ANTONINUS.  147 

daily  draw  it  in,  and  falling  upon  that  earth  out  of 
which  my  father  collected  the  seed,  and  my  mother  V 
the  blood,  and  my  nurse  the  milk  ;  out  of  which 
during  so  many  years  I  have  been  supplied  with 
food  and  drink  ;  which  bears  me  when  I  tread  on 
it  and  abuse  it  for  so  many  purposes. 

5.  Thou  sayest,  Men  cannot  admire  the  sharp- 
ness of  thy  wits.  —  Be  it  so  :  but  there  are  many 
other  things  of  which  thou  canst  not  say,  I  am  not 
formed  for  them  by  nature.  Show  those  qualities 
then  which  are  altogether  in  thy  power,  sincerity, 
gravity,  endurance  of  labor,  aversion  to  pleasure, 
contentment  with  thy  portion  and  with  few  things, 
benevolence,  frankness,  no  love  of  superfluity, 
freedom  from  trifling,  magnanimity.  Dost  thou 
not  see  how  many  qualities  thou  art  immediately 
able  to  exhibit,  in  which  there  is  no  excuse  of 
natural  incapacity  and  unfitness,  and  yet  thou  still 
remainest  voluntarily  below  the  mark  ?  or  art  thou 
compelled  through  being  defectively  furnished  by 
nature  to  murmur,  and  to  be  stingy,  and  to  flatter, 
and  to  find  fault  with  thy  poor  body,  and  to  try  to 
please  men,  and  to  make  great  display,  and  to  be  so 
restless  in  thy  mind?  No,  by  the  gods;  but  thou 
mightest  have  been  delivered  from  these  things 
long  ago.  /Only  if  in  truth  thou  canst  be  charged 
with  being  rather  slow  and  dull  of  comprehension,  /^ 
thou  must  exert  thyself  about  this  also,  not  neg-  ^^ 
lecting  it  nm>  yfit  *ak"ig  pleasure  in  thy  dulness.  V 


\VfiJ? 


148  MEDITA  TIONS. 

6.  One  man,  when  he  has  done  a  service  to 
another,  is  ready  to  set  it  down  to  his  account  as 
a  favor  conferred.  Another  is  not  ready  to  do  this, 
but  still  in  hisv  own  mind  he  thinks  of  the  man  as 
his  debtor,  and  he  knows  what  he  has  done.  A 
third  in  a  manner  does  not  even  know  what  he  has 
done,  but  he  is  like  a  vine  which  has  produced 
grapes,  and  seeks  for  nothing  more  after  it  has 
once  produced  its  proper  fruit.  As  a  horse  when 
he  has  run,  a  dog  when  he  has  tracked  the  game, 
a  bee  when  it  has  made  the  honey,  so  a  man  when 
he  has  done  a  good  act,  does  not  call  out  for 
others  to  come  and  see,  but  he  goes  on  to  another 
act,  as  a  vine  goes  on  to  produce  again  the  grapes 
in  season.  —  Must  a  man  then  be  one  of  these, 
who  in  a  manner  act  thus  without  observing  it  ?  — 
Yes.  —  But  this  very  thing  is  necessary,  the  obser- 
vation of  what  a  man  is  doing  :  for,  it  may  be 
said,  it  is  characteristic  of  the  social  animal  to  per- 
ceive that  he  is  working  in  a  social  manner,  and 
indeed  to  wish  that  his  social  partner  also  should 
perceive  it.  —  It  is  true  what  thou  sayest,  but  thou 
dost  not  rightly  understand  what  is  now  said :  and 
for  this  reason  thou  wilt  become  one  of  those  of 
whom  I  spoke  before,  for  even  they  are  misled  by 
a  certain  show  of  reason.  But  if  thou  wilt  choose 
to  understand  the  meaning  of  what  is  said,  do  not 
fear  that  for  this  reason  thou  wilt  omit  any  social 
act. 


\ 


MARCUS  AUK E LIU S  ANTONINUS.  149 

7.  A   prayer  of  the   Athenians:  Rain,   rain,  O 
dear   Zeus,  down   on  the  ploughed   fields  of  the 
Athenians  and  on  the  plains.  —  In  truth  we  ought 
riot  to  pray  at  all,  or  we  ought  to  pray  in   this 
simple  and  noble  fashion. 

8.  Just    as   we    must    understand   when   it   is 
said,   That   Aesculapius   prescribed   to    this   man 
horse-exercise,  or  bathing  in  cold  water,  or  going 
without  shoes,  so  we  must  understand  it  when  it 
is  said,  That  the  nature  of  the  universe  prescribed 
to  this  man  disease,  or  mutilation,  or  loss,  or  any- 
thing else  of  the  kind.     For  in  the  first  case  Pre- 
scribed means  something  like  this  :  he  prescribed 
this  for  this  man  as  a  thing  adapted  to  procure 
health;  and  in   the    second  case  it  means,    That 
which  happens1  to  [or  suits]  every  man  is  fixed  in 
a  manner  for  him  suitably  to  his  destiny.     For  this 
is  what  we  mean  when  we  say  that  things  are  suit- 
able to  us,  as  the  workmen  say  of  squared  stones 
in  walls  or  the  pyramids,  that  they  are  suitable, 
when  they  fit  them  to  one  another  in  some  kind  of 
connection.     For   there  is  altogether  one  fitness 
[harmony].     And  as  the  universe  is  made  up  out 
of  all  bodies  to  be  such  a  body  as  it  is,  so  out  of 
all  existing  causes  necessit}'  [destiny]  is  made  up 
to  be  such  a  cause  as  it  is.     And  even  those  who 
are  completely  ignorant-understand  what  I  mean  ; 

1  In  this  section  there  is  a  play  on  the  meaning  of  o-u/u- 
ftubmv. 


150  MEDITATIONS. 

for  they  say,  It  [necessity,  destiny]  brought  this 
to  such  a  person.  —  This  then  was  brought  and 
this  was  prescribed  to  him.  Let  us  then  receive 
these  things,  as  well  as  those  which  Aesculapius 
prescribes.  Many  as  a  matter  of  course  even 
among  his  prescriptions  are  disagreeable,  but  we 
accept  them  in  the  hope  of  health.  Let  the  per- 
fecting and  accomplishment  of  the  things  which 
the  common  nature  judges  to  be  good,  be  judged 
by  thee  to  be  of  the  same  kind  as  thy  health. 
And  so  accept  everything  which  happens,  even  if 
it  seem  disagreeable,  because  it  leads  to  this,  to  the 
health  of  the  universe  and  to  the  prosperity  and 
felicity  of  Zeus  [the  universe].  For  he  would 
not  have  brought  on  any  man  what  he  has  brought, 
if  it  were  not  useful  for  the  whole.  Neither  does 
the  nature  of  anything,  whatever  it  may  be,  cause 
anything  which  is  not  suitable  to  that  which  is 
directed  by  it.  For  two  reasons  then  it  is  right  to 
be  content  with  that  which  happens  to  thee ;  the 
one,  because  it  was  done  for  thee  and  prescribed 
for  thee,  and  in  a  manner  had  reference  to  thee, 
originally  from  the  most  ancient  causes  spun  with 
thy  destiny;  and  the  other,  because  even  that 
which  comes  severally  to  every  man  is  to  the  power 
which  administers  the  universe  a  cause  of  felicity 
and  perfection,  nay  even  of  its  very  continuance. 
For  the  integrity  of  the  whole  is  mutilated,  if 
thou  cuttest  off  anything  whatever  from  the  con- 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  151 

junction  and  the  continuit}'  either  of  the  parts  or 
of  the  causes.  And  thou  dost  cut  off,  as  far  as  it 
is  in  thy  power,  when  thou  art  dissatisfied,  and  in 
a  manner  triest  to  put  anything  out  of  the  way. 

9.  Be  not  disgusted,  nor  discouraged,  nor  dis- 
satisfied, if  thou  dost  not  succeed  in  doing  every- 
thing according  to  right  principles,  but  when  thou 
hast  failed,  return  back  again,  and  be  content  if 
the  greater  part  of  what  thou  doest  is  consistent 
with  man's  nature,  and  love  this  to  which  thou 
returnest;  and  do  not  return  to  philosophy  as  if 
she  were  a  master,  but  act  like  those  who  have 
sore  eyes  and  apply  a  bit  of  sponge  and  egg,  or  as 
another  applies  a  plaster,  or  drenching  with  water. 
For  thus  thou  wilt  not  fail  to  f  obey  reason,  and 
thou  wilt    repose   in   it.      And    remember    that 
philosophy   requires   only  the   things   which   thy 
nature  requires ;  but  thou  wouldst  have  something 
else  which  is  not  according  to  nature.  —  It  may  be 
objected,  Why,  what  is  more  agreeable  than  this 
[which  I  am  doing]  ?  —  But  is  not  this  the  very 
reason  why  pleasure  deceives  us  ?     Arid  consider 
if  magnanimity,  freedom,  simplicity,  equanimity, 
piety,  are  not  more  agreeable.     Fur  what  is  more 
agreeable  than  wisdom  itself,  when  thou  thinkest 
of  the  security  and  the  happy  course  of  all  things 
which  depend  on  the  faculty  of  understanding  and 
knowledge  ? 

10.  Things  are  in  such  a  kind  of  envelopment 


152  MEDITATIONS. 

that  they  have  seemed  to  philosophers,  not  a  few 
nor  those  common  philosophers,  altogether  unin- 
telligible ;  nay  even  to  the  Stoics  themselves  they 
seem  difficult  to  understand.  And  all  our  assent 
is  changeable  ;  for  where  is  the  man  who  never 
changes?  Carry  thy  thoughts  then  to  the  objects 
themselves,  and  consider  how  short-lived  they  are 
and  worthless,  and  that  they  may  be  in  the  pos- 
session of  a  filthy  wretch  or  a  whore  or  a  robber. 
Then  turn  to  the  morals  of  those  who  live  with 
thee,  and  it  is  hardly  possible  to  endure  even  the 
most  agreeable  of  them,  to  say  nothing  of  a  man 
being  hardly  able  to  endure  himself.  In  such 
darkness  then  and  dirt,  and  in  so  constant  a  flux 
both  of  substance  and  of  time,  and  of  motion  and 
of  things  moved,  what  there  is  worth  being  highly 
prized,  or  even  an  object  of  serious  pursuit,  I 
cannot  imagine.  But  on  the  contrary  it  is  a  man's 
duty  to  comfort  himself,  and  to  wait  for  the 
natural  dissolution,  and  not  to  be  vexed  at  the 
delay,  but  to  rest  in  these  principles  only  :  the  one, 
that  nothing  will  happen  to  me  which  is  not  con- 
formable to  the  nature  of  the  universe ;  and  the 
other,  that  it  is  in  my  power  never  to  act  contrary 
to  my  god  and  daemon :  for  there  is  no  man  who 
will  compel  me  to  this. 

11.  About  what  am  I  now  employing  my  own 
soul  ?  On  every  occasion  I  must  ask  myself  this 
question,  and  inquire,  What  have  I  now  in  this 


MAS C US  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  158 

part  of  me  which  they  call  the  ruling  principle  ? 
and  whose  soul  have  I  now,  —  that  of  a  child,  or 
of  a  young  man,  or  of  a  feeble  woman,  or  of  a 
tyrant,  or  of  a  domestic  animal,  or  of  a  wild  beast? 

12.  What  kind  of  things  those  are  which  appear 
good  to  the  many,  we  may  learn  even  from  this. 
For  if  any  man  should  conceive  certain  things  as 
being  really  good,  such  as  prudence,  temperance, 
justice,  fortitude,  he  would  not  after  having  first 
conceived   these    endure   to   listen  to    anything  f 
which  should  not  be  in  harmony  with  what  is  really 
good.f     But  if  a  man  has  first  conceived  as  good 
the  things  which  appear  to  the  many  to  be  good, 
he  will  listen  and  readily  receive  as  very  applicable 
that  which  was  said  by  the  comic  writer,     f  Thus 
even   the    many   perceive   the   difference.!      For 
were  it  not  so,  this  saying  would  not  offend  and 
would  not  be  rejected  [in  the  first  case],  while  we 
receive  it  when  it  is  said  of  wealth,  and  of  the 
means  which   further   luxury  and   fame,  as  said 
fitly  and  wittily.    Go  on  then  and  ask  if  we  should 
value  and  think  those  things  to  be  good,  to  which 
after  their  first  conception  in  the  mind  the  words 
of  the    comic  writer   might  be  aptly  applied,  — 
that  he  who  has  them,  through  pure  abundance 
has  not  a  place  to  ease  himself  in. 

13.  I  am  composed  of  the  formal  and  the  mate- 
rial ;  and  neither  of  them  will  perish  into   non-       . 
existence,  as  neither  of  them  came  into  existence 


154  MEDITATIONS. 

out  of  non-existence.  Every  part  of  me  then  will 
be  reduced  by  change  into  some  part  of  the  uni- 
verse, and  that  again  will  change  into  another 
part  of  the  universe,  and  so  on  forever.  And  by 
consequence  of  such  a  change  I  too  exist,  and 
those  who  begot  me,  and  so  on  forever  in  the 
other  direction.  For  nothing  hinders  us  from 
saying  so,  even  if  the  universe  is  administered 
according  to  definite  periods  [of  revolution]. 

14.  Reason  and  the  reasoning  art  [philosophy] 
are  powers  which  are  sufficient  for  themselves  and 
for  their   own  works.     They  move   then  from  a 
first  principle  which  is  their  own,  and  they  make 
their  way  to  the  end  which  is  proposed  to  them ; 
and  this  is  the  reason  why  such  acts  are  named 
Catorth<5seis  or  right  acts,   which  word  signifies 
that  they  proceed  by  the  right  road. 

15.  None  of  these  things  ought  to  be  called  a 
man's,   which  do   not  belong  to  a  man,  as  man. 
They  are  not  required  of  a  man,  nor  does  man's 
nature  promise  them,  nor  are  they  the  means  of 
man's   nature   attaining   its   end.      Neither   then 
does  the  end  of  man  lie  in  these  things,  nor  yet 
that  which  aids  to  the  accomplishment  of  this  end, 
and  that  which  aids  towards  this  end  is  that  which 
is  good.    Besides,  if  any  of  these  things  did  belong 
to  man,  it  would  not  be  right  for  a  man  to  despise 
them  and  to  set  himself  against  them  ;  nor  would 
a  man  be  worthy  of  praise  who  showed  that  he 


MARCUS  AUKELIUS  ANTONINUS.          155 

did  not  want  these  things,  nor  would  he  who 
stinted  himself  in  any  of  them  be  good,  if  indeed 
these  things  were  good.  But  now  the  more  of 
these  things  a  man  deprives  himself  of,  or  of  other 
things  like  them,  or  even  when  he  is  deprived  of 
any  of  them,  the  more  patiently  he  endures  the 
loss,  just  in  the  same  degree  he  is  a  better  man. 

16.  Such  as  are  thy  habitual  thoughts,  such  also 
will  be  the  character  of  thy  mind  ;  for  the  soul  is 
dyed  by  the  thoughts.     Dye  it  then  with  a  contin- 
uous series  of  such  thoughts  as  these  :  for  instance, 
that  where  a  man  can  live,  there  he  can  also  live 
well.     But  he  must  live  in  a  palace ;  well  then,  he 
can  also  live  well  in  a  palace.     And  again,  consider 
that  for  whatever  purpose  each  thing    has  been 
constituted,  for  this  it  has  been  constituted,   and 
towards  this  it  is  carried  ;  and  its  end  is  in  that 
towards  which  it  is  carried ;  and  where  the  end  is, 
there  also  is  the  advantage  and  the  good  of  each 
thing.     Now  the  good  for  the  reasonable  animal  is 
society  ;  for  that  we  are  made  for  society  has  been 
shown  above.1     Is    it  not  plain  that  the   inferior 
exist  for  the  sake  of  the  superior  ?   But  the  things 
which  have  life  are  superior  to  those  which  have 
not  life,  and  of  those  which  have  life  the  superior 
are  those  which  have  reason. 

17.  To  seek  what  is  "impossible  is  madness:  and 
it  is  impossible  that  the  bad  should  not  do  some- 
thing of  this  kind. 

1  ii.  i. 


156          &y  MEDITATIONS. 


18.  Nothing  happens  to  any  man  which  he   is 
not  formed  by  nature  to  bear.     The  same  things 

Tiappen  to  another,  and  either  because  he  does  not 
see  that  they  have  happened,  or  because  he  would 
show  a  great  spirit,  he  is  firm  and  remains  un- 
harmed. It  is  a  shame  then  that  ignorance  and 
conceit  should  be  stronger  than  wisdom. 

19.  Things  themselves  touch  not  the  soul,  not  in 
the  least  degree ;  nor  have  they  admission  to  the 
soul,  nor  can  they  turn  or  move  the  soul :  but  the 
soul  turns  and  moves  itself  alone,  and  whatever 
judgments  it  may  think  proper  to  make,  such  it 
makes  for  itself  the  things  which   present  them- 
selves to  it. 

20.  In  one  respect  man  is  the  nearest  thing  to 
me,  so  far  as  I  must  do  good  to  men  and  endure 
them.     But  so  far  as  some  men  make  themselves 
obstacles  to  my  proper  acts,  man  becomes  to  me 
one  of  the  things  which  are  indifferent,  no  less  than 
the  sun  or  wind  or  a  wild  beast.     Now  it  is  true 
that  these  may  impede  my  action,  but  they  are  no 
impediments  to  my  affects  and  disposition,  which 
have  the  power  of  acting  conditionally  and  chang- 
ing :  for  the  mind  converts  and  changes  every  hin- 
drance  to  its   activity  into  an  aid;    and  so    that 
which  is  a  hindrance  is  made  a  furtherance  to  an 
act ;  and  that  which  is  an  obstacle   on  the   road 
helps  us  on  this  road. 

21.  Reverence  that  which  is  best  in  the  universe ; 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  157 

and  this  is  that  which  makes  use  of  all  things  and 
directs  all  things.  And  in  like  manner  also  rev- 
erence that  which  is  best  in  thyself ;  and  this  is  of 
the  same  kind  as  that.  For  in  thyself  also,  that 
which  makes  use  of  everything  else  is  this,  and  thy 
life  is  directed  by  this. 

22.  That  which  does  no  harm  to  the  state,  does 
no   harm  to   the   citizen.     In   the   case   of   every 
appearance  of  harm  apply  this  rule  :  if  the  state  is 
not  harmed  by  this,  neither  am  I  harmed.     But  if 
the  state  is  harmed,  thou  must  not  be  angry  with 
him  who  does  harm  to  the  state.     Show  him  where 
his  error  is. 

23.  Often  think  of  the  rapidity  with  which  things 
pass  by  and  disappear,  both  the  things  which  are 
and  the  things  which  are  produced.     For  substance 
is  like  a  river  in  a  continual  flow,  and  the  activities 
of  things  are  in  constant  change,  and  the  causes 
work    in    infinite  varieties ;    and  there   is   hardly 
anything  which   stands  still.     And    consider  this 
which  is  near  to  thee,  this  boundless  abyss  of  the 
past  and  of  the  future  in  which  all  things  disappear. 
How  then  is  he  not  a  fool  who  is  puffed  up  with 
such  things  or  plagued  about  them  and  makes  him- 
self miserable  ?   for  they  vex  him  only  for  a  time, 
and  a  short  time. 

24.  Think  of  the  universal  substance,  of  which 
thou  hast  a  very  small  portion ;  and  of  universal 
time,  of  which  a  short  and  indivisible  interval  lias 


158  MED  IT  A  TIONS. 

been  assigned  to  thee  ;  and  of  that  which  is  fixed 
by  destiny,  and  how  small  a  part  of  it  thou  art. 

25.  Does  another  do  me  wrong  ?     Let  him  look 
to  it.     He  has  his  own  disposition,  his  own  activity. 
I  now  have  what  the  universal  nature  wills  me  to 
have ;  and  I  do  what  my  nature  now  wills  me  to 
do. 

26.  Let  the  part  of   thy  soul  which  leads  and 
governs  be  undisturbed  by  the  movements  in  the 
flesh,  whether  of  pleasure  or  of  pain  ;  and  let  it  not 
unite  with  them,  but  let  it  circumscribe  itself  and 
limit  those  affects  to  their  parts.     But  when  these 
affects  rise  up  to  the  mind  by  virtue  of  that  other 
sympathy  that  naturally  exists  in  a  body  which  is 
all  one,  then  thou  must  not  strive  to  resist  the  sen- 
sation, for  it  is  natural :  but  let  not  the  ruling  part 
of  itself  add  to  the  sensation  the  opinion  that  it  is 
either  good  or  bad. 

27.  Live  with  the  gods.     And  he  does  live  with 
the  gods  who  constantly  shows  to  them  that  his 
own  soul  is  satisfied  with  that  which  is  assigned  to 
him,  and  that  it  does  all  that  the  daemon  wishes, 
which  Zeus  hath  given  to  every  man  for  his  guar- 
dian and  guide,  a  portion  of  himself.     And  this  is 
every  man's  understanding  and  reason. 

28.  Art   thou   angry  with   him    whose   armpits 
stink  ?  art  thou  angry  with  him  whose  mouth  smells 
foul  ?    What  good  will  this  anger  do  thee  ?    He  has 
such  a  mouth,  he  has  such  armpits :  it  is  necessary 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.          159 

that  such  an  emanation  must  come  from  such 
things ;  but  the  man  has  reason,  it  will  be  said,  and 
he  is  able,  if  he  takes  pains,  to  discover  wherein  he 
offends ;  I  wish  thee  well  of  thy  discovery.  Well 
then,  and  thou  hast  reason  :  by  thy  rational  faculty 
stir  up  his  rational  faculty ;  show  him  his  error,  ad- 
monish him.  For  if  he  listens,  thou  wilt  cure  him, 
and  there  is  no  need  of  anger,  [f  Neither  tragic 
actor  nor  whore.f]  1 

29.  As   thou  intendest  to  live  when  thou  art 
gone  out,  ...  so  it  is  in  thy  power  to  live  here. 
But  if  men  do  not  permit  thee,  then  get  away  out 
of  life,  yet  so  as  if  thou  wert  suffering  no  harm. 
The  house  is  smoky,  and  I  quit  it.2     Why  dost 
thou  think  that  this  is  any  trouble  ?     But  so  long 
as  nothing  of  the  kind  drives  me  out,  I  remain,  am 
free,  and  no  man  shall  hinder  me  from  doing  what 
I  choose  ;  and  I  choose  to  do  what  is  according  to 
the  nature  of  the  rational  and  social  animal. 

30.  The  intelligence  of  the  universe  is  social. 
Accordingly  it  has  made   the  inferior  things  for 
the  sake  of  the  superior,  and  it  has  fitted  the  su- 

1  This  is  imperfect  or  corrupt,  or  both.  There  is  also 
something  wrong  or  incomplete  in  the  beginning  of  S  29, 
where  he  says  us  &-c\6uv  I'^v  Siavo^,  which  Gataker  translates 
"as  if  thou  wast  about  to  quit  life  ;  "  but  we  cannot  trans- 
late t$e\d<bv  in  that  way.  Other  translations  are  not  much 
more  satisfactory.  I  have  translated  it  literally  and  left  it 
imperfect. 

8  Epictetus,  i.  26,  18. 


160  MED  IT  A  TION8. 

perior  to  one  another.  Thou  seest  how  it  has  sub- 
ordinated, co-ordinated,  and  assigned  to  everything 
its  proper  portion,  and  has  brought  together  into 
concord  with  one  another  the  things  which  are  the 
best. 

31.  How   hast   thou    behaved   hitherto   to   the 
gods,  thy  parents,  brethren,  children,  teachers,  to 
those  who  looked  after  thy  infancy,  to  thy  friends, 
kinsfolk,  to    thy  slaves?     Consider   if  thou  hast 
hitherto  behaved  to  all  in  such  a  way  that  this 
may  be  said  of  thee,  — 

"  Never  has  wronged  a  man  in  deed  or  word." 

Arid  call  to  recollection  both  how  many  things 
thou  hast  passed  through,  and  how  many  things 
thou  hast  been  able  to  endure  and  that  the  history 
of  thy  life  is  now  complete  and  thy  service  is 
ended ;  and  how  many  beautiful  things  thou  hast 
seen ;  and  how  many  pleasures  and  pains  thou  hast 
despised;  and  how  man}r  things  called  honorable 
thou  hast  spurned ;  and  to  how  many  ill-minded 
folks  thou  hast  shown  a  kind  disposition. 

32.  Why  do  unskilled  and  ignorant  souls  disturb 
him  who   has  skill  and  knowledge  ?     What  soul 
then  has  skill  and  knowledge  ?    That  which  knows 
beginning  and  end,  and  knows  the  reason  which 
pervades  all  substance,  and  through  all  time  by 
fixed    periods   [revolutions]   administers  the  uni- 
verse. 


I 


MAE  C  U8  A  UBELIUS  ANTONINUS.         161 

33.  Soon,  very  soon,  thou  wilt  be  ashes,  or  a 
skeleton,  and  either  a  name  or  not  even  a  name ; 
but  name  is  sound  and  echo.  And  the  things  which 
are  much  valued  in  life  are  empty  and  rotten  and 
trifling,  and  [like]  little  dogs  biting  one  another, 
and  little  children  quarrelling,  laughing,  and  then 
straightway  weeping.  But  fidelity  and  modesty 
and  justice  and  truth  are  fled 

Up  to  Olympus  from  the  wide-spread  earth. 

HESIOD,  Works,  etc.  v.  197, 

What  then  is  there  which  still  detains  thee  here, 
if  the  objects  of  sense  are  easily  changed  and 
never  stand  still,  and  the  organs  of  perception  are 
dull  and  easily  receive  false  impressions,  and  the 
poor  soul  itself  is  an  exhalation  from  blood  ?  But 
to  have  good  repute  amid  such  a  world  as  this  is 
an  empty  thing.  Why  then  dost  thou  not  wait  in 
tranquillity  for  thy  end,  whether  it  is  extinction 
or  removal  to  another  state  ?  And  until  that  time 
comes,  what  is  sufficient?  Why,  what  else  than 
to  venerate  the  gods  and  bless  them,  and  to  do 
good  to  men,  and  to  practise  tolerance  and  self-re- 
straint ; l  but  as  to  everything  which  is  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  poor  flesh  and  breath,  to  remember 
that  this  is  neither  thine  nor  in  thy  power. 

1  This  is  the  Stoic  precept  d^Xoi>  xal  av^ov-    The  first  part    / 
teaches  us  to  be  content  with  men  and  things  as  they  are. 
The  second  part  teaches  us  the  virtue  of  self-restraint,  or 
the  government  of  our  passions. 


162 


MEDITATIONS. 


34.  Thou  canst  pass  thy  life  in  an  equable  flow 
of  happiness,  if  thou  canst  go  by  the  right  way, 
and  think  and  act  in  the  right  way.     These  two 
things  are  common  both  to  the  soul  of  God  and  to 
the  soul  of  man,  and  to  the  soul  of  every  rational 
being:  not   to   be   hindered   by  another;  and    to 
hold  good  to  consist  in  the  disposition  to  justice 
and  the  practice  of  it,  and  in  this  to  let  thy  desire 
find  its  termination. 

35.  If  this  is  neither  my  own  badness,  nor  an 
effect  of  my  own  badness,  and  the  common  weal  is 
not  injured,  why  am  I  troubled  about  it,  and  what 
is  the  harm  to  the  common  weal  ? 

36.  Do  not  be  carried  along  inconsiderately  by 
the  appearance  of  things,  but  give  help  [to  all] 
according  to  thy  ability  and  their  fitness ;  and  if 
they  should  have  sustained  loss  in  matters  which 
are    indifferent,   do     not    imagine    this   to   be   a 
damage  ;  for  it  is  a  bad  habit.     But  as  the  old 
man,  when  he  went  away,  asked  back  his  foster- 
child's  top,  remembering  that  it  was  a  top,  so  do 
thou  in  this  case  also. 

When  thou  art  calling  out  on  the  Rostra,  hast 
thou  forgotten,  man,  what  these  things  are?  — 
Yes;  but  they  are  objects  of  great  concern  to 
these  people  —  wilt  thou  too  then  be  made  a  fool 
for  these  things  ?  I  was  once  a  fortunate  man, 
but  I  lost  it,  I  know  not  how.  —  But  fortunate 
means  that  a  man  has  assigned  to  himself  a  good 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  163 

fortune  :  and  a  good  fortune  is  good  disposition  of 
the  soul,  good  emotions,  good  actions.1 

1  This  section  is  unintelligible.  Many  of  the  words  may 
be  corrupt,  and  the  general  purport  of  the  section  cannot  be 
discovered.  Perhaps  several  things  have  been  improperly 
joined  in  one  section.  I  have  translated  it  nearly  literally. 
Different  translators  give  the  section  a  different  turn,  and 
the  critics  have  tried  to  mend  what  they  cannot  understand. 


u 


VI. 

1.  THE  substance  of  the  universe  is  obedient 
and  compliant ;  and  the  reason  which  governs  it 
has  in  itself  no  cause  for  doing  evil,  for  it  has  no 
malice,  nor  does  it  do  evil  to  anything,  nor  is  any- 
thing harmed  by  it.     But  all  things  are  made  and 
perfected  according  to  this  reason. 

2.  Let  it  make  no  difference  to  thee  whethe 
thou  art  cold  or  warm,  if  thou  art  doing  thy  duty 
and  whether   thou   art   drowsy  or  satisfied  with 
sleep ;  and  whether  ill-spoken  of  or  praised ;  and 
whether  dying  or  doing  something  else.     For  it  is 
one  of  the  acts  of  life,  this  act  by  which  we  die : 
it  is  sufficient  then  in  this  act  also  to  do  well 
what  we  have  in  hand  (vi.  22,  28). 

3.  Look  within.  Let  neither  the  peculiar  quality 
of  anything  nor  its  value  escape  thee. 

4.  All  existing  things  soon  change,  and  they  will 
either  be  reduced  to  vapor,  if  indeed  all  substance 
is  one,  or  they  will  be  dispersed. 

5.  The  reason  which  governs  knows  what  its 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  165 

own  disposition  is,  and  what  it  does,  and  on  what 
material  it  works. 

6.  The  best  way  of  avenging  thyself  is  not  to 
become  like  [the  wrong-doer]. 

7.  Take  pleasure  in  one  thing  and  rest  in  it,  in 
passing  from  one  social  act  to  another  social  act, 
thinking  of  God. 

8.  The  ruling  principle  is  that  which  rouses  and 
turns  itself,  and  while  it  makes  itself  such  as  it  is 
and  such  as  it  wills  to  be,  it  also  makes  everything 
which  happens  appear  to  itself  to  be  such  as  it 
wills. 

9.  In  conformity  to  the  nature  of  the  universe 
every  single  thing  is  accomplished ;  for  certainly 
it  is  not  in  conformity  to  any  other  nature  that 
each  thing  is  accomplished,  either  a  nature  which 
externally  comprehends  this,  or  a  nature  which  is 
comprehended  within  this  nature,  or  a  nature  ex- 
ternal  and   independent   of   this    (xi.    1 ;  vi.  40 ; 
viii.  50). 

10.  The   universe  is  either  a   confusion,  and  a 
mutual  involution  of  things,  and  a  dispersion,  or 
it  is  unity  and  order  and  providence.     If  then  it  is 
the  former,  why  do  I  desire  to  tarry  in  a  fortu- 
itous combination  of  things  and  such  a  disorder? 
and  why  do  I  care  about  anything  else  than  how 
I  shall  at  last  become  -earth  ?  and  why  am  I  dis- 
turbed, for   the   dispersion   of   my   elements   will 
happen  whatever  I  do  ?     But  if  the  other  supposi- 


166  MEDITATIONS. 

^tion  is  true,  I  venerate,  and  I  am  firm,  and  I  trust 
\in  him  w  .o  governs  (iv.  27). 
v  11.  When  thou  hast  been  compelled  by  circum- 
stances to  be  disturbed  in  a  manner,  quickly 
return  to  thyself,  and  do  not  continue  out  of  tune 
longer  than  the  compulsion  lasts ;  for  thou  wilt 
have  more  mastery  over  the  harmony  by  contin- 
ually recurring  to  it. 

12.  If  thou  hadst  a  step-mother  and  a  mother  at 
the   same   time,  thou  wouldst  be  dutiful  to  thy 
step-mother,  but  still  thou  wouldst  constantly  re- 
turn to  thy  mother.    Let  the  court  and  philosophy 
now  be  to  thee  step-mother  and  mother :  return  to 
philosophy  frequently  and  repose  in  her,  through 
whom  what  thou  meetest  with  in  the  court  appears 
to  thee  tolerable,  and  thou  appearest  tolerable  in 
the  court. 

13.  When  we  have  meat  before  us  and  such  eat- 
ables, we  receive  the  impression  that  this  is  the 
dead  body  of  a  fish,  and  this  is  the  dead  body  of  a 
bird  or  of  a  pig ;  and  again,  that  this  Falernian  is 
only  a  little  grape-juice,  and  this  purple  robe  some 
sheep's  wool  dyed  with  the  blood  of  a  shell-fish : 
such  then  are  these  impressions,  and  they  reach 
the  things  themselves  and  penetrate  them,  and  so 
we  see  what  kind  of  things  they  are.     Just  in  the 
same  way  ought  we  to  act  all  through  life,  and 
where  there  are  things  which  appear  most  worthy 
of  our  approbation,  we  ought  to  lay  them  bare  and 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  167 

look  at  their  worthlessness  and  strip  them  of  all 
the  words  by  which  they  are  exalted.  For  out- 
ward show  is  a  wonderful  perverter  of  the  reason, 
and  when  thou  art  most  sure  that  thou  art  em- 
ployed about  things  worth  thy  pains,  it  is  then 
that  it  cheats  thee  most.  Consider  then  what 
Crates  says  of  Xenocrates  himself. 

14.  Most   of  the   things  which   the   multitude 
admire  are  referred  to  objects  of  the  most  general 
kind,  those  which  are  held  together  by  cohesion 
or  natural  organization,  such  as  stones,  wood,  fig- 
trees,  vines,  olives.     But  those  which  are  admired 
by  men,  who  are  a  little  more  reasonable,  are  re- 
ferred to  the  things  which  are  held  together  by  a 
living  principle,  as  flocks,  herds.     Those  which  are 
admired  by  men  who  are  still  more  instructed  are 
the  things  which  are  held  together  by  a  rational 
soul,  not  however  a  universal  soul,  but  rational  so 
far  as  it  is  a  soul  skilled  in  some  art,  or  expert  in 
some   other  way,  or  simply  rational  so  far  as  it 
possesses  a  number  of  slaves.     But  he  who  values 
a  rational   soul,    a   soul   universal   and  fitted  for 
political  life,  regards  nothing  else  except  this ;  and 
above  all  things  he  keeps  his  soul  in  a  condition 
and  in  an  activity  conformable  to  reason  and  social 
life,  and  he  co-operates  to  this  end  with  those  who 
are  of  the  same  kind  as. himself. 

15.  Some  things  are  hurrying  into  existence,  and 
others  are  hurrying  out  of  it ;  and  of  that  which  is 


168  MEDITA  T10N8. 

coming  into  existence  part  is  already  extinguished. 
Motions  and  changes  are  continually  renewing  the 
world,  just  as  the  uninterrupted  course  of  time  is 
always  renewing  the  infinite  duration  of  ages.  In 
this  flowing  stream  then,  on  which  there  is  no 
abiding,  what  is  there  of  the  things  which  hurry  by 
on  which  a  man  would  set  a  high  price  ?  It  would 
be  just  as  if  a  man  should  fall  in  love  with  one  of 
the  sparrows  which  fly  by,  but  it  has  already 
passed  out  of  sight.  Something  of  this  kind  is  the 
very  life  of  every  man,  like  the  exhalation  of  the 
blood  and  the  respiration  of  the  air.  For  such  as 
it  is  to  have  once  drawn  in  the  air  and  to  have 
given  it  back,  which  we  do  every  moment,  just 
the  same  is  it  with  the  whole  respiratory  power, 
which  thou  didst  receive  at  thy  birth  yesterday 
and  the  day  before,  to  give  it  back  to  the  element 
from  which  thou  didst  first  draw  it. 

16.  Neither  is  transpiration,  as  in  plants,  a 
thing  to  be  valued,  nor  respiration,  as  in  domesti- 
cated animals  and  wild  beasts,  nor  the  receiving 
of  impressions  by  the  appearances  of  things,  nor 
being  moved  by  desires  as  puppets  by  strings,  nor 
assembling  in  herds,  nor  being  nourished  by  food ; 
for  this  is  just  like  the  act  of  separating  and 
parting  with  the  useless  part  of  our  food.  What 
then  is  worth  being  valued  ?  To  be  received  with 
clapping  of  hands?  No.  Neither  must  we  value 
the  clapping  of  tongues;  for  the  praise  which 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.          169 

comes  from  the  many  is  a  clapping  of  tongues. 
Suppose  then  that  thou  hast  given  up  this  worth- 
less thing  called  fame,  what  remains  that  is  worth 
valuing  ?  This,  in  my  opinion :  to  move  thyself 
and  to  restrain  thyself  in  conformity  to  thy  proper 
constitution,  to  which  end  both  all  employments 
and  arts  lead.  For  every  art  aims  at  this,  that 
the  thing  which  has  been  made  should  be  adapted 
to  the  work  for  which  it  has  been  made  ;  and  both 
the  vine-planter  who  looks  after  the  vine,  arid  the 
horse-breaker,  and  he  who  trains  the  dog,  seek 
this  end.  But  the  education  and  the  teaching  of 
youth  aim  at  something.  In  this  then  is  the  value 
of  the  education  and  the  teaching.  And  if  this  is 
well,  thou  wilt  not  seek  anything  else.  Wilt  thou 
not  cease  to  value  many  other  things  too  ?  Then 
thou  wilt  be  neither  free,  nor  sufficient  for  thy 
own  happiness,  nor  without  passion.  For  of 
necessity  thou  must  be,  envious,  jealous,  and 
suspicious  of  those  who  can  take  away  those 
things,  and  plot  against  those  who  have  that 
which  is  valued  by  thee.  Of  necessity  a  man 
must  be  altogether  in  a  state  of  perturbation  who 
wants  any  of  these  things ;  and  besides,  he  must 
often  find  fault  with  the  gods.  But  to  reverence 
and  honor  thy  own  mind  will  make  thee  content 
with  thyself,  and  in  harmony  with  society,  and  in 
agreement  with  the  gods,  that  is,  praising  all  that 
they  give  and  have  ordered. 


170  MEDITATIONS. 

17.  Above,   below,   all   around   are    the   move- 
ments of  the  elements.     But  the  motion  of  virtue 
is  in  none  of  these :  it  is  something  more  divine, 
and  advancing  by  a  way  hardly  observed,  it  goes 
happily  on  its  road. 

18.  How  strangely   men   act !     They   will    not 
praise  those  who  are  living  at  the  same  time  and 
living   with    themselves;    but   to   be   themselves 
praised  by  posterity,  by  those  whom  they  have 
never  seen  or  ever  will  see,  this  they  set  much 
value  on.     But  this  is  very  much  the  same  as  if 
thou  shouldst  be  grieved  because  those  who  have 
lived  before  thee  did  not  praise  thee. 

19.  If  a  thing  is  difficult  to  be  accomplished  by 
thyself,  do  not  think  that  it  is  impossible  for  man: 
but  if  anything  is  possible  for  man  and  conform- 
able to  his  nature,  think  that  this  can  be  attained 
by  thyself  too. 

20.  In  the  gymnastic  exercises  suppose  that  a 
man  has  torn  thee  with  his  nails,  and  by  dashing 
against   thy  head  has   inflicted  a  wound.     Well, 
we  neither  show  any  signs  of  vexation,  nor  are  we 
offended,  nor  do  we  suspect  him  afterwards  as  a 
treacherous  fellow ;  and  yet  we  are  on  our  guard 
against  him,  not  however  as  an   enemy,  nor  yet 
with  suspicion,  but  we  quietly  get  out  of  his  way. 
Something  like  this  let  thy  behavior  be  in  all  the 
other  parts  of  life  ;  let  us  overlook  many  things  in 
those  who  are  like  antagonists  in  the  gymnasium. 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS,  171 

For  it  is  in  our  power,  as  I  said,  to  get  out  of  the 
way,  and  to  have  no  suspicion  nor  hatred. 

21.  If  any  man  is  able  to  convince  me  and  show 
me  that  I  do  not  think  or  act  right,  I  will  gladly 
change ;  for  I  seek  the  truth,  by  which  no  man 
was  ever  injured.    But  he  is  injured  who  abides  in 
his  error  and  ignorance. 

22.  I  do  my  duty :  other  things  trouble  me  not ; 
for  they  are  either  things  without  life,  or  things 
without  reason,  or  things  that  have  rambled  and 
know  not  the  way. 

23.  As  to  the  animals  which  have  no  reason, 
and  generally  all  things  and  objects,  do  thou,  since 
thou  hast  reason  and  they  have  none,  make  use  of 
them   with   a  generous   and   liberal   spirit.     But 
towards    human    beings,    as    they    have    reason, 
behave  in  a  social  spirit.     And  on  all  occasions 
call  on  the  gods,  and  do  not  perplex  thyself  about 
the  length  of  time  in  which  thou  shalt  do  this ; 
for  even  three  hours  so  spent  are  sufficient. 

24.  Alexander  the  Macedonian  and  his  groom 
by  death  were   brought   to  the   same   state ;  for 
either  they  were  received  among  the  same  seminal 
principles  of  the  universe,  or  they  were  alike  dis- 
persed among  the  atoms. 

25.  Consider    how   many   things  in   the    same 
indivisible  time  take  place  in  each  of  us,  —  things 
which  concern  the  body  and  things  which  concern 
the  soul :  and  so  thou  wilt  not  wonder  if  many 


172  MEDITATIONS. 

more  things,  or  rather  all  things  which  come  into 
existence  in  that  which  is  the  one  and  all,  which 
we  call  Cosmos,  exist  in  it  at  the  same  time. 

26.  If   any   man   should    propose   to   thee   the 
question,  how   the    name    Antoninus   is   written,, 
wouldst  thou  with  a  straining  of  the  voice  utter 
each  letter?     What  then  if  they  grow  angry,  wilt 
thou  be  angry  too  ?     Wilt  thou  not  go  on  with 
composure    and   number    every   letter?     Just   so 
then  in  this  life  also  remember  that  every  duty  is 
made  up  of  certain  parts.     These  it  is  thy  duty  to 
observe,  and  without  being  disturbed  or  showing 
anger  towards  those  who  are  angry  with  thee  to  go 
on  thy  way  and  finish  that  which  is  set  before  thee. 

27.  How  cruel  it  is  not  to  allow  men  to  strive 
after   the   things   which    appear   to   them   to   be 
suitable  to  their  nature  and  profitable  !     And  yet 
in  a  manner  thou  dost  not  allow  them  to  do  this, 
when    thou   art   vexed   because   they  do   wrong. 
For    they   are    certainly   moved    towards   things 
because  they  suppose  them  to  be  suitable  to  their 
nature  and  profitable  to  them.  — But  it  is  not  so. 
—  Teach    them    then,   and    show  them   without 
being  angry. 

28.  Death   is   a   cessation    of  the    impressions 
through   the   senses,  and    of  the   pulling   of  the 
strings  which  move  the  appetites,  and  of  the  dis- 
cursive movements  of  the  thoughts,  and  of  the 
service  to  the  flesh  (ii.  12). 


MARCUS  AURELIU8  ANTONINUS.  173 

29.  It  is  a  shame  for  the  soul  to  be  first  to  give    J 
way  in  this  life,  when  thy  body  does  not  give  way. 

30.  Take  care  that  thou  art  not  made  into  a 
Caesar,  that  thou  art  not  dyed  with  this  dye  ;  for 
such  things  happen.     Keep  thyself  then  simple, 
good,  pure,  serious,  free  from  affectation,  a  friend 
of  justice,  a  worshipper  of  the  gods,  kind,  affection- 
ate, strenuous  in  all  proper  acts.     Strive  to  con- 
tinue to  be  such  as  philosophy  wished  to  make 
thee.     Reverence  the  gods,  and  help  men.     Short 
is  life.     There  is  only  one  fruit   of  this  terrene 
life,  —  a  pious   disposition  and  social  acts.     Do 
everything  as  a  disciple  of  Antoninus.    Remember 
his  constancy  in  every  act  which  was  conformable 
to  reason,  and  his  evenness  in  all  things,  and  his 
piety,  and  the  serenity  of  his  countenance,  and  his 
sweetness,  and  his  disregard  of  empty  fame,  and 
his  efforts   to   understand   things;    and  how  he 
would  never   let   anything  pass  without  having 
first  most  carefully  examined  it  and  clearly  under- 
stood it ;  and  how  he  bore  with  those  who  blamed 
him  unjustly  without  blaming  them  in  return ; 
how  he  did  nothing  in   a  hurry ;   and   how  he 
listened  not  to  calumnies,  and  how  exact  an  ex- 
aminer of  manners  and  actions  he  was ;  and  not 
given   to    reproach   people,   nor  timid,   nor  sus- 
picious, nor  a  sophist;  and  with  how  little    he 
was  satisfied,  such   as  lodging,  bed,  dress,  food, 
servants ;  and  how  laborious  and  patient ;  and 


174  MEDFTA  TIONS. 

how  he  was  able  on  account  of  his  sparing  diet  to 
hold  out  to  the  evening,  not  even  requiring  to 
relieve  himself  by  any  evacuations  except  at  the 
usual  hour  ;  and  his  firmness  and  uniformity  in 
his  friendships ;  and  how  he  tolerated  freedom  of 
speech  in  those  who  opposed  his  opinions;  and 
the  pleasure  that  he  had  when  any  man  showed 
him  anything  better ;  and  how  religious  he  was 
without  superstition.  Imitate  all  this,  that  thou 
inayest  have  as  good  a  conscience,  when  thy  last 
hour  comes,  as  he  had  (i.  16). 

31.  Return  to  thy  sober  senses  and  call  thyself 
back  ;  and  when   thou  hast  roused   thyself  from 
sleep   and   hast   perceived   that    they    were   only 
dreams  which  troubled  thee,  now  in  thy  waking 
hours  look   at  these  [the  things  about  thee]   as 
thou  didst  look  at  those  [the  dreams]. 

32.  I  consist  of  a  little  body  and  a  soul.     Now 
to  this  little  body  all  things  are  indifferent,  for  it 
is  not  able  to  perceive  differences.     But  to  the 
understanding   those  things  only  are   indifferent 
which  are  not  the  works  of  its  own  activity.     But 
whatever  things  are  the  works  of  its  own  activity, 
all  these  are  in  its  power.     And  of  these  'however 
only  those  which  are  done  with  reference  to  the 
present;  for  as  to  the  future  and  the  past  activities 
of  the  mind,  even  these  are  for  the   present  in- 
different. 

33.  Neither  the  labor  which  the  hand  does  nor 


MARCUS  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.  175 

that  of  the  foot  is  contrary  to  nature,  so  long  as 
the  foot  does  the  foot's  work  and  the  hand  the 
hand's.  So  then  neither  to  a  man  as  a  man  is  his 
labor  contrary  to  nature,  so  long  as  it  does  the 
things  of  a  man.  But  if  the  labor  is  not  contrary 
to  his  nature,  neither  is  it  an  evil  to  him. 

34.  How  many  pleasures  have  been  enjoyed  by 
robbers,  patricides,  tyrants. 

35.  Dost  thou  not  see  how  the  handicraftsmen 
accommodate  themselves  up  to  a  certain  point  to 
those  who  are  not  skilled  in  their  craft,  —  never- 
theless they  cling  to  the  reason  [the  principles]  of 
their  art,  and  do  not  endure  to  depart  from  it? 
Is  it  not  strange  if  the  architect  and  the  physi- 
cian shall  have  more  respect  to  the  reason    [the 
principles]   of  their   own   arts   than   man   to  his 
own   reason,  which   is  common   to   him  and  the 
gods? 

36.  Asia,  Europe,  are  corners  of  the  universe ; 
all  the  sea  a  drop  in  the  universe ;  Athos  a  little 
clod  of  the  universe :   all  the  present  time  is  a 
point  in  eternity.   All  things  are  little,  changeable, 
perishable.     All   things  come   from   thence,  from 
that  universal  ruling  power  either  directly  pro- 
ceeding or  by  way  of  sequence.     And  accordingly 
the   lion's   gaping  jaws,  and   that  which   is   poi- 
sonous, and  every  harmful  thing,  as  a  thorn,  as 
mud,  are  after-products  of  the  grand  and   beau- 
tiful.     Do   not   then    imagine   that  they   are    of 


176  MEDITA  TION8. 

another  kind  from  that  which  thou  dost  vener- 
ate, but  form  a  just  opinion  of  the  source  of  all 
(vii.  75). 

37.  He  who  has  seen  present  things  has  seen 
all,  both  everything  which  has  taken  place  from 
all  eternity  and  everything  which  will  be  for  time 
without  end ;  for  all  things  are  of  one  kin  and  of 
one  form. 

38.  Frequently  consider  the  connection  of  all 
things  in  the  universe  and  their  relation  to  one 
another.     For  in  a  manner  all  things  are  impli- 
cated with  one  another,  and  all  in  this  way  are 
friendly  to  one  another ;  for  one  thing  conies  in 
order  after  another,  and  this  is  by  virtue  of  the  f 
active  movement  and  mutual  conspiration  and  the 
unity  of  the  substance  (ix.  1). 

39.  Adapt  thyself  to  the  things  with  which  thy 
lot  has  been  cast :  and  the  men  among  whom  thou 
hast  received  thy  portion,  love  them,  but  do  it 
truly  [sincerely]. 

40.  Every  instrument,  tool,  vessel,  if  it   does 
that  for  which  it  has  been  made,  is  well,  and  yet 
he  who  made  it  is  not  there.     But  in  the  things 
which  are  held  together  by  nature  there  is  within, 
and  there  abides  in,  them  the  power  which  made 
them ;  wherefore  the  more  is  it  fit  to  reverence 
this  power,  and  to  think,  that,  if  thou  dost  live 
and  act  according  to  its  will,  everything  in  thee  is 
in  conformity  to  intelligence.     And  thus  also  in 


MABCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.          177 

the  universe  the  things  which  belong  to  it  are  in 
conformity  to  intelligence. 

41.  Whatever  of  the  things  which  are  not  within 
thy  power  thou  shalt  suppose  to  be  good  for  thee 
or  evil,  it  must  of  necessity  be  that,  if  such  a  bad 
thing  befall  thee,  or  the  loss  of  such  a  good  thing, 
thou  wilt  not  blame  the  gods,  and  hate  men  too, 
those  who  are  the  cause  of  the  misfortune  or  the 
loss,  or  those  who  are  suspected  of  being  likely  to 
be  the  cause;  and  indeed  we  do  much  injustice 
because  we  make  a  difference  between  these  things 
[because  we  do  not  regard  these  things  as  indif- 
ferent f].1     But  if  we   judge   only  those   things 
which  are  in  our  power  to  be  good  or  bad,  there 
remains  no  reason  either  for  finding  fault  with 
God  or  standing  in  a  hostile  attitude  to  man.2 

42.  We  are  all  working  together  to  one  end, 
some  with  knowledge  and  design,  and  others  with- 
out knowing  what  they  do  ;  as  men  also  when  they 
are  asleep,  of  whom  it  is  Heraclitus,  I  think,  who 
says  that  they  are  laborers  and  co-operators  in  the 
things  which  take  place  in  the  universe.    But  men 
co-operate  after  different  fashions :  and  even  those 
co-operate  abundantly,  who  find  fault  with  what 

1  Gataker  translates  this  "because  we  strive  to  get  these 
things,"  comparing  the  use  of  5ia<f>tp€<rdai  in  v.  1,  and  x.  27, 
and  ix.  88,  where  it  appears  that  his  reference  should  be  xi. 
10.  He  may  be  right  in  the  interpretation,  but  I  doubt. 

8  Cicero,  De  Natura  Deorum.  iii.  32. 


ITS  MEDITATIONS. 

happens  and  those  who  try  to  oppose  it  and  to 
hinder  it ;  for  the  universe  had  need  even  of  such 
men  as  these.  It  remains  then  for  thee  to  under- 
stand among  what  kind  of  workmen  thou  placest 
thyself ;  for  he  who  rules  all  things  will  certainly 
make  a  right  use  of  thee,  and  he  will  receive  thee 
among  some  part  of  the  co-operators  and  of  those 
whose  labors  conduce  to  one  end.  But  be  not 
thou  such  a  part  as  the  mean  and  ridiculous  verse 
in  the  play,  which  Chrysippus  speaks  of.1 

43.  Does  the  sun  undertake  to  do  the  work  of 
the  rain,  or  Aesculapius  the  work  of  the   Fruit- 
bearer  [the  earth]  ?     And  how  is  it  with  respect 
to  each  of  the  stars,  are  they  not  different  and  vet 
they  work  together  to  the  same  end? 

44.  If  the  gods  have  determined  about  me  and 
about  the  things  which  must  happen  to  me,  they 
have  determined  well,  for  it  is  not  easy  even  to 
imagine  a  deity  without  forethought ;  and  as  to 
doing  me  harm,  why  should  they  have  any  desire 
towards  that?  for  what  advantage  would  result 
to  them  from  this  or  to  the  whole,  which  is  the 
special  object  of  their  providence  ?     But  if  they 
have  not  determined  about  me  individually,  they 
have    certainly   determined    about   the    whole   at 
least,  and  the  things  which  happen  by  way  of  se- 
quence in   this  general  arrangement  I  ought  to 
accept  with  pleasure  and  to  be  content  with  them. 

1  Plutarch,  adversus  Stoicos,  c.  14. 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ASTONIXUS.          179 

But  if  they  determine  about  nothing,  —  which  it 
is  wicked  to  believe,  or  if  we  do  believe  it,  let  us 
neither  sacrifice  nor  pray  nor  swear  by  them,  nor 
do  anything  else  which  we  do  as  if  the  gods  were 
present  and  lived  with  us,  —  but  if  however  the 
gods  determine  about  none  of  the  things  which 
concern  us,  I  am  able  to  determine  about  myself, 
and  I  can  inquire  about  that  which  is  useful ;  and 
that  is  useful  to  every  man  which  is  conformable 
to  his  own  constitution  and  nature.  But  my 
nature  is  rational  and  social ;  and  my  city  and 
country,  so  far  as  I  am  Antoninus,  is  Rome,  but  so 
far  as  I  am  a  man,  it  is  the  world.  The  things 
then  which  are  useful  to  these  cities  are  alone  use- 
ful to  me. 

45.  Whatever  happens  to  every  man,  this  is  for 
the  interest  of  the  universal :  this  might  be  suffi- 
cient. But  further  thou  wilt  observe  this  also  as  a 
general  truth,  if  thou  dost  observe,  that  whatever 
is  profitable  to  any  man  is  profitable  also  to  other 
men.  But  let  the  word  profitable  be  taken  here 
in  the  common  sense  as  said  of  things  of  the  middle 
kind  [neither  good  nor  bad]. 

I  46.  As  it  happens  to  thee  in  the  amphitheatre 
,-  and  such  places,  that  the  continual  sight  of  the 
same  things,  and  the  uniformity  make  the  specta- 
cle wearisome,  so  it  is  in.  the  whole  of  life  ;  for  all 
things  above,  below,  are  the  same  and  from  the 
same.  How  long  then  ? 


1 80  MED  IT  A  TIONS. 

47.  Think  continually  that  all  kinds  of  men  and 
of  all  kinds  of  pursuits  and  of  all  nations  are  dead, 
so  that  thy  thoughts  come  down  even  to  Philistion 
and    Phoebus    and    Origariion.      Now   turn   thy 
thoughts  to  the  other  kinds  [of  men].     To  that 
place  then  we  must  remove,  where  there  are  so 
many  great  orators,  and  so  many  noble  philoso- 
phers, Heraclitus,  Pythagoras,  Socrates ;  so  many 
heroes  of  former  days,  and  so  many  generals  after 
them,  and  tyrants ;  besides  these,  Eudoxus,  Hip- 
parchus,    Archimedes,   and   other   men   of    acute 
natural  talents,  great  minds,  lovers  of  labor,  ver- 
satile, confident,  mockers  even  of  the  perishable 
and  ephemeral  life  of  man,  as  Meriippus  and  such 
as  are  like  him.     As  to  all  these  consider  that 
they  have  long  been  in  the  dust.     What   harm 
then  is  this  to  them  ;  and  what  to  those  whose 
names  are  altogether  unknown  ?     One  thing  here 
is  worth  a  great  deal,  to  pass  thy  life  in  truth  and 
justice,  with  a  benevolent  disposition  even  to  liars 
and  unjust  men. 

48.  When  thou  wishest  to  delight  thyself,  think 
of  the  virtues  of  those  who  live  with  thee;  for 
instance,  the  activity  of  one,  and  the  modesty  of 
another,  and  the  liberality  of  a  third,  and  some 
other    good   quality   of    a   fourth.     For   nothing 
delights  so  much  as  the  examples  of  the  virtues, 
when  they  are  exhibited  in  the  morals  of  those 
who  live  with  us  and  present  themselves  in  abun- 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  181 

dance,  as  far  as  is  possible.     Wherefore  we  must 
keep  them  before  us. 

49.  Thou  art  not  dissatisfied,  I  suppose,  because 
thou  weighest  only  so  many  litrae  and  not  three 
hundred.     Be  not  dissatisfied  then  that  thou  must 
live  only  so  many  years  and  not  more  ;  for  as  thou 
art  satisfied  with  the  amount  of  substance  which 
has  been  assigned  to  thee,  so  be  content  with  the 
time. 

50.  Let  us  try  to  persuade  them  [men].     But 
act  even  against  their  will,  when  the  principles  of 
justice   lead  that  way.     If  however  any  man  by 
using  force  stands  in  thy  way,  betake  thyself  to 
contentment  and  tranquillity,  and  at  the  same  time 
employ   the    hindrance   towards   the   exercise   of 
some   other   virtue  ;  and  remember  that  thy  at- 
tempt was  with  a  reservation  [conditionally],  that 
thou  didst  not  desire  to  do  impossibilities.     What 
then   didst   thou   desire?  —  Some   such   effort   as 
this.  —  But  thou  attainest  thy  object,  if  the  things 
to   which    thou   wast    moved    are    [not]    accom- 
plished, f 

51.  He  who  loves  fame  considers  another  man's 
activity  to  be  his  own  good ;  and  he  who  loves 
pleasure,   his    own   sensations;   but   he   who   has 
understanding   considers   his  own  acts  to  be  his 
own  good. 

52.  It  is  in  our  power  to  have  no  opinion  about 
a  thing,  and  not  to  be  disturbed  in  our  soul ;  for 


182  MED  IT  A  TIONS. 

things  themselves  have  no  natural  power  to  form 
our  judgments. 

53.  Accustom  thyself  to  attend  carefully  to 
what  is  said  by  another,  and  as  much  as  it  is  pos- 
sible, be  in  the  speaker's  mind. 

]j         54.  That   which    is   not  good  for  the   swarm, 
neither  is  it  good  for  the  bee. 

55.  If  sailors  abused  the  helmsman  or  the  sick 
the  doctor,  would  they  listen  to  anybody  else ;  or 
how  could  the  helmsman  secure  the  safety  of  those 
in  the  ship,  or  the  doctor  the  health  of  those  whom 
he  attends  ? 

56.  How  many  together  with  whom  I  came  into 
the  world  are  already  gone  out  of  it. 

57.  To  the  jaundiced  honey  tastes  bitter,  and  to 
those  bitten  by  mad  dogs  water  causes  fear ;  and 
to  little  children  the  ball  is  a  fine  thing.     Why 
then  am  I  angry  ?     Dost  thou  think  that  a  false 
opinion  has  less  power  than  the  bile  in  the  jaun- 
diced or  the  poison  in  him  who  is  bitten  by  a  mad 
dog? 

58.  No  man  will  hinder  thee  from  living  accord- 
ing to  the  reason  of  thy  own  nature :  nothing  will 
happen  to  thee  contrary  to  the  reason  of  the  uni- 
versal nature. 

59.  What  kind  of  people  are  those  whom  men 
wish  to  please,  and  for  what  objects,  and  by  what 
kind  of  acts  ?  How  soon  will  time  cover  all  things, 
and  how  many  it  has  covered  already. 


VII. 

1.  WHAT  is  badness?    It  is  that  which  thou 
hast  often  seen.     And  on  the  occasion  of  every- 
thing which  happens  keep  this  in  mind,  that  it  is 
that  which  thou  hast  often  seen.     Everywhere  up 
and  down  thou  wilt  find  the  same  things,  with 
which  the   old  histories   are  filled,  those  of  the 
middle  ages  and  those  of  our  own  day ;  with  which 
cities  and  houses  are  filled  now.     There  is  nothing 
new :  all  things  are  both  familiar  and  short-lived. 

2.  How  can  our  principles  become  dead,  unless 
the  impressions   [thoughts]  which  correspond  to 
them  are  extinguished?     But  it  is  in  thy  power 
continuously  to  fan  these  thoughts  into  a  flame.   I 
can   have  that  opinion  about   anything  which    I 
ought  to  have.     If  I  can,  why  am  I  disturbed? 
The  things  which  are  external  to  my  mind  have 
no  relation  at  all  to  my  mind.  —  Let  this  be  the 
state  of  thy  affects,  and  thou  standest  erect.     To 
recover  thy  life  is  in  thy  power.     Look  at  things 
again  as  thou  didst  use  to  look  at  them ;  for  in 
this  consists  the  recovery  of  thy  life. 


184  MEDITATIONS. 

3.  The  idle  business  of  show,  plays  on  the  stage, 
flocks  of  sheep,  herds,  exercises  with  spears,  a  bone 
cast  to  little  dogs,  a  bit  of  bread  into  fishponds, 
laborings  of   ants    and  burden-carrying,  runnings 
about  of  frightened  little  mice,  puppets  pulled  by 
strings —  [all  alike].     It  is  thy  duty  then  in  the 
midst  of  such  things  to  show  good  humor  and  not 
a  proud  air ;  to  understand  however  that  every 
man  is  worth  just  so  much  as  the  things  are  worth 
about  which  he  busies  himself. 

4.  In   discourse   thou   must  attend  to  what  is 
said,  and  in  every  movement  thou  must  observe 
what  is  doing.     And  in  the  one  thou  shouldst  see 
immediately  to  what  end  it  refers,  but  in  the  other 
watch  carefully  what  is  the  thing  signified. 

5.  Is   my  understanding   sufficient  for  this   or 
not  ?     If  it  is  sufficient,  I  use  it  for  the  work  as  an 
instrument  given  by  the  universal  nature.     But  if 
it  is  not  sufficient,  then  either  I  retire  from  the 
work  and  give  way  to  him  who  is  able  to  do  it 
better,  unless  there  be  some  reason  why  I  ought 
not  to  do  so ;  or  I  do  it  as  well  as  I  can,  taking  to 
help  me  the  man  who  with  the  aid  of  my  ruling 
principle  can  do  what  is  now  fit  and  -useful  for 
the  general  good.     For  whatsoever  either  by  my- 
self or  with  another  I  can  do,  ought  to  be  directed 
to   this  only,  to   that  which   is   useful   and  well 
suited  to  society. 

6.  How  many  after  being  celebrated  by  fame 


MABCUS  A  UBELIUS  ANTONINUS.          185 

have  been  given  up  to  oblivion ;  and  how  many     J 
who  have  celebrated  the  fame  of  others  have  long 
been  dead. 

7.  Be  not  ashamed  to  be  helped ;  for  it  is  thy 
business   to   do   thy  duty  like   a   soldier   in   the 
assault  on  a  town.     How  then,  if  being  lame  thou 
canst  not  mount  up  on  the  battlements  alone,  but 
with  the  help  of  another  it  is  possible  ? 

8.  Let  not  future  things  disturb  ,thee,  for  thou 
wilt  come  to  them,  if  it  shall  be  necessary,  having 
with  thee  the  same  reason  which  now  thou  usest 
for  present  things. 

9.  All  things  are  implicated  with  one  another, 
and  the  bond  is  holy  ;  and  there  is  hardly  any- 
thing  unconnected   with   any  other    thing.     For 
things  have  been  co-ordinated,  and  they  combine 
to  form  the  same  universe  [order].     For  there  is 
one  universe  made  up  of  all  things,  and  one  god 
who  pervades  all  things,  and  one  substance,1  and 
one  law,  [one]   common  reason  in  all  intelligent 
animals,  and  one  truth ;  if  indeed  there  is  also  one 
perfection  for  all  animals  which  are  of  the  same 
stock  and  participate  in  the  same  reason. 

10.  Everything  material  soon  disappears  in  the 
substance   of  the  whole;  and  everything  formal 
[causal]  is  very  soon  taken  back  into  the  univer- 
sal reason  ;  and  the  memory  of  everything  is  very 
soon  overwhelmed  in  time. 

1  "  One  substance,"  p.  42,  note  1. 


186  MEDITATIONS. 

11.  To    the   rational   animal  the  same   act  is 
according  to  nature  and  according  to  reason. 

12.  Be  thou  erect,  or  be  made  erect  (iii.  5). 

13.  Just  as  it  is  with  the   members  in   those 
bodies  which   are   united   in   one,   so   it  is  with 
rational  beings  which  exist  separate,  for  they  have 
been  constituted  for  one  co-operation.     And  the 
perception  of  this  will  be  more  apparent  to  thee  if 
thou  often  sayest  to  thyself  that  I  am  a  member 
[juAos]  of  the  system  of  rational  beings.     But  if 
[using  the  letter  r~\  thou  sayest  that  thou  art  a 
part  [/upos],  thou  dost  not  yet  love  men  from  thy 
heart;  beneficence  does  not  yet  delight  thee  for 
its  own  sake ; 1  thou  still  doest  it  barely  as  a  thing 
of  propriety,  and  not  yet  as  doing  good  to  thyself. 

14.  Let  there  fall  externally  what  will  on  the 
parts  which  can  feel  the  effects  of  this  fall.     For 
those  parts  which  have  felt  will  complain,  if  they 
choose.      But   I,   unless   I   think   that   what  has 
happened  is  an  evil,  am  not  injured.     And  it  is  in 
my  power  not  to  think  so. 

15.  Whatever  any  one  does  or  says,  I  must  be 
good ;  just  as  if  the  gold,  or  the  emerald,  or  the 
purple  were  always  saying  this,  Whatever  any  one 
does  or  says,  I  must  be  emerald  and  keep  my  color. 

16.  The  ruling  faculty  does  not  disturb  itself ;  I 
mean,  does  not  frighten  itself  or  cause  itself  pain.f 

1  I  have  used  Gataker's  conjecture  /caTaX^Taocws  instead  of 
the  common  reading  KaTaXyirriKus :  compare  iv.  20 ;  ix.  42. 


MA3CUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.          187 

But  if  any  one  else  can  frighten  or  pain  it,  let  him 
do  so.  For  the  faculty  itself  will  not  by  its  own 
opinion  turn  itself  into  such  ways.  Let  the  body 
itself  take  care,  if  it  can,  that  it  suffer  nothing, 
and  let  it  speak,  if  it  suffers.  But  the  soul  itself, 
that  which  is  subject  to  fear,  to  pain,  which  has 
completely  the  power  of  forming  an  opinion  about 
these  things,  will  suffer  nothing,  for  it  will  never 
deviate  f  into  such  a  judgment.  The  leading  prin- 
ciple in  itself  wants  nothing,  unless  it  makes  a 
want  for  itself;  and  therefore  it  is  both  free  from 
perturbation  and  unimpeded,  if  it  does  not  dis- 
turb and  impede  itself. 

17.  Eudaemonia  [happiness]  is  a  good  daemon, 
or  a  good  thing.     What  then  art  thou  doing  here, 

0  imagination  ?     Go  away,  I  entreat  thee  by  the 
gods,  as  thou  didst  come,  for  I  want  thee  not. 
But  thou  art  come  according  to  thy  old  fashion. 

1  am  not  angry  with  thee :  only  go  away. 

18.  Is  any  man  afraid  of  change  ?     Why,  what 
can  take  place  without  change?     What  then  is 
more  pleasing  or  more  suitable  to  the  universal 
nature  ?     And  canst  thou  take  a  bath  unless  the 
wood   undergoes  a  change  ?  and   canst  thou  be 
nourished,  unless  the  food  undergoes  a  change  ? 
And  can  anything  else  that  is  useful  be  accom- 
plished without  change  ?     Dost  thou  not  see  then 
that  for  thyself  also  to  change  is  just  the  same,  and 
equally  necessary  for  the  universal  nature  ? 


188  MEDITATIONS. 

19.  Through  the  universal  substance  as  through 
a  furious  torrent  all  bodies  are  carried,  being  by 
their  nature  united  with  and   co-operating  with 
the  whole,  as   the   parts   of  our  body  with  one 
another.     How  many  a  Chrysippus,  how  many  a 
Socrates,  how  many  an  Epictetus  has  time  already 
swallowed  up  !     And  let  the  same  thought  occur 
to  thee  with  reference  to  every  man  and  thing 
(v.  23;  vi.  15). 

20.  One  thing  only  troubles  me,  lest  I  should 
do  something  which  the  constitution  of  man  does 
not  allow,  or  in  the  way  which  it  does  not  allow, 
or  what  it  does  not  allow  now. 

21.  Near  is  thy  forgetfulness  of  all  things ;  and 
near  the  forgetfulness  of  thee  by  all. 

22.  It  is  peculiar  to  man  to  love  even  those 
who  do  wrong.     And  this  happens,  if  when  they 
do  wrong  it  occurs  to  thee  that  they  are  kinsmen, 
and  that  they  do  wrong  through  ignorance  and 
unintentionally,  and  that  soon  both  of  you  will 
die ;  and  above  all,  that  the  wrong-doer  has  done 
thee  no  harm,  for  he  has  not  made  thy  ruling  fac- 
ulty worse  than  it  was  before. 

23.  The  universal  nature  out  of  the  universal 
substance,  as  if  it  were  wax,  now  moulds  a,  horse, 
and  when  it  has  broken  this  up,  it  uses  the  mate- 
rial for  a  tree,  then   for  a  man,  then   for  some- 
thing else ;  and  each  of  these  things  subsists  for  a 
very  short  time-    But  it  is  no  hardship  for  the 


MAECUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  189 

vessel  to  be  broken  up,  just  as  there  was  none  in 
its  being  fastened  together  (viii.  50). 

24.  A  scowling  look  is  altogether   unnatural; 
when  it  is  often  assumed,1  the  result  is  that  all 
comeliness    dies    away,   and   at  last  is   so   com- 
pletely extinguished  that  it  cannot  be  again  lighted 
up  at  all.     Try  to  conclude  from  this  very  fact 
that  it  is  contrary  to  reason.     For  if  even  the  per- 
ception of  doing  wrong  shall  depart,  what  reason 
is  there  for  living  any  longer  ? 

25.  Nature  which  governs  the  whole  will  soon 
change  all  things  which  thou  seest,  and  out  of      I 
their  substance  will  make  other  things,  and  again    J 
other  things  from  the  substance  of  them,  in  order 
that  the  world  may  be  ever  new  (xii.  23). 

26.  When  a  man  has  done  thee  any  wrong,  im- 
mediately consider  with  what  opinion  about  good 
or  evil  he  has  done  wrong.     For  when  thou  hast 
seen  this,  thou  wilt  pity  him,  and  wilt  neither 
wonder  nor   be  angry.     For  either  thou  thyself 
thinkest  the  same  thing  to  be  good  that  he  does 
or  another  thing  of  the  same  kind.     It  is  thy  duty 
then  to  pardon  him.     But  if  thou  dost  not  think 
such  things  to  be  good  or  evil,  thou  wilt  more 
readily  be  well  disposed  to  him  who  is  in  error. 

27.  Think  not  so  much  of  what  thou  hast  not 
as  of  what  thou  hast :  but  of  the  things  which  thou 
hast  select  the  best,  and  then  reflect  how  eagerly 

1  This  is  corrupt. 


190  MEDITATIONS. 

they  would  have  been  sought,  if  thou  hadst  them 
not.  At  the  same  time,  however,  take  care  that 
thou  dost  not  through  being  so  pleased  with  them 
accustom  thyself  to  overvalue  them,  so  as  to  be 
disturbed  if  ever  thou  shouldst  not  have  them. 

28.  Retire  into  thyself.     The  rational  principle 
which  rules  has  this  nature,  that  it  is  content  with 
itself  when  it  does  what  is  just,  and  so  secures 
tranquillity. 

29.  Wipe  out  the  imagination.   Stop  the  pulling 
of  the   strings.     Confine   thyself  to  the  present. 
Understand  well  what  happens  either  to  thee  or 
to   another.     Divide  and  distribute  every  object 
into  the  causal  [formal]  arid  the  material.     Think 
of  thy  last  hour.     Let  the  wrong  which  is  done  by 
a   man    stay   there   where   the   wrong   was   done 
(viii.  29). 

30.  Direct  thy  attention  to  what  is  said.     Let 
thy  understanding  enter  into  the  things  that  are 
doing  and  the  things  which  do  them  (vii.  4). 

31.  Adorn  thyself  with  simplicity  and  modesty, 
and  with  indifference  towards  the  things  which  lie 
between  virtue  and  vice.     Love  mankind.    Follow 
God.     The  poet  says  that  law  rules  all  —  f     And 
it  is  enough  to  remember  that  law  rules  all.f  1 

32.  About  death :  whether  it  is  a  dispersion,  or 
a  resolution  into  atoms,  or  annihilation,  it  is  either 
extinction  or  change. 

1  The  end  of  this  section  is  unintelligible. 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  191 

33.  About  pain :  the  pain  which  is  intolerable 
carries  us  off;  but  that  which  lasts  a  long  time  is  tol- 
erable ;  and  the  mind  maintains  its  own  tranquillity 
by  retiring  into  itself,!  and  the  ruling  faculty  is  not 
made  worse.     But  the  parts  which  are  harmed  by 
pain,  let  them,  if  they  can,  give  their  opinion  about  it. 

34.  About  fame :  look  at  the  minds  [of  those 
who  seek  fame],  observe  what  they  are,  and  what 
kind  of  things  they  avoid,  and  what  kind  of  things 
they  pursue.     And  consider  that  as  the  heaps  of 
sand  piled  on  one  another  hide  the  former  sands, 
so  in  life  the   events  which  go  before  are  soon 
covered  by  those  which  come  after. 

35.  From  Plato : l    The  man  who  has  an  ele- 
vated mind  and  takes  a  view  of  all  time  and  of  all 
substance,  dost  thou  suppose  it  possible  for  him  to 
think  that  human  life  is  anything  great  ?    It  is  not 
possible,  he  said.  —  Such  a  man  then  will  think 
that  death  also  is  no  evil.  —  Certainly  not. 

36.  From  Antisthenes:  It  is  royal  to  do  good 
and  to  be  abused. 

37.  It  is  a  base  thing  for  the  countenance  to  be 
obedient  and  to  regulate  and  compose  itself  as  the 
mind  commands,  and  for  the  mind  not  to  be  regu- 
lated and  composed  by  itself. 

38.  It  is  not  right  to  vex  ourselves  at  things, 
For  they  care  nought  about  it.2 

1  Plato,  Pol,  vi.  486. 

1  From  the  Bellerophon  of  Euripides. 


192  MEDITA  TIONS. 

39.  To  the  immortal  gods  and  us  give  joy. 

40.  Life  must  be  reaped  like  the  ripe  ears  of 

corn. 
One  man  is  born ;  another  dies.1 

41.  If  gods  care  not  for  me  and  for  my  children, 
There  is  a  reason  for  it. 

42.  For  the  good  is  with  me,  and  the  just.2 

43.  No  joining  others  in  their  wailing,  no  violent 

emotion. 

44.  From  Plato  :  3  But  I  would  make  this  man 
a  sufficient  answer,  which  is  this  :  Thou  sayest  not 
well,  if  thou  thinkest  that  a  man  who  is  good  for 
anything  at  all  ought  to  compute  the  hazard  of 
life  or  death,  and  should  not  rather  look  to  this 
only  in  all  that  he  does,  whether  he  is  doing  what 
is  just  or  unjust,  and  the  works  of  a  good  or  a  bad 
man. 

45.  3For  thus  it  is,  men  of  Athens,  in  truth: 
wherever  a  man  has  placed  himself  thinking  it  the 
best  place  for  him,  or  has  been  placed  by  a  com- 
mander, there  in  my  opinion  he  ought  to  stay  and 
to    abide    the    hazard,   taking   nothing   into   the 

1  From  the  Hypsipyle  of  Euripides.    Cicero  (Tuscul.  iii. 
25)  has  translated  six  lines  from  Euripides,  and  among  them 
are  these  two  lines, — 

"  Reddenda  terrae  est  terra :  turn  vita  omnibus 
Metenda  ut  fruges  :  Sic  jubet  necessitas." 

2  See  Aristophanes,  Acharnenses,  v.  661. 

3  From  the  Apologia,  c.  16. 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  198 

reckoning,  either  death  or  anything  else,  before 
the  baseness  [of  deserting  his  post], 

46.  But,  my  good  friend,  reflect  whether  that 
which  is  noble  and  good  is  not  something  different 
from  saving  and  being  saved ;  for  f  as  to  a  man 
living  such  or  such  a  time,  at  least  one  who  is 
really  a  man,  consider  if  this  is  not  a  thing  to  be 
dismissed  from  the  thoughts  :  f  and  there  must  be 
no  love  of  life :  but  as  to  these  matters  a  man 
must  intrust  them  to  the  Deity  and  believe  what 
the  women  say,  that  no  man  can  escape  his  des- 
tiny, the  next  inquiry  being  how  he  may  best  live 
the  time  that  he  has  to  live. 1 

47.  Look  round  at  the  courses  of  the  stars,  as  if 
thou  wert  going  along  with  them;  and  constantly 
consider  the  changes   of  the   elements  into  one 
another,  for  such  thoughts  purge  away  the  filth  of 
the  terrene  life. 

48.  This  is  a  fine  saying  of  Plato  : 2  That  he 
who  is  discoursing  about  men  should  look  also  at 
earthly  things  as  if  he  viewed  them  from  some 
higher  place  ;  should  look  at  them  in  their  assem- 
blies, armies,  agricultural  labors,  marriages,  treaties, 

1  Plato,  Gorgias,  c.  68  (512).  In  this  passage  the  text  of 
Antoninus  has  iartov,  which  is  perhaps  right ;  but  there  is  a 
difficulty  in  the  words  ^  7<ip  TOVTO  fdv,  rb  ftv  bTro<rov8r)  XP^WF 
r6vye  ws  dXrjflwj  Avdpa  tartov  tarrl,  /cai  oi5,  &c.  The  conjecture 
fi>KTtov  for  tartov  does  not  mend  the  matter. 

*  It  is  said  that  this  is  not  in  the  extant  writings  of  Plato. 


194  MEDITATIONS. 

births,  deaths,  noise  of  the  courts  of  justice,  desert 
places,  various  nations  of  barbarians,  feasts,  lamen- 
tations, markets,  a  mixture  of  all  things  and  an 
orderly  combination  of  contraries. 

49.  Consider  the  past,  —  such  great  changes  of 
political  supremacies  ;  thou  mayest  foresee  also  the 
things  which  will  be.  For  they  will  certainly  be  of 
like  form,  and  it  is  not  possible  that  they  should 
deviate  from  the  order  of  the  things  which  take 
place    now ;    accordingly   to    have    contemplated 
human  life  for  forty  years  is  the  same  as  to  have 
contemplated    it    for    ten   thousand   years.     For 
what  more  wilt  thou  see  ? 

50.  That  which  has  grown  from  the  earth  to  the 

earth, 
But  that  which  has  sprung  from  heavenly 

seed, 

Back  to  the  heavenly  realms  returns.1 
This  is  either  a  dissolution  of  the  mutual  invo- 
lution of  the  atoms,  or  a  similar  dispersion  of  the 
unsentient  elements. 

51.  With  food  and  drinks  and  cunning  magic  arts 
Turning  the  channel's  course  to  'scape  from 

death.2 

The  breeze  which  heaven  has  sent 
We   must   endure,  and   toil  without   com- 
plaining. 

1  From  the  Chrysippus  of  Euripides. 

2  The  first  two  lines  are  from  the  Supplices  of  Euripides, 
v.  1110. 


MAE C US  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  195 

52.  Another  may  be  more  expert  in  casting  his 
opponent;  but  he   is  not  more  social,  nor  more 
modest,  nor  better   disciplined  to  meet  all  that  J 
happens,  nor  more  considerate  with  respect  to  the 
faults  of  his  neighbors. 

53.  Where  any  work  can  be  done  conformably 
to  the  reason  which  is  common  to  gods  and  men, 
there  we  have  nothing  to  fear ;  for  where  we  are 
able  to  get  profit  by  means  of  the  activity  which  is 
successful  and  proceeds  according  to  our  constitu- 
tion, there  no  harm  is  to  be  suspected. 

54.  Everywhere  and  at  all  times  it  is  in  thy 
power  piously  to  acquiesce   in   thy  present  con- 
dition, and  to  behave  justly  to  those  who  are  about 
thee,  and  to   exert   thy  skill   upon   thy   present 
thoughts,  that  nothing  shall  steal  into  them  with- 
out being  well  examined. 

55.  Do  not  look  around  thee  to  discover  other 
men's  ruling  principles,  but  look  straight  to  this, 
to  what  nature   leads  thee,   both  the   universal 
nature  through  the  things  which  happen  to  thee, 
and  thy  own  nature  through  the  acts  which  must 
be  done  by  thee.     But  every  being  ought  to  do 
that  which  is  according  to  its  constitution ;  and  all 
other  things  have  been  constituted  for  the  sake  of 
rational  beings,  just  as  among  irrational  things  the 
inferior  for   the   sake   of    the   superior,   but  the 
rational  for  the  sake  of  one  another. 

The  prime  principle  then  in  man's  constitution 


196  MEDITATIONS. 

is  the  social.  And  the  second  is  not  to  yield 
to  the  persuasions  of  the  body,  —  for  it  is  the 
peculiar  office  of  the  rational  and  intelligent 
motion  to  circumscribe  itself,  and  never  to  be 
overpowered  either  by  the  motion  of  the  senses  or 
of  the  appetites,  for  both  &re  animal ;  but  the  in- 
telligent motion  claims  superiority,  and  does  not 
permit  itself  to  be  overpowered  by  the  others.  And 
with  good  reason,  for  it  is  formed  by  nature  to 
use  all  of  them.  The  third  thing  in  the  rational 
constitution  is  freedom  from  error  and  from  decep- 
tion. Let  then  the  ruling  principle  holding  fast 
to  these  things  go  straight  on,  and  it  has  what  is 
its  own. 

56.  Consider  thyself  to  be  dead,  and  to  have 
completed  thy  life  up  to  the  present  time;  and 
live   according  to  nature  the  remainder  which  is 
allowed  thee. 

57.  Love  that  only  which  happens  to  thee  and 
is  spun  with  the  thread  of  thy  destiny.     For  what 
is  more  suitable  ? 

58.  In  everything  which  happens  keep  before 
thy  eyes  those  to  whom  the  same  things  happened, 
and  how  they  were  vexed,  and  treated  them  as 
strange   things,  and  found  fault  with  them :  and 
now  where  are  they  ?     Nowhere.     Why  then  dost 
thou   too    choose   to   act  in   the   same  way;  and 
why  dost  thou  not  leave  these  agitations  which  are 
foreign   to  nature  to   those  who  cause  them  and 


MAECUS  AUKELIUS  ANTONINUS.          197 

those  who  are  moved  by  them ;  and  why  art  thou 
not  altogether  intent  upon  the  right  way  of  mak- 
ing use  of  the  things  which  happen  to  thee  ?  For 
then  thou  wilt  use  them  well,  and  they  will  be  a 
material  for  thee  [to  work  on].  Only  attend  to 
thyself,  and  resolve  to  be  a  good  man  in  every  act 
which  thou  doest :  and  remember  .  .  . 1 

59.  Look   within.     Within   is   the   fountain   of 
good,  and  it  will  ever  bubble  up,  if  thou  wilt  ever 
dig. 

60.  The  body  ought  to  be  compact,  and  to  show 
no  irregularity  either  in  motion  or  attitude.     For 
what  the  mind  shows  in  the  face  by  maintaining 
in  it  the  expression  of  intelligence  and  propriety, 
that  ought  to  be  required  also  in  the  whole  body. 
But  all  these  things  should  be  observed  without 
affectation. 

61.  The  art  of  life  is  more  like  the  wrestler's  art 
than  the  dancer's,  in  respect  of  this,  that  it  should 
stand  ready  and  firm  to  meet  onsets  which  are 
sudden  and  unexpected. 

62.  Constantly  observe  who  those  are  whose  ap- 
probation thou  wishest  to  have,  and  what  ruling 
principles    they    possess.     For    then    thou    wilt 
neither  blame  those  who  offend  involuntarily,  nor 

1  This  section  is  obscure,  and  the  conclusion  is  so  corrupt 
that  it  is  impossible  to  give  any  probable  meaning  to  it.  It 
is  better  to  leave  it  as  it  is  than  to  patch  it  up,  as  some 
critics  and  translators  have  done. 


198  MEDITATIONS. 

wilt  thou  want  their  approbation,  if  thou  lookest 
to  the  sources  of  their  opinions  and  appetites. 

63.  Every  soul,  the  philosopher  says,  is  invol- 
untarily deprived  of  truth;  consequently  in  the 
same  way  it  is  deprived  of  justice  and  temper- 
ance   and    benevolence    and   everything    of    the 
kind.      It   is    most   necessary  to   bear  this   con- 
stantly in  mind,  for  thus  thou  wilt  be  more  gentle 
towards  all. 

64.  In  every  pain  let  this  thought  be  present, 
that  there  is  no  dishonor  in  it,  nor  does  it  make 
the  governing  intelligence  worse,  for  it  does  not 
damage  the  intelligence  either  so  far  as  the  intelli- 
gence is  rational  l  or  so  far  as  it  is  social.     Indeed 
in  the  case  of  most  pains  let  this  remark  of  Epi- 
curus aid  thee,  that  pain  is  neither  intolerable  nor 
everlasting,  if  thou  bearest  in  mind  that  it  has  its 
limits,  and  if  thou  addest  nothing  to  it  in  imagi- 
nation :  and  remember  this  too,  that  we  do  not 
perceive  that  many  things  which  are  disagreeable 
to  us  are  the  same  as  pain,  such  as  excessive  drow- 
siness, and  the  being  scorched  by  heat,  and  the 
having  no  appetite.     When  then  thou  art  discon- 
tented about  any  of  these  things,  say  to  thyself 
that  thou  art  yielding  to  pain. 


1  The  text  has  vyiK^,  which  it  has  been  proposed  to  alter  to 
\oyiK-/i,  and  this  change  is  necessary.  We  shall  then  have  in 
this  section  Xo7tK^  and  KoivuvtKJ  associated,  as  we  have  in 
s.  68  \oyiKiri  and  iroXm/nJ,  and  in  s.  72. 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  199 

65.  Take  care  not  to  feel  towards  the  inhuman 
as  they  feel  towards  men.1 

66.  How   do   we   know   if    Telauges   was    not 
superior  in  character  to  Socrates  ?     For  it  is  not 
enough  that  Socrates  died  a  more  noble  death,  and 
disputed  more    skilfully   with   the   sophists,   and 
passed  the  night  in  the  cold  with  more  endurance, 
and   that  when   he  was   bid   to   arrest   Leon  2  of 
Salamis,  he  considered  it  more  noble  to  refuse,  and 
that    he   walked     in    a    swaggering   way   in   the 
streets3  —  though   as  to  this  fact  one  may  have 
great  doubts  if  it  was  true.     But  we  ought  to  in- 
quire what   kind   of  a  soul  it  was  that  Socrates 
possessed,  and  if  he  was  able  to  be  content  with 
being  just   towards   men   and  pious  towards  the 
gods,   neither    idly   vexed   on   account   of   men's 
villany,  nor  yet  making  himself  a  slave  to  any 
man's  ignorance,  nor  receiving  as  strange  anything 
that  fell  to  his  share  out  of  the  universal,  nor  en- 
during it  as  intolerable,  nor  allowing  his  under- 
standing to   sympathize  with   the   affects  of  the 
miserable  flesh. 

67.  Nature   has   not  so  mingled  f    [the  intelli- 


1  I  have  followed  Gataker's  conjecture  of 
of  the  MSS.  reading  ol  Avepw-jroi. 

2  Leon  of  Salamis.     See  Plato,  Epist.  7;   Apolog.  c.  20: 
Epictetus,  iv.  1,  160;  iv.  7,  3ol 

3  Aristophan.      Nub.     362.     8ri  /3pei>0i*i  r  tv  raiaiv  65ots  Kal  TW 

irapo/3dX\ct. 


200  MEDITATIONS. 

gence]  with  the  composition  of  the  body,  as  not  to 
have  allowed  thee  the  power  of  circumscribing  thy- 
self and  of  bringing  under  subjection  to  thyself  all 
that  is  thy  own  ;  for  it  is  very  possible  to  be  a 
divine  man  and  to  be  recognized  as  such  by  no 
one.  Always  bear  this  in  mind ;  and  another 
thing  too,  that  very  little  indeed  is  necessary  for 
living  a  happy  life.  And  because  thou  hast  des- 
paired of  becoming  a  dialectician  arid  skilled  in  the 
knowledge  of  nature,  do  not  for  this  reason  re- 
nounce the  hope  of  being  both  free  and  modest, 
and  social  and  obedient  to  God. 

68.  It  is  in  thy  power  to  live  free  from  all  com- 
pulsion in  the  greatest  tranquillity  of  mind,  even 
if  all  the  world  cry  out  against  thee  as  much  as 
they  choose,  and  even  if  wild  beasts  tear  in  pieces 
the  members  of  this  kneaded  matter  which  has 
grown  around  thee.  For  what  hinders  the  mind 
in  the  midst  of  all  this  from  maintaining  itself  in 
tranquillity  and  in  a  just  judgment  of  all  surround- 
ing things  and  in  a  ready  use  of  the  objects  which 
are  presented  to  it,  so  that  the  judgment  may  say 
to  the  thing  which  falls  under  its  observation  :  This 
thou  art  in  substance  [reality],  though  in  men's 
opinion  thou  mayest  appear  to  be  of  a  different 
kind;  and  the  use  shall  say  to  that  which  falls 
under  the  hand:  Thou  art  the  thing  that  I  was 
seeking;  for  to  me  that  which  presents  itself  is 
always  a  material  for  virtue  both  rational  and 


MARCUS  AVRELIUS  ANTONINUS.          201 

political,  and  in  a  word,  for  the  exercise  of  art, 
which  belongs  to  man  or  God.  For  everything 
which  happens  has  a  relationship  either  to  God  or 
man,  and  is  neither  new  nor  difficult  to  handle,  but 
usual  and  apt  matter  to  work  on. 

69.  The  perfection  of  moral  character  consists 
in  this,  in  passing  every  day  as  the  last,  and  in 
being  neither  violently  excited  nor  torpid  nor  play- 
ing the  hypocrite. 

70.  The  gods  who  are  immortal  are  not  vexed 
because  during  so  .long  a  time  they  must  tolerate 
continually  men  such  as  they  are  and  so  many  of 
them  bad ;  and  besides  this,  they  also   take  care 
of  them  in  all  ways.     But  thou,  who  art  destined 
to  end  so  soon,  art  thou  wearied  of  enduring  the 
bad,  and  this  too  when  thou  art  one  of  them  ? 

71.  It  is  a  ridiculous  thing  for  a  man  not  to  fly 
from  his  own  badness,  which  is  indeed  possible, 
but  to  fly  from  other  men's  badness,  which  is  im- 
possible. 

72.  Whatever  the  rational  and  political  [social] 
faculty  finds  to  be  neither  intelligent  nor  social,  it 
properly  judges  to  be  inferior  to  itself. 

73.  When  thou  hast  done  a  good  act  and  an- 
other has  received  it,  why  dost  thou  still  look  for  a      ./ 
third   thing  besides  these,  as  fools  do,  either  to 
have  the  reputation  of  having  done  a  good  act  or 

to. obtain  a  return? 

74.  No  man  is  tired  of  receiving  what  is  useful. 


MEDITATIONS. 

But  it  is  useful  to  act  according  to  nature.  Do 
not  then  be  tired  of  receiving  what  is  useful  by 
doing  it  to  others. 

75.  The  nature  of  the  All  moved  to  make  the 
universe.  But  now  either  everything  that  takes 
place  comes  by  way  of  consequence  or  [contin- 
uity] ;  or  even  the  chief  things  towards  which  the 
ruling  power  of  the  universe  directs  its  own  move- 
ment are  governed  by  no  rational  principle.  If 
this  is  remembered,  it  will  make  thee  more  tran- 
quil in  many  things  (vi.  44 ;  ix.  28). l 

1  It  is  not  easy  to  understand  this  section.  It  has  been 
suggested  that  there  is  some  error  in  7}  a\6yi<rTa,  &c.  Some 
of  the  translators  have  made  nothing  of  the  passage,  and 
they  have  somewhat  perverted  the  words.  The  first  proposi- 
tion is,  that  the  universe  was  made  by  some  sufficient  power. 
A  beginning  of  the  universe  is  assumed,  and  a  power  which 
framed  an  order.  The  next  question  is,  How  are  things  pro- 
duced now?  Or,  in  other  words,  by  what  power  do  forms 
appear  in  continuous  succession?  The  answer,  according  to 
Antoninus,  may  be  this  :  It  is  by  virtue  of  the  original  con- 
stitution of  things  that  all  change  and  succession  have  been 
effected  and  are  effected.  And  this  is  intelligible  in  a  sense, 
if  we  admit  that  the  universe  is  always  one  and  the  same,  a 
continuity  of  identity;  as  much  one  and  the  same,  as  man  is 
one  and  the  same, —  which  he  believes  himself 'to  be,  though 
he  also  believes  and  cannot  help  believing  that  both  in  his 
body  and  in  his  thoughts  there  is  change  and  succession. 
There  is  no  real  discontinuity  then  in  the  universe ;  and  if 
we  say  that  there  was  an  order  framed  in  the  beginning  and 
that  thet  things  which  are  now  produced  are  a  consequence 
of  a  previous  arrangement,  we  speak  of  things  as  we  are 
compelled  to  view  them,  as  forming  a  series  or  succession ; 


MAE C  US  A  UBELIUS  ANTONINUS.         208 

just  as  we  speak  of  the  changes  in  our  own  bodies  and  the 
sequence  of  our  own  thoughts.  But  as  there  are  no  intervals, 
not  even  intervals  infinitely  small,  between  any  two  supposed 
states  of  any  one  thing,  so  there  are  no  intervals,  not  even 
infinitely  small,  between  what  we  call  one  thing  and  any 
other  thing  which  we  speak  of  as  immediately  preceding  or 
following  it.  What  we  call  time  is  an  idea  derived  from  our 
notion  of  a  succession  of  things  or  events,  an  idea  which  is 
a  part  of  our  constitution,  but  not  an  idea  which  we  can  sup- 
pose to  belong  to  an  infinite  intelligence  and  power.  The 
conclusion  then  is  certain  that  the  present  and  the  past,  the 
production  of  present  things  and  the  supposed  original 
order,  out  of  which  we  say  that  present  things  now  come, 
are  one ;  and  the  present  productive  power  and  the  so-called 
past  arrangement  are  only  different  names  for  one  thing.  I 
suppose  then  that  Antoninus  wrote  here  as  people  sometimes 
talk  now,  and  that  his  real  meaning  is  not  exactly  expressed 
by  his  words.  There  are  certainly  other  passages  from  which 
I  think  that  we  may  collect  that  he  had  notions  of  produc- 
tion something  like  what  I  have  expressed. 

We  now  come  to  the  alternative :  "or  even  the  chief 
things  .  .  .  principle."  I  do  not  exactly  know  what  he 
means  by  TO.  KvpidraTa,  "the  chief,"  or  "the  most  excellent," 
or  whatever  it  is.  But  as  he  speaks  elsewhere  of  inferior 
and  superior  things,  and  of  the  inferior  being  for  the  use  of 
the  superior,  and  of  rational  beings  being  the  highest,  he 
may  here  mean  rational  beings.  He  also  in  this  alternative 
assumes  a  governing  power  of  the  universe,  and  that  it  acts 
by  directing  its  power  towards  these  chief  objects,  or 
making  its  special,  proper  motion  towards  them.  And  here 
he  uses  the  noun  (oppty  "  movement,"  which  contains  the 
same  notion  as  the  verb  (w/j/urjo-e)  "moved,"  which  he  used 
at  the  beginning  of  the  paragraph,  when  he  was  speaking  of 
the  making  of  the  universe.  If  we  do  not  accept  the  first 
hypothesis,  he  says,  we  must  take  the  conclusion  of  the 
second,  that  the  "  chief  things  towards  which  the  ruling 


204  MEDITATIONS. 

power  of  the  universe  directs  its  own  movement  are 
governed  by  no  rational  principle."  The  meaning  then  is,  if 
there  is  a  meaning  in  it,  that  though  there  is  a  governing 
power  which  strives  to  give  effect  to  its  efforts,  we  must  con- 
clude that  there  is  no  rational  direction  of  anything,  if  the 
power  which  first  made  the  universe  does  not  in  some  way 
govern  it  still.  Besides,  if  we  assume  that  anything  is  now 
produced  or  now  exists  without  the  action  of  the  supreme 
intelligence,  and  yet  that  this  intelligence  makes  an  effort  to 
act,  we  obtain  a  conclusion  which  cannot  be  reconciled  with 
the  nature  of  a  supreme  power,  whose  existence  Antoninus 
always  assumes.  The  tranquillity  that  a  man  may  gain  from 
these  reflections  must  result  from  his  rejecting  the  second 
hypothesis,  and  accepting  the  first, — whatever  may  be  the 
exact  sense  in  which  the  emperor  understood  the  first.  Or, 
as  he  says  elsewhere,  if  there  is  no  Providence  which  governs 
the  world,  man  has  at  least  the  power  of  governing  himself 
according  to  the  constitution  of  his  nature ;  and  so  he  may 
be  tranquil,  if  he  does  the  best  that  he  can. 

If  there  is  no  error  in  the  passage,  it  is  worth  the  labor  to 
discover  the  writer's  exact  meaning  —for  I  think  that  he  had 
a  meaning,  though  people  may  not  agree  what  it  was.  (Com- 
pare ix.  28.)  If  I  have  rightly  explained  the  emperor's 
meaning  in  this  and  other  passages,  he  has  touched  the  solu- 
tion of  a  great  question. 


VIII. 

1.  THIS  reflection  also  tends  to  the  removal  of  the 
desire  of  empty  fame,  that  it  is  no  longer  in  thy 
power  to  have  lived  the  whole  of  thy  life,  or  at 
least  thy  life  from  thy  youth  upwards,  like  a  phi- 
losopher ;  but  both  to  many  others  and  to  thyself 
it  is  plain  that  thou  art  far  from  philosophy.  Thou 
hast  fallen  into  disorder  then,  so  that  it  is  no 
longer  easy  for  thee  to  get  the  reputation  of  a  phi- 
losopher ;  and  thy  plan  of  life  also  opposes  it.  If 
then  thou  hast  truly  seen  where  the  matter  lies, 
throw  away  the  thought,  How  thou  shalt  seem 
[to  others],  and  be  content  if  thou  shalt  live  the 
rest  of  thy  life  in  such  wise  as  thy  nature  wills. 
Observe  then  what  it  wills,  and  let  nothing  else 
distract  thee ;  for  thou  hast  had  experience  of  many 
wanderings  without  having  found  happiness  any- 
where, —  not  in  syllogisms,  nor  in  wealth,  nor  in 
reputation,  nor  in  enjoyment,  nor  anywhere. 
Where  is  it  then?  In  doing  what  man's  nature 
requires.  How  then  shall  a  man  do  this  ?  If  he 
has  principles  from  which  come  his  affects  and  his 


206  MEDITATIONS. 

acts.  What  principles  ?  Those  which  relate  to 
good  and  bad :  the  belief  that  there  is  nothing  good 
for  man  which  does  not  make  him  just,  temperate, 
manly,  free  ;  and  that  there  is  nothing  bad  which 
does  not  do  the  contrary  to  what  has  been 
mentioned. 

2.  On  the  occasion  of  every  act  ask  thyself,  How 
is  this  with  respect  to  me  ?     Shall  I  repent  of  it  ? 
A   little   time   and  I  am   dead,  and   all  is   gone. 
What  more  do  I  seek,  if  what  I  am  now  doing  is 
the    work  of   an    intelligent  living   being,  and  a 
social  being,  and  one  who  is  under  the  same  law 
with  God? 

3.  Alexander  and  Caius  l  and  Pompeius,  what 
are  they  in  comparison  with  Diogenes  and  Hera- 
clitus  and  Socrates?     For  they  were  acquainted 
with  things,  and  their  causes  [forms],  and  their 
matter,  and  the  ruling  principles  of  these  men  were 
the  same  [or  conformable  to  their  pursuits].     But 
as  to  the  others,  how  many  things  had  they  to  care 
for,  and  to  how  many  things  were  they  slaves ! 

4.  [Consider]  that  men  will  do  the  same  things 
nevertheless,  even  though  thou  shouldst  burst. 

5.  This  is  the  chief  thing :    Be  not  perturbed, 
for  all  things  are  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
universal ;  and  in  a  little  time  thou  wilt  be  nobody 
and  nowhere,  like  Hadrianus  and  Augustus.     In 

1  Caius  is  C.  Julius  Caesar,  the  dictator ;  and  Pompeius  is 
Cn.  Pompeius,  named  Magnus. 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.          207 

the  next  place,  having  fixed  thy  eyes  steadily  on 
thy  business  look  at  it,  and  at  the  same  time  re- 
membering that  it  is  thy  duty  to  be  a  good  man, 
and  what  man's  nature  demands,  do  that  without 
turning  aside ;  and  speak  as  it  seems  to  thee  most 
just,  only  let  it  be  with  a  good  disposition  and  with 
modesty  and  without  hypocrisy. 

6.  The  nature  of  the  universal  has  this  work  to 
do,  —  to  remove  to  that  place  the  things  which  are 
in  this,  to  change  them,  to  take  them  away  hence, 
and  to  carry  them  there.  /  All  things  are  change, 
yet  we  need  not  fear  anything  new.     All  things 
are  familiar  [to  us]  ;  but  the  distribution  of  them 
still  remains  the  same. 

7.  Every  nature  is  contented  with  itself  when  it 
goes  on  its  way  well ;  and  a  rational  nature  goes 
on  its  way  well  when  in  its  thoughts  it  assents  to 
nothing  false  or  uncertain,  and  when  it  directs  its 
movements  to  social  acts  only,  and  when  it  confines 
its  desires  and  aversions  to  the  things  which  are 
in  its  power,  arid  when  it  is  satisfied  with  every- 
thing that  is  assigned  to  it  by  the  common  nature. 
For  of  this  common  nature  every  particular  nature 
is  a  part,  as  the  nature  of  the  leaf  is  a  part  of  the 
nature  of  the  plant ;  except  that  in  the  plant  the 
nature  of  the  leaf  is  part  of  a  nature  which  has  not 
perception  or  reason,  and  is  subject  to  be  impeded; 
but  the  nature  of  man  is  part  of  a  nature  which  is 
not  subject  to  impediments,  and  is  intelligent  and 


^vC 


208  MEDITATIONS. 

just,  since  it  gives  to  everything  in  equal  portions 
and  according  to  its  worth,  times,  substance,  cause 
[form],  activity,  and  incident.  But  examine,  not 
to  discover  that  any  one  thing  compared  with  any 
other  single  thing  is  equal  in  all  respects,  but  by 
taking  all  the  parts  together  of  one  thing  and  com- 
paring them  with  all  the  parts  together  of  another. 

8.  Thou   hast  not  leisure   [or  ability]  to   read. 
But  thou  hast  leisure  [or  ability]  to  check  arro- 
gance :  thou  hast  leisure  to  be  superior  to  pleasure 
and  pain  :  thou  hast  leisure  to  be  superior  to  love 
of  fame,  and  not  to  be  vexed  at  stupid  and  ungrate- 
ful people,  nay  even  to  care  for  them. 

9.  Let  no  man  any  longer  hear  thee  finding  fault 
with  the  court  life  or  with  thy  own  (v.  16). 

10.  Repentance  is  a  kind  of  self-reproof  for  hav- 
ing neglected  something  useful ;  but  that  which  is 
good  must  be  something  useful,  and  the  perfect 
good  man  should  look  after  it.     But  no  such  man 
would  ever  repent  of  having  refused  any  sensual 
pleasure.     Pleasure   then    is    neither    good    nor 
useful. 

11.  This  thing,  what  is  it  in  itself,  in  its  own 
constitution?  What  is  its  substance  and  material? 
And  what  its  casual  nature  [or  form]  ?    And  what 
is  it  doing  in  the  world  ?     And  how  long  does  it 
subsist  ? 

12.  When  thou  risest  from  sleep  with  reluctance, 
remember  that  it  is  according  to  thy  constitution 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  209 

and  according  to  human  nature  to  perform  social 
acts,  but  sleeping  is  common  also  to  irrational 
animals.  But  that  which  is  according  to  each  in- 
dividual's nature  is  also  more  peculiarly  its  own, 
and  more  suitable  to  its  nature,  and  indeed  also 
more  agreeable  (v.  1). 

13.  Constantly,  and,  if  it  be   possible, 'on   the 
occasion  of  every  impression  on  the  soul,  apply  to 
it  the  principles  of  Physic,  of  Ethic,  and  of  Dialec- 
tic. 

14.  Whatever  man  thou  meetest  with,  immedi- 
ately say  to  thyself:  What  opinions  has  this  man 
about    good   and    bad  ?     For  if  with  respect  to 
pleasure  and  pain  and  the  causes  of  each,  and  with 
respect  to  fame  and  ignominy,  death  and  life,  he 
has  such  and  such  opinions,  it  will  seem  nothing 
wonderful  or  strange  to  me  if  he  does  such  and 
such  things ;  and  I  shall  bear  in  mind  that  he  is 
compelled  to  do  so.1 

15.  Remember  that  as  it  is  a  shame  to  be  sur- 
prised if  the  fig-tree  produces  figs,  so  it  is  to  be 
surprised  if  the  world  produces   such  and  such    / 
things  of  which  it  is  productive  ;  and  for  the  phy- 
sician and  the  helmsman  it  is  a  shame  to  be  sur- 
prised if  a  man  has  a  fever,  or  if  the  wind  is  unfav- 
orable. 

16.  Remember  that  to  change  thy  opinion  and 

1  Antoninus  v.  16.     Thucydides,  iii.  10 ;  t*  yfy  T<?  5ia\X4<r- 
roiTi  TTJS  yvufJLTjs  Kal  al  Siafiopai  rdv  Zpywv  KaOlffravrcu. 


, 
\J 


210  MEDITATIONS. 

to  follow  him  who  corrects  thy  error  is  as  consis- 
tent with  freedom  as  it  is  to  persist  in  thy  error. 
For  it  is  thy  own,  the  activity  which  is  exerted 
according  to  thy  own  movement  and  judgment, 
and  indeed  according  to  thy  own  understanding 
too. 

17.  If  a  thing  is  in  thy  own  power,  why  dost 
thou  do  it  ?    but  if  it  is  in  the  power  of  another, 
whom    dost  thou  blame,  —  the  atoms  [chance]  or 
the  gods  ?     Both  are  foolish.     Thou  must  blame 
nobody.     For  if  thou  canst,  correct  [that  which  is 
the  cause]  ;  but  if  thou  canst  not  do  this,  correct 
at  least  the  thing  itself;  but  if  thou  canst  not  do 
even   this,  of  what  use  is  it  to  thee  to  find  fault  ? 
for  nothing  should  be  done  without  a  purpose. 

18.  That  which  has  ^died  falls  not  out  of  the 
universe.     If  it  stays  here,  it  also  changes  here, 
and  is  dissolved  into  its  proper  parts,  which  are 
elements   of    the   universe   and  of  thyself.     And 
these  too  change,  and  they  murmur  not. 

19.  Everything  exists  for  some  end,  —  a  horse, 
a  vine.     Why  dost  thou  wonder  ?     Even  the  sun 
will  say,  I  am  for  some  purpose,  and  the  rest  of 
the  gods  will  say  the  same.     For  what  purpose 
then  art  thou,  —  to  enjoy  pleasure  ?     See  if  com- 
mon sense  allows  this. 

20.  Nature  has  had  regard  in  everything  no  less 
to  the  end  than  to  the  beginning  and  the  contin- 
uance, just  like  the  man  who  throws  up  a  ball. 


MAKCUS  AUSELIUS  ANTONINUS.  211 

What  good  is  it  then  for  the  ball  to  be  thrown  up, 
or  harm  for  it  to   come  down,  or  even  to  have  J 
fallen  ?  and  what  good  is  it  to  the  bubble  while  it 
holds  together,  or  what  harm  when  it  is  burst? 
The  same  may  be  said  of  a  light  also. 

21.  Turn  it  [the  body]  inside  out,  and  see  what 
kind  of  thing  it  is ;  and  when  it  has  grown  old, 
what  kind  of   thing  it  becomes,  and  when  it  is 
diseased. 

Short  lived  are  both  the  praiser  and  the  praised, 
and  the  rememberer  and  the  remembered :  and  all       / 
this  in  a  nook  of  this  part  of  the  world ;  and  not    J 
even  here  do  all  agree,  no,  not  any  one  with  him- 
self:  and  the  whole  earth  too  is  a  point. 

22.  Attend  to  the  matter  which  is  before  thee,        / 
whether  it  is  an  opinion  or  an  act  or  a  word. 

Thou  sufferest  this  justly :  for  thou  choosest 
rather  to  become  good  to-morrow  than  to  be  good 
to-day. 

23.  Am  I  doing  anything  ?     I  do  it  with  refer- 
ence  to   the   good   of  mankind.     Does  anything 
happen  to  me  ?     I  receive  it  and  refer  it  to  the 
'gods,  and  the  source  of  all  things,  from  which  all 
that  happens  is  derived. 

24.  Such  as  bathing  appears  to  thee, — oil,  sweat, 
dirt,  filthy  water,   all   things   disgusting,  —  so   is     \J 
every  part  of  life  and  everything. 

25.  Lucilla    saw  Verus   die,  and   then    Lucilla 
died.     Secunda   saw   Maximus   die,  and  then  Se-     V 


V 


212  MEDITATIONS. 

cunda  died.  Epitynchanus  saw  Diotimus  die,  and 
then  Epitynchanus  died.  Antoninus  saw  Faus- 
tina die,  and  then  Antoninus  died.  Such  is  every- 
thing. Celer  saw  Hadrianus  die,  and  then  Celer 
died.  And  those  sharp-witted  men,  either  seers  or 
men  inflated  with  pride,  where  are  they,  —  for 
instance  the  sharp-witted  men,  Charax  and  Deme- 
trius the  Platonist  and  Eudaemon,  and  any  one 
else  like  them?  All  ephemeral,  dead  long  ago. 
Some  indeed  have  not  been  remembered  even  for 
a  short  time,  and  others  have  become  the  heroes  of 
fables,  and  again  others  have  disappeared  even 
from  fables.  Remember  this  then,  that  this  little 
compound,  thyself,  must  either  be  dissolved,  or 
thy  poor  breath  must  be  extinguished,  or  be  re- 
moved and  placed  elsewhere. 

26.  It  is  satisfaction  to  a  man  to  do  the  proper 
works  of  a  man.  Now  it  is  a  proper  work  of  a  man 
to  be  benevolent  to  his  own  kind,  to  despise  the 
movement  of  the  senses,  to  form  a  just  judgment 
of  plausible  appearances,  and  to  take  a  survey  of 
the  nature  of  the  universe  and  of  the  things  which 
happen  in  it. 

27.  There  are  three  relations  [betweep  thee  and 
other  things]  :  the  one  to  the  body  l  which  sur- 

1  The  text  has  atriov,  which  in  Antoninus  means  "  form," 
"  formal."  Accordingly  Schultz  recommends  either  Valken- 
aer's  emendation  dyyciov,  "body,"  or  Corais'  ffupdriov.  Com- 
pare xii.  13 ;  x.  38. 


MAfiCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  213 

rounds  thee ;  the  second  to  the  divine  cause  from 
which  all  things  come  to  all ;  and  the  third  to 
those  who  live  with  thee. 

28.  Pain  is  either  an  evil  to  the  body  —  then  let 
the  body  say  what  it  thinks  of  it  —  or  to  the  soul ; 
but  it  is  in  the  power  of  the  soul  to  maintain  its 
own  serenity  and  tranquillity,  and  not  to  think 
that   pain   is  an  evil.     For  every  judgment  and 
movement  and  desire  and  aversion  is  within,  and 
no  evil  ascends  so  high. 

29.  Wipe  out  thy  imaginations  by  often  saying 
to  thyself:  Now  it  is  in  my  power  to  let  no  bad- 
ness be  in  this  soul,  nor  desire,  nor  any  perturba- 
tion at  all ;  but  looking  at  all  things  I  see  what  is 
their  nature,  and  I  use  each  according  to  its  value. 
—  Remember   this   power  which  thou   hast   from 
nature. 

30.  Speak  both  in  the  senate  and  to  every  man, 
whoever  he  may  be,  appropriately,  not  with  any 
affectation  :  use  plain  discourse. 

31.  Augustus'   court,  wife,   daughter,  descend- 
ants,   ancestors,    sister,    Agrippa,   kinsmen,   inti- 
mates, friends,  Areius,1  Maecenas,  physicians,  and 
sacrificing   priests,  —  the   whole     court    is    dead. 
Then  turn  to  the  rest,  not  considering  the  death 
of  a  single  man   [but  of  a  whole  race],  as  of  the 

1  Areius  ("Apeios)  was  a  philosopher,  who  was  intimate 
with  Augustus ;  Sueton.  Augustus,  c.  89 ;  Plutarch,  Antoni- 
nus, 80;  Dion  Cassius,  51,  c.  16. 


214  MEDITATIONS. 

Pompeii;  and  that  which  is  inscribed  on  the 
tomb,  —  The  last  of  his  race.  Then  consider  what 
trouble  those  before  them  have  had  that  they 
might  leave  a  successor ;  and  then,  that  of  neces- 
sity some  one  must  be  the  last.  Again,  here  con- 
sider the  death  of  a  whole  race. 

32.  It  is  thy  duty  to  order  thy  life  well  in  every 
single  act ;  and  if  every  act  does  its  duty  as  far  as 
is   possible,  be    content;  and   no   one   is   able    to 
hinder  thee  so  that  each  act  shall  not  do  its  duty. 
—  But  something  external  will  stand  in  the  way. 
Nothing  will  stand  in  the  way  of  thy  acting  justly 
and     soberly   and    considerately.  —  But    perhaps 
some  other  active  power  will  be  hindered.  —  Well, 
but  by  acquiescing  in  the  hindrance  and  by  being 
content   to   transfer  thy  efforts  to  that  which  is 
allowed,  another  opportunity  of  action  is  immedi- 
ately put  before  thee  in  place  of  that  which  was 
hindered,  and  one  which  will  adapt  itself  to  this 
ordering  of  which  we  are  speaking. 

33.  Receive  [wealth  or  prosperity]  without  arro- 
gance ;  and  be  ready  to  let  it  go. 

34.  If  thou  didst  ever  see  a  hand  cut  off,  or  a 
foot,  or  a  head,  lying  anywhere  apart  from  the  rest 
of  the  body,  such  does  a  man  make  himself,  as  far 
as  he  can,  who  is  not  content  with  what  happens, 
and  separates  himself  from  others*  or  does  any- 
thing unsocial.     Suppose  that  thou  hast  detached 
thyself  from  the  natural  unity,  —  for  thou  wast 


MARCUS  AUKELIUS  ANTONINUS.         215 

made  by  nature  a  part,  but  now  thou  hast  cut  thy- 
self off,  —  yet  here  there  is  this  beautiful  provi- 
sion, that  it  is  in  thy  power  again  to  unite  thyself. 
God  has  allowed  this  to  no  other  part,  after  it  has 
been  separated  and  cut  asunder,  to  come  together 
again.  But  consider  the  kindness  by  which  he 
has  distinguished  man,  for  he  has  put  it  in  his 
power  not  to  be  separated  at  all  from  the  uni- 
versal ;  and  when  he  has  been  separated,  he  has 
allowed  him  to  return  and  to  be  united  and  to  re- 
sume his  place  as  a  part. 

35.  As  the  nature  of  the  universal  has  given  to     \J 
every  rational  being  all  the  other  powers  that  it 
has,f  so  we  have  received  from  it  this  power  also. 
For  as  the  universal  nature  converts  and  fixes  in 

its  predestined  place  everything  which  stands  in 
the  way  and  opposes  it,  and  makes  such  things  a 
part  of  itself,  so  also  the  rational  animal  is  able  to 
make  every  hindrance  its  own  material,  and  to  use 
it  for  such  purposes  as  it  may  have  designed.1 

36.  Do  not  disturb  thyself  by  thinking  of  the 
whole  of  thy  life.     Let  not  thy  thoughts  at  once 
embrace    all    the   various    troubles   which    thou       / 
mayest  expect  to  befall  thee :  but  on  every  occa- 
sion ask  thyself,  What  is  there  in  this  which  is  in- 

1  The  text  is  corrupt  at  the  beginning  of  the  paragraph, 
but  the  meaning  will  appear  if  the  second  \oyucuv  is  changed 
into  8\<av:  though  this  change  alone  will  not  establish  the 
completeness  of  the  text. 


216  MEDITATIONS. 

tolerable  and  past  bearing?  for  thou  wilt  be 
ashamed  to  confess.  In  the  next  place  remember 
that  neither  the  future  nor  the  past  pains  thee,  but 
only  the  present.  But  this  is  reduced  to  a  very  lit- 
tle, if  thou  only  circumscribest  it,  and  chidest  thy 
mind  if  it  is  unable  to  hold  out  against  even  this. 

37.  Does  Panthea  or  Pergamus  now  sit  by  the 
tomb  of  Verus  ? l     Does  Chaurias  or  Diotimus  sit 
by  the  tomb  of  Hadrianus  ?     That  would  be  ridic- 
ulous.    Well,  suppose  they  did  sit  there,  would 
the  dead  be  conscious  of  it  ?  and  if  the  dead  were 
conscious,  would   they   be   pleased  ?  and  if  they 
were  pleased,  would  that  make  them  immortal? 
Was   it   not  in   the  order  of   destiny  that  these 
persons  too  should  first  become  old  women  and 
old  men  and  then  die  ?     What  then  would  those 
do  after  these  were  dead  ?     All  this  is  foul  smell 
and  blood  in  a  bag. 

38.  If  thou   canst   see   sharp,   look   and  judge 
wisely,!  says  the  philosopher. 

39.  In  the  constitution  of  the  rational  animal  I 
see  no  virtue  which  is  opposed  to  justice ;  but  I 
see  a  virtue  which  is  opposed  to  love  of  pleasure, 
and  that  is  temperance. 

40.  If  thou  takest  away  thy  opinion  about  that 
which    appears   to   give   thee   pain,  thou   thyself 
standest  in  perfect  security.  —  Who  is  this  self? 

1  "Verus"  is  a  conjecture  of  Saumaise,  and  perhaps  the 
true  reading. 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.          217 

—  The  reason.  —  But  I  am  not  reason.  —  Be  it  so. 
Let  then  the  reason  itself  not  trouble  itself.  But 
if  any  other  part  of  thee  suffers,  let  it  have  its  own 
opinion  about  itself  (vii.  16). 

41.  Hindrance  to  the  perceptions  of  sense  is  an 
evil  to  the  animal  nature.   Hindrance  to  the  move- 
ments [desires]  is  equally  an  evil  to  the  animal 
nature.     And  something  else  also  is  equally  an  im- 
pediment and  an  evil  to  the  constitution  of  plants. 
So  then  that  which  is  a  hindrance  to  the  intelli- 
gence is  an  evil  to  the  intelligent  nature.     Apply 
all   these   things  then  to  thyself.     Does  pain  or 
sensuous   pleasure   affect  thee?     The  senses  will 
look  to  that.     Has  any  obstacle  opposed  thee  in 
thy   efforts  towards  an  object?     If  indeed  thou 
wast  making  this  effort  absolutely  [uncondition- 
ally, or  without   any  reservation],  certainly  this 
obstacle  is  an  evil  to  thee  considered  as  a  rational 
animal.     But  if  thou  takest  [into  consideration] 
the  usual  course  of  things,  thou  hast  not  yet  been 
injured  nor  even  impeded.     The  things  however 
which  are  proper  to  the  understanding  no  other 
man  is  used  to  impede,  for  neither  fire,  nor  iron, 
nor   tyrant,  nor  abuse,   touches   it   in   any  way. 
When  it  has  been  made  a  sphere,  it  continues  a 
sphere  (xi.  12). 

42.  It  is  not  fit  that  I"  should  give  myself  pain, 
for  I  have  never  intentionally  given  pain  even  to 
another. 


21  8  MEDITA  TIONS. 

43.  Different    things   delight   different   people; 
but   it  is  my  delight  to  keep  the  ruling  faculty 
sound  without  turning  away  either  from  any  man 
or  from  any  of  the  things  which  happen  to  men, 
but  looking  at  and  receiving  all  with  welcome  eyes 
and  using  everything  according  to  its  value. 

44.  See    that  thou  secure  this  present  time  to 
thyself,  for  those  who  rather  pursue  posthumous 
fame  do  not  consider  that  the  men  of  after  time 
will  be  exactly  such  as  these  whom  they  cannot 
bear  now  ;  and  both  are  mortal.     And  what  is  it 
in  any  way  to  thee  if  these  men  of  after  time  utter 
this  or  that  sound,  or  have  this  or  that  opinion 
about  thee  ? 

45.  Take  me  and  cast  me  where  thou  wilt  ;  for 
there  I  shall  keep  my  divine  part  tranquil,  that  is, 
content,  if  it  can  feel  and  act  conformably  to  its 
proper  constitution.     Is  this  [change  of  place]  suf- 
ficient reason  why  my  soul  should  be  unhappy  and 
worse  than  it  was,  depressed,  expanded,  shrinking, 
affrighted  ?  and  what  wilt  thou  find  which  is  suffi- 
cient reason  for  this  ?  1 

46.  Nothing  can  happen  to  any  man  which  is 
not  a  human  accident,  nor  to  an  ox  which  is  not 
according  to  the  nature  of  an  ox,  nor  to  a  vine 


in  this  passage  seems  to  have  a  passive  sense. 
It  is  difficult  to  find  an  apt  expression  for  it  and  some  of  the 
other  words.  A  comparison  with  xi.  12,  will  help  to  explain 
the  meaning. 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  219 

which  is  not  according  to  the  nature  of  a  vine, 
nor  to  a  stone  which  is  not  proper  to  a  stone.  If 
then  there  happens  to  each  thing  both  what  is 
usual  and  natural,  why  shouldst  thou  complain? 
For  the  common  nature  brings  nothing  which  may 
not  be  borne  by  thee. 

47.  If  thou  art  pained  by  any  external  thing,  it 
is  not  this  thing  that  disturbs  thee,  but  thy  own 
judgment  about  it.     And  it  is  in  thy  power  to  wipe 
out  this  judgment  now.     But  if  anything  in  thy 
own  disposition  gives  thee  pain,  who  hinders  thee 
from  correcting  thy  opinion  ?   And  even  if  thou  art 
pained  because  thou  art  not  doing  some  particular 
thing  which  seems  to  thee  to  be  right,  why  dost 
thou  not  rather  act  than  complain?  —  But  some 
insuperable  obstacle  is  in  the  way  ?  —  Do  not  be 
grieved  then,  for  the  cause  of  its  not  being  done 
depends  not  on  thee.  —  But  it  is  not  worth  while 
to  live,  if  this  cannot  be  done.  —  Take  thy  depar- 
ture then  from  life  contentedly,  just  as  he  dies  who 
is  in  full  activity,  and  well  pleased  too  with  the 
things  which  are  obstacles. 

48.  Remember  that  the  ruling  faculty  is  invinci- 
ble, when  self-collected  it  is  satisfied  with  itself,  if 
it  does  nothing  which  it  does  not  choose  to  do, 
even  if  it  resist  from  mere  obstinacy.     What  then 
will  it  be  when  it  forms  a-  judgment  about  anything 
aided  by  reason  and  deliberately?     Therefore  the 
mind  which  is  free  from  passions  is  a  citadel,  for 


220  MEDITATIONS. 

man  has  nothing  more  secure  to  which  he  can  fly 
for  refuge  and  for  the  future  be  inexpugnable.  He 
then  who  has  not  seen  this  is  an  ignorant  man ;  but 
he  who  has  seen  it  and  does  not  fly  to  this  refuge 
is  unhappy. 

49.  Say  nothing  more  to  thyself  than  what  the 
first  appearances  report.     Suppose  that  it  has  been 
reported  to  thee  that  a  certain  person  speaks  ill  of 
thee.     This  has  been  reported  ;  but  that  thou  hast 
been  injured,  that  has  not  been  reported.     I  see 
that  my  child  is  sick.     I  do  see ;  but  that  he  is  in 

\J  danger,  I  do  not  see.  Thus  then  always  abide  by 
the  first  appearances,  and  add  nothing  thyself  from 
within,  and  then  nothing  happens  to  thee.  Or 
rather  add  something  like  a  man  who  knows  every- 
thing that  happens  in  the  world. 

50.  A  cucumber  is  bitter  —  Throw  it  away.  — 
There   are  briers  in  the  road  —  Turn  aside  from 
them.  —  This  is  enough.     Do  not  add,  And  why 
were  such  things  made  in  the  world?     For  thou 
wilt  be  ridiculed  by  a  man  who  is  acquainted  with 
nature,  as  thou  wouldstbe  ridiculed  by  a  carpenter 
and   shoemaker   if   thou  didst  find  fault  because 
thou  seest  in  their  workshop  shavings  and  cuttings 
from  the  things  which  they  make.     And  yet  they 
have  places  into  which  they  can  throw  these  shav- 
ings and  cuttings,  and  the  universal  nature  has  no 
external  space  ;  but  the  wondrous  part  of  her  art 
is  that  though  she  has  circumscribed  herself,  every- 


MARCUS  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.  221 

thing  within  her  which  appears  to  decay  and  to 
grow  old  and  to  be  useless  she  changes  into  her- 
self, and  again  makes  other  new  things  from  these 
very  same,  so  that  she  requires  neither  substance 
from  without  nor  wants  a  place  into  which  she  may 
cast  that  which  decays.  She  is  content  then  with 
her  own  space,  and  her  own  matter,  and  her  own 
art. 

51.  Neither  in  thy  actions  be  sluggish  nor  in  thy 
conversation   without  method,  nor  wandering  in 
thy  thoughts,  nor  let  there  be  in  thy  soul  inward 
contention  nor  external  effusion,  nor  in  life  be  so 
busy  as  to  have  no  leisure. 

Suppose  that  men  kill  thee,  cut  thee  in  pieces, 
curse  thee.  What  then  can  these  things  do  to  pre- 
vent thy  mind  from  remaining  pure,  wise,  sober, 
just  ?  For  instance,  if  a  man  should  stand  by  a 
limpid  pure  spring,  and  curse  it,  the  spring  never 
ceases  sending  up  potable  water ;  and  if  he  should 
cast  clay  into  it  or  filth,  it  will  speedily  disperse 
them  and  wash  them  out,  and  will  not  be  at  all 
polluted.  How  then  shalt  thou  possess  a  perpetual 
fountain  [and  not  a  mere  well]?  By  forming f 
thyself  hourly  to  freedom  conjoined  with  content- 
ment, simplicity,  and  modesty. 

52.  He  who  does  not  know  what  the  world  is, 
does  not  know  where  he  is.     And  he  who  does  not 
know  for  what  purpose  the  world  exists,  does  not 
know  who  he  is,  nor  what  the  world  is.     But  he 


222  MEDITATIONS. 

who  has  failed  in  any  one  of  these  things  could  not 
even  say  for  what  purpose  he  exists  himself. 
What  then  dost  thou  think  of  him  who  [avoids  or] 
seeks  the  praise  of  those  who  applaud,  of  men  who 
know  not  either  where  they  are  or  who  they  are  ? 

53.  Dost  thou  wish  to  be  praised  by  a  man  who 
curses  himself  thrice   every  hour?   wouldst  thou 
wish  to  please  a  man  who  does  not  please  himself? 
Does  a  man  please  himself  who  repents  of  nearly 
everything  that  he  does  ? 

54.  No  longer  let  thy  breathing  only  act  in  con- 
cert with  the  air  which  surrounds  thee,  but  let  thy 
intelligence  also  now  be  in  harmony  with  the  intel- 
ligence which  embraces  all  things.     For  the  intel- 
ligent power  is  no  less  diffused  in  all  parts  and 
pervades  all  things  for  him  who  is  willing  to  draw 
it  to  him  than  the  aerial  power  for  him  who  is  able 
to  respire  it. 

55.  Generally,  wickedness  does  no  harm  at  all 
to  the  universe ;  and  particularly  the  wickedness 
[of  one  man]  does  no  harm  to  another.     It  is  only 
harmful  to  him  who  has  it  in  his  power  to  be  re- 
leased from  it  as  soon  as  he  shall  choose. 

56.  To  my  own   free  will  the  free  will  of  my 
neighbor  is  just  as   indifferent  as  his  poor  breath 
and  flesh.     For  though  we  are  made  especially  for 
the  sake  of  one  another,  still  the  ruling  power  of 
each  of  us  has  its  own  office,  for  otherwise  my 
neighbor's  wickedness  would  be  my  harm,  which 


MABCUS  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.  223 

God  has  not  willed  in  order  that  my  unhappiness 
may  not  depend  on  another. 

57.  The  sun  appears  to  be  poured  down,  and  in 
all  directions  indeed  it  is  diffused,  yet  it  is  not 
effused.     For  this  diffusion  is  extension :  Accord- 
ingly its  rays  are  called  Extensions  [d/crtves]  be- 
cause they  are  extended  [d™  TOV  cKretW&u].1     But 
one  may  judge  what  kind  of  a  thing  a  ray  is,  if  he 
looks  at  the  sun's  light  passing  through  a  narrow 
opening  into  a  darkened  room,  for  it  is  extended 
in  a  right  line,  and  as  it  were  is  divided  when  it 
meets  with   any  solid   body  which  stands  in  the 
way  and  intercepts  the  air  beyond ;  but  there  the 
light  remains  fixed  and  does  not  glide  or  fall  off. 
Such  then  ought  to  be  the  outpouring  and  diffu- 
sion of  the  understanding,  and  it  should  in  no  way 
be  an   effusion,  but  an  extension,  and  it  should 
make  no  violent  or  impetuous  collision  with  the 
obstacles  which  are  in  its  way  ;  nor  yet  fall  down, 
but  be  fixed,  and  enlighten  that  which  receives  it. 
For  a  body  will  deprive  itself  of  the  illumination, 
if  it  does  not  admit  it. 

58.  He  who  fears  death  either  fears  the  loss  of 
sensation  or  a  different  kind  of  sensation.     But  if 
thou  shalt  have  no  sensation,  neither  wilt  thoufeel 
any  harm  ;  and  if  thou  shalt  acquire  another  kind 
of  sensation,  thou  wilt  be  a  different  kind  of  living 
being  and  thou  wilt  not  cease  to  live. 

1  A  piece  of  bad  etymology. 


224  MEDITATIONS 

59.  Men    exist   for   the   sake  of    one    another. 
Teach  them  then  or  bear  with  them. 

60.  In  one  way  an  arrow  moves,  in  another  way 
the  mind.     The  mind  indeed,  both  when  it  exer- 
cises   caution    and   when    it   is   employed   about 
inquiry,  moves  straight  onward  not  the  less,  and 
to  its  object. 

61.  Enter  into  every  man's  ruling  faculty ;  and 
also  let  every  other  man  enter  into  thine.1 

1  Compare  Epictetus,  iii.  9,  12. 


IX. 

1.  HE  who  acts  unjustly  acts  impiously.  For 
since  the  universal  nature  has  made  rational  ani- 
mals for  the  sake  of  one  another  to  help  one 
another  according  to  their  deserts,  but  in  no  way 
to  injure  one  another,  he  who  transgresses  her  will 
is  clearly  guilty  of  impiety  towards  the  highest 
divinity.  And  he  too  who  lies  is  guilty  of  impiety 
to  the  same  divinity;  for  the  universal  nature  is 
the  nature  of  things  that  are ;  and  things  that  are 
have  a  relation  to  all  things  that  come  into  ex- 
istence.1 And  further,  this  universal  nature  is 

1  "  As  there  is  not  any  action  or  natural  event,  which  we 
are  acquainted  with,  so  single  and  unconnected  as  not  to 
have  a  respect  to  some  other  actions  and  events,  so  possibly 
each  of  them,  when  it  has  not  an  immediate,  may  yet  have  a 
remote,  natural  relation  to  other  actions  and  events,  much 
beyond  the  compass  of  this  present  world."  Again  :  "  Things 
seemingly  the  most  insignificant  imaginable  are  perpetually 
observed  to  be  necessary  conditions  to  other  things  of  the 
greatest  importance ;  so  that  any  one  thing  whatever  may, 
for  aught  we  know  to  the  contrary ,  be  a  necessary  condition 
to  any  other." — Butler's  Analogy,  Chap.  7.  See  all  the 
chapter.  Some  critics  take  rd  inrdpxorra  in  this  passage  of 


226  MEDITATIONS. 

named  truth,  and  is  the  prime  cause  of  all  things 
that  are  true.  He  then  who  lies  intentionally  is 
guilty  of  impiety  inasmuch  as  he  acts  unjustly  by 
deceiving;  and  he  also  who  lies  unintentionally, 
inasmuch  as  he  is  at  variance  with  the  universal 
nature,  and  inasmuch  as  he  disturbs  the  order  by 
fighting  against  the  nature  of  the  world ;  for  he 
fights  against  it,  who  is  moved  of  himself  to  that 
which  is  contrary  to  truth,  for  he  had  received 
powers  from  nature  through  the  neglect  of  which 
he  is  not  able  now  to  distinguish  falsehood  from 
truth.  And  indeed  he  who  pursues  pleasure  as 
good,  and  avoids  pain  as  evil,  is  guilty  of  impiety. 
For  of  necessity  such  a  man  must  often  find  fault 
with  the  universal  nature,  alleging  that  it  assigns 
things  to  the  bad  and  the  good  contrary  to  their 
deserts,  because  frequently  the  bad  are  in  the  en- 
joyment of  pleasure  and  possess  the  things  which 
procure  pleasure,  but  the  good  have  pain  for  their 
share  and  the  things  which  cause  pain.  And 
further,  he  who  is  afraid  of  pain  will  sometimes 
also  be  afraid  of  some  of  the  things  which  will 
happen  in  the  world,  and  even  this  is  impiety. 
And  he  who  pursues  pleasure  will  not  abstain  from 

Antoninus  to  be  the  same  as  TO,  8vra :  but  if  that  were  so,  he 
might  have  said  irpbs  &\\T)\a  instead  of  irpbs  ra  vTra.p-x.ovra. 
Perhaps  the  meaning  of  irpbs  ra  v-n-dpxovra  may  be  "to  all 
prior  things."  If  so,  the  translation  is  still  correct.  See 
vi.  38. 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.          227 

injustice,  and  this  is  plainly  impiety.  Now  with 
respect  to  the  things  towards  which  the  universal 
nature  is  equally  affected,  —  for  it  would  not  have 
made  both,  unless  it  was  equally  affected  towards 
both,  —  towards  these  they  who  wish  to  follow 
nature  should  be  of  the  same  mind  with  it,  and 
equally  affected.  With  respect  to  pain,  then, 
and  pleasure,  or  death  and  life,  or  honor  and 
dishonor,  which  the  universal  nature  employs 
equally,  whoever  is  not  equally  affected  is  mani- 
festly acting  impiously.  And  I  say  that  the  uni- 
versal nature  employs  them  equally,  instead  of 
saying  that  they  happen  alike  to  those  who  are 
produced  in  continuous  series  and  to  those  who 
come  after  them  by  virtue  of  a  certain  original 
movement  of  Providence,  according  to  which  it 
moved  from  a  certain  beginning  to  this  ordering 
of  things,  having  conceived  certain  principles  of 
the  things  which  were  to  be,  and  having  deter- 
mined powers  productive  of  beings  and  of  changes 
and  of  such  like  successions  (vii.  75). 

2.  It  would  be  a  man's  happiest  lot  to  depart 
from  mankind  without  having  had  any  taste  of  ly- 
ing and  hypocrisy  and  luxury  and  pride.  However, 
to  breathe  out  one's  life  when  a  man  has  had 
enough  of  these  things  is  the  next  best  voyage,  as 
the  saying  is.  Hast  thou  determined  to  abide 
with  vice,  and  has  not  experience  yet  induced 
thee  to  fly  from  this  pestilence?  For  the  destruc- 


228  MEDITATIONS. 

tion  of  the  understanding  is  a  pestilence,  much 
more  indeed  than  any  such  corruption  and  change 
of  this  atmosphere  which  surrounds  us.  For  this 
corruption  is  a  pestilence  of  animals  so  far  as  they 
are  animals ;  but  the  other  is  a  pestilence  of  men 
so  far  as  they  are  men. 

3.  Do  not  despise  death,  but  be  well  content 
with  it,  since  this  too  is  one  of  those  things  which 
nature  wills.  For  such  as  it  is  to  be  young  and 
to  grow  old,  and  to  increase  and  to  reach  maturity, 
and  to  have  teeth  and  beard  and  gray  hairs,  and  to 
beget  and  to  be  pregnant  and  to  bring  forth,  and 
all  the  other  natural  operations  which  the  seasons 
of  thy  life  bring,  such  also  is  dissolution.  This, 
then,  is  consistent  with  the  character  of  a  reflect- 
ing man,  — to  be  neither  careless  nor  impatient  nor 
contemptuous  with  respect  to  death,  but  to  wait 
for  it  as  one  of  the  operations  of  nature.  As  thou 
now  waitest  for  the  time  when  the  child  shall  come 
out  of  thy  wife's  womb,  so  be  ready  for  the  time 
when  thy  soul  shall  fall  out  of  this  envelope.1  But 
if  thou  requirest  also  a  vulgar  kind  of  comfort 
which  shall  reach  thy  heart,  thou  wilt  be  made 
best  reconciled  to  death  by  observing  -  the  objects 
from  which  thou  art  going  to  be  removed,  and  the 
morals  of  those  with  whom  thy  soul  will  no  longer 
be  mingled.  For  it  is  no  way  right  to  be  offended 
with  men,  but  it  is  thy  duty  to  care  for  them  and 
1  Note  1  of  the  Philosophy,  p.  84. 


MARCUS  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.  229 

to  bear  with  them  gently;  and  yet  to  remember 
that  thy  departure  will  not  be  from  men  who  have 
the  same  principles  as  thyself.  For  this  is  the  only 
thing,  if  there  be  any,  which  could  draw  us  the 
contrary  way  and  attach  us  to  life,  —  to  be  per- 
mitted to  live  with  those  who  have  the  same  prin- 
ciples as  ourselves.  But  now  thou  seest  how  great 
is  the  trouble  arising  from  the  discordance  of  those 
who  live  together,  so  that  thou  mayst  say,  Come 
quick,  O  death,  lest  perchance  I,  too,  should  forget 
myself. 

4.  He  who  does  wrong  does  wrong  against  him- 
self.    He  who  acts  unjustly  acts  unjustly  to  him- 
self, because  he  makes  himself  bad. 

5.  He  often  acts  unjustly  who  does  not  do  a  cer- 
tain thing  ;  not  only  he  who  does  a  certain  thing. 

6.  Thy  present  opinion  founded  on  understand- 
ing, and  thy  present   conduct  directed  to  social 
good,   and    thy   present    disposition   of    content- 
ment with  everything  which  happens  f  —  that  is 

tough. 

7.  Wipe  out  imagination :  check  desire :  extin- 
guish appetite  :  keep  the  ruling  faculty  in  its  own 
power. 

8.  Among  the  animals  which  have  not  reason 
one  life  is  distributed ;  but  among  reasonable  ani- 
mals  one  intelligent  soul  is  distributed:   just  as 
there  is  one  earth  of  all  things  which  are  of  an 
earthy  nature,  and  we  see  by  one  light,  and  breathe 


230  MEDITATIONS. 

one  air,  all  of  us  that  have  the  faculty  of  vision 
and  all  that  have  life. 

9.  All  things  which  participate  in  anything 
which  is  common  to  them  all  move  towards  that 
which  is  of  the  same  kind  with  themselves.  Every- 
thing which  is  earthy  turns  towards  the  earth, 
everything  which  is  liquid  flows  together,  and 
everything  which  is  of  an  aerial  kind  does  the  same, 
so  that  they  require  something  to  keep  them  asun- 
der, and  the  application  of  force.  Fire  indeed 
moves  upwards  on  account  of  the  elemental  fire, 
but  it  is  so  ready  to  be  kindled  together  with  all 
the  fire  which  is  here,  that  even  every  substance 
which  is  somewhat  dry  is  easily  ignited,  because 
there  is  less  mingled  with  it  of  that  which  is  a  hin- 
drance to  ignition.  Accordingly,  then,  everything 
also  which  participates  in  the  common  intelligent 
nature  moves  in  like  manner  towards  that  which 
is  of  the  same  kind  with  itself,  or  moves  even  more. 
For  so  much  as  it  is  superior  in  comparison  with 
all  other  things,  in  the  same  degree  also  is  it  more 
ready  to  mingle  with  and  to  be  fused  with  that 
which  is  akin  to  it.  Accordingly  among  animals 
devoid  of  reason  we  find  swarms  of  bees,  and  herds 
of  cattle,  arid  the  nurture  of  young  birds,  and  in 
a  manner,  loves ;  for  even  in  animals  there  are 
souls,  and  that  power  which  brings  them  together 
is  seen  to  exert  itself  in  the  superior  degree,  and 
in  such  a  way  as  never  has  been  observed  in  plants 


MAECUS  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.  231 

nor  in  stones  nor  in  trees.  But  in  rational  animals 
there  are  political  communities  and  friendships, 
and  families  and  meetings  of  people;  and  in  wars, 
treaties,  and  armistices.  But  in  the  things  which 
are  still  superior,  even  though  they  are  separated 
from  one  another,  unity  in  a  manner  exists,  as  in 
the  stars.  Thus  the  ascent  to  the  higher  degree 
is  able  to  produce  a  sympathy  even  in  things  which 
are  separated.  See,  then,  what  now  takes  place ; 
for  only  intelligent  animals  have  now  forgotten 
this  mutual  desire  and  inclination,  and  in  them 
alone  the  property  of  flowing  together  is  not  seen. 
But  still,  though  men  strive  to  avoid  [this  union], 
they  are  caught  and  held  by  it,  for  their  nature  is 
too  strong  for  them ;  and  thou  wilt  see  what  I  say, 
if  thou  only  observest.  Sooner,  then,  will  one  find 
anything  earthy  which  comes  in  contact  with  no" 
earthy  thing,  than  a  man  altogether  separated  from 
other  men. 

10.  Both  man  and  God  and  the  universe  produce 
fruit ;  at  the  proper  seasons  each  produces  it.     But 
and  if  usage  has  especially  fixed  these  terms  to  the 
vine  and  like  things,  this  is  nothing.     Reason  pro- 
duces fruit  both  for  all  and  for  itself,  and  there  are 
produced  from  it  other  things  of  the  same  kind  as 
reason  itself. 

11.  If  thou  art  able,  .correct  by  teaching  those 
who  do  wrong ;  but  if  thou  canst  not,  remember 
that  indulgence  is  given  to  thee  for  this  purpose. 


232  MEDITATIONS. 

And  the  gods,  too,  are  indulgent  to  such  persons , 
and  for  some  purposes  they  even  help  them  to  get 
health,  wealth,  reputation  ;  so  kind  they  are.  And 
it  is  in  thy  power  also ;  or  say,  who  hinders  thee  ? 

12.  Labor  not  as  one  who  is  wretched,  nor  yet 
as  one  who  would  be  pitied  or  admired :  but  direct 
thy  will   to  one  thing   only,  —  to  put  thyself  in 
motion  and  to  check  thyself,  as  the  social  reason 
requires. 

13.  To-day   I   have   got  out  of  all  trouble,  or 
rather  I  have  cast  out  all  trouble,  for  it  was  not 
outside,  but  within  and  in  my  opinions. 

14.  All  things  are  the  same,  familiar  in  expe- 
rience, and  ephemeral  in  time,  and  worthless  in 
the  matter.     Everything  now  is  just  as  it  was  in 
the  time  of  those  whom  we  have  buried. 

15.  Things  stand  outside  of  us,  themselves  by 
themselves,  neither  knowing  aught  of  themselves, 
nor  expressing  any  judgment.     What  is  it,  then, 
which  does  judge  about  them  ?  The  ruling  faculty. 

16.  Not  in  passivity  but  in  activity  lie  the  evil 
and  the  good  of  the  rational  social  animal,  just  as 
his  virtue  and  his  vice  lie  not  in  passivity  but  in 
activity.1 

17.  For  the  stone  which  has  been  thrown  up  it 
is  no  evil  to  come  down,  nor  indeed  any  good  to 
have  been  carried  up  (viii.  20). 

1  Virtutis  omnis  laus  in  actione  consistit.  —  Cicero,  De  Off. 
i.  6. 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.          233 

18.  Penetrate  inwards  into  men's  leading  princi- 
ples, and  thou  wilt  see  what  judges  thou  art  afraid 
of,  and  what  kind  of  judges  they  are  of  themselves. 

19.  All  things  are  changing:  and  thou  thyself 
art  in  continuous  mutation  and  in  a  manner  in 
continuous   destruction,  and   the  whole   universe 
too. 

20.  It  is  thy  duty  to  leave  another  man's  wrong- 
ful act  there  where  it  is  (vii.  29 ;  ix.  38). 

21.  Termination    of    activity,    cessation    from 
movement  and  opinion,  and  in  a  sense  their  death, 
is  no  evil.     Turn  thy  thoughts  now  to  the  consid- 
eration of  thy  life,  thy  life  as  a  child,  as  a  youth, 
thy  manhood,  thy  old  age,  for  in  these  also  every 
change  was  a  death.     Is  this  anything  to  fear? 
Turn   thy   thoughts   now   to   thy  life  under  thy 
grandfather,  then  to  thy  life  under  thy  mother,  then 
to  thy  life  under  thy  father ;  and  as  thou  findest 
many  other  differences  and  changes  and  termina- 
tions, ask  thyself,  Is  this  anything  to  fear?     In 
like  manner,  then,  neither  are  the  termination  and 
cessation  and  change  of  thy  whole  life  a  thing  to 
be  afraid  of. 

22.  Hasten  [to  examine]  thy  own  ruling  faculty 
and  that  of  the  universe  and  that  of  thy  neighbor : 
thy  own  that  thou  mayst  make  it  just:  and  that  of 
the  universe,  that  thou"  mayst  remember  of  what 
thou  art  a  part ;  and  that  of  thy  neighbor,  that  thou 
mayst  know  whether  he  has  acted  ignorantlj  or 


234  MEDITATIONS. 

with  knowledge,  and  that  thou  mayst  also  consider 
that  his  ruling  faculty  is  akin  to  thine. 

23.  As  thou  thyself  art  a  component  part  of  a 
social  system,  so  let  every  act  of  thine  be  a  com- 
ponent part  of  social  life.     Whatever  act  of  thine 
then  has  no  reference  either  immediately  or  re- 
motely to  a  social  end,  this  tears  asunder  thy  life, 
and  does  not  allow  it  to  be  one,  and  it  is  of  the 
nature   of   a   mutiny,  just  as  when    in  a  popular 
assembly  a   man  acting  by  himself  stands  apart 
from  the  general  agreement. 

24.  Quarrels  of  little  children  and  their  sports, 
and  poor  spirits  carrying  about  dead  bodies  [such 
is  everything]  ;  and  so  what  is  exhibited  in  the 
representation  of  the  mansions  of  the  dead  l  strikes 
our  eyes  more  clearly. 

25.  Examine  into  the  quality  of  the  form  of  an 
object,  and  detach  it  altogether  from  its  material 
part,  and  then  contemplate  it ;  then  determine  the 
time,  the  longest  which  a  thing  of  this  peculiar 
form  is  naturally  made  to  endure. 

26.  Thou  hast  endured  infinite  troubles  through 
not  being  contented  with  thy  ruling  faculty  when 
it  does  the  things  which  it  is  constituted  by  nature 
to  do.     But  enough  f  [of  this]. 

1  T&  Trjs  New/as  may  be,  as  Gataker  conjectures,  a  dramatic 
representation  of  the  state  of  the  dead.  Schultz  supposes 
that  it  may  be  also  a  reference  to  the  Newte  of  the  Odyssey 
(lib.  xi.). 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  235 

27.  When  another  blames  thee  or  hates  thee, 
or  when  men  say  about  thee  anything  injurious, 
approach  their  poor  souls,  penetrate  within,  and 
see  what  kind  of  men  they  are.     Thou  wilt  dis- 
cover that  there  is  no  reason  to  take  any  trouble 
that  these   men   may   have   this  or  that  opinion 
about  thee.     However,  thou  must  be  well  disposed 
towards   them,   for  by   nature   they   are   friends. 
And  the  gods  too  aid  them  in  all  ways,  by  dreams, 
by  signs,  towards  the  attainment  of  those  things  on 
which  they  set  a  value.f 

28.  The  periodic  movements  of  the  universe  are 
the  same,  up  and  down  from  age  to  age.     And 
either    the    universal   intelligence   puts   itself  in 
motion  for  every  separate  effect,  and  if  this  is  so, 
be  thou  content  with  that  which  is  the  result  of  its 
activity;  or   it   puts   itself   in   motion  once,  and 
everything  else  comes  by  way  of  sequence l  in  a 
manner ;  or  indivisible  elements  are  the  origin  of 
all  things.  —  In  a  word,  if  there  is  a  god,  all  is 
well ;  and  if  chance  rules,  do  not  thou  also  be 
governed  by  it  (vi.  44  ;  vii.  75). 

Soon  will  the  earth  cover  us  all :  then  the  earth, 
too,  will  change,  and  the  things  also  which  result 
from  change  will  continue  to  change  forever,  and 
these  again  forever.  For  if  a  man  reflects  on  the 

1  The  words  which  immediately  follow  KO.T  tiraKo\oMT)ffiv  are 
corrupt.  But  the  meaning  is  hardly  doubtful.  (Compare 
vii.  75.) 


236  MEDITATIONS. 

changes  and  transformations  which  follow  one 
another  like  wave  after  wave  and  their  rapidity,  he 
will  despise  everything  which  is  perishable  (xii.  21). 

29.  The  universal  cause  is  like  a  winter  torrent: 
it    carries   everything   along   with   it.     But   how 
worthless  are  all  these  poor  people  who  are   en- 
gaged in  matters  political,  and,  as  they  suppose, 
are  playing  the  philosopher !    All  drivellers.    Well 
then,   man :  do   what  nature   now  requires.     Set 
thyself  in  motion,  if  it  is  in  thy  power,  and  do  not 
look  about  thee  to  see  if  any  one  will  observe  it ; 
nor  yet  expect  Plato's  Republic  : l  but  be  content 
if  the  smallest  thing  goes  on  well,  and  consider 
such  an  event  to  be  no  small  matter.     For  who 
can  change  men's  opinions  ?  and  without  a  change 
of  opinions  what  else  is  there  than  the  slavery  of 
men   who    groan   while    they   pretend   to   obey? 
Come  now  and  tell  me  of  Alexander  and  Philip- 
pus  and  Demetrius  of  Phalerum.  They  themselves 
shall    judge   whether   they   discovered   what   the 
common  nature  required,  and  trained  themselves 
accordingly.  But  if  they  acted  like  tragedy  heroes, 
no    one    has    condemned    me    to   imitate   them. 
Simple   and   modest   is   the  work   of  philosophy. 
Draw  me  not  aside  to  insolence  and  pride. 

30.  Look   down   from   above  on  the  countless 

1  Those  who  wish  to  know  what  Plato's  Republic  is,  may 
now  study  it  in  the  accurate  translation  of  Davies  and 
Vaughan. 


MABCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.          237 

herds  of  men  and  their  countless  solemnities,  and 
the  infinitely  varied  voyagings  in  storms  and 
calms,  and  the  differences  among  those  who  are 
born,  who  live  together,  and  die.  And  consider, 
too,  the  life  lived  by  others  in  olden  time,  and  the 
life  of  those  who  will  live  after  thee,  and  the  life 
now  lived  among  barbarous  nations,  and  how 
many  know  not  even  thy  name,  and  how  many 
will  soon  forget  it,  and  how  they  who  perhaps  now 
are  praising  thee  will  very  soon  blame  thee,  and 
that  neither  a  posthumous  name  is  of  any  value, 
nor  reputation,  nor  anything  else. 

31.  Let  there   be   freedom  from  perturbations 
with  respect  to  the  things  which  come  from  the 
external   cause  ;  and  let  there  be  justice  in  the 
things  done  by  virtue  of  the  internal  cause,  that  is, 
let  there  be  movement  and  action  terminating  in 
this,  in  social  acts,  for  this  is  according  to  thy 
nature. 

32.  Thou  canst  remove  out  of  the  way  many 
useless  things  among  those  which  disturb  thee,  for 
they  lie  entirely  in  thy  opinion ;  and  thou  wilt 
then  gain  for  thyself  ample  space  by  comprehend- 
ing the  whole  universe  in  thy  mind,  and  by  con- 
templating the  eternity  of  time,  and  observing  the 
rapid  change  of  every  several  thing,  how  short  is 
the  time  from  birth  to  dissolution,  and  the  illimit- 
able   time   before   birth   as  well   as   the   equally 
boundless  time  after  dissolution  I 


238  MEDITATIONS. 

33.  All  that  thou  seest  will  quickly  perish,  and 
those  who  have  been  spectators  of  its  dissolution 
will  very  soon  perish  too.     And  he  who  dies  at  the 
extremest  old  age  will  be  brought  into  the  same 
condition  with  him  who  died  prematurely. 

34.  What   are   these   men's   leading  principles, 
and  about  what  kind  of  things  are  they  busy,  and 
for  what  kind  of  reasons  do  they  love  and  honor  ? 
Imagine  that  thou  seest  their  poor  souls  laid  bare. 
When   they  think   that   they  do   harm   by   their 
blame  or  good  by  their  praise,  what  an  idea ! 

35.  Loss  is  nothing  else  than  change.     But  the 
universal  nature  delights  in  change,  and  in  obedi- 
ence to  her  all  things  are  now  done  well,  and  from 
eternity  have  been  done  in  like  form,  and  will  be 
such  to  time  without  end.     What,  then,  dost  thou 
say,  —  that   all  things  have  been   and  all  things 
always  will  be  bad,  and  that  no  power  has  ever 
been    found   in    so   many   gods   to   rectify   these 
things,  but  the  world  has  been  condemned  to  be 
bound  in  never  ceasing  evil  (iv.  45,  vii.  18)  ? 

36.  The  rottenness  of  the  matter  which  is  the 
foundation  of  everything !  water,  dust,  bones,  filth : 
or  again,  marble  rocks,  the  callosities  of  •  the  earth  ; 
and  gold  and  silver,  the  sediments ;  and  garments, 
only  bits   of  hair ;  and   purple   dye,   blood ;  and 
everything  else  is  of  the  same  kind.     And  that 
which  is  of  the  nature  of  breath  is  also  another 
thing  of  the  same  kind,  changing  from  this  to  that. 


MAECUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  239 

37.  Enough  of  this  wretched  life  and  murmur- 
ing and  apish  tricks.     Why  art  thou  disturbed  ? 
What  is  there  new  in  this  ?    What  unsettles  thee? 
Is  it  the  form  of  the  thing  ?     Look  at  it.     Or  is  it 
the  matter  ?     Look  at  it.     But  besides  these  there 
is  nothing.     Towards  the  gods  then,  now  become 
at  last  more  simple  and  better.     It  is  the  same 
whether  we  examine  these  things  for  a  hundred 
years  or  three. 

38.  If  any  man  has  done  wrong,  the  harm  is 
his  own.     But  perhaps  he  has  not  done  wrong. 

39.  Either  all  things  proceed  from  one  inteH^ 
gent  source  and  come  together  as  in  one  body,  and 
the  part  ought  not  to  find  fault  with  what  is  done 
for  the  benefit  of  the  whole ;  or  there  are  only 
atoms,  and  nothing  else  than  mixture  and  disper- 
sion.    Why,  then,  art  thou  disturbed  ?  Say  to  the 
ruling  faculty,  Art  thou  dead,  art  thou  corrupted, 
art  thou  playing  the  hypocrite,  art  thou  become  a 
beast,  dost  thou  herd  and  feed  with  the  rest  ? l 

40.  Either  the  gods  have  no  power  or  they  have 
power.     If,  then,  they  have  no  power,  why  dost 
thou  pray  to  them  ?     But  if  they  have  power,  why 
dost  thou   not   pray   for   them  to  give  thee  the 

1  There  is  some  corruption  at  the  end  of  this  section ;  but 
I  think  that  the  translation  expresses  the  emperor's  meaning. 
Whether  intelligence  rules  all  things  or  chance  rules,  a  man 
must  not  be  disturbed.  He  must  use  the  power  that  he  has, 
and  be  tranquil. 


240  MEDITATIONS. 

faculty  of  not  fearing  any  of  the  things  which  thou 
fearest,  or  of  not  desiring  any  of  the  things  which 
thou  desirest,  or  not  being  pained  at  anything, 
rather  than  pray  that  any  of  these  things  should 
not  happen  or  happen  ?  for  certainly  if  they  can 
co-operate  with  men,  they  can  co-operate  for  these 
purposes.  But  perhaps  thou  wilt  say  the  gods 
have  placed  them  in  thy  power.  Well,  then,  is  it 
not  better  to  use  what  is  in  thy  power  like  a  free 
man  than  to  desire  in  a  slavish  and  abject  way 
what  is  not  in  thy  power  ?  And  who  has  told  thee 
that  the  gods  do  not  aid  us  even  in  the  things 
which  are  in  our  power?  Begin,  then,  to  pray  for 
such  things,  and  thou  wilt  see.  One  man  prays 
thus  :  How  shall  I  be  able  to  lie  with  that  woman? 
Do  thou  pray  thus :  How  shall  I  not  desire  to  lie 
with  her  ?  Another  prays  thus :  How  shall  I  be 
released  from  this?  Another  prays:  How  shall  I 
not  desire  to  be  released?  Another  thus:  How 
shall  I  not  lose  my  little  son  ?  Thou  thus :  How 
shall  I  not  be  afraid  to  lose  him  ?  In  fine,  turn 
thy  prayers  this  way,  and  see  what  comes. 

41.  Epicurus  says,  In  my  sickness  my  conversa- 
tion was  not  about  my  bodily  sufferings,  nor,  says 
he,  did  I  talk  on  such  subjects  to  those  who  visited 
me ;  but  I  continued  to  discourse  on  the  nature  of 
things  as  before,  keeping  to  this  main  point,  how 
the  mind,  while  participating  in  such  movements 
as  go  on  in  the  poor  flesh,  shall  be  free  from  per- 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.          241 

turbations  and  maintain  its  proper  good.  Nor  did 
I,  he  says,  give  the  physicians  an  opportunity  of 
putting  on  solemn  looks,  as  if  they  were  doing 
something  great,  but  my  life  went  on  well  and 
happily.  Do,  then,  the  same  that  he  did  both  in 
sickness,  if  thou  art  sick,  and  in  any  other  circum- 
stances ;  for  never  to  desert  philosophy  in  any 
events  that  may  befall  us,  nor  to  hold  trifling  talk 
either  with  an  ignorant  man  or  with  one  unac- 
quainted with  nature,  is  a  principle  of  all  schools 
of  philosophy  ;  but  to  be  intent  only  on  that  which 
thou  art  now  doing  and  on  the  instrument  by 
which  thou  doest  it. 

42.  When  thou  art  offended  with  any  man's 
shameless  conduct,  immediately  ask  thyself,  Is  it 
possible,  then,  that  shameless  men  should  not  be 
in  the  world  ?  It  is  not  possible.  Do  not,  then, 
require  what  is  impossible.  For  this  man  also  is 
one  of  those  shameless  men  who  must  of  necessity 
be  in  the  world.  Let  the  same  considerations  be 
present  to  thy  mind  in  the  case  of  the  knave,  and 
the  faithless  man,  and  of  every  man  who  does 
wrong  in  any  way.  For  at  the  same  time  that 
thou  dost  remind  thyself  that  it  is  impossible  that 
such  kind  of  men  should  not  exist,  thou  wilt  be- 
come more  kindly  disposed  towards  every  one 
individually.  It  is  useful  to  perceive  this,  too, 
immediately  when  the  occasion  arises,  what  virtue 
nature  has  given  to  man  to  oppose  to  every  wrong- 


242  MEDITATIONS. 

ful  act.  For  she  has  given  to  man,  as  an  antidote 
against  the  stupid  man,  mildness,  and  against 
another  kind  of  man  some  other  power.  And  in 
all  cases  it  is  possible  for  thee  to  correct  by  teach- 
ing the  man  who  is  gone  astray ;  for  every  man 
who  errs  misses  his  object  and  is  gone  astray. 
Besides,  wherein  hast  thou  been  injured?  For 
thou  wilt  find  that  no  one  among  those  against 
whom  thou  art  irritated  has  done  anything  by 
which  thy  mind  could  be  made  worse  ;  but  that 
which  is  evil  to  thee  and  harmful  has  its  founda- 
tion only  in  the  mind.  And  what  harm  is  done  or 
what  is  there  strange,  if  the  man  who  has  not  been 
instructed  does  the  acts  of  an  uninstructed  man  ? 
Consider  whether  thou  shouldst  not  rather  blame 
thyself,  because  thou  didst  not  expect  such  a  man 
to  err  in  such  a  way.  For  thou  hadst  means  given 
thee  by  thy  reason  to  suppose  that  it  was  likely 
that  he  would  commit  this  error,  and  yet  thou  hast 
forgotten  and  art  amazed  that  he  has  erred.  But 
most  of  all  when  thou  blamest  a  man  as  faithless 
or  ungrateful,  turn  to  thyself.  For  the  fault  is 
manifestly  thy  own,  whether  thou  didst  trust  that 
a  man  who  had  such  a  disposition  would  keep  his 
promise,  or  when  conferring  thy  kindness  thou 
didst  not  confer  it  absolutely,  nor  yet  in  such 
way  as  to  have  received  from  thy  very  act  all  the 
profit.  For  what  more  dost  thou  want  when  thou 
hast  done  a  man  a  service  ?  art  thou  not  content 


MARCUS  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.  243 

that  them  hast  done  something  conformable  to  thy 
nature,  and  dost  thou  seek  to  be  paid  for  it  ?  just 
as  if  the  eye  demanded  a  recompense  for  seeing,  or 
the  feet  for  walking.  For  as  these  members  are 
formed  for  a  particular  purpose,  and  by  working 
according  to  their  several  constitutions  obtain 
what  is  their  own  ;  1  so  also  as  man  is  formed  by 
nature  to  acts  of  benevolence,  when  he  has  done 
anything  benevolent  or  in  any  other  way  condu- 
cive to  the  common  interest,  he  has  acted  conform- 
ably to  his  constitution,  and  he  gets  what  is  his 
own. 


«  rb  tdiov.  This  sense  of  dTr^xeti'  occurs  in  xi.  1,  and 
iv.  49  ;  also  in  St.  Matthew,  vi.  2,  a.irtyov<Ti  rbv  fuff66v,  and  in 
Epictetus. 


X. 

1.  WILT  them,  then,  my  soul,  never  be  good 
and  simple  and  one  and  naked,  more  manifest 
than  the  body  which  surrounds  thee  ?  Wilt  thou 
never  enjoy  an  affectionate  and  contented  disposi- 
tion ?  Wilt  thou  never  be  full  and  without  a  want 
of  any  kind,  longing  for  nothing  more,  nor  desiring 
anything,  either  animate  or  inanimate,  for  the  en- 
joyment of  pleasures  ?  nor  yet  desiring  time 
wherein  thou  shalt  have  longer  enjoyment,  or 
place,  or  pleasant  climate,  or  society  of  men  with 
whom  thou  mayst  live  in  harmony  ?  but  wilt  thou 
be  satisfied  with  thy  present  condition,  and  pleased 
with  all  that  is  about  thee,  and  wilt  thou  con- 
vince thyself  that  thou  hast  everything,  and  that  it 
comes  from  the  gods,  that  everything  is  well  for 
thee,  and  will  be  well  whatever  shall  please  them, 
and  whatever  they  shall  give  for  the  conservation 
of  the  perfect  living  being,1  the  good  and  just  and 
beautiful,  which  generates  and  holds  together  all 

1  That  is,  God  (iv.  40),  as  he  is  defined  by  Zeno.  But  the 
confusion  between  gods  and  God  is  strange. 


MARCUS  AURELIU8  ANTONINUS.  245 

things,  and  contains  and  embraces  all  things  which 
are  dissolved  for  the  production  of  other  like 
things  ?  Wilt  thou  never  be  such  that  thou  shalt 
so  dwell  in  community  with  gods  and  men  as 
neither  to  find  fault  with  them  at  all,  nor  to  be 
condemned  by  them  ? 

2.  Observe  what  thy  nature  requires,  so  far  as 
thou  art  governed  by  nature  only  :  then  do  it  and 
accept  it,  if  thy  nature,  so  far  as  thou  art  a  living 
being,  shall  not  be  made  worse  by  it.     And  next 
thou  must  observe  what  thy  nature  requires  so  far 
as   thou   art  a  living   being.     And  all  this  thou 
mayst  allow  thyself,  if  thy  nature,  so  far  as  thou 
art  a  rational  animal,  shall  not  be  made  worse  by 
it.     But  the  rational  animal  is  consequently  also  a 
political   [social]   animal.     Use  these  rules,  then, 
and  trouble  thyself  about  nothing  else. 

3.  Everything  which  happens  either  happens  in 
such  wise  as  thou  art  formed  by  nature  to  bear  it, 
or  as  thou  art  not  formed  by  nature  to  bear  it.    If, 
then,  it  happens  to  thee  in  such  way  as  thou  art 
formed  by  nature  to  bear  it,  do  not  complain,  but 
bear  it  as  thou  art  formed  by  nature  to  bear  it. 
But  if  it  happens  in  such  wise  as  thou  art  not 
formed  by  nature  to  bear  it,  do  not  complain,  for 
it  will  perish  after  it  has  consumed  thee.    Remem- 
ber, however,  that  thou  art  formed  by  nature  to 
bear  everything,  with  respect  to  which  it  depends 
on   thy  own   opinion   to  make  it  endurable  and 


246  MEDITATIONS. 

tolerable,  by  thinking  that  it  is  either  thy  interest 
or  thy  duty  to  do  this. 

4.  If  a  man  is  mistaken,  instruct  him  kindly 
and  show  him  his  error.     But  if  thou  art  not  able, 
blame  thyself,  or  blame  not  even  thyself. 

5.  Whatever  may  happen  to  thee,  it  was  pre- 
pared for  thee  from  all  eternity ;  and  the  implica- 
tion  of  causes   was   from   eternity  spinning  the 
thread  of  thy  being,  and  of  that  which  is  incident 
to  it  (iii.  11 ;  iv.  26). 

6.  Whether   the   universe   is  [a  concourse  of] 
atoms,  or  nature  [is  a  system],  let  this  first  be  es- 
tablished, that  I  am  a  part  of  the  whole  which  is 
governed  by  nature ;  next,  I  am  in  a  manner  inti- 
mately related  to  the  parts  which  are  of  the  same 
kind  with   myself.     For   remembering   this,  inas- 
much as  I  am  a  part,  I  shall  be  discontented  with 
none  of  the  things  which  are  assigned  to  me  out 
of  the  whole  ;  for  nothing  is  injurious  to  the  part 
if  it  is  for  the  advantage  of  the  whole.     For  the 
whole  contains  nothing  which  is  not  for  its  advan- 
tage ;  and  all  natures  indeed  have  this  common 
principle,  but  the  nature  of  the  universe  has  this 
principle  besides,  that  it  cannot  be  compelled  even 
by  any  external  cause  to  generate  anything  harm- 
ful to  itself.     By  remembering,  then,  that  I  am  a 
part   of  such   a   whole,   I  shall  be  content  with 
everything  that  happens.     And  inasmuch  as  I  am 
in  a  manner  intimately  related  to  the  parts  which 


MABCUS  AUKELIUS  ANTONINUS.  247 

are  of  the  same  kind  with  myself,  I  shall  do  noth- 
ing unsocial,  but  I  shall  rather  direct  myself  to  the 
things  which  are  of  the  same  kind  with  myself,  and 
I  shall  turn  all  my  efforts  to  the  common  interest, 
and  divert  them  from  the  contrary.  Now,  if  these 
things  are  done  so,  life  must  flow  on  happily,  just 
as  thou  mayst  observe  that  the  life  of  a  citizen  is 
happy,  who  continues  a  course  of  action  which  is 
advantageous  to  his  fellow-citizens,  and  is  content 
with  whatever  the  state  may  assign  to  him. 

7.  The  parts  of  the  whole,  everything,  I  mean, 
which  is  naturally  comprehended  in  the  universe, 
must  of  necessity  perish ;  but  let  this  be  under- 
stood in  this  sense,  that  they  must  undergo 
change.  But  if  this  is  naturally  both  an  evil  and 
a  necessity  for  the  parts,  the  whole  would  not 
continue  to  exist  in  a  good  condition,  the  parts 
being  subject  to  change  and  constituted  so  as  to 
perish  in  various  ways.  For  whether  did  Nature 
herself  design  to  do  evil  to  the  things  which  are 
parts  of  herself,  and  to  make  them  subject  to  evil 
and  of  necessity  fall  into  evil,  or  have  such  results 
happened  without  her  knowing  it?  Both  these 
suppositions,  indeed,  are  incredible.  But  if  a  man 
should  even  drop  the  term  Nature  [as  an  efficient 
power],  and  should  speak  of  these  things  as 
natural,  even  then  it  would  be  ridiculous  to  affirm 
at  the  same  time  that  the  parts  of  the  whole  are  in 
their  nature  subject  to  change,  and  at  the  same 


248  MEDITATIONS. 

time  to  be  surprised  or  vexed  as  if  something  were 
happening  contrary  to  nature,  particularly  as  the 
dissolution  of  things  is  into  those  things  of  which 
each  thing  is  composed.  For  there  is  either  a  dis- 
persion of  the  elements  out  of  which  everything 
has  been  compounded,  or  a  change  from  the  solid 
to  the  earthy  and  from  the  airy  to  the  aerial,  so 
that  these  parts  are  taken  back  into  the  universal 
reason,  whether  this  at  certain  periods  is  consumed 
by  fire  or  renewed  by  eternal  changes.  And  do 
not  imagine  that  the  solid  and  the  airy  part  belong 
to  thee  from  the  time  of  generation.  For  all  this 
received  its  accretion  only  yesterday  and  the  day 
before,  as  one  may  say,  from  the  food  and  the  air 
which  is  inspired.  This,  then,  which  has  received 
[the  accretion],  changes,  not  that  which  thy 
mother  brought  forth.  But  suppose  that  this 
[which  thy  mother  brought  forth]  implicates  thee 
very  much  with  that  other  part,  which  has  the 
peculiar  quality  [of  change],  this  is  nothing  in 
fact  in  the  way  of  objection  to  what  is  said.1 

1  The  end  of  this  section  is  perhaps  corrupt.  The  mean- 
ing is  very  obscure.  I  have  given  that,  meaning  which 
appears  to  be  consistent  with  the  whole  argument.  The 
emperor  here  maintains  that  the  essential  part  of  man  is  un- 
changeable, and  that  the  other  parts,  if  they  change  or 
perish,  do  not  affect  that  which  really  constitutes  the  man. 
See  the  Philosophy  of  Antoninus,  p.  62,  note  2.  Schultz 
supposed  "thy  mother"  to  mean  nature,  TJ  0tf<m.  But  I  doubt 
about  that. 


MAHCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  249 

8.  When  thou  hast  assumed  these  names,  good, 
modest,  true,  rational,  a  man  of  equanimity,  and 
magnanimous,  take  care  that  thou  dost  not  change 
these  names;  and  if  thou  shouldst  lose  them, 
quickly  return  to  them.  And  remember  that  the 
term  Rational  was  intended  to  signify  a  discriminat- 
ing attention  to  every  several  thing,  and  freedom 
from  negligence ;  and  that  Equanimity  is  the  vol- 
untary acceptance  of  the  things  which  are  assigned 
to  thee  by  the  common  nature  ;  and  that  Magna- 
nimity is  the  elevation  of  the  intelligent  part 
above  the  pleasurable  or  painful  sensations  of  the 
flesh,  and  above  that  poor  thing  called  fame,  and 
death,  and  all  such  things.  If,  then,  thou  main- 
tainest  thyself  in  the  possession  of  these  names, 
without  desiring  to  be  called  by  these  names  by 
others,  thou  wilt  be  another  person  and  wilt  enter 
on  another  life.  For  to  continue  to  be  such  as 
thou  hast  hitherto  been,  and  to  be  torn  in  pieces 
and  defiled  in  such  a  life,  is  the  character  of  a 
very  stupid  man  and  one  over-fond  of  his  life,  and 
like  those  half-devoured  fighters  with  wild  beasts, 
who  though  covered  with  wounds  and  gore,  still 
entreat  to  be  kept  to  the  following  day,  though 
they  will  be  exposed  in  the  same  state  to  the  same 
claws  and  bites.1  Therefore  fix  thyself  in  the  pos- 

1  See  Seneca,  Epp.  70,  on  these  exhibitions  which  amused 
the  people  of  those  days.  These  fighters  were  the  Bestiarri, 
some  of  whom  may  have  been  criminals;  but  even  if  they 


250  MEDITATIONS. 

session  of  these  few  names :  and  if  thou  art  able 
to  abide  in  them,  abide  as  if  thou  wast  removed  to 
certain  islands  of  the  Happy.1  But  if  thou  shalt 
perceive  that  thou  fallest  out  of  them  and  dost 
not  maintain  thy  hold,  go  courageously  into  some 
nook  where  thou  shalt  maintain  them,  or  even 
depart  at  once  from  life,  not  in  passion,  but  with 
simplicity  and  freedom  and  modesty,  after  doing 
this  one  [laudable]  thing  at  least  in  thy  life,  to 
have  gone  out  of  it  thus.  In  order,  however,  to 
the  remembrance  of  these  names,  it  will  greatly 
help  thee  if  thou  rememberest  the  gods,  and  that 

were,  the  exhibition  was  equally  characteristic  of  the  de- 
praved habits  of  the  spectators. 

1  The  islands  of  the  Happy,  or  the  Fortunatae  Insulae,  are 
spoken  of  by  the  Greek  and  Koman  writers.  They  were  the 
abode  of  Heroes,  like  Achilles  and  Diomedes,  as  we  see  in 
the  Scolion  of  Harmodius  and  Aristogiton.  Sertorius  heard 
of  the  islands  at  Cadiz  from  some  sailors  who  had  been 
there,  and  he  had  a  wish  to  go  and  live  in  them  and  rest  from 
his  troubles  (Plutarch,  Sertorius,  c.  8).  In  the  Odyssey, 
Proteus  told  Menelaus  that  he  should  not  die  in  Argos,  but 
be  removed  to  &  place  at  the  boundary  of  the  earth  where 
Ehadamanthus  dwelt  (Odyssey,  iv.  565)  :  — 

"  For  there  in  sooth  man's  life  is  easiest : 
Nor  snow  nor  raging  storm  nor  rain  is  there 
But  ever  gently  breathing  gales  of  Zephyr 
Oceanus  sends  up  to  gladden  man." 

It  is  certain  that  the  writer  of  the  Odyssey  only  follows 
some  old  legend,  without  having  any  knowledge  of  any 
place  which  corresponds  to  his  description.  The  two  islands 
which  Sertorius  heard  of  may  be  Madeira  and  the  adjacent 
island.  Compare  Pindar,  01.  ii.  129. 


MARCUS  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.          251 

they  wish  not  to  be  flattered,  but  wish  all  reason- 
able beings  to  be  made  like  themselves;  and  if 
thou  rememberest  that  what  does  the  work  of  a 
fig-tree  is  a  fig-tree,  and  that  what  does  the  work 
of  a  dog  is  a  dog,  and  that  what  does  the  work  of 
a  bee  is  a  bee,  and  that  what  does  the  work  of  a 
man  is  a  man. 

9.  Mimi,1  war,  astonishment,  torpor,  slavery, 
will  daily  wipe  out  those  holy  principles  of  thine, 
f  How  many  things  without  studying  nature  dost 
thou  imagine,  and  how  many  dost  thou  neglect?2 
But  it  is  thy  duty  so  to  look  on  and  so  to  do 
everything,  that  at  the  same  time  the  power  of 
dealing  with  circumstances  is  perfected,  and  the 
contemplative  faculty  is  exercised,  and  the  con- 
fidence which  comes  from  the  knowledge  of  each 
several  thing  is  maintained  without  showing  it, 
but  yet  not  concealed.  For  when  wilt  thou  enjoy 
simplicity,  when  gravity,  and  when  the  knowledge 
of  every  several  thing,  both  what  it  is  in  sub- 
stance, and  what  place  it  has  in^  the  universe, 
and  how  long  it  is  formed  to  exist,  and  of  what 
things  it  is  compounded,  and  to  whom  it  can  be- 
long, and  who  are  able  both  to  give  it  and  take  it 
away  ? 

1  Corals  conjectured  /wiros  "hatred"  in  place  of  Mimi,  Ro- 
man plays  in  which  action  and  gesticulation  were  all  or 
nearly  all. 

1  This  is  corrupt.     See  the  edition  of  Schultz. 


252  MEDITATIONS. 

10.  A  spider  is  proud  when  it  has  caught  a  fly, 
and  another  when  he  has  caught  a  poor  hare,  and 
another  when  he  has  taken  a  little  fish  in  a  net, 
and  another  when  he  has  taken  wild  boars,  and 
another  when   he  has   taken  bears,  and  another 
when  he  has   taken  Sarmatians.     Are  not   these 
robbers,  if  thou  examinest  their  opinions  ? 1 

11.  Acquire   the  contemplative  way  of  seeing 
how  all  things  change  into  one  another,  and  con- 
stantly attend  to  it,  and  exercise   thyself  about 
this   part    [of  philosophy].      For   nothing   is   so 
much  adapted  to  produce  magnanimity.     Such  a 
man  has  put  off  the  body,  and  as  he  sees  that  he 
must,  no  one   knows   how  soon,  go   away  from 
among  men  and  leave  everything  here,  he  gives 
himself  up  entirely  to  just  doing  in  all  his  actions, 
and  in  everything  else  that   happens  he  resigns 
himself  to  the  universal  nature.     But  as  to  what 
any   man   shall   say   or   think   about   him   or   do 
against  him,  he  never  even  thinks  of  it,  being  him- 
self contented  with  these  two  things,  —  with  act- 
ing justly  in  what  he  now  does,  and  being  satisfied 
with  what  is  now  assigned  to  him ;  and  he  lays 
aside  all  distracting  and  busy  pursuits,  .and  desires 
nothing    else    than   to    accomplish   the    straight 

1  Marcus  means  to  say  that  conquerors  are  robbers.  He 
himself  warred  against  Sarmatians,  and  was  a  robber,  as  he 
says,  like  the  rest.  But  compare  the  life  of  Avidius  Cassius, 
c.  4,  by  Vulcatius. 


sius, 


MAECUS  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.  253 

course  through  the   law,1  and   by  accomplishing 
the  straight  course  to  follow  God. 

12.  What  need  is  there  of  suspicious  fear,  since 
it  is  in  thy  power  to  inquire  what  ought  to  be 
done  ?     And  if  thou  seest  clear,  go  by  this  way 
content,  without  turning  back :  but  if  thou  dost 
not  see   clear,  stop  and   take  the  best   advisers. 
But  if  any  other  things  oppose  thee,  go  on  accord- 
ing to  thy  powers  with  due  consideration,  keeping 
to  that  which  appears  to  be  just.     For  it  is  best 
to  reach   this   object,  and  if  thou   dost   fail,  let 
thy  failure  be  in  attempting  this.     He  who  fol- 
lows  reason  in  all  .things   is   both  tranquil   and 
active  at  the  same  time,  and  also  cheerful  and  col- 
lected. 

13.  Inquire  of  thyself  as  soon  as  thou  wakest 
from  sleep  whether  it  will  make  any  difference  to 
thee  if  another  does  what  is  just  and  right.     It 
will  make  no  difference  (vi.  32;  viii.  55). 

Thou  hast  not  forgotten,  I  suppose,  that  those 
who  assume  arrogant  airs  in  bestowing  their  praise 
or  blame  on  others  are  such  as  they  are  at  bed  and 
at  board,  and  thou  hast  not  forgotten  what  they  do, 
and  what  they  avoid,  and  what  they  pursue,  and 
how  they  steal  and  how  they  rob,  not  with  hands 
arid  feet,  but  with  their  most  valuable  part,  by 
means  of  which  there  is  produced,  when  a  man 

1  By  the  law,  he  means  the  divine  law,  obedience  to  the  will 
of  God. 


254  MEDITATIONS. 

chooses,  fidelity,  modesty,  truth,  law,  a  good  dae- 
mon [happiness]  (vii.  17)  ? 

14.  To  her  who  gives  and   takes  back  all,  to 
nature,  the  man  who  is  instructed   and  modest 
says,  Give  what  thou  wilt;  take  back  what  thou 
wilt.     And  he  says  this  not  proudly,  but  obedi- 
ently, and  well  pleased  with  her. 

15.  Short  is  the  little  which  remains  to  thee  of 
life.     Live  as  on  a  mountain.     For  it  makes  no 
difference  whether  a  man  lives  there  or  here,  if  he 
lives  everywhere  in  the  world  as  in  a  state  [polit- 
ical community].     Let  men  see,  let  them  know  a 
real  man  who  lives  according  to  nature.     If  they 
cannot  endure  him,  let  them  kill  him.     For  that 
is  better  than  to  live  thus  [as  men  do]. 

16.  No  longer  talk  at  all  about  the  kind  of  man 
that  a  good  man  ought  to  be,  but  be  such. 

17.  Constantly  contemplate  the  whole  of  time 
and  the  whole  of  substance,  and  consider  that  all 
individual  things  as  to  substance  are  a  grain  of  a 
fig,  and  as  to  time  the  turning  of  a  gimlet. 

18.  Look  at  everything  that  exists,  and  observe 
that  it  is  already  in  dissolution  and  in  change,  and 
as  it  were  putrefaction  or  dispersion,  or  that  every- 
thing is  so  constituted  by  nature  as  to  die. 

19.  Consider  what  men  are  when  they  are  eat- 
ing, sleeping,  generating,  easing  themselves,  and 
so  forth.     Then  what  kind  of  men  they  are  when 
they  are  imperious  f  and  arrogant,  or  angry  and 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  255 

scolding  from  their  elevated  place.  But  a  short 
time  ago  to  how  many  they  were  slaves  and  for 
what  things;  and  after  a  little  time  consider  in 
what  a  condition  they  will  be. 

20.  That  is  for  the  good  of  each  thing,  which 
the  universal  nature  brings  to  each.     And  it  is  for 
its  good  at  the  time  when  nature  brings  it. 

21.  "  The  earth  loves  the  shower ; "  and  "  the 
solemn  ether  loves ;  "  and  the  universe  loves  to 
make  whatever  is  about  to  be.     I  say  then  to  the 
universe,  that  I  love  as  thou  lovest.     And  is  not 
this  too  said,  that  "  this  or  that  loves  [is  wont]  to 
be  produced  ?  "  1 

22.  Either   thou   livest   here  and  hast  already 
accustomed  thyself  to  it,  or  thou  art  going  away, 
and  this  was  thy  own  will ;  or  thou  art  dying  and 
hast   discharged   thy   duty.      But    besides   these 
things  there  is  nothing.     Be  of  good  cheer,  then. 

23.  Let  this  always  be  plain  to  thee,  that  this 

1  These  words  are  from  Euripides.  They  are  cited  by  Aris- 
totle, Ethic.  Nicom.  viii.  1.  Athenaeus  (xiii.  296)  and  Sto- 
baeus  quote  seven  complete  lines  beginning  epq.  ptv  6(j.fipov 
yaia.  There  is  a  similar  fragment  of  Aeschylus,  Danaides, 
also  quoted  by  Athenaeus. 

It  was  the  fashion  of  the  Stoics  to  work  on  the  meanings 
of  words.  So  Antoninus  here  takes  the  verb  <£t\€t,  "loves," 
which  has  also  the  sense  of  "is  wont,"  "  uses,"  and  the  like. 
He  finds  in  the  common  language  of  mankind  a  philosophical 
truth,  and  most  great  truths  are  expressed  in  the  common 
language  of  life ;  some  understand  them,  but  most  people 
utter  them  without  knowing  how  much  they  mean. 


256  MEDITATIONS. 

piece  of  land  is  like  any  other ;  and  that  all  things 
here  are  the  same  with  things  on  the  top  of  a 
mountain,  or  on  the  sea-shore,  or  wherever  thou 
choosest  to  be.  For  thou  wilt  find  just  what 
Plato  says,  Dwelling  within  the  walls  of  a  city  as 
in  a  shepherd's  fold  on  a  mountain.  [The  three 
last  words  are  omitted  in  the  translation.]  l 

24.  What  is  my  ruling  faculty  now  to  me?  and 
of  what  nature  am  I  now  making  it  ?  and  for  what 
purpose  am  I  now  using  it  ?  is  it  void  of  under- 
standing ?  is  it  loosed  and  rent  asunder  from  social 
life?  is  it  melted  into  and  mixed  with  the  poor 
flesh  so  as  to  move  together  with  it  ? 

25.  He  who  flies  from  his  master  is  a  runaway ; 
but  the  law  is  master,  and  he  who  breaks  the  law 
is  a  runaway.     And  he  also   who  is   grieved   or 
angry  or  afraid,f  is  dissatisfied  because  something 
has  been  or  is  or  shall  be  of  the  things  which  are 
appointed  by  him  who  rules  all  things,  and  he  is 
Law  and  assigns  to  every  man  what  is  fit.     He 
then  who  fears   or   is   grieved   or   is   angry  is  a 
runaway.2 

26.  A  man  deposits  seed  in  a  womb  and  goes 
away,  and  then  another  cause  takes  it,  and  labors 

1  Plato,  Theaet.  174  D.  E.  But  compare  the  original  with 
the  use  that  Antoninus  has  made  of  it. 

8  Antoninus  is  here  playing  on  the  etymology,  of  wfyios, 
law,  assignment,  that  which  assigns  (»^Met)  to  every  man  his 
portion. 


MAECUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  257 

on  it  and  makes  a  child.  What  a  thing  from  such 
a  material !  Again,  the  child  passes  food  down 
through  the  throat,  and  then  another  cause  takes 
it  and  makes  perception  and  motion,  and  in  fine, 
life  and  strength  and  other  things  ;  how  many  and 
how  strange  !  Observe  then  the  things  which  are 
produced  in  such  a  hidden  way,  and  see  the  power 
just  as  we  see  the  power  which  carries  things 
downwards  and  upwards,  not  with  the  eyes,  but 
still  no  less  plainly  (vii.  75). 

27.  Constantly  consider  how  all  things  such  as 
they  now  are,  in  time  'past  also  were  ;  and  con- 
sider  that   they   will   be    the   same   again.     And 
place  before  thy  eyes  entire  dramas  and  stages  of 
the  same  form,  whatever  thou  hast  learned  from 
thy  experience  or  from  older  history ;  for  example, 
the  whole  court  of  Hadrianus,  and  the  whole  court 
of  Antoninus,  and  the  whole  court  of  Philippus, 
Alexander,    Croesus ;     for   all    those   were    such 
dramas  as  we  see  now,  only  with  different  actors. 

28.  Imagine  every  man  who  is  grieved  at  any- 
thing or  discontented  to  be  like  a  pig  which  is  sac- 
rificed and  kicks  and  screams. 

Like  this  pig  also  is  he  who  on  his  bed  in  silence 
laments  the  bonds  in  which  we  are  held.  And 
consider  that  only  to  the  rational  animal  is  it 
given  to  follow  voluntarily  what  happens ;  but 
simply  to  follow  is  a  necessity  imposed  on  all. 

29.  Severally  on  the  occasion  of  everything  that 


258  MEDITATIONS. 

thou  doest,  pause  and  ask  thyself  if  death  is  a 
dreadful  thing  because  it  deprives  thee  of  this. 

30.  When  thou  art  offended  at  any  man's  fault, 
forthwith  turn  to  thyself  and  reflect  in  what  like 
manner  thou  dost   err  thyself;   for  example,  in 
thinking  that  money  is  a  good  thing,  or  pleasure, 
or  a  bit  of  reputation,  and  the  like.     For  by  at- 
tending to  this  thou  wilt  quickly  forget  thy  anger, 
if  this  consideration  also  is  added,  that  the  man  is 
compelled  :  for  what  else  could  he  do  ?  or,  if  thou 
art  able,  take  away  from  him  the  compulsion. 

31.  When   thou   hast  seen   Satyron l  the  Soc- 
ratic,f  think  of  either  Eutyches  or  Hymen,  and 
when  thou  hast  seen  Euphrates,  think  of  Euty- 
chion  or  Silvanus,  and  when  thou  hast  seen  Alci- 
phron  think   of  Tropaeophorus,  and  when  thou 
hast  seen  Xenophon,  think  of  Crito 2  or  Severus, 
and  when  thou  hast  looked  on   thyself,  think  of 
any  other  Caesar,  and  in  the  case  of  every  one  do 
in  like  manner.     Then  let  this  thought  be  in  thy 
mind,  Where  then  are  those  men  ?     Nowhere,  or 

1  Nothing  is  known  of  Satyron  or  Satyrion ;  nor,  I  believe, 
of  Eutyches  or  Hymen.     Euphrates  is  honorably  mentioned 
by  Epictetus  (iii.  15,  8;  iv.  8,  17).     Pliny  (Epp,  i.  10)  speaks 
very  highly  of  him.     He  obtained  the  permission  of  the  Em- 
peror Hadrian  to  drink  poison,  because  he  was  old  and  in  bad 
health  (Dion  Cassius,  69,  c.  8). 

2  Crito  is  the  friend  of  Socrates;  and  he  was,  it  appears, 
also  a  friend  of  Xenophon.     When  the  emperor  says  "  seen" 
(t'Scij/),  he  does  not  mean  with  the  eyes. 


MABCUS  AUEELIU8  ANTONINUS.  259 

nobody  knows  where.  For  thus  continuously 
thou  wilt  look  at  human  things  as  smoke  and 
nothing  at  all ;  especially  if  thou  reflectest  at  the 
same  time  that  what  has  once  changed  will  never 
exist  again  in  the  infinite  duration  of  time.  But 
thou,  in  what  a  brief  space  of  time  is  thy  exist- 
ence ?  And  why  art  thou  not  content  to  pass 
through  this  short  time  in  an  orderly  way  ?  What 
matter  and  opportunity  [for  thy  activity]  art  thou 
avoiding?  For  what  else  are  all  these  things, 
except  exercises  for  the  reason,  when  it  has  viewed 
carefully  and  by  examination  into  their  nature  the 
things  which  happen  in  life  ?  Persevere  then 
until  thou  shalt  have  made  these  things  thy  own, 
as  the  stomach  which  is  strengthened  makes  all 
things  its  own,  as  the  blazing  fire  makes  flame 
and  brightness  out  of  everything  that  is  thrown 
into  it. 

32.  Let   it  not  be  in  any  man's  power  to  say 
truly  of  thee  that  thou  art  not  simple  or  that  thou 
art  not  good ;  but  let  him  be  a  liar  whoever  shall 
think  anything  of  this  kind  about  thee ;  and  this 
is  altogether  in  thy  power.     For  who  is  he  that 
shall  hinder   thee  from  being  good  and  simple? 
Do  thou  only  determine  to  live  no  longer  unless 
thou  shalt  be  such.    For  neither  does  reason  allow 
[thee  to  live],  if  thou  art  not  such.1 

33.  What  is  that  which  as  to  this  material  [our 

1  Compare  Epictetus,  i.  29,  28. 


260  MEDITATIONS. 

life]  can  be  done  or  said  in  the  way  most  conform- 
able to  reason  ?  For  whatever  this  may  be,  it  is 
in  thy  power  to  do  it  or  to  say  it,  and  do  not 
make  excuses  that  thou  art  hindered.  Thou  wilt 
not  cease  to  lament  till  thy  mind  is  in  such  a  con- 
dition that,  what  luxury  is  to  those  who  enjoy 
pleasure,  such  shall  be  to  thee,  in  the  matter 
which  is  subjected  and  presented  to  thee,  the 
doing  of  the  things  which  are  conformable  to 
man's  constitution;  for  a  man  ought  to  consider 
as  an  enjoyment  everything  which  it  is  in  his 
power  to  do  according  to  his  own  nature.  And  it 
is  in  his  power  everywhere.  Now,  it  is  not  given 
to  a  cylinder  to  move  everywhere  by  its  own 
motion,  nor  yet  to  water  nor  to  fire,  nor  to  any- 
thing else  which  is  governed  by  nature  or  an 
irrational  soul,  for  the  things  which  check  them 
and  stand  in  the  way  are  many.  But  intelligence 
and  reason  are  able  to  go  through  everything  that 
opposes  them,  and  in  such  manner  as  they  are 
formed  by  nature  and  as  they  choose.  Place 
before  thy  eyes  this  facility  with  which  the  reason 
will  be  carried  through  all  things,  as  fire  upwards, 
as  a  stone  downwards,  as  a  cylinder  .down  an  in- 
clined surface,  and  seek  for  nothing  further.  For 
all  other  obstacles  either  affect  the  body  only, 
which  is  a  dead  thing ;  or,  except  through  opinion 
and  the  yielding  of  the  reason  itself,  they  do  not 
crush  nor  do  any  harm  of  any  kind ;  for  if  they 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.          261 

4 

did,  he  who  felt  it  would  immediately  become  bad. 
Now,  in  the  case  of  all  things  which  have  a  certain 
constitution,  whatever  harm  may  happen  to  any  of 
them,  that  which  is  so  affected  becomes  conse- 
quently worse ;  but  in  the  like  case,  a  man  be- 
comes both  better,  if  one  may  say  so,  and  more 
worthy  of  praise  by  making  a  right  use  of  these 
accidents.  And  finally  remember  that  nothing 
harms  him  who  is  really  a  citizen,  which  does  not 
harm  the  state ;  nor  yet  does  anything  harm  the 
state,  which  does  not  harm  law  [order]  ;  and  of 
these  things  which  are  called  misfortunes  not  one 
harms  law.  What  then  does  not  harm  law  does 
not  harm  either  state  or  citizen. 

34.  To  him  who  is  penetrated  by  true  princi- 
ples even  the  briefest  precept  is  sufficient,  and  any 
common  precept,  to  remind  him  that  he  should  be 
free  from  grief  and  fear.  For  example,  - 

"  Leaves,  some  the  wind  scatters  on  the  ground  — 
So  is  the  race  of  men." ' 

Leaves,  also,  are  thy  children  ;  and  leaves,  too,  are 
they  who  cry  out  as  if  they  were  worthy  of  credit 
and  bestow  their  praise,  or  on  the  contrary  curse, 
or  secretly  blame  and  sneer ;  and  leaves,  in  like 
manner,  are  those  who  shall  receive  and  transmit 
a  man's  fame  to  after-times.  For  all  such  things  as 
these  "  are  produced  in.  the  season  of  spring,"  as 
the  poet  says;  then  the  wind  casts  them  down; 
1  Homer,  II.  vi.  146. 


262  MEDITATIONS. 

then  the  forest  produces  other  leaves  in  their 
places.  But  a  brief  existence  is  common  to  all 
things,  and  yet  thou  avoidest  and  pursuest  all 
things  as  if  they  would  be  eternal.  A  little  time, 
and  thou  shalt  close  thy  eyes ;  and  him  who  has 
attended  thee  to  thy  grave  another  soon  will  lament. 

35.  The   healthy  eye   ought  to   see  all  visible 
things  and  not  to  say,  I  wish  for  green  things  ;  for 
this  is  the  condition  of  a  diseased  eye.     And  the 
healthy  hearing  and  smelling  ought  to  be  ready  to 
perceive  all  that  can  be  heard  and  smelled.     And 
the  healthy  stomach  ought  to  be  with  respect  to 
all  food  just  as  the  mill  with  respect  to  all  things 
which  it  is  formed  to  grind.     And  accordingly  the 
healthy  understanding  ought  to  be  prepared  for 
everything  which  happens ;  but  that  which  says, 
Let  my  dear  children  live,  and  let  all  men  praise 
whatever   I   may  do,  is  an   eye   which  seeks  for 
green  things,  or  teeth  which  seek  for  soft  things. 

36.  There   is  no  man  so  fortunate  that  there 
shall  not  be  by  him  when  he  is  dying  some  who 
are  pleased  with  what  is  going  to  happen.1     Sup- 
pose that  he  was  a  good  and  wise  man,  will  there 
not  be  at  last  some  one  to  say  to  himself,  Let  us 
at  last  breathe  freely,  being  relieved  from  this 
schoolmaster?     It   is   true  that  he  was  harsh  to 

1  He  says  *a.K6v,  but  as  he  affirms  in  other  places  that  death 
is  no  evil,  he  must  mean  what  others  may  call  an  evil,  and  he 
means  only  "  what  is  going  to  happen." 


MARCUS  AUBELIUS  ANTONINUS.  263 

none  of  us,  but  I  perceived  that  he  tacitly  con- 
demns us.  —  This  is  what  is  said  of  a  good  man. 
But  in  our  own  case  how  many  other  things  are 
there  for  which  there  are  many  who  wish  to  get 
rid  of  us.  Thou  wilt  consider  this,  then,  when 
thou  art  dying,  and  thou  wilt  depart  more  con- 
tentedly by  reflecting  thus  :  I  am  going  away  from 
such  a  life,  in  which  even  my  associates  in  behalf 
of  whom  I  have  striven  so  much,  prayed,  and 
cared,  themselves  wish  me  to  depart,  hoping  per- 
chance to  get  some  little  advantage  by  it.  Why 
then  should  a  man  cling  to  a  longer  stay  here? 
Do  not  however  for  this  reason  go  away  less 
kindly  disposed  to  them,  but  preserving  thy  own 
character,  and  friendly  and  benevolent  and  mild, 
and  on  the  other  hand  not  as  if  thou  wast  torn 
away ;  but  as  when  a  man  dies  a  quiet  death,  the 
poor  soul  is  easily  separated  from  the  body,  such 
also  ought  thy  departure  from  men  to  be,  for 
nature  united  thee  to  them  and  associated  thee. 
But  does  she  now  dissolve  the  union  ?  Well,  I  am 
separated  as  from  kinsmen,  not  however  dragged 
resisting,  but  without  compulsion  ;  for  this,  too,  is 
one  of  the  things  according  to  nature. 

37.  Accustom  thyself  as  much  as  possible  on 
the  occasion  of  anything  being  done  by  any  per- 
son to  inquire  with  thyself,  For  what  object  is  this 
man  doing  this?  But  begin  with  thyself,  and 
examine  thyself  first. 


264  MEDITATIONS. 

38.  Remember  that  this  which  pulls  the  strings 
is  the  thing  which  is  hidden  within  :  this  is  the 
power  of  persuasion,  this  is  life,  this,  if  one  may  so 
say,  is  man.  In  contemplating  thyself  never  in- 
clude the  vessel  which  surrounds  thee  and  these 
instruments  which  are  attached  about  it.  For 
they  are  like  to  an  axe,  differing  only  in  this,  that 
they  grow  to  the  body.  For  indeed  there  is  no 
more  use  in  these  parts  without  the  cause  which 
moves  and  checks  them  than  in  the  weaver's 
shuttle,  and  the  writer's  pen,  and  the  driver's 
whip.1 

1  See  the  Philosophy  of  Antoninus,  p.  62,  n.  2. 


XI. 

1.  THESE  are  the  properties  of  the  rational  soul : 
it  sees  itself,  analyzes  itself,  and  makes  itself  such 
as  it  chooses  ;  the  fruit  which  it  bears  itself  enjoys, 
—  for  the  fruits  of  plants  and  that  in  animals 
which  corresponds  to  fruits  others  enjoy,  —  it 
obtains  its  own  end,  wherever  the  limit  of  life  may 
be  fixed.  Not  as  in  a  dance  and  in  a  play  and  in 
such  like  things,  where  the  whole  action  is  incom- 
plete if  anything  cuts  it  short ;  but  in  every  part, 
and  wherever  it  may  be  stopped,  it  makes  what 
has  been  set  before  it  full  and  complete,  so  that  it 
can  say,  I  have  what  is  my  own.  And  further  it 
traverses  the  whole  universe,  and  the  surrounding 
vacuum,  and  surveys  its  form,  and  it  extends 
itself  into  the  infinity  of  time,  and  embraces  and 
comprehends  the l  periodical  renovation  of  all 
things,  and  it  comprehends  that  those  who  come 
after  us  will  see  nothing  new,  nor  have  those 
before  us  seen  anything  more,  but  in  a  manner  he 
who  is  forty  years  old,  if- he  has  any  understanding 
at  all,  has  seen  by  virtue  of  the  uniformity  that 
TaXtry«»wtoi'.  See  v,  13,  32 ;  x.  7. 


266  MEDITATIONS. 

prevails  all  things  which  have  been  and  all  that 
will  be.  This  too  is  a  property  of  the  rational 
soul,  love  of  one's  neighbor,  and  truth  and  mod- 
esty, and  to  value  nothing  more  than  itself,  which 
is  also  the  property  of  Law.1  Thus  then  right 
reason  differs  not  at  all  from  the  reason  of  justice. 

2.  Thou  wilt  set  little  value  on  pleasing  song 
and  dancing  and  the  pancratium,  if  thou  wilt  dis- 
tribute the  melody  of   the  voice  into  its  several 
sounds,   and  ask  thyself  as  to  each,  if  thou  art 
mastered  by  this ;  for  thou  wilt  be  prevented  by 
shame  from  confessing  it :  and  in  the  matter  of 
dancing,  if  at  each  movement  and  attitude  thou 
wilt  do  the  same ;  and  the  like  also  in  the  matter 
of  the  pancratium.     In    all   things,  then,  except 
virtue  and  the  acts  of  virtue,  remember  to  apply 
thyself  to  their  several  parts,  and  by  this  division 
to  come  to  value  them  little :  and  apply  this  rule 
also  to  thy  whole  life. 

3.  What  a  soul  that  is  which  is  ready,  if  at  any 
moment  it  must  be  separated  from  the  body,  and 
ready  either  to   be   extinguished    or  dispersed  or 
continue    to    exist ;    but   so    that    this    readiness 
comes  from  a  man's  own  judgment,  not  from  mere 
obstinacy,  as  with  the  Christians,2  but  consider- 

1  Law  is  the  order  by  which  all  things  are  governed. 

2  See  the  Life  of  Antoninus.     This  is  the  only  passage  in 
which  the  emperor  speaks  of  the  Christians.     Epictetus  (iv. 
7,  6)  names  them  Galilaei. 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  267 

ately  and  with  dignity  and  in  a  way  to  persuade 
another,  without  tragic  show. 

4.  Have  I  done  something  for  the  general  in- 
terest?    Well  then  I  have  had  my  reward.     Let 
this  always  be  present  to  thy  mind,  and  never 
stop  [doing  such  good]. 

5.  What  is  thy  art?     To  be  good.     And  how 
is  this  accomplished  well  except  by  general  prin- 
ciples, some  about  the  nature  of  the  universe,  and 
others  about  the  proper  constitution  of  man  ? 

6.  At  first  tragedies  were  brought  on  the  stage 
as  means  of  reminding  men  of  the  things  which 
happen  to  them,  and  that  it  is  according  to  nature 
for  things  to  happen  so,  and  that,  if  you  are  de- 
lighted with  what   is  shown   on   the    stage,  you 
should   not   be    troubled  with   that  which   takes 
place  on  the  larger  stage.     For  you  see  that  these 
things  must  be  accomplished  thus,  and  that  even 
they  bear  them  who  cry  out,1 "  O  Cithaeron."    And, 
indeed,  some  things  are  said  well  by  the  dramatic 
writers,  of  which  kind  is  the  following  especially :  — 

"  Me  and  my  children  if  the  gods  neglect, 
This  has  its  reason  too."  2 

And  again,  — 

"  We  must  not  chafe  and  fret  at  that  which  happens." 
And,— 

"  Life's  harvest  reap  like  the  wheat's  fruitful  ear." 
And  other  things  of  the  -same  kind. 

1  Sophocles,  Oedipus  Rex. 
*  See  vii.  41,  38,  40. 


268  MEDITATIONS. 

After  tragedy  the  old  comedy  was  introduced, 
which  had  a  magisterial  freedom  of  speech,  and  by 
its  very  plainness  of  speaking  was  useful  in  re- 
minding men  to  beware  of  insolence  ;  and  for  this 
purpose  too  Diogenes  used  to  take  from  these 
writers. 

But  as  to  the  middle  comedy,  which  came  next, 
observe  what  it  was,  and  again,  for  what  object  the 
new  comedy  was  introduced,  which  gradually  sank 
down  into  a  mere  mimic  artifice.  That  some  good 
things  are  said  even  by  these  writers,  everybody 
knows :  but  the  whole  plan  of  such  poetry  and 
dramaturgy,  to  what  end  does  it  look? 

7.  How  plain  does  it  appear  that  there  is  not 
another  condition  of  life  so  well  suited  for  philoso- 
phizing as  this  in  which  thou  now  happenest  to  be. 

8.  A  branch  cut  off  from  the  adjacent  branch 
must  of  necessity  be  cut  off  from  the  whole  tree 
also.     So  too  a  man  when  he  is  separated  from 
another  man  has  fallen  off  from  the  whole  social 
community.     Now  as  to  a  branch,  another  cuts  it 
off;  but  a  man  by  his  own  act  separates  himself 
from   his  neighbor  when  he  hates  him  and  turns 
away  from  him,  and  he  does  not  know  that  he  has 
at  the  same  time  cut  himself  off  from  the  whole 
social  system.     Yet  he  has  this  privilege  certainly 
from    Zeus,  who  framed  society,  for  it  is  in  em- 
power to  grow  again  to  that  which  is  near  to  us, 
and  again  to  become  a  part  which  helps  to  make 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINU8.          269 

up  the  whole.  However,  if  it  often  happens,  this 
kind  of  separation,  it  makes  it  difficult  for  that 
which  detaches  itself  to  be  brought  to  unity  and  to 
be  restored  to  its  former  condition.  Finally,  the 
branch,  which  from  the  first  grew  together  with 
the  tree,  and  has  continued  to  have  one  life  with 
it,  is  not  like  that  which  after  being  cut  off  is  then 
ingrafted,  for  this  is  something  like  what  the 
gardeners  mean  when  they  say  that  it  grows  with 
the  rest  of  the  tree,  but  f  that  it  has  not  the  same 
mind  with  it. 

9.  As  those  who  try  to  stand  in  thy  way  when 
thou  art  proceeding  according  to  right  reason  will 
not  be  able  to  turn  thee  aside  from  thy  proper 
action,  so   neither  let  them  drive  thee  from  thy 
benevolent  feelings  towards  them,  but  be  on  thy 
guard  equally  in  both  matters,  not  only  in   the 
matter  of  steady  judgment  and  action,  but  also  in 
the   matter   of   gentleness   to    those    who    try   to 
hinder  or  otherwise  trouble  thee.     For  this  also  is 
a  weakness,  to  be  vexed  at  them,  as  well  as  to  be 
diverted  from  thy  course   of  action  and  to  give 
way  through  fear  ;  for  both  are  equally  deserters 
from  their  post,  —  the  man  who  does  it  through 
fear,  and  the  man  who  is  alienated  from  him  who 
is  by  nature  a  kinsman  and  a  friend. 

10.  There  is  no  nature  which  is  inferior  to  art, 
for  the  arts  imitate  the  natures  of  things.     But  if 
this  is  so,  that  nature  which  is  the  most  perfect 


270  MEDITATIONS. 

and  the  most  comprehensive  of  all  natures,  cannot 
fall  short  of  the  skill  of  art.  Now  all  arts  do  the 
inferior  things  for  the  sake  of  the  superior ;  there- 
fore the  universal  nature  does  so  too.  And,  in- 
deed, hence  is  the  origin  of  justice,  and  in  justice 
the  other  virtues  have  their  foundation  :  for  justice 
will  not  be  observed,  if  we  either  care  for  middle 
things  [things  indifferent],  or  are  easily  deceived 
arid  careless  and  changeable  (v.  16,  30  ;  vii.  55). 

11.  If  the  things  do  not  come  to  thee,  the  pur- 
suits and  avoidances  of  which  disturb  thee,  still  in 
a  manner  thou  goest  to  them.     Let  then  thy  judg- 
ment about  them  be  at  rest,  and  they  will  remain 
quiet,  and  thou  wilt  not  be  seen  either  pursuing 
or  avoiding. 

12.  The  spherical  form  of  the  soul  maintains  its 
figure  when  it  is  neither  extended  towards  any 
object,  nor  contracted  inwards,  nor  dispersed  nor 
sinks  down,  but  is  illuminated  by  light,  by  which 
it  sees  the  truth,  —  the  truth  of  all  things  and  the 
truth  that  is  in  itself  (viii.  41,  45  ;  xii.  3). 

13.  Suppose   any  man   shall   despise   me.     Let 
him  look  to  that  himself.     But  I  will  look  to  this, 
that  I  be  not  discovered  doing  or  saying  anything 
deserving  of  contempt.     Shall  any  man  hate  me? 
Let  him  look  to  it.     But  I  will  be  mild  and  benev- 
olent towards  every  man,  and  ready  to  show  even 
him   his   mistake,  not   reproachfully,   nor  yet   as 
making  a  display  of  my  endurance,  but  nobly  and 


MAE C US  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.          271 

honestly,  like  the  great  Phocion,  unless  indeed  he 
only  assumed  it.  For  the  interior  [parts]  ought 
to  be  such,  and  a  man  ought  to  be  seen  by  the  gods 
neither  dissatisfied  with  anything  nor  complaining. 
For  what  evil  is  it  to  thee,  if  thou  art  now  doing 
what  is  agreeable  to  thy  own  nature,  and  art  satis- 
fied with  that  which  at  this  moment  is  suitable  to 
the  nature  of  the  universe,  since  thou  art  a  human 
being  placed  at  thy  post  in  order  that  what  is 
for  the  common  advantage  may  be  done  in  some 
way? 

14.  Men   despise   one   another   and   flatter  one 
another;  and  men  wish  to  raise  themselves  above 
one  another,  and  crouch  before  one  another. 

15.  How  unsound  and  insincere  is  he  who  says, 
I  have  determined  to  deal  with  thee  in  a  fair  way ! 
—  What  art  thou  doing,  man  ?     There  is  no  occa- 
sion to  give  this  notice.     It  will  soon  show  itself 
by  acts.     The  voice  ought  to  be  plainly  written 
on  the  forehead.    Such  as  a  man's  character  is,f  he 
immediately  shows  it  in  his  eyes,  just  as  he  who  is 
beloved  forthwith  reads  everything  in  the  eyes  of 
lovers.     The  man  who  is  honest  and  good  ought 
to  be  exactly  like  a  man  who  smells  strong,  so  that 
the  bystander  as  soon  as  he  comes  near  him  must 
smell  whether  he  choose  or  not.     But  the  affecta- 
tion of  simplicity  is  like  a  crooked  stick.1   Nothing 

\  Instead  of  <r/cd\/«7  Saumaise  reads  cvca^.    There  is  a 
Greek  proverb,   <TK*np!>v  &\ov  otStiror'   dpOfo:    "You  cannot 


272  MEDITATIONS. 

is  more  disgraceful  than  a  wolfish  friendship  [false 
friendship].  Avoid  this  most  of  all.  The  good 
and  simple  and  benevolent  show  all  these  things 
in  the  eyes,  and  there  is  no  mistaking. 

16.  As  to  living  in  the  best  way,  this  power  is 
in  the  soul,  if  it  be  indifferent  to  things  which  are 
indifferent.     And  it  will  be  indifferent,  if  it  looks 
on    each   of  these   things   separately  and   all   to- 
gether, and  if  it  remembers  that  not  one  of  them 
produces  in  us  an  opinion  about  itself,  nor  comes 
to  us ;  but  these  things  remain  immovable,  and  it 
is  we  ourselves  who  produce  the  judgments  about 
them,  and,  as  we  may  say,  write  them  in  ourselves, 
it  being  in  our  power  not  to  write  them,  and  it 
being  in  our  power,  if  perchance  these  judgments 
have  imperceptibly  got  admission  to  our  minds,  to 
wipe   them   out;  and  if  we   remember   also  that 
such  attention  will  only  be  for  a  short  time,  and 
then  life  will  be  at  an  end.     Besides,  what  trouble 
is  there  at  all  in  doing  this  ?     For  if  these  things 
are  according  to  nature,  rejoice  in  them  and  they 
will   be  easy  to  thee :  but  if  contrary  to  nature, 
seek  what  is  conformable  to  thy  own  nature,  and 
strive  towards  this,  even  if  it  bring  no  reputation ; 
for  every  man  is  allowed  to  seek  his  own  good. 

17.  Consider  whence  each  thing  is  come,  and  of 
what  it  consists,!  and  into  what  it  changes,  and 

make  a  crooked  stick  straight."  —  The  wolfish  friendship  is 
an  allusion  to  the  fable  of  the  sheep  and  the  wolves. 


MAECU8  AUEELIU8  ANTONINUS.          273 

what  kind  of  a  thing  it  will  be  when  it  has 
changed,  and  that  it  will  sustain  no  harm. 

18.  [If  any  have  offended  against  thee,  consider 
first]  :  What  is  my  relation  to  men,  and  that  we 
are  made  for  one  another  ;  and  in  another  respect 
I  was  made  to  be  set  over  them,  as  a  ram  over  the 
flock  or  a  bull  over  the  herd.  But  examine  the 
matter  from  first  principles,  from  this :  If  all 
things  are  not  mere  atoms,  it  is  nature  which 
orders  all  things  :  if  this  is  so,  the  inferior  things 
exist  for  the  sake  of  the  superior,  and  these  for  the 
sake  of  one  another  (ii.  1;  ix.  39;  v.  16 ;  iii.  4). 

Second,  consider  what  kind  of  men  they  are  at 
table,  in  bed,  and  so  forth  :  and  particularly,  under 
what  compulsions  in  respect  of  opinions  they  are  ; 
and  as  to  their  acts,  consider  with  what  pride  they 
do  what  they  do  (viii.  14  ;  ix.  34). 

Third,  that  if  men  do  rightly  what  they  do,  we 
ought  not  to  be  displeased :  but  if  they  do  not 
right,  it  is  plain  that  they  do  so  involuntarily  and 
in  ignorance.  For  as  every  soul  is  unwillingly 
deprived  of  the  truth,  so  also  is  it  unwillingly  de- 
prived of  the  power  of  behaving  to  each  man 
according  to  his  deserts.  Accordingly  men  are 
pained  when  they  are  called  unjust,  ungrateful, 
and  greedy,  and  in  a  word  wrong-doers  to  their 
neighbors  (vii.  62,  63  ;  ii.  1 ;  vii.  26  ;  viii.  29). 

Fourth,  consider  that  thou  also  doest  many 
things  wrong,  and  that  thou  art  a  man  like  others ; 


274  MEDITATIONS. 

and  even  if  thou  dost  abstain  from  certain  faults, 
still  thou  hast  the  disposition  to  commit  them, 
though  either  through  cowardice,  or  concern  about 
reputation,  or  some  such  mean  motive,  thou  dost 
abstain  from  such  faults  (i.  17). 

Fifth,  consider  that  thou  dost  not  even  under- 
stand whether  men  are  doing  wrong  or  not,  for 
many  things  are  done  with  a  certain  reference  to 
circumstances.  And  in  short,  a  man  must  learn  a 
great  deal  to  enable  him  to  pass  a  correct  judg- 
ment on  another  man's  acts  (ix.  38;  iv.  51). 

Sixth,  consider  when  thou  art  much  vexed  or 
grieved,  that  man's  life  is  only  a  moment,  and  after 
a  short  time  we  are  all  laid  out  dead  (vii.  58  ;  iv. 
48). 

Seventh,  that  it  is  not  men's  acts  which  disturb 
us,  for  those  acts  have  their  foundation  in  men's 
ruling  principles,  but  it  is  our  own  opinions  which 
disturb  us-flake  away  these  opinions  then,  and 
resolve  to  dismiss  thy  judgment  about  an  act  as  if 
it  were  something  grievous,  and  thy  anger  is  gone. 
How  then  shall  I  take  away  these  opinions  ?  By 
reflecting  that  no  wrongful  act  of  another  brings 
shame  on  thee  :  for  unless  that  which  is  shameful 
is  alone  bad,  thou  also  must  of  necessity  do  many 
things  wrong,  and  become  a  robber  and  everything 
else  (v.  25;  vii.  16). 

Eighth,  consider  how  much  more  pain  is  brought 
on  u«  by  the  anger  and  vexation  caused  by  such 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.          275 

acts  than  by  the  acts  themselves,  at-whiciTWe'  are 
angry  and  vexed  (iv.  39,  49 ;  vii.  24). 

Ninth,  consider  that  a  good  disposition  is  invin- 
cible if  it  be  genuine,  and  not  an  affected  smile 
and  acting  a  part.  Iflmi  m\u\(  will  the  most  violent 
man  do  to  thee,  if  thou  continuest  to  be  of  a  kind 
disposition  towards  him,  and  if,  as  opportunity 
offers,  thou  gently  admonishest  him  and  calmly 
correctest  his  errors  at  the  very  time  when  he  is 
trying  to  do  thee  harm,  saying,  Not  so,  my  child : 
we  are  constituted  by  nature  for  something  else  : 
I  shall  certainly  not  be  injured,  but  thou  art  injur- 
ing thyself,  my  child.  —  And  show  him  with 
gentle  tact  and  by  general  principles  that  this  is 
so,  and  that  even  bees  do  not  do  as  he  does,  nor 
any  animals  which  are  formed  by  nature  to  be 
gregarious.  And  thou  must  do  this  neither  with 
any  double  meaning  nor  in  the  way  of  reproach, 
but  affectionately  and  without  any  rancor  in  thy 
soul ;  and  not  as  if  thou  wert  lecturing  him,  nor 
yet  that  any  bystander  may  admire,  but  either 
when  he  is  alone,  and  if  others  are  present  .  .  -1 

Remember  these  nine  rules,  as  if  thou  hadst  re- 
ceived them  as  a  gift  from  the  Muses,  and  begin 
at  last  to  be  a  man  while  thou  livest.  But  thou 
must  equally  avoid  flattering  men  and  being  vexed 
at  them,  for  both  are  unsocial  and  lead  to  harm. 
And  let  this  truth  be  present  to  thee  in  the  excite- 
1  It  appears  that  there  is  a  defect  in  the  text  here. 


276  MEDITATIONS. 

ment  of  anger,  that  to  be  moved  by  passion  is  not 
manly,  but  that  mildness  and  gentleness,  as  they 
are  more  agreeable  to  human  nature,  so  also  are 
they  more  manly ;  and  he  who  possesses  these 
qualities  possesses  strength,  nerves,  and  courage, 
and  not  the  man  who  is  subject  to  fits  of  passion 
and  discontent.  For  in  the  same  degree  in  which 
a  man's  mind  is  nearer  to  freedom  from  all 
passion,  in  the  same  degree  also  is  it  nearer  to 
strength :  and  as  the  sense  of  pain  is  a  character- 
istic of  weakness,  so  also  is  anger.  For  he  who 
yields  to  pain  and  he  who  yields  to  anger,  both  are 
wounded  and  both  submit. 

But  if  thou  wilt,  receive  also  a  tenth  present 
from  the  leader  of  the  [Muses,  Apollo],  and  it  is 
this,  —  that  to  expect  bad  men  not  to  do  wrong  is 
madness,  for  ho  who  expect^  this1  desire^  an  im- 
possibility. But  to  allow  men  to  behave  so  to 
others,  and  to  expect  them  not  to  do  thee  any 
wrong,  is  irrational  and  tyrannical. 

19.  There  are  four  principal  aberrations  of  the 
superior  faculty  against  which  thou  shouldst  be 
constantly  on  thy  guard,  and  when  thou  hast 
detected  them,  thou  shouldst  wipe  them  out  and 
say  on  each  occasion  thus:  This  thought  is  not 
necessary  :  this  tends  to  destroy  social  union :  this 
which  thou  art  going  to  sa}*-  comes  not  from  the 
real  thoughts  ;  for  thou  shouldst  consider  it  among 
the  most  absurd  of  things  for  a  man  not  to  speak 


MAECUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  277 

from  his  real  thoughts.  But  the  fourth  is  when 
thou  shalt  reproach  thyself  for  anything,  for  this 
is  an  evidence  of  the  diviner  part  within  thee 
being  overpowered  and  yielding  to  the  less  hon- 
orable and  to  the  perishable  part,  the  body,  and 
to  its  gross  pleasures  (iv.  24 ;  ii.  16). 

20.  Thy  aerial  part  and  all,  the  fiery  parts  which 
are  mingled  in  thee,  though  by  nature  they  have 
an  upward  tendency,  still  in  obedience  to  the 
disposition  of  the  universe  they  are  overpowered 
here  in  the  compound  mass  [the  body].  And  also 
the  whole  of  the  earthy  part  in  thee  and  the 
watery,  though  their  tendency  is  downward,  still 
are  raised  up  and  occupy  a  position  which  is  not 
their  natural  one.  In  this  manner  then  the  ele- 
mental parts  obey  the  universal ;  for  when  they 
have  been  fixed  in  any  place,  perforce  they  re- 
main there  until  again  the  universal  shall  sound 
the  signal  for  dissolution.  It  is  not  then  strange 
that  thy  intelligent  part  only  should  be  disobe- 
dient and  discontented  with  its  own  place?  And 
yet  no  force  is  imposed  on  it,  but  only  those 
things  which  are  conformable  to  its  nature :  still 
it  does  not  submit,  but  is  carried  in  the  opposite 
direction.  For  the  movement  towards  injustice 
and  intemperance  and  to  anger  and  grief  and  fear 
is  nothing  else  than  the  act  of  one  who  deviates 
from  nature.  And  also  when  the  ruling  faculty 
is  discontented  with  anything  that  happens,  then 


278  MEDl  TA  TIONS. 

too  it  deserts  its  post:  for  it  is  constituted  for 
piety  and  reverence  towards  the  gods  no  less  than 
for  justice.  For  these  qualities  also  are  compre- 
hended under  the  generic  term  of  contentment 
with  the  constitution  of  things,  and  indeed  they 
are  prior  l  to  acts  of  justice. 

21.  He  who  has  not  one  and  always  the  same 
object  in  life,  cannot  be  one  and  the  same  all 
through  his  life.  But  what  I  have  said  is  not 
enough,  unless  this  also  is  added,  what  this  ob- 
ject ought  to  be.  For  as  there  is  not  the  same 
opinion  about  all  the  things  which  in  some  way 
or  other  are  considered  by  the  majority  to  be 

1  The  word  irpea-fivTepa,  which  is  here  translated  "prior," 
may  also  mean  "  superior;  "  but  Antoninus  seems  to  say  that 
piety  and  reverence  of  the  gods  precede  all  virtues,  and  that 
other  virtues  are  derived  from  them,  even  justice,  which  in 
another  passage  (xi.  10)  he  makes  the  foundation  of  all 
virtues.  The  ancient  notion  of  justice  is  that  of  giving  to 
every  one  his  due.  It  is  not  a  legal  definition,  as  some  have 
supposed,  but  a  moral  rule  which  law  cannot  in  all  cases  en- 
force. Besides,  law  has  its  own  rules,  which  are  sometimes 
moral  and  sometimes  immoral;  but  it  enforces  them  all 
simply  because  they  are  general  rules,  and  if  it  did  not  or 
could  not  enforce  them,  so  far  Law  would  not  be  Law.  Jus- 
tice, or  the  doing  what  is  just,  implies  a  universal  rule  and 
obedience  to  it;  and  as  we  all  live  under  universal  Law, 
which  commands  both  our  body  and  our  intelligence,  and  is 
the  law  of  our  nature,  that  is,  the  law  of  the  whole  constitu- 
tion of  man,  we  must  endeavor  to  discover  what  this  su- 
preme Law  is.  It  is  the  will  of  the  power  that  rules  all. 
By  acting  in  obedience  to  this  will,  we  do  justice,  and  by 
consequence  everything  else  that  we  ought  to  do. 


MA B  C  US  A  UEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  279 

good,  but  only  about  some  certain  things,  that  is, 
things  which  concern  the  common  interest,  so 
also  ought  we  to  propose  to  ourselves  an  object 
which  shall  be  of  a  common  kind  [social]  and 
political.  For  he  who  directs  all  his  own  efforts 
to  this  object,  will  make  all  his  acts  alike,  and 
thus  will  always  be  the  same. 

22.  Think  of  the    country  mouse   and   of  the 
town  mouse,  and  of  the  alarm  and  trepidation  of 
the  town  mouse.1 

23.  Socrates  used  to  call  the  opinions  of  the 
many  by   the    name   of    Lamiae,  —  bugbears   to 
frighten  children. 

24.  The  Lacedaemonians  at  their  public  spec- 
tacles used  to  set  seats  in  the  shade  for  strangers, 
but  themselves  sat  down  anywhere. 

25.  Socrates  excused  himself  to  Perdiccas  2  for 
not  going  to  him,  saying,  It  is  because  I  would 
not  perish  by  the  worst  of  all  ends ;  that  is,  I 
would  not  receive  a  favor  and  then  be  unable  to 
return  it. 

26.  In  the  writings  of  the  [Ephesians]  3  there 
was  this  precept,  constantly  to  think  of  some  one 
of  the  men  of  former  times  who  practised  virtue. 

1  The  story  is  told  by  Horace  in  his  Satires  (ii.  6),  and  by 
others  since,  but  not  better. 

2  Perhaps  the  emperor  made  a  mistake  here,  for  other 
writers  say  that  it  was  Archelaus,  the  son  of  Perdiccas,  who 
invited  Socrates  to  Macedonia. 

3  Gataker  suggested  'ETriKovpciuv  for  ' 


280  MEDITATIONS. 

27.  The  Pythagoreans  bid  us  in  the   morning 
look  to  the  heavens  that  we  may  be  reminded  of 
those  bodies  which  continually  do  the  same  things 
and  in  the  same  manner  perform  their  work,  and 
also  be  reminded  of  their  purity  and  nudity.     For 
there  is  no  veil  over  a  star. 

28.  Consider  what  a  man  Socrates  was  when  he 
dressed    himself  in  a  skin,  after  Xanthippe  had 
taken  his  cloak  and  gone  out,  and  what  Socrates 
said  to  his  friends  who  were  ashamed  of  him  and 
drew  back  from  him  when  they  saw  him  dressed 
thus. 

29.  Neither  in  writing  nor  in  reading  wilt  thou 
be  able  to  lay  down  rules  for  others  before  thou 
shalt  have   first  learned   to   obey   rules    thyself. 
Much  more  is  this  so  in  life. 

30.  A  slave  thou  art :  free  speech  is  not  for  thee. 

31.  And  my  heart  laughed  within. 

ix.  413. 


32.  And  virtue  they  will  curse,  speaking  harsh  words. 

HESIOD,  Works  and  Days,  184. 

33.  To  look  for  the  fig  in  winter  is  a  madman's 
act :  such  is  he  who  looks  for   his  child  when  it 
is  no  longer  allowed  (Epictetus,  iii.  24,  £7). 

34.  When  a  man  kisses  his  child,  said  Epictetus, 
he  should  whisper  to  himself,  "  To-morrow  per- 
chance thou  wilt  die."  —  But  those  are  words  of 
bad  omen.  —  "  No  word  is  a  word  of  bad  omen," 
said   Epictetus,  "  which   expresses   any   work   of 


MAE C US  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  281 

nature  ;  or  if  it  is  so,  it  is  also  a  word  of  bad  omen 
to  speak  of  the  ears  of  corn  being  reaped  "  (Epic- 
tetus,  iii.  24,  88). 

35.  The  unripe  grape,  the  ripe  bunch,  the  dried 
grape  all  are  changes,  not  into  nothing,  but  into 
something  which  exists  not  yet  (Epictetus,  iii.  24). 

36.  No  man  can  rob  us  of  our  free  will  (Epic- 
tetus, iii.  22,  105). 

37.  Epictetus  also  said,  a  man  must  discover  an 
art  [or  rules]  with  respect  to  giving  his  assent ; 
and   in    respect   to   his   movements   he   must   be 
careful   that   they  be    made   with    regard   to   cir- 
cumstances, that  they  be   consistent  with  social 
interests,  that  they  have  regard  to  the  value  of 
the  object;  and  as  to  sensual   desire,  he  should 
altogether  keep  away  from  it ;  and  as  to  avoid- 
ance   [aversion],   he    should    not    show   it   with 
respect  to  any  of  the  things  which  are  not  in  our 
power. 

38.  The  dispute  then,  he  said,  is  not  about  any 
common  matter,  but  about  being  mad  or  not. 

39.  Socrates  used  to  say,  What  do  you  want, 
souls  of  rational  men   or   irrational  ?  —  Souls  of 
rational    men.  —  Of  what    rational    men,   sound 
or  unsound  ?  —  Sound.  —  Why  then  do  you   not 
seek  for  them  ?  —  Because  we  have  them. —  Why 
then  do  you  fight  and  quarrel  ? 


XII. 

1.  ALL  those  things  at  which  thou  wishest  to  ar- 
rive by  a  circuitous  road  thou  canst  have  now,  if 
thou  dost  not  refuse  them  to  thyself.  And  this 
means,  if  thou  wilt  take  no  notice  of  all  the  past, 
and  trust  the  future  to  providence,  and  direct  the 
present  only  conformably  to  piety  and  justice. 
Conformably  to  piety,  that  thou  mayst  be  con- 
tent with  the  lot  which  is  assigned  to  thee,  for 
nature  designed  it  for  thee  and  thee  for  it.  Con- 
formably to  justice,  that  thou  mayst  always  speak 
the  truth  freely  and  without  disguise,  and  do  the 
things  which  are  agreeable  to  law  and  according 
to  the  worth  of  each.  And  let  neither  another 
man's  wickedness  hinder  thee,  nor  opinion  nor 
voice,  nor  yet  the  sensations  of  the  poor  flesh 
which  has  grown  about  thee  ;  for  the  passive  part 
will  look  to  this.  If,  then,  whatever  the  time 
may  be  when  thou  shalt  be  near  to  thy  departure, 
neglecting  everything  else  thou  shalt  respect  only 
thy  ruling  faculty  and  the  divinity  within  thee, 
and  if  thou  shalt  be  afraid  not  because  thou  must 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  283 

some  time  cease  to  live,  but  if  thou  shalt  fear 
never  to  have  begun  to  live  according  to  nature, 
—  then  thou  wilt  be  a  man  worthy  of  the  uni- 
verse which  has  produced  thee,  and  thou  wilt 
cease  to  be  a  stranger  in  thy  native  land,  and  to 
wonder  at  things  which  happen  daily  as  if  they 
were  something  unexpected,  and  to  be  dependent 
on  this  or  that. 

2.  God  sees  the  minds  [ruling  principles]  of  all 
men  bared  of  the  material  vesture  and  rind  and 
impurities.     For  with  his  intellectual  part  alone 
he  touches  the  intelligence  only  which  has  flowed 
and  been  derived  from  himself  into  these  bodies. 
And  if  thou  also  usest  thyself  to  do  this,  thou 
wilt  rid  thyself  of  thy  much  trouble.     For  he  who 
regards  not  the  poor   flesh  which  envelops  him, 
surely  will  not  trouble  himself  by  looking  after 
raiment  and   dwelling   and   fame   and  such  like 
externals  and  show. 

3.  The  things  are  three  of  which  thou  art  com- 
posed :  a  little  body,  a  little  breath  [life],  intelli- 
gence.    Of  these  the  first  two  are  thine,  so  far  as 
it  is  thy  duty  to  take  care  of  them  ;  but  the  third 
alone  is  properly  thine.     Therefore  if  thou  shalt 
separate   from  thyself,  that   is,  from   thy  under- 
standing, whatever  others  do  or  say,  and  whatever 
thou   hast  done   or   said   thyself,  and     whatever 
future  things  trouble  thee  because  they  may  hap- 
pen, and  whatever  in   the  body  which  envelops 


284  MEDITATIONS. 

thee  or  in  the  breath  [life],  which  is  by  nature 
associated  with  the  body,  is  attached  to  thee 
independent  of  thy  will,  and  whatever  the  ex- 
ternal circumfluent  vortex  whirls  round,  so  that 
the  intellectual  power  exempt  from  the  things  of 
fate  can  live  pure  and  free  by  itself,  doing  what 
is  just  and  accepting  what  happens  and  saying  the 
truth :  if  thou  wilt  separate,  I  say,  from  this  ruling 
faculty  the  things  which  are  attached  to  it  by  the 
impressions  of  sense,  and  the  things  of  time  to 
come  and  of  time  that  is  past,  and  wilt  make  thy- 
self like  Empedocles'  sphere, 

"  All  round  and  in  its  joyous  rest  reposing; "  * 
and  if  thou  shalt  strive  to  live  only  what  is  really 
thy  life,  that  is,  the  present,  —  then  thou  wilt  be 
able  to  pass  that  portion  of  life  which  remains  for 
thee  up  to  the  time  of  thy  death  free  from  per- 
turbations, nobly,  and  obedient  to  thy  own  daemon 
[to  the  god  that  is  within  thee]  (ii.  13,  17 ;  iii.  5, 
6 ;  xi.  12). 

f  4.  I  have  often  wondered  how  it  is  that  every 

I  man  loves  himself  more  than  all  the  rest  of  men, 

but  yet  sets  less  value  on  his  own  opinion  of  him- 

\  self  than  on  the  opinion  of  others.     If  then  a  god 

lor  a  wise  teacher  should  present  himself  to  a  man 

\and  bid  him   to  think  of  nothing  and  to  design 

V  !  The  verse  of  Empedocles  is  corrupt  in  Antoninus.  It  has 
been  restored  by  Peyron  from  a  Turin  manuscript,  thus  :  — 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.          285 

nothing  which  he  would  not  express  as  soon  as  he 
conceived  it,  he  could  not  endure  it  even  for  a 
single  day.1  So  much  more  respect  have  we  to 
what  our  neighbors  shall  think  of  us  than  to  what 
we  shall  think  of  ourselves. 

5.  How  can  it  be  that  the  gods,  after  having 
arranged   all   things   well   and    benevolently   for 
mankind,  have  overlooked  this  alone,  that  some 
men,  and  very  good  men,  and  men  who,  as  we 
may   say,   have   had    most   communion  with   the 
divinity,    and   through   pious   acts   and   religious 
observances  have  been   most  intimate  with   the 
divinity,  when  they  have  once  died  should  never 
exist  again,  but  should  be  completely  extinguished  ? 

But  if  this  is  so,  be  assured  that  if  it  ought  to 
have  been  otherwise,  the  gods  would  have  done  it. 
For  if  it  were  just,  it  would  also  be  possible  ;  and 
if  it  were  according  to  nature,  nature  would  have 
had  it  so.  But  because  it  is  not  so,  if  in  fact  it  is  not 
so,  be  thou  convinced  that  it  ought  not  to  have 
been  so :  for  thou  seest  even  of  thyself  that  in 
this  inquiry  thou  art  disputing  with  the  Deity  ; 
and  we  should  not  thus  dispute  with  the  gods, 
unless  they  were  most  excellent  and  most  just ; 
but  if  this  is  so,  they  would  not  have  allowed 
anything  in  the  ordering  of  the  universe  to  be 
neglected  unjustly  and  irrationally. 

6.  Practise  thyself  even  in  the  things  which  thou 

1  iii.  4. 


286  MEDITATIONS. 

despairest  of  accomplishing.  For  even  the  left 
hand,  which  is  ineffectual  for  all  other  things  for 
want  of  practice,  holds  the  bridle  more  vigorously 
than  the  right  hand ;  for  it  has  been  practised  in 
this. 

7.  Consider  in  what  condition  both  in  body  and 
soul  a  man  should  be  when  he  is  overtaken  by 
death;   and    consider   the   shortness   of  life,   the 
boundless    abyss   of    time   past   and  future,   the 
feebleness  of  all  matter. 

8.  Contemplate  the  formative  principles  [forms] 
of  things  bare  of  their  coverings  ;  the  purposes  of 
actions;  consider  what  pain  is,  what  pleasure  is, 
and  death,  and  fame ;  who  is  to  himself  the  cause 
of  his   uneasiness;  how  no   man   is   hindered  by 
another  ;  that  everything  is  opinion. 

9.  In    the   application   of  thy   principles   thou 
must  be  like  the  pancratiast,  not  like  the  gladi- 
ator ;  for  the  gladiator  lets  fall  the  sword  which  he 
uses  and  is  killed ;  but  the  other  always  has  his 
hand,  and  needs  to  do  nothing  else  than  use  it. 

10.  See  what  things  are  in  themselves,  dividing 
them  into  matter,  form,  and  purpose. 

11.  What  a  power  man  has  to  do  nothing  except 
what  God  will  approve,  and  to  accept  all  that  God 
may  give  him. 

12.  With  respect  to  that  which  happens  con- 
formably  to  nature,   we  ought  to  blame  neither 
gods,  for  they  do  nothing  wrong  either  voluntarily 


MARCUS  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.  287 

or  involuntarily,  nor  men,  for  they  do  nothing 
wrong  except  involuntarily.  Consequently  we 
should  blame  nobody  (ii.  11,  12,  13;  vii.  62; 
viii.  17). 

13.  How  ridiculous  and  what  a  stranger  he  is 
who  is  surprised  at  anything  which  happens  in  life. 

14.  Either  there  is  a  fatal  necessity  and  invinci- 
ble  order,  or  a  kind  providence,  or  a  confusion 
without  a  purpose  and  without  a  director  (iv.  27)- 
If  then  there  is  an  invincible  necessity,  why  dost 
thou  resist?     But  if  there  is  a  providence  which 
allows  itself  to  be  propitiated,  make  thyself  worthy 
of  the  help  of  the  divinity.     But  if  there  is  a  con- 
fusion without  a  governor,  be  content  that  in  such 
a  tempest  thou  hast  in  thyself  a  certain  ruling  in- 
telligence.    And   even  if  the  tempest  carry  thee 
away,  let  it  carry  away  the  poor  flesh,  the  poor 
breath,   everything   else ;  for   the   intelligence   at 
least  it  will  not  carry  away. 

15.  Does  the  light  of  the  lamp  shine  without 
losing  its  splendor  until  it  is  extinguished;  and 
shall  the  truth  which  is  in  thee  and  justice  and 
temperance  be  extinguished  [before  thy  death]  ? 

16.  When  a  man  has  presented  the  appearance 
of  having  done  wrong  [say],  How  then  do  I  know 
if   this  is  a  wrongful  act?     And  even  if  he  has 
done  wrong,  how  do  I  know  that  he  has  not  con- 
demned himself  ?     And  so  this  is  like  tearing  his 
own  face.     Consider  that  he  who  would  not  have 


288  MEDITATIONS. 

the  bad  man  do  wrong,  is  like  the  man  who  would 
not  have  the  fig-tree  to  bear  juice  in  the  figs,  and 
infants  to  cry,  and  the  horse  to  neigh,  and  what- 
ever else  must  of  necessity  be.  For  what  must  a 
man  do  who  has  such  a  character?  If  then  thou 
art  irritable,!  cure  this  man's  disposition.1 

17.  If  it  is  not  right,  do  not  do  it :  if  it  is  not 
true,  do  not  say  it.     [For  let  thy  efforts  be  —  ]  2 

18.  In  everything  always  observe  what  the  thing 
is   which   produces   for  thee  an  appearance,  and 
resolve    it   by   dividing   it  into   the   formal,    the 
material,  the  purpose,  and  the  time  within  which 
it  must  end. 

19.  Perceive  at  last  that  thou  hast  in  thee  some- 
thing  better   and    more   divine   than   the   things 
which  cause  the  various  affects,  and  as  it  were  pull 
thee   by  the  strings.     What  is   there  now  in  my 
mind,  —  is  it  fear,  or  suspicion,  or  desire,  or  any- 
thing of  the  kind  (v.  11)  ? 

20.  First,  do  nothing  inconsiderately,  nor  with- 
out a  purpose.     Second,  make   thy  acts  refer  to 
nothing  else  than  to  a  social  end. 

21.  Consider  that  before  long  thou  wilt  be  no- 
body and  nowhere,  nor  will  any  of  the  things  exist 

1  The  interpreters  translate  yopyfa   by  the  words  "acer, 
validusque,"  and  "  skilful."    But  in  Epictetus  (ii.  16,  20;  iii. 
12,  10)  70/376*  means  "vehement,"  "prone  to  anger,"  "irri- 
table." 

2  There  is  something  wrong  here,  or  incomplete. 


MARCUS  AURELIU8  ANTONINUS.  289 

which  thou  now  seest,  nor  any  of  those  who  are 
now  living.  For  all  things  are  formed  by  nature 
to  change  and  be  turned  and  to  perish,  in  order 
that  other  things  in  continuous  succession  may 
exist  (ix.  28). 

22.  Consider   that   everything   is   opinion,  and 
opinion  is  in  thy  power.     Take  away  then,  when 
thou  choosest,  thy  opinion,  and  like  a  mariner  who 
has  doubled  the  promontory,  thou  wilt  find  calm, 
everything  stable,  and  a  waveless  bay. 

23.  Any  one  activity,  whatever  it  may  be,  when 
it  has  ceased  at  its  proper  time,  suffers  no  evil  be- 
cause it  has  ceased  ;  nor  he  who  has  done  this  act, 
does  he  suffer  any  evil  for  this  reason,  that  the  act 
has  ceased.     In  like  manner  then  the  whole  which 
consists  of  all  the  acts,  which  is  our  life,  if  it  cease 
at  its  proper  time,  suffers  no  evil  for  this  reason, 
that  it  has  ceased  ;  nor  he  who  has  terminated  this 
series  at  the  proper  time,  has  he  been  ill  dealt  with. 
But  the  proper  time  and  the  limit  nature  fixes, 
sometimes   as  in  old  age  the  peculiar  nature  of 
man,   but   always   the    universal   nature,   by   the 
change   of  whose   parts   the  whole   universe  con- 
tinues ever  young  and  perfect.1     And  everything 
which  is  useful  to  the  universal  is  always  good  and 
in  season.     Therefore  the  termination  of  life  for 
every  man  is  no  evil,  because  neither  is  it  shame, 
ful,  since  it  is  both  independent  of  the  will  and 

1  vii.  25. 


290  MEDITATIONS. 

not  opposed  to  the  general  interest,  but  it  is  good, 
since  it  is  seasonable,  and  profitable  to  and  con- 
gruent with  the  universal.  For  thus  too  he  is 
moved  by  the  Deity  who  is  moved  in  the  same 
manner  with  the  Deity,  and  moved  towards  the 
same  things  in  his  mind. 

24.  These  three  principles  thou  must  have  in 
readiness:  In  the    things   which    thou    doest   do 
nothing  either  inconsiderately  or  otherwise  than  as 
justice  herself  would  act ;  but  with  respect  to  what 
may  happen  to  thee  from  without,  consider  that  it 
happens  either  by  chance  or  according  to  provi- 
dence, and  thou  must  neither  blame  chance  nor 
accuse  providence.     Second,  consider  what  every 
being  is  from  the  seed  to  the  time  of  its  receiving  a 
soul,  and  from  the  reception  of  a  soul  to  the  giving 
back  of  the  same,  and  of  what  things  every  being 
is  compounded,  and  into  what  things  it  is  resolved. 
Third,  if  thou  shouldst  suddenly  be  raised  up  above 
the  earth,  and  shouldst  look  down  on  human  things, 
and  observe  the  variety  of  them  how  great  it  is, 
and  at  the  same  time  also  shouldst  see  at  a  glance 
how  great  is  the  number  of  beings  who  dwell  all 
around  in  the  air  and  the  ether,  consider  that  as 
often  as  thou  shouldst  be  raised  up,  thou  wouldst 
see  the  same  things,  sameness  of  form  and  short- 
ness of  duration.    Are  these  things  to  be  proud  of  ? 

25.  Cast  away  opinion:  thou  art  saved.     Who 
then  hinders  thee  from  casting  it  away  ? 


MABCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  291 

26.  When   thou   art   troubled  about  anything, 
thou  hast  forgotten  this,  that  all  things  happen 
according  to  the  universal  nature ;  and  forgotten 
this,  that  a  man's  wrongful  act  is  nothing  to  thee  ; 
and  further  thou  hast  forgotten  this,  that  every- 
thing which  happens,  always  happened  so  and  will 
happen  so,  and  now  happens  so  everywhere ;  for- 
gotten this  too,  how  close  is  the  kinship  between 
a  man  and  the  whole  human  race,  for  it  is  a  com- 
munity, not  of  a  little  blood  or  seed,  but  of  intelli- 
gence.    And   thou  hast  forgotten  this  too,    that 
every  man's  intelligence  is  a  god  and  is  an  efflux 
of  the  Deity  ; l  and  forgotten  this,  that  nothing  is  a 
man's  own,  but  that  his  child  and  his  body  and  his 
very  soul  came  from  the   Deity ;  forgotten   this, 
that  everything  is  opinion  ;  and  lastly  thou  hast 
forgotten  that  every  man  lives  the  present  time 
only,  and  loses  only  this. 

27.  Constantly  bring  to  thy  recollection  those 
who    have    complained    greatly   about  anything, 
those  who   have   been   most  conspicuous  by  the 
greatest  fame  or  misfortunes  or  enmities  or  for- 
tunes of  any  kind :  then  think  where  are  they  all 
now  ?     Smoke  and  ash  and  a  tale,  or  not  even  a 
tale      And  let  there  be  present  to  thy  mind  also 
everything   of  this   sort,  how  Fabius  Catullinus 
lived   in   the  countryj  and  Lucius  Lupus  in  his 
gardens,  and  Stertinius  at  Baiae,  and  Tiberius  at 

1  See  Epictetus,  ii.  8,  9,  etc. 


292  MEDITATIONS. 

Capreae,  and  Velius  Rufus  [or  Rufus  at  Velia]  ; 
and  in  fine  think  of  the  eager  pursuit  of  anything 
conjoined  with  pride  ;  l  and  how  worthless  every- 
thing is  after  which  men  violently  strain  ;  and 
how  much  more  philosophical  it  is  for  a  man  in 
the  opportunities  presented  to  him  to  show  himself 
just,  temperate,  obedient  to  the  gods,  and  to  do 
this  with  all  simplicity  :  for  the  pride  which  is 
proud  of  its  want  of  pride  is  the  most  intolerable 
of  all. 

28.  To  those  who  ask,  Where  hast  thou  seen 
the  gods,  or  how  dost  thou  comprehend  that  they 
exist  and  so  worshippest  them,  I  answer,  in  the 
first  place,  they  may  be  seen  even  with  the  eyes  ;  2 


1  fAer'  o^o-ews.     Ofyo-w  ical  rO</>os,  Epict.  i.  8,  6. 

2  "  Seen  even  with  the  eyes."    It  is  supposed  that  this  may 
be   explained  by  the  Stoic  doctrine,  that  the  universe  is  a 
god  or  living  being  (iv.  40),  and  that  the  celestial  bodies  are 
gods  (viii.  19).     But  the  emperor  may  mean  that  we  know 
that  the  gods  exist,  as  he  afterwards  states  it,  because  we 
see  what  they  do;   as  we  know  that  man  has   intellectual 
powers,  because  we  see  what  he  does,  and  in  no  other  way 
do  we  know  it.     This  passage  then  will  agree  with  the 
passage  in  the  Epistle  to  the  Romans  (i.  v.  20),  and  with  the 
Epistle  to  the  Colossians  (i.  v.  15),  in  which  Jesus  Christ  is 
named   "the  image  of  the  invisible  god;  "   and  with  the 
passage  in  the  Gospel  of  St.  John  (xiv.  v.  9.)  ' 

Gataker,  whose  notes  are  a  wonderful  collection  of  learn- 
ing, and  all  of  it  sound  and  good,  quotes  a  passage  of  Calvin 
which  is  founded  on  St.  Paul's  language  (Rom.  i.  v.  20)  : 
"God  by  creating  the  universe  [or  world,  mundum],  being 
himself  invisible,  has  presented  himself  to  our  eyes  con- 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS.  293 

in  the  second  place,  neither  have  I  seen  even  my 
own  soul,  and  yet  I  honor  it.  Thus  then  with 
respect  to  the  gods,  from  what  I  constantly  ex- 
perience of  their  power,  from  this  I  comprehend 
that  they  exist,  and  I  venerate  them. 

29.  The  safety  of  life  is  this,  to  examine  every- 
thing  all   through,   what   it   is   itself,   that  is  its 
material,  what  the  formal  part ;  with  all  thy  soul 
to  do  justice  and  to  say  the  truth.     What  remains, 
except  to  enjoy  life  by  joining  one  good  thing  to 
another  so  as  not  to  leave  even  the  smallest  inter- 
vals between  ? 

30.  There  is  one  light  of  the  sun,  though  it  is 
interrupted  by  walls,  mountains,  and  other  things 
infinite.     There  is  one  common  substance,1  though 
it   is   distributed   among   countless   bodies  which 
have  their  several  qualities.     There  is  one  soul, 
though  it  is  distributed  among  infinite  natures  and 
individual  circumscriptions  [or  individuals].  There 
is   one   intelligent  soul,   though   it   seems   to   be 
divided.     Now   in    the   things  which   have   been 
mentioned,  all  the  other  parts,  such  as  those  which 

spicuously  in  a  certain  visible  form."  He  also  quotes  Seneca 
(De  Benef.  iv.  c.  8)  :  "  Quocunque  te  flexeris,  ibi  ilium 
videbis  occurrentem  tibi :  nihil  ab  illo  vacat,  opus  suum  ipse 
implet."  Compare  also  Cicero,  De  Senectute  (c.  22),  Xeno- 
phon's  Cyropaedia  (viii.  7) ,  and  Mem.  iv.  3 ;  also  Epictetus, 
i.  6,  de  Providentia.  I  think  that  my  interpretation  of  An- 
toninus is  right. 

1  iv.  40. 


294  MEDITATIONS. 

are  air  and  matter,  are  without  sensation  and  have 
no  fellowship :  and  yet  even  these  parts  the  intel- 
ligent principle  holds  together  and  the  gravitation 
towards  the  same.  But  intellect  in  a  peculiar 
manner  tends  to  that  which  is  of  the  same  kin, 
and  combines  with  it,  and  the  feeling  for  com- 
munion is  not  interrupted. 

31.  What   dost    thou   wish,  —  to    continue   to 
exist?     Well,  dost  thou  wish  to  have  sensation, 
movement,  growth,  and  then  again   to  cease  to 
grow,  to  use  thy  speech,  to  think  ?  What  is  there  of 
all  these  things  which  seems  to  thee  worth  desiring? 
But  if  it  is  easy  to  set  little  value  on  all  these 
things,  turn  to  that  which  remains,  which  is  to 
follow  reason   and   God.     But   it  is  inconsistent 
with  honoring   reason   and   God   to   be   troubled 
because  by  death  a  man  will  be  deprived  of  the 
other  things. 

32.  How  small   a   part   of   the   boundless   and 
unfathomable  time  is  assigned  to  every  man,  for  it 
is  very  soon  swallowed  up  in  the  eternal !     And 
how  small  a  part  of  the  whole   substance ;  and 
how  small  a  part  of  the  universal  soul ;  and  on 
what  a  small  clod  of  the  whole  earth  thou  creep- 
est !     Reflecting  on  all  this,  consider,  nothing  to 
be  great,  except  to  act  as  thy  nature  leads  thee, 
and  to   endure   that  which  the   common  nature 
brings. 

33.  How  does  the  ruling  faculty  make  use  of 


MAE C US  AUEELIUS  ANTONINUS.         295 

itself?  for  all  lies  in  this.  But  everything  else, 
whether  it  is  in  the  power  of  thy  will  or  not,  is 
only  lifeless  ashes  and  smoke. 

34.  This  reflection  is  most  adapted  to  move  us 
to  contempt  of  death,  that  even  those  who  think 
pleasure  to  be  a  good  and  pain  an  evil  still  have 
despised  it. 

35.  The  man  to  whom  that  only  is  good  which 
comes  in  due  season,  and  to  whom  it  is  the  same 
thing  whether  he  has  done  more  or  fewer  acts 
conformable   to    right    reason,    and   to    whom   it 
makes  no  difference  whether  he  contemplates  the 
world  for  a  longer  or  a  shorter  time,  —  for  this 
man  neither  is  death  a  terrible  thing  (iii.  7  ;  vi. 
23  ;x.  20;xii.  23). 

36.  Man,  thou  hast  been  a  citizen  in  this  great 
state  [the  world]  ; 1  what  difference  does  it  make 
to  thee  whether  for  five  years  [or  three]  ?  for 
that  which  is  conformable  to  the  laws  is  just  for 
all.  Where  is  the  hardship  then,  if  no  tyrant  nor 
yet  an  unjust  judge  sends  thee  away  from  the 
state,  but  nature,  who  brought  thee  into  it?  the 
same  as  if  a  praetor  who  has  employed  an  actor 
dismisses  him  from  the  stage.2  —  "  But  I  have  not 
finished  the  five  acts,  but  only  three  of  them."  — 
Thou  sayest  well,  but  in  life  the  three  acts  are 
the  whole  drama ;  for  what  shall  be  a  complete 

Mi.  16; -iii.  11;  iv.  29. 
Mii.  8;  xi.  1. 


296  MEDITATIONS. 

drama  is  determined  by  him  who  was  once  the 
cause  of  its  composition,  and  now  of  its  disso- 
lution: but  thou  art  the  cause  of  neither.  De- 
part then  satisfied,  for  he  also  who  releases  thee 
is  satisfied. 


INDEXES 


INDEX    OF    TERMS. 


d5id<j>opa  (indifferentia,  Cicero,  Seneca,  Epp.  82) ;  things  in- 
different, neither  good  nor  bad ;  the  same  as  ^<ra. 
O.IVXP&S  (turpis,  Cic.),  ugly;  morally  ugly. 
airta,  cause. 

,  afriov,  r6,  the  formal  or  formative  principle,  the  cause. 

s,  unsocial. 
dva<f)opd,  reference,  relation  to  a  purpose. 
dj/u7re£cu/>£7-ws,  unconditionally. 
dir6ppoia,  efflux. 

dirpoalpera,  rd,  the  things  which  are  not  in  our  will  or  power. 
dpx"f),  a  first  principle. 
Arofjioi  (corpora  individua,  Cic.),  atoms. 
avrdptceia,  est   quae  parvo  contenta  omne  id  respuit  quod 

abundat  (Cic.) ;  contentment. 
avrdpitris,  sufficient  in  itself ;  contented. 

d0o/o/xaf,  means,  principles.    The  word  has  also  other  signifi- 
cations in  Epictetus.    Index  ed.  Schweig. 

,  rd,  things  which  are  produced,  come  into  existence, 
god,  god  in  man,  man's  intelligent  principle. 
s,  disposition,  affection  of  the  mind. 
s,  division  of  things  into  their  parts,  dissection,  resolu- 
tion, analysis. 
SiaXe/cTwci},  ars  bene  disserendi  et  vera  ac  falsa  dijudicandi 

(Cic.). 
$td\vffut  dissolution,  the  opposite  of  <nJ>/c/>wtf. 


300  INDEX. 

Stdvoia,  understanding;  sometimes,  the  mind  generally,  the 
whole  intellectual  power. 

(decreta,  Cic.),  principles. 

,  intellectual  faculty. 
,  temperance,  self-restraint. 
etSoy  in  divisione  f  ormae  sunt,  quas  Graeci  etSrj  vocant ;  nostri, 
si  qul  haec  forte  tractant,  species  appellant  (Cic.).    But 
«5os  is  used  by  Epictetus  and  Antoninus  less  exactly  and  as 
a  general  term,  like  genus.    Index  Epict.  ed.  Schweig.  — 
'(2s  S4  ye  al  irpurrcu  oti<rla.i  irp6s  TO,  fiXXo  UXOVGIV,  ovr<*>  Kal  rb  ctSos 
irpbt  ri>  7^05  2x*4'     inroKfirai  yap  rb  «3os  TV  ytvci.     (Aristot. 
Cat.  c.  5.) 

(fatalis  necessitas,  fatum,  Cic.),  destiny,  necessity. 
,  aversions,  avoidance,  the  turning  away  from  things ; 
the  opposite  of  <5/>^£ew. 

,  rd,  things  which  have  life. 
,  action,  activity. 

Ht>voiai,  notio,  notiones  (Cic.),  or  "  notitiae  rerum;" 
notions  of  things.     (Notionem  appello  quam  Graeci  turn 
twoiav,  tnmirp&X^tv,  Cic.). 
),  the  unity. 

,  attention  to  an  object, 
animi  tranquillitas  (Cic.). 

T&,  ctfjxvcla,  benevolence;    ctnevjs   sometimes  means 
well-contented, 
benevolence. 
,  power,  faculty. 

,  KOTO,  by  way  of  sequence. 
•}jyefu>vuc6v,  r6,  the  ruling  faculty  or  part;  principatus  (Cic.). 
eewpjiMTa,  percepta  (Cic.),  things  perceived,  .general  prin- 
ciples. 

KaO^Keiv,  r6,  duty,  "  ofRcium." 
*ca\6$,  beautiful. 

xardX^is,  comprehension ;  cognitio,  perceptio,  comprehensio 
(Cic.). 

constitution. 


INDEX.  301 

KciTop66ff€is,  KaropOtifMTa  ;  recta,  recte  facta  (Cic.)  ;  right  acts, 
those  acts  to  which  we  proceed  by  the  right  or  straight 
road. 

,  order,  world,  universe. 

s,  b  flXos,  the  universe,  that  which  is  the  One  and  the  All 
(vi.  25). 

,  a  judgment. 

rb  HvSov,  that  which  rules  within  (iv.  1),  the  same  as 
rb  ijy€iM)vtK6v.    Diogenes  Laertius,  vii.,  Zeno.    -rjyefMfiK^v  Se 
tlvai  rb  Kvpi&rarov  T^S  '/'t'X'?5' 
\oyiKd,  rd,  the  things  which  have  reason. 

s,  rational, 
s,  reason. 
Xityoj  <rirep[JMTiK6s,  seminal  principle. 

AtAra,  rd,  things  indifferent,  viewed  with  respect  to  virtue. 
voepts,  intellectual. 
s,  law. 
s,  intelligence,  understanding. 

,  arrogance,  pride.    It  sometimes  means  in  Antoninus 
the  same  as  r00os;  but  it  also  means  "  opinion." 
olKovo^la  (dispositio,  ordo,  Cic.)  has  sometimes  the  peculiar 
sense  of  artifice,  or  doing  something  with  an  apparent 
purpose  different  from  the  real  purpose. 
SKov,  r6,  the  universe,  the  whole  :  ij  T&V  \tiwv  0tf<ns. 
6vra,  T<£,  things  which  exist ;  existence,  being. 
6pe£is,  desire  of  a  thing,  which  is  opposed  to  €K/cX«rts,  aversion. 
,  movement  towards  an  object,  appetite;  appetitio,  natu- 
ralis  appetitus,  appetitus  animi  (Cic.). 

,  substance  (vi.  49).  Modern  writers  sometimes  incor- 
rectly translate  it  "  essentia."  It  is  often  used  by  Epicte- 
tus  in  the  same  sense  as  v\rj.  Aristotle  (Cat.  c.  5)  defines 
otota,  and  it  is  properly  translated  "substantia"  (ed.  Jul. 
Pacius).  Porphyrius  (Isag.  c.  2)  :  ^  otoLa.  fourd™  ov<ra  r$ 
Hijdtv  elvcLi  irpb  avrrjs  ytvos  rjv  rb  yeviK&TaTov. 
Tra.paKo\ov6tjTiKTj  56va.fj.is,  TJ,  "the  power  which  enables  us  to 
observe  and  understand. 


302  INDEX. 


eTcru,  passivity,  opposed  to  tvtpycia  ;  also,  affect. 

s,  circumstances,  the  things  which  surround  us; 
troubles,  difficulties. 

],  destiny. 

ns,  purpose,  free  will  (Aristot.  Rhet.  i.  13). 
irpoatperd,  rd,  things  which  are  within  our  will  or  power. 
irpocuperiKbv,  r6,  free  will. 
irp6ee<ris,  a  purpose,  proposition. 
7rp6»oia  (providentia,  Cic.),  providence. 
s,  object,  purpose. 
v,  element. 

(assensio,  approbatio,  Cic.),  assent;  <rvyKaTa0Ams 
(probationes,  Gellius,  xix.  1). 
ffvyKplfjMTa,  things  compounded  (ii.  3). 

<rvyKpi<ns,  the  act  of  combining  elements  out  of  which  a  body 
is  produced,  combination. 

,  ordering,  arrangement  (compositio). 
,  system,  a  thing  compounded  of  parts  which  have  a 
certain  relation  to  one  another. 
V\T),  matter,  material. 
v\iic6v,  7-6,  the  material  principle. 
vTrefrlpeffis,  exception,   reservation;    ne0'    vrefripfoews,   condi- 

tionally. 

Mee™,  material  to  work  on  ;  thing  to  employ  the  reason  on; 
proposition,  thing  assumed  as  matter  for  argument  and  to 
lead  to  conclusions.  (Quaestionum  duo  sunt  genera; 
alterum  infinitum,  definitum  alterum.  Deflnitum  est,  quod 
virbdeviv  Graeci,  nos  causam  :  infinitum,  quod  Ofotv  illi  appel- 
lant, nos  propositum  possumus  nominare.  Cic.  See  Aristot. 
Anal.  Post,  i.  c.  2). 
inroKel/j£va,  rd,  things  present  or  existing,  vi.  4^  or  things 

which  are  a  basis  or  foundation. 
vir6\-r)\f/is,  opinion. 

V7r6<rra(m,  basis,  substance,  being,  foundation  (x.  5).  Epic- 
tetus  has  rb  u7ro<rrartK6v  Kal  ofotQSes.  (Justinus  ad  Diogn. 
c.  2.) 


INDEX.  303 

v(f>l<TTa<rdai,  to  subsist,  to  be. 

<j>avra<rlai  (visus,  Cic.) ;  appearances,  thoughts,  impressions 

(visa  animi,  Gellius,  xix.  1)  :  <j>a.vra<rla  fori  TI/TTOXTIS  tv  \f/vxv- 
<pdvrafffMt  seems  to  be  used  by  Antoninus  in  the  same  sense 

as  <f>avraa-la.     Epictetus  uses  only  <f>avraffla. 
<t>avraffT6v,   that  which  produces    a    ^avraffta :    <t>o.vro.<TT*>v    rb 

rrjv  <t>avra<riav  aiffd-ryrov. 
nature. 

s,  ij  T&V  fiXcoy,  the  nature  of  the  universe. 
i,  soul,  life,  living  principle. 
\oytK^,  voepd,  a  rational  soul,  an  intelligent  soul. 


GENEEAL    INDEX. 


^*  The  paragraphs  (par.)  and  lines  (1.)  are  those  of  the  sections. 


Active,  man  is  by  nature,  ix.  16. 

Advice  from  the  good  to  be  taken,  vi.  21 ;  viii.  16. 

Affectation,  vii.  60;  viii.  30;  xi.  18  (par.  9),  10. 

Anger  discouraged,  vi.  26,  27 ;  xi.  18. 

Anger,  offences  of,  ii.  10. 

Anger,  uselessness  of,  v.  28 ;  viii.  4. 

Appearances  not  to  be  regarded,  v.  36 ;  vi.  3,  13. 

Astonishment  should  not  be  felt  at  anything  that  happens, 

viii.  15;  xii.  1  (sub  fine),  13. 

Attainment,  what  is  within  everyone's,  vii.  67 ;  viii.  8. 
Attention  to  what  is  said  or  done,  vi.  53 ;  vii.  4,  30 ;  viii.  22. 

Bad,  the,  ii.  1. 
Beautiful,  the,  ii.  1. 

Causal.     See  Formal. 

Change  keeps  the  world  ever  new,  vii.  25 ;  viii.  50  (1.  13)  ; 

xii.  23  (1.  10). 
Change,  law  of,  iv.  3  (sub  f.),  36;  v.  13,  23;  vi.  4,  15,  36; 

vii.  18;  viii.  6;  ix.  19,  28  (par.  2),  35;  x.  7,  18;  xii.  21. 
Change,  no  evil  in,  iv.  42. 
Christians,  the,  xi.  3. 
Circle,  things  come  round  in  a,  ii.  14. 


306  INDEX. 

Comedy,  new,  xi.  6. 

Comedy,  old,  xi.  6. 

Complaining,  uselessness  of,  viii.  17,  50. 

Connection.    See  Universe. 

Conquerors  are  robbers,  x.  10. 

Contentment.     See  Resignation. 

Co-operation.     See  Mankind  and  Universe. 

Daemon,   the,  ii.  13,  17;   iii.  6    (1.  8),  7,  16    (1.  14);   v.   10 

(sub  f.),  27;  xii.  3  (sub  f.). 
Death,  ii.  11,  12,  17;  iii.  3,  7;  iv.  5 ;  v.  33;  vi.  2,  24,  28;  vii. 

32;  viii.  20,  58;  ix.  3,  21;  x.  £6;  xii.  23,  34,  35. 
Death  inevitable,  iii.  3;  iv.  3  (1.  19),  6,  32,  48,  50;  v.  33;  vi. 

47;  viii.  25,  31. 
Desire,  offences  of,  ii.  10. 
Destiny,  iii.  11  (1.  19);  iv.  26;  v.  8  (1.  8,  etc.),  24;  vii.  57; 

x.  5. 

Discontent.     See  Eesignation. 

Doubts  discussed,  vi.  10;  vii.  75;  ix.  28,  39;  xii.  5,  14. 
Duty,  all-importance  of,  vi.  2,  22 ;  x.  22. 

Earth,  insignificance  of  the,  iii.  10;  iv.  3  (par.  2,  sub  f.)  ;  vi. 

36;  viii.  21;  xii.  32. 
Earthly  things,  transitory  nature  of,  ii.  12,  17;  iv.  32,  33,  35, 

48;  v.  23;  vi.  15,  36;  vii.  21,  34;  viii.  21,  25;  x.   18,  31; 

xii.  27. 
Earthly  things,  worthlessness  of,  ii.  12;   v.  10,  33;  vi.  15; 

vii.  3;  ix.  24,  36;  xi.  2;  xii.  27. 
Equanimity,  x.  8. 

Example,  we  should  not  follow  bad,  vi.  6 ;  vii.  65. 
Existence,  meanness  of,  viii.  24. 
Existence,  the  object  of,  v.  1 ;  viii.  19. 
External  things  cannot  really  harm  a  man,  or  affect  the  soul, 

ii.  11  (1.  12) ;  iv.  3  (sub.  f.),  8,  39,  49  (par.  2) ;  v.  35;  vii. 

64;  viii.  1  (sub  f.),  32,  51  (par.  2) ;  ix.  31;  x.  33. 

Failure,  x.  12. 


INDEX.  307 

Fame,  worthlessness  of,  iii.  10;  iv.  3  (1.  34),  19,  33  (1. 10)  ;  v. 

33;  vi.  16,  18;  vii.  34;  viii.  1,  44;  ix.  30. 
Fear,  what  we  ought  to,  xii.  1  (1.  18). 
Fellowship.     See  Mankind. 
Few  things  necessary  for  a  virtuous  and  happy  life,  ii.  5 ;  iii. 

10;  vii.  67;  x.  8  (1.  22). 
Flattery,  xi.  18  (par.  10). 
Formal,  the,  and  the  material,  iv.  21  (par.  2)  ;  v.  13 ;  vii.  10, 

29;  viii.  11;  ix.  25;  xii.  8,  10,  18. 
Future,  we  should  not  be  anxious  about  the,  vii.  8 ;  viii.  36 ; 

xii.  1. 

Gods,  perfect  justice  of  the,  xii.  5  (par.  2). 
Gods,  the,  vi.  44 ;  xii.  28. 
Gods,  the,  cannot  be  evil,  ii.  11 ;  vi.  44. 
Good,  the,  ii.  1. 

Habit  of  thought,  v.  16. 

Happiness,  what  is  true,  v.  9  (sub  f.),  34;  viii.  1;  x.  33. 

Help  to  be  accepted  from  others,  vii.  7. 

Heroism,  true,  xi.  18  (par.  10). 

Ignorance.    See  Wrong-doing. 

Independence.    See  Self-reliance. 

Indifferent  things,  ii.  11   (sub  f.) ;  iv.  39;  vi.  32;  ix.  1  (1. 

30). 

Individual,  the.    See  Interests. 
Infinity.    See  Time. 
Ingratitude.    See  Mankind. 
Injustice,  ix.  1. 
Intelligent  soul,  rational  beings  participate  in  the  same,  iv. 

40 ;  ix.  8,  9 ;  x.  1  (1.  15) ;  xii.  26,  30. 
Interests  of  the  whole  and  the  individual  identical,  iv.  23; 

v.  8  (1.  29)  ;  vi.  45,  54;  x.  6,  20,  33  (sub  f.)  ;  xii.  23  (1.  12). 

Justice,  v.  34;  x.  11;  xi.  10. 

Justice  and  reason  identical,  xi.  1  (sub  f.). 

Justice  prevails  everywhere,  iv.  10. 


308  INDEX. 

Leisure,  we  ought  to  have  some,  viii.  61. 

Life,  a  good,  everywhere  possible,  v.  16. 

Life  can  only  be  lived  once,  ii.  14 ;  x.  31  (1.  11). 

Life,  shortness  of,  ii.  4,  17;  iii.  10,  14;  iv.  17,48  (subf.), 

50;  vi.  15,36,  56;  x.  31,  34. 
Life  to  be  made  a  proper  use  of,  without  delay,  ii.  4;  iii.  1, 

14;  iv.  17,  37;  vii.  56;  viii.  22;  x.  31  (1.  14);  xii.  1  (1.18). 
Life,  whether  long  or  short,  matters  not,  vi.  49;  ix.  33; 

xii.  36. 

Magnanimjty,  x.  8. 

Mankind,  co-operation  and  fellowship  of,  one  with  another, 
ii.  1  (1.  11),  16;  iii.  4  (sub  f.),  11  (sub  f.);  iv.  4,  33  (sub 
f.)  ;  v.  16  (1.  11),  20;  vi.  7,  14  (sub  f.),  23,  39;  vii.  5,  13, 
22,  55;  viii.  12,  26,  34,  43,  59;  ix.  1,  9  (sub  f.),  23,  31,  42 
(sub  f.)  ;  x.  36  (1.  16)  ;  xi.  8,  21 ;  xii.  20. 

Mankind,  folly  and  baseness  of,  v.  10  (1.  9) ;  ix.  2,  3  (1.  13), 
29;  x.  15,  19. 

Mankind,  ingratitude  of,  x.  36. 

Material,  the.     See  Formal. 

Nature,  after  products  of,  iii.  2 ;  vi.  36. 

Nature,  bounds  fixed  by,  v.  1. 

Nature,  man  formed  by,  to  bear  all  that  happens  to  him, 

v.  18 ;  viii.  46. 
Nature,  nothing  evil,  which  is  according  to,  ii.  17  (sub  f.) , 

vi.  33. 
Nature  of  the  universe.     See  Universe,  nothing  that  happens 

is  contrary  to  the  nature  of  the. 
Nature,  perfect  beauty  of,  iii.  2 ;  vi.  36. 
Nature,  we  should  live  according  to,  iv.  48  (sub  f.),  51 ;  v.  3, 

25;  vi.  16  (1.  12)  ;  vii.  15,  55;  viii.  1,  54;  x.  33. 
New,  nothing,  under  the  sun,  ii.  14  (1.  11) ;  iv.  44;  vi.  37,  46; 

vii.  1,  49;  viii.  6;  ix.  14;  x.  27;  xi.  1. 

Object,  we  should  always  act  with  a  view  to  some,  ii.  7,  16 
(1.  12);  iii.  4 ;  iv.  2 ;  viii.  17 ;  x.  37;  xi.  21;  xii.  20. 


INDEX.  309 

Obsolete,  all  things  become,  iv.  33. 

Omissions,  sins  of,  ix.  5. 

Opinion,  iv.  3  (sub  f.),  7,  12,  39;  vi.  52,  57;  vii.  2,  14,  16,  26, 

68;  viii.  14,  29,  40,  47,  49;  ix.  13,  29  (1.  9),  32,  42  (1.  21)  ; 

x.  3 ;  xi.  16,  18 ;  xii.  22,  25. 

Others'  conduct  not  to  be  inquired  into,  iii.  4  ;  iv.  18 ;  v.  25. 
Others,  opinion  of,  to  be  disregarded,  viii.  1  (1.  9);   x.  8 

(1.  12),  11;  xi.  13;  xii.  4. 
Others,  we  should  be  lenient  towards,  ii.  13  (sub  f.) ;  iii.  11 

(sub  f .)  ;  iv.  3  (1.  16)  ;  v.  33  (1.  17) ;  vi.  20,  27 ;  vii.  26,  62, 

63,  70;  ix.  11,  27;  x.  4;  xi.  9,  13,  18;  xii.  16. 
Others,  we  should  examine  the  ruling  principles  of,  iv.  38; 

ix.  18,  22,  27,  34. 
Ourselves  often  to  blame,  for  expecting  men  to  act  contrary 

to  their  nature,  ix.  42  (1.  25). 
Ourselves,  reformation  should  begin  with,  xi.  29. 
Ourselves,  we  should  judge,  x.  30;  xi.  18  (par.  4). 

Pain,  vii.  33,  64 ;  viii.  28. 

Perfection  not  to  be  expected  in  this  world,  ix.  29  (1.  7). 

Perseverance,  v.  9 ;  x.  12. 

Persuasion,  to  be  used,  vi.  50. 

Perturbation,  vi.  16  (sub  f.) ;  vii.  58;  ix.  31. 

Pessimism,  ix.  35. 

Philosophy,  v.  9;  vi.  12;  ix.  41  (1.  12). 

Pleasure,  he  who  pursues,  is  guilty  of  impiety,  ix.  1  (1.  19). 

Pleasures  are  enjoyed  by  the  bad,  vi.  34;  ix.  1  (1.  23). 

Power,  things  in  our  own,  v.  5,  10  (sub  f .)  ;  vi.  32,  41,  52,  58 ; 
vii.  2,  14,  54,  68 ;  x.  32,  33. 

Power,  things  not  in  our  own,  v.  33  (sub  f.)  ;  vi.  41. 

Practice  is  good,  even  in  things  which  we  despair  of  accom- 
plishing, xii.  6. 

Praise,  worthlessness  of,  iii.  4  (sub  f .) ;  iv.  20;  vi.  16,  59; 
vii.  62;  viii.  52,53;  ix.  84. 

Prayer,  the  right  sort  of,  v.  7 ;  ix.  40. 

Present  time  the  only  thing  a  man  really  possesses,  ii.  14 ;  iii. 
10;  viii.  44;  xii.  3  (sub  f.). 


310  INDEX. 

Procrastination.     See  Life  to  be  made  a  proper  use  of,  etc. 
Puppet  pulled  by  strings  of  desire,  ii.  2;  iii.  16;  vi.  16,  28; 
vii.  3,  29 ;  xii.  19. 

Kational  soul.     See  Ruling  part. 

Rational  soul,  spherical  form  of  the,  viii.  41  (sub  f.)  ;  xi.  12; 

xii.  3  (and  see  Ruling  part). 
Reason,  all-prevailing,  v.  32;  vi.  1,  40. 
Reason  and  nature  identical,  vii.  11. 
Reason,  the,  can  adapt  everything  that  happens  to  its  own 

use,  v.  20;  vi.  8;  vii.  68  (1.  13)  ;  viii.  35;  x.  31  (sub  f.). 
Reason,  we  should  live  according  to.     See  Nature. 
Repentance  does  not  follow  renouncement  of  pleasure,  viii. 

10. 
Resignation  and  contentment,  iii.  4   (1.  27,  etc.),  16  (1.  10, 

etc.);  iv.  23,  31,  33  (sub  f.),  34;  v.  8,  33  (1.  16);  vi.  16 

(sub  f.),  44,  4J);  vii.  27,  57;  ix.  37;  x.  1,  11,  14,  25,  28,  35. 
Revenge,  best  kind  of,  vi.  6. 
Rising  from  bed,  v.  1 ;  viii.  12. 
Ruling  part,  the,  ii.  2;  iv.  1;  v.  11,  19,  21,  26;  vi,  14,  35;  vii. 

16,  55  (par.  2)  ;  viii.  45,  48,  56,  57,  60,  61;  ix.  15,  26;  x.  24, 

33  (1.  16),  38;  xi.  1,  19,  20;  xii.  3,  14. 

Self-reliance  and  steadfastness  of  soul,  iii.  5  (sub  f.),  12;  iv. 

11,  29  (1.  5),  49  (par.  1) ;  v.  3,  34  (1.  5) ;  vi.  44  (1.  15) ;  vii. 

12,  15;  ix.  28  (1.  8),  29  (sub  f.)  ;  xii.  14. 
Self-restraint,  v.  33  (sub  f.). 

Self,  we  should  retire  into,  iv.  3  (1.  4  and  par.  2) ;  vii.  28,  33, 

59 ;  viii.  48. 
Senses,  movements  of  the,  to  be  disregarded,  v.  31  (1.  10) ; 

vii.   55  (par.  2);   viii.  26,  39;   x.  8  (1.  9)  ;   xi.  19;   xii.   1 

(1.  11). 

Sickness,  behavior  in,  ix.  41. 
Social.     See  Mankind. 
Steadfastness  of  soul.     See  Self-reliance. 
Substance,  the  universal,  iv.  40;  v.  24;  vii.  19,  23;  xii.  30. 
Suicide,  v.  29;  viii.  47  (sub  f.)  ;  x.  8  (1.  27). 


INDEX.  311 

Time  compared  to  a  river,  iv.  43. 

Time,  infinity  of,  iv.  3  (1.  35),  50  (sub  f.)  ;  v.  24;  ix.  32;  xii. 

7,  32. 

Tragedy,  xi.  6. 
Tranquillity  of  soul,  iv.  3;  vi.  11;  vii.  68;  viii.  28. 

Ugly,  the,  ii.  1. 

Unintelligible  things,  v.  10. 

Universe,  harmony  of  the,  iv.  27,  45;  v.  8  (1.  14). 

Universe,  intimate  connection  and  co-operation  of  all  things 

in  the,  one  with  another,  ii.  3,  9;  iv.  29;  v.  8,  30;  vi.  38, 

42,  43;  vii.  9,  19,  68  (sub  f.)  ;  viii.  7 ;  ix.  1 ;  x.  1. 
Universe,  nothing  that  dies   falls   out  of  the,   viii.  18,  50 

(1.9);  x.  7(1.  18). 
Universe,  nothing  that  happens  is  contrary  to  the  nature  of 

the,  v.  8,  10  (sub  f.)  ;  vi.  9,  58;  viii.  5 ;  xii.  26. 
Unnecessary  things,  v.  15. 
Unnecessary  thoughts,  words,  and  actions,  iii.  4;  iv.  24. 

Vain  professions,  x.  16 ;  xi.  15. 

Virtue,  vi.  17. 

Virtue  its  own  reward,  v.  6;  vii.  73;  ix.  42  (1.  36)  ;  xi.  4. 

Virtue,  omnipotence  of,  iv.  16. 

Virtue,  pleasure  in  contemplating,  vi.  48. 

Whole,  integrity  of  the,  to  be  preserved,  v.  8  (sub  f.). 

Whole,  the.     See  Interests. 

Wickedness  has  always  existed,  vii.  1. 

Wickedness  must  exist  in  the  world,  viii.  15,  50 ;  ix.  42 ;  xi. 

18  (par.  11)  ;  xii.  16. 
Worst  evil,  the,  ix.  2  (1.  7). 
Worth  and  importance,  things  of  real,  iv.  33  (sub  f.) ;  v.  10 

(1.  16)  ;  vi.  16,  30  (1.  7),  47  (sub  f.)  ;  vii.  20,  44,  46,  58,  66; 

viii.  2,  3,  5;  ix.  6,  12;  x,  8  (1.  22),  11;  xii.  1,  27,  31,  33. 
Wrong-doing  cannot  really  harm  anyone,  vii.  22 ;  viii.  55  ;  ix. 

42  (1.  19) ;  x.  13  (par.  1)  ;  xi.  18  (par.  7). 


312  INDEX. 

Wrong-doing  injures  the  wrong-doer,  iv.  26;  ix.  4,  38;  xi.  18 

(par.  3). 
Wrong-doing  owing  to  ignorance,  ii.  1,  13;  vi.  27;  vii.  22, 

26,  62,  63 ;  xi.  18 ;  xii.  12. 
Wrong-doing  to  be  left  where  it  is,  vii.  29  ;  ix.  20. 


THE   END. 


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